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The UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparation: is there an 
Enforceable Right to Reparation for Victims of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law violations?  
 
The present thesis evaluates the international legal standing of the right to a remedy and 
reparation contained in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law. It focuses on two aspects of the right to a remedy and 
reparation. First, it examines the application of state responsibility principles to the 
relationship between states and individuals when human rights and international 
humanitarian law violations are committed. Secondly, it analyses the convergence of 
norms of state liability in different branches of international law: human rights law, the 
law on diplomatic protection, international humanitarian law, and international criminal 
law. It advances the proposition that state responsibility for reparation in favour of 
individuals has crystallised in international law. 
 
The thesis is divided in four chapters. The first is an introductory chapter. It defines the 
scope and objective of the study, and identifies and maps the existing scholarly positions 
on the right to a remedy and reparation for individuals under international law. Chapter 2 
describes the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens and its relationship to the 
right to reparation in human rights law. Chapter 3 explores the right to reparation for 
international humanitarian law violations. As a conclusion, Chapter 4 assesses whether 
the Principles and Guidelines reflect the standards of international law previously 
 ii 
analysed. It looks at whether principles of state responsibility can apply to the 
relationship between individuals and states – a basic presumption of this instrument that 
was also one of the main sources of contention during the drafting and adoption process 
at the UN. It concludes that individuals can invoke state responsibility directly under 
contemporary international law through an actionable right to reparation for serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that constitute international 
wrongful acts. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
As the international legal advisor of REDRES,1 I lead the NGO coalition that lobbied for 
the drafting and adoption of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law2 (hereafter Principles and Guidelines). 
From 2001-2006, I had the opportunity to participate in this process directly, being 
present during all the consultative meetings as well as other formal and informal 
consultations. This initiative was part of the standard setting work of REDRESS. At the 
time, I was also in charge of other initiatives, including lobbying for victims’ rights at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) preparatory committees and the establishment of its 
Trust Fund; conducting research on thematic issues like the right to reparation; and 
representing victims of torture seeking remedies before national and international fora. 
While these undertakings were closely related to my work with the Principles and 
Guidelines, it was the casework program that mostly informed the content of my standard 
setting activities at the UN. As a lawyer representing torture survivors, I faced the 
innumerable legal and practical hurdles that victims have when seeking justice and other 
forms of reparation. From this experience, I learned that the lack of procedural avenues to 
access justice was a major obstacle to obtaining redress. The procedural aspects of 
reparation became a major focus of my strategy. During the drafting and adoption process 
                                               
1 REDRESS is a human rights organisation that helps torture survivors obtain justice and reparation. It 
works with survivors to help restore their dignity and to make torturers accountable (www.redress.org) 
2 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, GA Res 60/147 (16 
December 2005) UN Doc A/Res/60/147 [Hereafter Principles and Guidelines]. 
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of the Principles and Guidelines, I lobbied for the recognition and inclusion of 
international law principles establishing access to judicial remedies for gross violations of 
human rights (HR) and serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) or the 
inapplicability of statues of limitations when serious breaches were committed. One of 
the most important aspects of the adoption of this instrument, in my view, was to clarify 
the existence of an international right to access to justice.  
 
As Chapter 4 explains, the legal basis of the right to a remedy and reparation in the 
Principles and Guidelines is state responsibility. The instrument assumes that individuals 
as holders of international rights have a right to a remedy and reparation against states 
when these rights are breached (i.e. when states commit international wrongful acts 
(IWA) against individuals). However, as it will be analysed, this assumption is not 
universally accepted. Germany, for example, opposed such interpretation of international 
law during the drafting process as well as during the adoption of the instrument. One of 
the arguments put forward was that state responsibility applies to interstate relationships 
only. Chapter 1 details how some academics also challenge the proposition that sate 
responsibility principles can apply to the relationship between states and individuals. 
Chapter 3 describes how the concept of individuals having an international right to a 
remedy and reparation has been questioned more sharply in the context of IHL, where 
individuals have no access to conventional international remedies and their role as right 
holders is less clear than in HR law.  
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These arguments are sometimes reflected in domestic and international judicial decisions 
on reparations. They also inform political and judicial forums on related topics like: 
enforcement of awards; liability of non-state actors; and the application of sovereign 
immunities when victims bring judicial claims against foreign officials/states. It is 
important therefore to review the premise that state responsibility principles apply to the 
relationship between individuals and states (and the consequent existence of an individual 
right to a remedy and reparation under general international law). Otherwise, the lack of 
consensus in this area of law will continue to hinder victims’ access to justice and 
reparation.  
 
The present work explores this question in the context of the Principles and Guidelines, 
the key document on reparations in international law. While the legal nature of this 
instrument is sometimes taken for granted, this unsettled question (state responsibility as 
its legal basis) continues to affect the implementation of the right to reparation in 
practice. As will be described, whether in courts or political forums, the underpinning 
theoretical and legal discrepancies continue to hinder progressive development in this 
area of law. This uncertainty affects other related areas. Particularly relevant are: a) the 
applicability of immunities in cases of serious HR and IHL violations, and b) the right to 
reparation for victims of international crimes committed by non-state actors.  
 
It terms of immunities, it is difficult to separate the victims’ right to access to justice from 
the states’ right or obligation to afford immunity to other states or state officials. As long 
as there is ambiguity on the legal basis and status of the accountability of states towards 
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individuals and the procedural dimensions of such obligation, it will be hard to clarify the 
relationship between remedies and immunities. Similarly, while more and more victims 
suffer from non-state violence during armed conflicts or other situations of violence 
where IHL applies, it is unclear how these victims can claim reparation. First, it is 
difficult to conceive an autonomous non-state actors’ obligation to afford remedies and 
reparations in the current state-focused international legal framework.3 Second, it seems 
challenging to address non-state actors responsibility to afford reparation without 
clarifying first the extent of the states’ obligation towards victims.  
 
For this reason, the present thesis focuses on the preliminary question whether states have 
an obligation under international law to provide access to justice and reparation to 
victims of serious HR and IHL violations. It analyses the legal basis of this obligation and 
its procedural scope. Can victims invoke state responsibility directly? Do the Principles 
and Guidelines reflect existing international law in this regard? Does this entail an 
enforceable right to reparation for victims of serious HR and IHL violations under CIL? 
This is already a broad and intricate topic and a question insufficiently addressed in 
existing literature, particularly within the specific context of the UN instrument. For this 
reason, the current work revisits this proposition. Questions surrounding immunities and 
non-state liability are vast and complex and go beyond the scope of the present work. 
These topics are only mentioned when necessary in relation to the overall argument that 
state responsibility principles apply to the relationship between states and individuals.  
While not specifically addressed, the applicability of immunities and the scope of non-
                                               
3 A separate question all together is whether non-state responsibility for HR violations enhances the 
protection of HR in general. For a brief discussion of this topic see footnote 711 and accompanying text 
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state liability are clearly outstanding questions that affect victims’ access to justice and 
reparations. As this thesis concludes, more detailed research needs to be conducted in 
these areas of law. Hopefully, the present work will help clarify some of the preliminary 
questions necessary to explore these topics. 
 
Finally, the current dissertation reflects some of my previous writings on the right to 
reparation. Notably, a segment of Chapter I was published as an article in The 
International Journal of Human Rights.4 Section 3.D.i of Chapter 3 is based on research I 
conducted for a preliminary case report for REDRESS5 and section four of Chapter 4 is 
based in great part on a REDRESS manual I wrote in 2006.6 Chapter 4 also reflects some 
of the conclusions of two articles I published after the adoption of the Principles and 
Guidelines:  ‘Redressing Torture: A Genealogy of Remedies and Enforcement’7 and 
'Codifying the Rights of Victims in International Law: Remedies and Reparation'.8  Many 
of my reflections stem from the cases I litigated while I was working at REDRSSS as 
well as with the Open Society Justice Initiative; some of them are cited in this thesis.  
 
                                               
4 Gabriela Echeverria, Do victims of torture and other serious human rights violations have an independent 
and enforceable right to reparation? The International Journal of Human Rights. 2012;16(5):698–716. 
5 The report analysed the possibility of obtaining compensation for a group of women survivors from the 
Omarska Camp that had testified before the ICTY (in file with author). Part of this report is published in 
REDRESS’ website. 
6 See: Implementing Victims’ Rights: a Handbook on the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation. Available at: 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Reparation%20Principles.pdf (accessed 17 April 16) 
7 Gabriela Echeverria, ‘Redressing Torture, A Genealogy of Remedies and Enforcement’, Torture (IRCT 
Journal), 16(3) (2006), 152–81 [hereinafter ‘Genealogy’]. 
8 Gabriela Echeverria, 'Codifying the Rights of Victims in International Law: Remedies and Reparation' in 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed), Redressing Injustices Through Mass Claims Processes: Innovative 
Responses to Unique Challenges (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press) 2006 [hereinafter 
‘Codifying’]. 
 6 
1. Concept and context of the right to a remedy and reparation 
 
It is generally recognised that victims of serious human rights violations have a right to 
reparation. For example, Article 14 of the UN Convention Against Torture, a widely 
ratified instrument, establishes that victims should obtain ‘redress and have an 
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible’.9 All major human rights instruments establish similar 
provisions. However, the details and applicability of the right to reparation for victims 
remain rather vague. While there is a consensus that an obligation to afford reparation 
exists when a violation of human rights is committed, it is still unclear who bears the 
obligation to afford reparation,10 to whom it should be awarded, and how such reparation 
can be claimed and enforced.  
 
If a state commits a HR violation against a citizen of another state, in theory the 
breaching state owns reparation to the state of nationality of the individual victim. But 
what about the individual victim? And what happens when the state of nationality 
commits the breach? Are individuals also ‘subjects’ of international law with rights and 
                                               
9 Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (adopted 10 December 
1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter UNCAT]. 
10 While state responsibility for human rights violations is well established in international law, there are 
scenarios where establishing concurrent responsibility for individual(s) and state(s) for acts that breach 
human rights is not necessarily straightforward. The question of reparation becomes very complex when 
dealing with non-state actors and the laws of war. Whether in regards to armed conflicts, internal 
disturbances, acts of terrorism, or other types of organised crime, many questions arise in respect to victims 
and reparation. Do post-war treaties or transitional accords prevail over individual claims? Can non-state 
actors commit human rights violations? How can international law make non-state actors accountable to 
afford reparation? If individuals are said to be responsible, does this mean that states should bear no 
responsibility? In sum, when non-state actors commit acts that can be qualified as international crimes, 
human rights violations, and/or international humanitarian law breaches, it is still unclear how regimes of 
state and individual responsibility/reparation operate in practice.  
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capacity to exercise such rights, like states? Can they bring autonomous claims 
independent of states’ consent? How can these rights be enforced when there is no 
universal human rights court?  
 
There are now numerous international norms, mostly conventional but also customary, 
which require states to protect fundamental HR. However, it is important to ask whether 
the state obligation to protect human rights under international law gives rise only to 
corresponding rights of other states or also to international rights of individuals. There are 
also various international conventional norms on HR that expressly establish obligations 
of reparation on states that have breached norms protecting individuals. According to 
these conventions, the obligation to afford reparation by wrongdoing states creates rights 
in favour of other states. But can we say nowadays that those obligations on wrongdoing 
states correspond also rights of the individual victims of the breach? If there is a 
conventional individual right to reparation, does this mean that individuals have a right to 
reparation for HR violations also under CIL? 
 
The present study assumes that violations of customary HR and IHL give rise to an 
obligation under general international law on wrongdoing states to afford reparation. Its 
aim is to investigate if the individual victim can be the beneficiary of such obligation. To 
do this, it will analyse whether general rules of international law on state responsibility 
apply to individuals as they do to states: can individuals invoke state responsibility? 
2. Aim of the study  
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Although research on reparations has gained increased attention, in general studies on 
reparation have looked into specific aspects of reparations rather than the overall right to 
reparation, and always in a state-focused framework. As Evans notes, research has 
generally been compartmentalised into HR, international criminal law (ICL), or IHL.11 In 
the academic field, for example, attention has been given to: the right to a remedy and 
reparation under HR law (analysing the regional systems of protection of human rights 
and their implementation in national law);12 the right to reparation in political transitions 
(i.e. the rights of victims in ‘transitional justice’ processes);13 reparation by individuals 
for international crimes;14 reparation for historical injustices;15 and the specific right to 
compensation in IHL.16  
 
                                               
11 C Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 8. 
12 See, for example, D Shelton, Remedies In International Human Rights Law (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 143-
152; D Cassel, ‘The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations-Awarded by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ in M Bossuyt, P Lemmens, K De Feyt, and S Paramentier (eds), Out of Ashes: Reparation 
for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Intersentia 2006); P Sardaro, ‘Jus non 
dicere for Allegations of Serious Violations of Human Rights: Questionable Trends in the Recent Case 
Law of the Strasbourg Court’ (2003) 6 European Human Rights 601; N Roth-Arriaza, ‘Reparations 
decisions and dilemmas’ (2004) 27(2) Hastings International And Comparative Law Review 157. 
13 See for example, P de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations (OUP 2006); see also Bossuyt (n 12), 
which generally deals with issues of post-conflict reparations. 
14 For example, F McKay, ‘Are Reparations Appropriately Addressed in the ICC Statute?’ in D Shelton 
(ed), International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court 
(Transnational Publishers 2000).  
15 For example, F Francioni, ‘Reparation for Indigenous People: is International Law ready to Ensure 
Redress for Historical Injustices?’ in F Lenzerini (ed), Reparations for Indigenous People: International 
and Comparative Perspectives (OUP 2008). 
16 See, for example, R Bank and E Schwager, ‘Is there a Substantive Right to Compensation for Individual 
Victims of Armed Conflict against a State under International Law?’(2006) GYIL 49; P d’Argent, Les 
reparations de guerre en droit international public (Bruylant 2002). Other studies on more general legal 
remedies for IHL violations include: A MacDonald, ‘Rights to Legal Remedies for Victims of Serious 
Violations of IHL’ (Doctoral thesis, Queen’s University of Belfast 2003); L Zegveld, ‘Remedies for 
Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 
497; E. Gillard, ‘Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2003) 85 International 
Review of the Red Cross 529, 536-537. Notably the ILA conducted a series of studies on the right to 
reparation and adopted two declarations on the substantive and procedural right to reparation (see Chapter 
3). 
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The first analysis approaching the question of reparation as a whole from a victim’s 
standpoint was the comprehensive study17 on the right to reparation carried out by 
Professor van Boven in 1993 in preparation of the Principles and Guidelines.  
 
The subsequent draft instruments, the study by Professor Cherif Bassiouni updating the 
principles and guidelines, and the final instrument adopted by the General Assembly in 
2005, were the first documents to merge the different legal regimes that involve issues 
relevant to the right to an effective remedy and adequate reparation in a comprehensive 
manner and from the perspective of the victim. After all, as Bassiouni notes, ‘legal 
distinctions and technicalities surrounding various classifications of crimes … are of litt le 
significance to victims in their quest for redress’.18  
 
Evans makes a detailed study of reparation for HR and IHL violations from a victim’s 
perspective in her book The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of 
Armed Conflict.19 However, the focus of Evans’ study is on the right to substantive 
reparations rather than the right to a legal remedy/access to justice:  
The study focuses on the reparations aspects of victims’ rights rather than on their 
right to access to justice and their right to a legal remedy. The objective is to apply 
a victim-oriented approach by using as a key evaluation tool the comprehensive 
concept of the victims’ right to reparations established in the UN Basic Principles 
on the Right to Reparation for Victims, rather than referring to the polarised ‘truth 
versus justice’ discourse, which until the Basic Principles were adopted tended to 
dominate in assessments of post-conflict and transitional justice initiatives.20 
                                               
17 T van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of 
gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms: Final Report’ (2 July 1993) UN Doc E/CN. 
4/Sub.2/1993/8.  
18 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 
204. 
19 C Evans, Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (n 11) 8. 
20 Ibid. 
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The present thesis seeks to find out if there is a right to a remedy and reparation for 
victims of serious HR and IHL violations under general international law as purported by 
the Principles and Guidelines. Specifically, it examines whether individuals can be the 
beneficiaries of the secondary obligation to afford reparation of states for IWA under 
principles of state responsibility and whether individuals can bring claims directly under 
international law against states. According to van Boven,21 the essence of the right to a 
remedy and reparation is reflected in the general principle of law established in Chorzów 
of wiping out the consequences of the wrong committed.22 He argues that for this reason 
it is appropriate for the Principles and Guidelines to rely on the doctrine of state 
responsibility codified in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC 
Responsibility Articles).23  
 
The present study also addresses reparation under ICL, but is not concerned with the 
obligation to afford reparation by individuals for international crimes. Instead, it focuses 
on the application of state responsibility principles in the area of ICL to help clarify the 
question of the existence of a right of individuals to reparation vis-à-vis the responsible 
state for IHL violations.  
                                               
21 T van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights to a Remedy and Reparations: The New United Nations Principles and 
Guidelines’ in C Ferstman, M Goetz and A Stephens (eds), Reparations for victims of genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity: systems in place and systems in the making (Martinus Nijhoff 2009).  
22 ‘Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.’ See: Chorzów 
Factory Case (Jurisdiction) (1927) Series A no 22 [47] [hereinafter Chorzów]. 
23 See: International Law Commission, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
53rd session’ (23 April- 1 June, 1 June and 2 July- 10 August 2002) UN Doc A/56/10). 
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3. Structure and outline  
 
After an introduction, the present study is divided in four chapters, followed by a list of 
general conclusions. The first is an introductory chapter, presenting preliminary questions 
that define the scope and objective of the study as well as identifying and mapping the 
existing scholarly positions on the right to reparation for individuals in international law. 
The second and third chapters are more specific. Chapter 2 describes the law of state 
responsibility for injuries to aliens and its relation to the right to reparation in 
international HR law. Chapter 3 describes the right to reparation for IHL violations. The 
fourth chapter is a concluding chapter: it assesses whether the Principles and Guidelines 
reflect current standards of international law on the right to a remedy and reparation for 
victims of serious HR and IHL violations, in particular, the question of whether 
principles of state responsibility can apply to the relationship between states and 
individuals – a basic presumption of this instrument that was also one of the main sources 
of contention during the drafting and adoption process at the UN.   
 
A. Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 1 gives a brief overview of the development of the right to reparation for 
individuals and addresses some relevant preliminary issues that define the scope of the 
present analysis: a) the distinction between the international obligation under HR law to 
afford remedies and reparation at the domestic level and the obligation to afford 
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reparation for an IWA; b) the different types of rights in international law, specifically, 
the difference between substantive and procedural rights and its treatment under 
international law; and c) the criminal responsibility of individuals and its relation to 
international personality and reparation.  
 
Following these preliminary explanations, Chapter 1 is divided into three parts. First, it 
assesses the current legal position of the individual in international law by looking at 
whether individuals are subjects of international law and/or enjoy legal personality under 
this legal regime. After all, even if international responsibility is commonly considered in 
relation to states as the traditional subjects of international law, it is in essence a broader 
question, inseparable from that of legal personality in all its forms.24 Second, it identifies 
and examines four different positions in regards to international norms containing 
individual primary and secondary rights and the relationship between these substantive 
rights and the right to reparation. Third, it assesses if the international community can be 
the guardian of individual rights and/or whether customary rules of international 
responsibility can be applicable to individuals.  
 
B. Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 examines the notion of diplomatic protection and its relationship to HR law. 
The focus of this dissertation is not to look at reparation obtained through inter-state 
agreement or inter-state legal action, but to investigate whether individuals have a right to 
                                               
24 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, OUP Press 2003) 435. 
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reparation under general international law for serious HR and IHL violations as 
presupposed by the Principles and Guidelines. For this reason, Chapter 2 analyses the 
relationship that exists between diplomatic protection and HR claims. In particular, it 
investigates the connection of diplomatic protection to the right to reparation and the 
right to an effective domestic remedy (denial of justice/access to justice). IHL claims on 
behalf of nationals injured by foreign nations during wartime, including claims as part of 
war settlements and peace treaties, are addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
Before introducing the concept of state responsibility for injuries to aliens and diplomatic 
protection, Chapter 2 explains the terminology introduced by the ILC Responsibility 
Articles of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ obligations, as well as the concept of independent 
responsibility. This terminology is relevant to this study since the Principles and 
Guidelines also apply it. The aim of the Principles and Guidelines is to define the scope 
of the right to a remedy and reparation, and allow for the future development of 
procedural remedies and substantive reparations. Like the ILC Responsibility Articles, 
the instrument does not define what constitutes a substantive violation (in this case of 
international HR or IHL), but only describes the legal consequences (the rights and 
duties) arising from these violations and establishes appropriate procedures and 
mechanisms to implement them. Consequently, this terminology is also used in the 
present study (despite the limitations these terms carry as described in Chapter 2). 
 
Following this introductory explanation, the chapter describes how diplomatic protection 
is both the predecessor to the right to reparation in HR law and a well-established 
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mechanism that allows states to obtain reparation on behalf of their nationals for HR 
violations. It addresses the difference between diplomatic protection and consular 
assistance, as well as providing an overview of the history of diplomatic protection. It 
includes a description of the abuse of this mechanism in the nineteenth century and the 
consequent entrenchment of principles like exhaustion of domestic remedies, sovereign 
equality, and immunities in the notion of diplomatic protection and in reparation 
procedures in general. Chapter 2 further describes the nature of denial of justice as a 
primary and secondary rule under the law of state responsibility and its similarity to the 
primary right to an effective domestic (procedural) remedy under HR law and the right to 
an international remedy when such primary right (access to justice) at the domestic level 
is breached. It concludes that in the same way that denial of justice is understood as a 
system failure, where exhaustion of domestic remedies is an inherent material element of 
the IWA of denial of justice, international HR violations materialise as IWAs after states 
fail to afford effective domestic remedies and reparation in accordance with international 
standards. The analysis of the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens is 
particularly relevant as it shows that access to justice is an integral part of the minimum 
standard of justice. Before concluding, the chapter examines the elements of diplomatic 
protection to give context to the analysis of state responsibility principles when applied to 
reparation for individual victims of HR and IHL violations, including assessment of 
individual damage and forms of reparation.  
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C. Chapter 3 
 
As described, the first two chapters analyse whether individuals have rights in 
international law and therefore an enforceable right to reparation when such rights are 
breached. Chapter 1 describes how the ILC Responsibility Articles do not exclude this 
possibility in cases of fundamental rights. The development of HR law and the law on 
diplomatic protection described in Chapter 2 also support this interpretation. However, 
recent events in the area of IHL seem to point in a different direction. The ICJ 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State established that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign 
immunity by allowing WWII claims to proceed in Italian courts. The Court did not find it 
necessary to address the question of individual reparation for serious violations of IHL;25 
it simply looked at whether Germany enjoyed immunity in Italian courts according to 
present customary international law (CIL). It answered this question affirmatively. 
However the court did ‘regret’ leaving the victims without a remedy.26 While this 
decision is specific to the circumstances of the case (e.g. a WWII claim brought before a 
foreign court), it has been read as ‘putting an end to a debate that arose out of the noble 
                                               
25‘[b]ecause immunity is upheld, no need to examine questions whether individuals are directly entitled to 
compensation for violation of IHL and whether states may validly waive the claims of their nationals in 
such cases’ in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (Judgment) 
[2012] ICJ Rep 108. [Hereinafter Germany v Italy]. 
26 ‘It is a matter of surprise — and regret — that Germany decided to deny compensation . . .’ (idem 99). 
Judge Yusuf in his Dissenting Opinion, strongly affirms that: ‘It bears to be recalled in this connection that 
disputes between States are not submitted to an international adjudicatory body, and particularly to the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, for expressions of surprise and regret, but for their 
appropriate settlement on the basis of international law’. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf, Germany v 
Italy case (n 25) [10].  
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motive to improve the fate of victims of armed conflict but failed to fully grasp the 
complexity of financial settlement after armed conflict’.27 
 
The Principles and Guidelines recognise the existence of a right to a (procedural) remedy 
and (substantive) reparation for individual victims of gross violations of HR and serious 
violations of IHL (including, when applicable, a right to compensation). For this reason, 
Chapter 3 analyses the question of reparation and remedies for IHL breaches. It gives a 
brief description of the status of the law at the time that the set of principles and 
guidelines was drafted and the more recent developments in this area of law after its 
adoption by the UN General Assembly. The chapter mainly confines the discussion to 
compensation. Financial reward is among the most frequent issues arising in the context 
of the right of individuals to reparation in cases of serious violations of IHL.28 Having 
this in mind, the chapter analyses: a) whether there is a right to a (procedural) remedy and 
(substantive) reparation for individuals directly under IHL; and b) whether there is a right 
to reparation for victims of serious violations of IHL under the general principles of state 
responsibility. The first part describes the ambiguities of the relevant provisions on 
compensation enshrined in the Hague Convention IV of 1907 (Hague IV) and Additional 
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (AP I) and investigates if these provisions can 
apply to individuals. It shows that while the evidence to establish that the IHL provisions 
on compensation apply to individuals is inconclusive, nothing in IHL prevents reparation 
                                               
27 C Tomuschat, ‘State Responsibility and the Individual Right to Reparation before National Courts’ in A 
Clapham and P Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014). 
28 P Gaeta, ‘Are Victims of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Entitled to 
Compensation?’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law (OUP 2011). 
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to individuals. The second part asks if the traditional state-to-state reparation for victims 
of armed conflict is a matter of policy or a legal norm. It investigates whether the 
emergence of HR has altered the concept of state responsibility, adapting the modalities 
of reparation for IHL violations to the new developments of international law, or whether 
there is a rule that excludes reparation to individuals in cases of IHL breaches. It briefly 
re-examines individual reparation in the context of state responsibility (including an 
overview of these issues in the ILC Responsibility Articles) and provides examples of 
contemporary state practice, applying principles of state responsibility to individual 
reparation in cases of IHL violations. It then explores the question of individual 
reparation under ICL and its relationship to state liability. The recent developments in 
this area of law are succinctly discussed, to the extent that they may help clarify the 
question of the existence of the right of individuals to reparation vis-à-vis the responsible 
state for IHL violations.  
D. Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 starts with the origins and background of the Principles and Guidelines. It 
describes the start of the victimology movement after World War II, its stall during the 
Cold War years, and how this movement regained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s 
influencing international law in areas such as HRL, IHL, and ICL.  It explains that it was 
in this context—the end of the Cold War and the general demands of reparative justice— 
that the Sub Commission on Human Rights appointed Theo van Boven as Special 
Rapporteur to study the question of victim reparation, with a view to drafting principles 
and guidelines on this subject. The chapter then describes in detail the context and the 
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fourteen-year process that led to the drafting and adoption of the instrument before the 
UN.  
 
Following these introductory sections, Chapter 4 looks at two basic contentions implicit 
in the Principles and Guidelines: first, that the instrument reflects the perspective of the 
victims; and second, that the law on state responsibility is the legal basis of the right to a 
remedy and reparation for victims of serious HR and IHL violations.  
 
It is generally agreed that the Principles and Guidelines have a victim-based perspective. 
However, as will be explained, the use of ‘victim perspective’ in the context of the 
Principles and Guidelines has more than one meaning. It refers on the one hand to how 
the instrument reflects the needs of the victims, and on the other, to how the victim is the 
point of departure. Both assertions are critically assessed to see whether the aim of 
reflecting the victim’s viewpoint and using the victim’s needs as a point of departure or 
drafting methodology is real or even possible. It describes the conceptual tension between 
a victim-oriented framework and a state-focused framework when determining state 
obligations. In particular, it examines how both the aim and methodology employed 
affected the scope of the instrument and the substance of the provisions making the 
process more flexible and inclusive of victims’ voices, but at the same time limiting the 
content and scope of some of its legal provisions.    
 
Before analysing in detail the content and structure of the instrument, Chapter 4 addresses 
the question of state responsibility as the legal basis of the right to reparation for victims 
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of gross violations of HR and serious violations of IHL. It explores the relationship 
between the Principles and Guidelines and the law of state responsibility, including the 
similarities and differences between this instrument and the ILC Responsibility Articles. 
Finally, it gives an overview of the content of the instrument, including the provisions on 
prevention, investigation, prosecution, and punishment, as well as the right to procedural 
remedies (effective legal avenues of redress) and substantive reparations (in the form of 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition).  
 
E. Conclusion 
 
The thesis finishes with a series of general conclusions, including that principles of state 
responsibility can apply to the relationship between individuals and states when 
fundamental rights are breached (i.e. when states commit IWA and individuals are the 
right holders) and, that the law on diplomatic protection has evolved and now recognises 
individual rights, including the right to reparation. It also concludes that the evidence is 
insufficient to demonstrate that IHL provisions contain a primary obligation to afford 
reparation to individuals in contemporary CIL. However, the dissertation resolves that 
this legal regime does not limit the application of HR affording such rights during armed 
conflict. More importantly, it demonstrates that there is no rule under IHL in particular or 
CIL in general that prevents reparation to individuals. When states commit violations of 
IHL that constitute IWA and individuals are the right holders, principles of state 
responsibility apply. States are obliged to afford reparation to the victim directly under 
international law. 
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Historically, reparation for victims of war has been afforded at the inter-state level and 
war reparations have been traditionally negotiated between the governments involved in 
the conflict. It is clear that there are policy considerations that affect the enforcement of 
individual rights in practice. However there is no norm of IHL or general international 
law establishing that reparation for violations committed during armed conflict can only 
be afforded to states. On the contrary, the tendency is to recognise an individual right to 
reparation for IHL breaches. It is clear as well that the right to a remedy and reparation 
under HR law applies during armed conflict. As implicit in the Principles and Guidelines, 
the right to reparation under principles of state responsibility belongs also to the direct 
victims of gross violations of HR and serious violations of IHL that constitute IWA.   
 
After critically assessing the Principles and Guidelines, the thesis concludes that perhaps 
the instrument would have been clearer and stronger if the original scope of the 
instrument—addressing gross violations of HR and fundamental freedoms— had been 
maintained. Still, its adoption reflects recognition of victim-oriented policies as part of 
international law. 
 
Since the General Assembly adopted the Principles and Guidelines without a vote, there 
is some basis to consider the text as declaratory of legal standards in the area of victims’ 
rights, particularly the provisions on the right to effective remedies and adequate 
reparations. Despite the questions raised on the legal status of the Principles and 
Guidelines, its underlying premise of applying principles of state responsibility to the 
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relationship between individuals and states is consistent with current developments in 
international law. 
 
4. Terminology and key concepts 
 
Terms such as ‘remedy,’ ‘reparation,’ ‘redress,’ and other similar words in the context of 
violations of HR and IHL appear in a large number of international, regional, and 
domestic instruments, and in UN resolutions and reports. Sometimes the different terms 
are used to express identical or similar concepts, and at other times they are used without 
distinction. What is clear however is that states have a dual obligation towards victims: to 
make it possible for them to seek relief for the harm suffered and to provide a final result 
that actually addresses the harm. Still, while the dual dimension of the obligation is clear, 
different terminology is used when referring to the same concept. For example, Shelton 
uses the term ‘remedy’ as encompassing both the procedural obligation to afford legal 
avenues and the substantive relief afforded (i.e. she refers to the substance of the relief as 
remedies instead of reparations). On the other hand, the Principles and Guidelines clearly 
establish that victims have a right to a remedy and reparation. The translation of the term 
remedy in the other official UN languages indicates that the term refers to the procedural 
avenue to obtain the substantive relief. 29 In keeping with this terminology, the present 
study uses ‘reparation’ as a general term that refers to access to legal remedies (access to 
                                               
29 In the Spanish version, the term is translated as ‘recurso’, as opposed to ‘remedio’, clearly referring to 
the procedural avenue to obtain reparation. It is the same in the French version (‘recours’). See 
http://www.ohchr.org/SP/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx and 
http://www.ohchr.org/FR/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx (accessed on 10 April 
16)  
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justice) as well as to substantive reparations. ‘Redress’ most commonly describes the 
action involved, but may also be used as a synonym for ‘reparations’. 
 
Whether referred to as a right to reparation or remedy, what is important is to keep in 
mind that both aspects (procedural and substantive) of the obligation towards victims are 
inextricable. As explained by the Human Rights Committee (HRC): ‘Without reparation 
to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an 
effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not 
discharged’.30 
 
As Chapter 1 describes, international HR law governs the effectiveness of the procedural 
remedies/recourse (e.g. civil, administrative, and criminal) and the adequacy of the 
substantive reparation/relief (e.g. compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction). 
However, the obligation to afford reparation at the domestic level should not be mistaken 
with the obligation to afford reparation for IWA. While obviously related, one is a 
primary international obligation in international HR law, and the other is a secondary 
obligation under general international law; the latter is governed by state responsibility 
principles applicable to all violations of international law. The terminology of primary 
                                               
30 ‘16. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals whose Covenant 
rights have been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the 
obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not 
discharged. In addition to the explicit reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14, paragraph 6, 
the Committee considers that the Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee 
notes that, where appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, 
such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and 
practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.’ Human Rights 
Committee, ‘General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the 
Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 16. 
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and secondary obligations is described in more detail in Chapter 2, as well as the 
relationship between the right of access to justice and denial of justice claims. 
 
Finally, while the Principles and Guidelines refer to ‘gross’ violations of HR, the present 
study uses gross or serious HR violations to refer to breaches of HRL that also constitute 
crimes under international law.  
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Chapter 1: The legal position of the individual and the right to 
reparation 
 
 
Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium* 
 
 
 
1. Brief overview of the right to reparation for individuals 
 
According to the Principles and Guidelines, the forms of reparation for individuals 
include: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition.31      
 
The right to reparation for individuals is closely linked to state liability. However, 
international responsibility under the rules protecting individuals from official abuses has 
changed over time. Traditionally, state-centric international law safeguarded individuals 
only in respect of certain conduct by states other than their own – whether enemy nations 
(under the laws and customs of war) or states where they might reside or exercise 
commercial activities (under the law of state responsibility for injury to aliens). Under 
these norms, the right to reparation was attributed to the state of the injured national to 
claim against the offending state at the inter-state level.32 Whether in war or peacetime, a 
state had the right (but not the obligation) to take up the claims of its nationals before an 
international body.  
                                               
* Where there is a right, there is a remedy. 
31 Principles and Guidelines (n 2). 
32 van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution’ (n 17) 42. 
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This understanding of the injury as perpetrated against the state of nationality, rather than 
the individual, followed the concept of international law as a legal system regulating the 
relationship between states. Individuals were perceived merely as objects of international 
law33 and were thus not considered to be bearers of rights or obligations under 
international law.34 However, after World War II, the state-centric approach of 
international law underwent a remarkable transformation. The international legal system 
became increasingly concerned with the individuals involved in atrocities. Attention was 
focused on both the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators and the intrinsic 
rights of individuals as human beings. At Nuremberg, it was recognised that: ‘crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities’.35 It was 
followed by the adoption on 10 December 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, heralding the inherent rights of individuals to dignity and respect.  
 
International law governing HR abuses has since developed rapidly.36 With the 
establishment of the UN and the acceptance of its Charter as the principal instrument of 
international law, the international legal framework has gradually been transformed from 
a law of coexistence to one of cooperation.37 The internationalisation of HR has been part 
of this process. Today there is an extensive body of law designed to protect all 
                                               
33 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I, Peace (Longmans, Green, and Co. 1905) 200. 
34 P Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge 1997) 100. 
35 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal in The Trial of German Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, (H.M Stationery Office 
1950) Vol. 22, p 447. 
36 For a discussion of the development of human rights law and the right to a remedy, see: Shelton, 
Remedies (n 12) p2-7.  
37 See generally, W Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens 1964). 
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individuals from abuses of all governments, including ones’ own, in both times of peace 
and war. At the same time, while states have traditionally invoked the responsibility of 
other states for breaching their international obligations, today it is also possible and 
widely practised for individuals and non-state entities to invoke state responsibility 
before international dispute settlement bodies (e.g. before commercial arbitration 
procedures, administrative bodies, human rights tribunals, etc.).38   
 
2. Some preliminary issues related to reparation and the individual 
 
Considering the development of international law since World War II, is it fair to say that 
individuals now enjoy rights directly under international law? If so, do individuals have a 
secondary right to reparation when these primary rights are breached? Notably, 
individuals might be able to seek redress for HR violations under certain conventional 
regimes, like the European or American conventions on HR, or might be able to claim 
some form of relief before a domestic or international reparation mechanism. But do 
individuals have a right to reparation regardless of the existence of these treaties and ad 
hoc mechanisms established by states? What is the relationship between these 
conventional remedies and other remedies under general international law?  
 
In order to establish whether individuals have a right to reparation under international 
law, it is necessary to establish first whether individuals enjoy international rights. Before 
                                               
38 E Brown Weiss, ‘Invoking State Responsibility In The Twenty-First Century’ (2002) 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 
798; F Orrego Vicuna, ‘Individuals and Non-State Entities before International Courts and Tribunals’ 
(2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of Uni ted Nat ions La w 53.  
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analysing the existing sources of a possible right to reparation for individuals, it would 
seem necessary to assess the legal position of the individual in international law. After 
all, an international wrong presupposes the breach of an obligation under international 
law. The rights arising from an IWA are secondary rights deriving from a primary 
substantive right. Only by assuming that individuals are true holders of rights as personal 
entitlements can we argue that individuals have a right to reparation. But we must refer 
again to the traditional position that international law constitutes a pattern of mutual 
relationships among states. In this context, it is necessary to ask what the legal position of 
the individual is today, taking into account the recent development of international law – 
particularly of international HR law in the second half of the twentieth century. Do 
human beings truly enjoy human rights directly under international law or are they only 
the beneficiaries of international duties and rights of states? 
 
A. International reparation and domestic reparation 
 
The obligation to afford effective domestic remedies and adequate reparation is firmly 
embodied in all major international human rights treaties and declarative instruments.39 
                                               
39 For example, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (III) of 10 
December 1948; Article 2(3), Article 9(5) and Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (entry into force 23 March, 1976); Article 6 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  (entry into force 4 January 1969); Article 39 of the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (entry into force 2 September 1990); Article 14 of the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (entry into force 26 June 1987); Article 
24 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (entry 
into force 23 od December 2010) and Article 75 of the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court 
(entry into force 1 July 2002, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9). It has also figured in regional instruments, for 
example, the European Convention on Human Rights (entry into force 3 September 1953, art 5(5), 13 and 
41); the American Convention on Human Rights (entry into force 18 July 1978) (Articles 25, 68 and 
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The effectiveness of the procedural remedies/recourse (e.g. civil, administrative, and 
criminal) and the adequacy of the substantive reparation/relief (e.g. compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction) are governed by international HR law.40 However, this 
obligation to afford reparation at the domestic level should not be mistaken with the 
obligation to afford reparation for IWAs. While obviously related – both are based on the 
general principle of law that every violation entails the duty to afford reparation – one is a 
primary international obligation in international human rights law (e.g. Article 13 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights contains the right to a domestic remedy),41 and 
the other (the obligation to afford reparation for IWAs) is a secondary obligation under 
general international law. The latter is governed by state responsibility principles 
applicable to all violations of international law.  
 
If states fail to comply with the primary international HR obligation to afford domestic 
remedies and reparation for acts or omissions contrary to international law, they commit 
an IWA and thus are liable to afford reparation at the international level. The present 
study investigates who would be the beneficiary of this secondary obligation to afford 
reparation. 
                                                                                                                                            
63(1)); the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (entry into force 21 October 1986) (Article 
21(2)). See also, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
UNGA Res 40/34 (29 November 1985); Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (Article 19), UNGA Res 47/133 (18 December 1992); Principles on the Effective 
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (Principle 20), 
recommended by Economic and Social Council (24 May 1989 Res 1989/65); and Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (adopted  UNGA Res 48/104). 
40 See REDRESS, ‘Enforcement of Awards for Victims of Torture and Other International Crimes’ The 
Redress Trust (2006) available at: < 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/master_enforcement%2030%20May%202006.pdf > 
accessed 4 March 2016 (hereinafter, ‘Enforcement Report’). 
41 “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting 
in an official capacity.” Article 13, European Convention of Human Rights [hereinafter ECHR] (n.39). 
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This is not to say that a state can only be held responsible under objective or non-fault 
responsibility; that is, merely when ‘having failed to fulfil its international obligation 
with respect to vigilance, protection and control’.42 Today it is also recognised that states 
have due diligence obligations: ‘[t]hus […] states may be held responsible for domestic 
human rights violations – even violations in the private sphere – on an account of failure 
to legislate so as to prevent them’.43  
 
In any event, it is when a state fails to redress a violation in accordance with the 
principles of international law (e.g. effective investigation and prosecution; adequate 
compensation; etc.) that it commits an IWA and becomes liable under international law. 
Otherwise, states would be responsible under general international law every time an 
official or some other person connected to the state commits a violation. Instead, it is 
when the state fails to deal with the violation in question that it breaches general 
international law: ‘A State should be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong 
within the framework of its own domestic legal system before its international 
responsibility can be called into question’.44 This is consistent with human rights treaties 
and jurisprudence (individuals can only have recourse to an international human rights 
body after exhausting effective domestic remedies) and with the law of state 
responsibility for injuries to aliens, since states cannot exercise diplomatic protection 
                                               
42 R Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’ (1976) 2(1) YB ILC 3, 120. 
43 M Koskenniemi, ‘Doctrines of State Responsibility’ (n. 51) 50, citing H Charleswoth and C Chinkin, The 
Boundaries of International Law. A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press 2000) 148. 
44 AA Cançado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International 
Law: Its Rationale in the International Protection of Individual Rights (Cambridge University Press 1983) 
1. 
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until the injured individual has exhausted all effective local remedies.45 The rule of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies is in this context an inherent material element of an 
international human rights violation (or denial of justice in the case of diplomatic 
protection).46 
 
Chapter 2 explores in detail the understanding of exhaustion of domestic remedies as a 
substantive element of denial of justice and human rights claims.  When analysing the 
origins and shaping of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the chapter looks at 
the debates in the early 20th century about the meaning of denial of justice that took place 
in the context of the wider dispute between capital exporting and importing states over 
the exercise of a minimum standard of treatment with respect to foreigners and their 
property.  It looks in detail at the Calvo Doctrine espousing a national as opposed to 
international treatment and the Calvo Clause used by Latin American states requesting 
exhaustion of domestic remedies before recourse to international adjudication or 
retaliation.47  Chapter 2 explains how the Dredging48 decision interpreting the scope of 
the Calvo Clause, upheld the right of states to intervene diplomatically in cases of denial 
of justice but at the same time denied individuals that had signed a Calvo Clause the right 
                                               
45 The ICJ held in the Interhandel case that "the rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a 
condition of the presentation of an international claim is founded upon the principle that the respondent 
State must first have an opportunity to redress by its own means within the framework of its own domestic 
legal system the wrong alleged to have been done to the individual." ICJ Reports (1959), 27. 
46 There is a serious debate over the question of whether the exhaustion of local remedies rule is substantive 
or procedural or both. For a detailed analysis of the history, purpose, and use of the rule of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies in general international law and international human rights law, see S D'Ascoli and K 
Scherr, ‘The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the International Law Doctrine and its 
Application in the Specific Context of Human Rights Protection’ (2007) European University Institute 
Working Paper LAW No. 2007/02. See also J Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in Crawford, The Law of 
State Responsibility (n 51) 1061. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Chapter 2 on state 
responsibility, diplomatic protection, and the duty to afford reparation to individuals. 
47 The Calvo Doctrine and Clause are analysed in detail in Chapter 2. 
48 North American Dredging Company (n 218) 
 31 
to request such protection without prior exhaustion of local remedies (despite a waiver of 
such rule in the arbitration treaty). With these findings, the tribunal clarified the 
understanding of denial of justice as a systemic breach where the exhaustion of local 
remedies is a substantive part of the breach and not simply a question of admissibility 
that can be waived by the parties. Chapter 2 concludes that in the same way that denial of 
justice is understood as a system failure, where exhaustion of domestic remedies is an 
inherent material element of the IWA of denial of justice, international HR violations 
materialise as IWAs after states fail to afford effective domestic remedies and reparation 
in accordance with international standards. 
 
Importantly, when the prohibited acts or omission are massive and/or systematic, there is 
no need to exhaust local remedies. As noted by the International Law Commission (ILC) 
‘[…] International complaint procedures, for example in the field of human rights, attach 
different consequences to systematic breaches, e.g. in terms of the non-applicability of 
the rule of exhaustion of local remedies’.49 When violations are massive and/or 
systematic, it is assumed that there are no effective domestic remedies and/or the 
violations committed are part of a direct policy of the state.50  The ILC – when 
commenting upon former Article 19 on ‘crimes’ of states (now Article 40 of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles51) – considered that a telling example of a state crime was ‘a 
                                               
49 ILC Responsibility Articles, Commentary to Article 40 [7]. The Commentaries to the ILC Responsibility 
Articles are reproduced in Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). 
50 ‘Human rights treaty bodies and courts have developed a consistent jurisprudence that on-going massive 
violation or recurring patterns of violations are indicative of ineffective domestic remedies, thereby 
relieving the complainant(s) of having to exhaust such remedies’. L Oette, ‘Bringing Justice to Victims’ in 
C Ferstman et al (n 21) 225. 
51 Reproduced in Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). According to the ILC Commentary to 
Part 3 and Article 40, since there has been no development of penal consequences for states, the ILC’s 
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large-scale or systematic practice adopted in contempt of the rights and dignity of the 
human being’.52 Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) held in Furundzija:  
[i]f carried out as an extensive practice of State officials, torture amounts to a 
serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential 
importance for safeguarding the human beings, this constituting a particularly 
grave wrongful act generating State responsibility.53 
 
Even when violations are not widespread, if carried out in an organised and deliberate 
way, they are regarded as systematic. A state, for example, can be responsible for war 
crimes on the basis of a single case or a host of cases of killings of prisoners of war when 
it is established that these crimes are committed under a direct policy of the state: ‘What 
suffices here is proof of the existence of a pattern of violence and the possibility of 
inferring from this pattern the acquiescence by the state's military and political authorities 
in or even approval of the criminal behaviour of their subordinates’.54 It must also be 
borne in mind that certain ‘state crimes’, like the prohibitions of aggression and genocide, 
by their very nature require an intentional violation on a large scale.55 It could be argued 
                                                                                                                                            
adopted Articles do not differentiate between ‘crimes’ and ‘delicts’ of states anymore. However, Article 40 
still reflects that when acts are gross or systematic there are certain implications for the secondary rules of 
state responsibility. See generally ILC Responsibility Articles, Commentary to Part III and Article 40. The 
Commentaries to the ILC Responsibility Articles are reproduced in Report of the ILC Responsibility 
Articles (n 23). See also M Koskenniemi, ‘Doctrines of State Responsibility’ in J Crawford et al (eds), The 
Law of State Responsibility (OUP 2010) 48-49.   
52 See (1976) 2(2) YB ILC 121 [70]. 
53 Furundzija (Judgment) ICTY-IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) [141]. 
54 P Gaeta, ‘On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?’ (2007) 18(4) Eur J Int 
Law 631, 641 [hereinafter ‘Genocide’]. 
55 Commentary to Article 41 (8) reproduced in Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). For a 
detailed discussion on the responsibility of states for the crime of genocide, see Gaeta ‘Genocide’ (n. 54), 
where she argues that state responsibility for international crimes is different than the international criminal 
liability of individuals. Her article criticises the ICJ ruling on the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on the basis that the Genocide Convention 
establishes obligations on states to criminalise individual acts of genocide and does not prohibit or regulate 
state acts of genocide. See also: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
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therefore that certain violations (so called state-crimes) by their very nature automatically 
entail state responsibility.56  
 
B. Different types of rights in international law: primary, secondary and tertiary 
rights  
 
Disconnecting a subject’s substantive rights from the procedural means to enforce such 
rights (e.g. separate primary and secondary rights) became commonplace in international 
law after the UN Charter recognised fundamental HR and freedoms of persons. At the 
time, no international mechanisms or treaties giving individuals any form of international 
standing existed; individuals could not assert any rights without the intermediation of 
states. Still, many advocated that even without individual standing, natural persons were 
the true holders of international rights. Lauterpacht, for example, insisted that individuals 
were subjects of international law with rights, notwithstanding that, as the law stood in 
1947, they could not assert these rights directly in the international sphere.57 This has 
                                                                                                                                            
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), International Court of Justice, 26 
Feb. 2007. 
56 In terms of state responsibility in international law, there is a difference between ‘state torture’ and an 
isolated case of torture committed by a state official. The first case entails state responsibility when a 
pattern of ‘system criminality’ is proven. The second requires exhaustion of effective domestic remedies if 
available. The state commits an IWA when it fails to redress the torture. The same scenario applies to any 
violation of human rights that is not adequately redressed at the domestic level, regardless of the gravity of 
the act. The only difference would be that HR law requires specific remedies for serious violations of HR 
like access to judicial as opposed to administrative remedies.   One can take the view that in the case of so-
called state crimes the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is not applicable because the direct intent of 
the state can be proven. The state is breaching the international legal order directly. The IWA materialises 
irrespective of domestic remedies. It is also possible to argue that the rule of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is not applicable because it is assumed that there are no effective remedies available. As observed 
in the conclusions, this nuanced difference can have an impact on the debate over non-state responsibility 
for human rights violations or the obligation to afford reparation for IHL violations (where non-state 
liability is recognised and no individual claims mechanism exists at the international level).  Gaeta 
describes the special circumstances or particularities of state responsibility for international crimes. She 
argues that individual criminal responsibility is different from state responsibility at the international level. 
See Gaeta ‘Genocide’ (n. 54) 641. 
57 H Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge University Press 1947) 438. In 1950, 
Lauterpacht made himself the champion of the new concept of international law in his famous book 
International Law and Human Rights, where he wrote: ‘The Charter of the United Nations, in recognising 
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changed considerably and today there are many treaties and mechanisms affording 
international standing to individuals. Still, as it will be analysed in detail below, some 
jurists argue that individuals have no right to reparation in international law.58  
 
The present chapter will show how, despite the development of international law since 
WWII, it is still debated whether individuals enjoy substantive rights directly under 
international law (e.g. whether the right not to be tortured is a right of the individual or a 
right of states to ensure that no other state commits torture). By the same token, it is still 
questioned whether even if individuals enjoy substantive international rights, they have a 
secondary right to reparation or/and a (tertiary) right to claim it when these primary rights 
are breached. 
 
If one argues that individuals do not enjoy primary rights, then it follows logically that 
individuals do not have a secondary right to reparation (again, the right to reparation 
belongs to states and states can set up mechanisms to allow victims to seek reparation 
directly).59 The protection of human rights is in this scenario completely dependent on the 
will of states and individual victims have no means to enforce these ‘state-human’ 
rights.60 However, many commentators argue that individuals can be holders of 
substantive rights without necessarily being holders of the procedural rights to enforce 
                                                                                                                                            
the fundamental human rights and freedoms, has to that extent constituted individuals subjects of the law of 
nations’. H Lauterpacht, International law and Human Rights (FA Praeger 1950) 61.  
58 See: Section 4 of Chapter 1 
59 The notion in traditional diplomatic protection that the injury to the individual is an injury to the state 
itself has been criticised as an exaggeration, ‘a “legal fiction”’. Still, according to John Dugard, Special 
Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, even if ‘diplomatic protection is premised on a fiction, it is an 
important institution of customary international law which serves as a valuable instrument for the 
protection of the persons and property aliens’ – Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in Crawford, The Law of 
State Responsibility (n 51) 1052. Furthermore, human rights law has influenced the law on diplomatic 
protection. Today it is generally accepted that the right to a remedy belongs to both the state of nationality 
and the individual victim. See Chapter 2 for further discussion. 
60 ‘By establishing and consenting to human rights limitations on their own sovereignty, states actually 
define, delimit, and contain those rights, thereby domesticating their use and affirming the authority of the 
state as the source from which such rights spring’ – M Koskenniemi, International Law (International 
Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory) (Aldershot 1991) 406. 
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them. This approach to individual rights leads to complex scenarios where the rights of 
victims and the victims’ standing in international law become ambiguous. In general, four 
positions can be identified in regards to primary and secondary (human) rights and will 
be discussed in detail in this chapter: 
 
 Position 1: Individuals only have primary rights when secondary rights can be 
enforced in established international mechanisms. So if there is a (established 
international) remedy, there is a right. If there is no (established international) 
remedy, there is no right. Since there is no established universal HR remedy, there 
is no right to reparation under CIL. 
 Position 2: Individuals have primary rights but no secondary rights to reparation. 
Individuals can have rights without (established) remedies, so the right to 
reparation is independent and not a corollary of a primary right. Nowadays, HR 
treaties only afford a partial right to reparation and there is no right to reparation 
under CIL. 
 Position 3: Individuals have primary and secondary rights but no tertiary rights to 
claim reparation directly in international law. Only states have such procedural 
capacity under international law and need to specifically grant this capacity to 
individuals (e.g. by setting human rights bodies, claims commissions, etc.) or 
espouse their claims through diplomatic protection. Consequently, individuals 
cannot bring claims before domestic tribunals solely on the basis of international 
law, unless the national legal system allows it. 
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 Position 4: Individuals have primary rights and a corollary secondary right to 
claim reparation. In other words, if there is no right there is no remedy. But if 
there is a right there should be a remedy. 
 
C. Individual criminal responsibility and reparation  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis analyses in some detail the relation between ICL and the right to 
reparation. However, it is important at this point to offer a clarification on international 
crimes, particularly piracy, and its relation to international personality and reparation. 
There is a clear link between criminal responsibility under ICL and an individual’s legal 
personality in international law (and therefore with individuals’ right to claim reparation). 
In this context, the doctrine of hostis humani generis (or ‘the enemy against all mankind’) 
is one of the few principles of international law preceding the UN Charter that offers 
evidence of recognition of individuals as actors of international law. However, it is 
debatable whether piracy – which has been recognised as a ‘crime against the law of 
nations’ for centuries – should be seen as a jurisdictional rule allowing states to exercise 
jurisdiction or a rule conferring legal personality on individuals. Even if ‘since Second 
World War real forms of individual criminal responsibility under international law have 
developed’61 and therefore it can be argued that the individual can be considered today a 
                                               
61 ‘[…] First steps were taken with the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals and 
the conclusion of the Genocide Convention in the immediate post-war period; after the end of the Cold War 
there followed in rapid succession the creation by the Security Council resolution of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (1992) and Rwanda (1994), and then the adoption of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (1998) which entered into force on 1 July 2002’. J Crawford and S 
Olleson, ‘The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility’ in M Evans (ed), International Law (4th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 445.  
 37 
subject of international law with ICL obligations and its corollary rights,62 it still leaves 
the question of rights and reparation unanswered. Arguing that individuals are obliged to 
follow international law precepts does not necessarily mean that they can invoke them as 
the required standard of behaviour in other actors (e.g. such as states).63 As will be 
explained in the following section, it is not sufficient to look at whether the individual is 
a subject, an actor, or a participant in international law to establish the existence of 
individual primary and secondary rights. It is necessary to determine first which 
conditions have to be fulfilled to qualify a rule under international law as a norm 
containing an individual right and then to examine whether any general regime of 
reparations has developed to cover the individual holders of such right(s). It is in this 
respect that looking at the developments of ICL and its recognition of international 
individual standing (e.g. the rights of victims under Article 75 of the Rome Statute to 
lodge claims of reparation directly before the International Criminal Court) can help 
clarify whether a general regime of reparations has been developed in respect to certain 
rules.  
3. The subject/object discussion 
 
                                               
62 See for example Cassese, who assumes corresponding rights to every individual obligation under general 
ICL. Footnotes 72-73 and accompanying text. Clapham goes further and argues that a progressive 
understating of international law recognises individual as subjects that have not only criminal law 
obligations and their corollary rights but that also have civil law obligations: ‘…individuals are now seen as 
having not only criminal law obligations but also rights under international law. If we do not want the 
development of international law to stagnate we should perhaps admit the progressive idea that individuals 
have, in addition to these rights and criminal law obligations, certain international civil law obligations; this 
step could help to build an international community which properly recognizes the role of the individual in 
international law’. A Clapham, ‘The Role of the Individual in International Law’ (2010) 21(1) European 
Journal of International Law 25. 
63 R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1994) 54.  
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While international law has traditionally been understood as a law of states, the issue of 
the role of the individual in international law has been a part of the debate over the nature 
of the international legal system for centuries. In 1532, Francisco de Vitoria considered 
that the indigenous peoples of America had some claim to protection under international 
(natural) law.64 Still, the dominant view has been that individuals have no effective role 
in the international legal system. Rather, their role is determined by states and is entirely 
subject to states’ consent. The leading positivist theories confirm such a construction. The 
position is that: ‘Since the Law of Nations is a law between States only, and since the 
States are the sole exclusive subjects of International Law, individuals are mere objects of 
International Law, and the latter is unable to confer directly rights and duties upon 
individuals’.65  
 
Under this traditional view, individuals are objects, either in the same sense as territory or 
rivers are objects of the system because there are (state-created) legal rules about them, or 
in the sense that they are beneficiaries under the system, so that treaties on, for example, 
diplomatic persons or commerce, indirectly benefit individuals.66 Yet, the classical 
doctrine of international law had to be reconsidered after the Charter of the United 
Nations opened the doors of international law to the individual. Hersh Lauterpacht, who 
continued Oppenheim’s treatise, made himself the champion of the new concept of 
international law in his famous book International Law and Human Rights, in which he 
                                               
64 RA Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (OUP 1990) 
93.  
65 Oppenheim, International Law (n 33) 341. 
66 R McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in M Evans (ed), International 
Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 286. 
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wrote: ‘The Charter of the United Nations, in recognising the fundamental human rights 
and freedoms, has to that extent constituted individuals subjects of the law of nations’.67 
 
Since the creation of the UN, numerous human rights treaties have been adopted. 
However, for many it is not sufficient to refer to the existence of human rights treaties in 
order to draw the conclusion that personality under international law exists. Given that 
states create these rights in the first place, the position of states as sole rights-holders in 
the international legal system seems to prevail. As Koskenniemi explains, ‘by 
establishing and consenting to human rights limitations on their own sovereignty, states 
actually define, delimit, and contain those rights, thereby domesticating their use and 
affirming the authority of the state as the source from which such rights spring’.68 While 
Koskenniemi’s observation refers to the structure of international law as a whole, a 
number of customary rights of individuals in the international system are now, to some 
extent, separate from the specific control and direction of states, particularly those 
protected by jus cogens69 norms that give rise to obligation erga omnes.70 One could refer 
                                               
67 Lauterpacht, Human Rights  (n 57) 61. 
68 M Koskenniemi, International Law (n 60) 406. 
69 Peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens):  Some rules of international law are recognised by 
the international community of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation.  These rules prevail over 
and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them.  Such a 
peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of international law having the 
same character. See US Restatement (third) of Foreign Relations Law, 102 (1987).   
70 According to the ICJ judgment in Barcelona, an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a vis another 
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omens. Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), Belgium v. Spain, 
I.C.J. February 5, 1970 [33]. For a critique on the view that the breach of jus cogens norms give rise to 
obligations erga omnes, see P Picone, ‘The Distinction between Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes’ 
in E Cannizzaro (ed) The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP 2011) 411. 
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to these as independent rights within the international legal system. For example, 
Kooijimans has said: 
 
[S]ince we have seen that erga omnes obligations exist independently of State 
consent, the corresponding rights exist also independently of State consent. That 
means that the bearer of these rights, the individual, has an international legal status 
that cannot be dependent upon state consent either. The individual’s status in 
international law, therefore, would not be derivative but original.71 
 
In a similar way, when looking at individuals’ obligations under international criminal 
law, Cassese argues that one can assume ‘corresponding rights’ to every individual’s 
‘strict international obligation fully to respect some important values (maintenance of 
peace, protection of human dignity, etc.)’.72 He claims: 
It would be not only consistent from the viewpoint of legal logic but also in keeping 
with new trends emerging in the world community to argue that the international 
right in respect of those obligations accrues to all individuals: they are entitled to 
respect for their life and limbs, and for their dignity; hence they have a right not to 
become a victim of war crimes, crimes against humanity, aggression, torture, 
terrorism.73 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) clarified the issue of international personality and 
what a ‘subject’ of the international legal system is in its Reparations for Injuries 
Opinion, which concerned the question of whether the United Nations had the capacity to 
bring an international claim against a state for injuries of one of its agents.  The Court 
concluded that ‘the Organization is an international person’.74 According to the Court, 
being an international person means that: ‘it is a subject of international law and capable 
                                               
71 P Kooijmans, ‘Contribution to Discussion (Part 4)’ in A Randelzhofer and C Tomuschat (eds), State 
Responsibility And The Individual: Reparation In Instances of Grave Violations of Human Rights (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1999) 248. 
72  A Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 145. 
73 Idem 145. 
74 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 
1949, 174,179 [hereinafter Reparations Opinion]. 
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of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has the capacity to maintain its 
rights by bringing international claims’.75  
 
The Court further clarified that there can be subjects of the international legal system that 
are not states, but these subjects do not all possess the same rights and duties, and not all 
of these rights and duties need to be on the international plane alone. It also explained 
how the international legal system has developed, and continues to develop, in ways that 
allow non-state actors to have international legal personality and so to act independently 
in the international legal system:76  
 
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature 
or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the 
community.  Throughout its history, the development of international law has been 
influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in 
the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon 
the international plane by certain entities which are not States…77 
 
But while one might think that the notion of international legal ‘subjectivity’ is a first 
port of call for anyone seeking to examine the existence of individual primary and 
secondary rights, the existing jurisprudence is not necessarily helpful. If we ask ourselves 
whether individuals are subjects of law in order to establish whether individuals have 
rights and duties and the capacity to challenge violations of their rights, then the 
definition of subjects of international law in the Reparations for Injuries Opinion will 
lead us nowhere. As Brownlie points out, the ICJ definition of a subject of international 
law as ‘an entity capable of possessing international rights and duties and having capacity 
                                               
75 Idem 179 (emphasis added). 
76 McCorquodale (n 66) 285. 
77 Reparations Opinion (n 74) 178. 
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to maintain its rights by bringing international claims’ is circular.78 International law 
recognises the capacity to act at the international level of an entity that is already capable 
of acting at the international level.  
 
The notion of subjects/objects of international law is being increasingly rejected in legal 
doctrine. For example, after looking at whether there are truly rules for determining who 
can be classed as a subject, Higgins concludes: ‘[t]he whole notion of “subjects” and 
“objects” has no credible reality, and… no functional purpose’.79 Higgins seems to 
suggest that the whole enterprise is constructed by doctrine and consequently can be 
dismantled by doctrine: ‘[w]e have erected and intellectual prison of our own choosing 
and then declared it to be an unalterable constraint’.80  A number of writers have 
criticised the ‘subject’ v ‘object’ dichotomy, not least, because it privileges certain voices 
and silences others.81 Clapham explains how these categories are used to exclude 
potential actors of international law: ‘[i]t seems assumed that increasing the categories of 
international legal persons recognised under international law will lead to an expansion of 
the possible authors of international law. This, of course, is seen to threaten the viable 
development of a decentralized, state-centred international legal order’. 82 
 
Higgins offers an alternative approach, preferring the idea of the ‘participant’ in the 
international legal decision-making process. Under this view, there are many participants 
                                               
78 Brownlie, Principles (n 24) 57. 
79 Higgins, Problems and Process (n 63) 49. 
80 Idem 49. 
81 Koskenniemi, ‘Doctrines of State Responsibility’ (n. 51) 50. 
82 A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 63.  
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in the international legal system, in the sense that there are many different entities – from 
states and international organisations to transnational corporations and natural persons – 
who engage in international activity. Participation may be extensive and over a wide 
range of international matters or it can be limited to a few issues. Participation will 
depend on the particular area of the international legal system concerned and the activity 
and involvement of entities in that area, rather than on the determination by states as to 
whether any non-states are ‘subjects’ for a specific purpose. McCorquodale points out 
that considering individuals as ‘participants’ rather than ‘objects’ or ‘subjects’ is a 
compelling and practical argument: a flexible framework to explore the involvement of 
the individual in the international legal system.83 However, it still leaves open the 
question of whether individuals as ‘participants’ have direct rights in international law, 
and consequently, whether they have a right to reparation and the capacity to bring 
international claims. After explaining her approach on individuals as participants of the 
international legal order, Higgins still asks:  
 
What exactly do we mean when we ask if international law applies to individuals? 
Do we mean, are they obliged to follow its precepts? Or do we mean can they 
invoke it as the required standard of behaviour in other actors, such as states? These 
are difficult questions, and we will need to approach the underlying issues step by 
step.84  
 
So whether we consider the individual a subject of international law or simply a 
participant, it is still necessary to determine which conditions have to be fulfilled to 
qualify a rule under international law as a norm containing an individual right. In 
                                               
83 Evans, Reparation for Victims (n 11) 302.  
84 Higgins, Problems and Process (n 63) 54. 
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addition, it is also necessary to examine whether any general regime of reparations has 
developed to cover individuals.  
4. Analysing the different positions in regards to international norms containing 
individual primary and secondary rights  
 
There are various international conventional norms on human rights that expressly 
establish obligations of reparation upon states that have breached norms protecting 
individuals. Clearly, other states and, in certain cases, the international community as a 
whole have corresponding rights against these wrongdoing states.85 But can we nowadays 
say that individual victims of a breach equally have corresponding rights?  
 
A. Position 1:  Individual primary rights only exist when established procedural 
remedies are in place, therefore there are no individual primary and secondary 
rights under Customary International Law (CIL) 
 
Logically, if a procedural avenue to claim a breach of an individual right is in place, then 
the existence of a primary right can be inferred. Based on this general premise, however, 
In a Kelsenian manner,86 Tomuschat deduces that it is only when there are established 
international procedural remedies that true (human) rights exist. According to him, the 
existence of a right depends on the availability of a procedure to enforce the right under 
international law. Without the factual possibility of enforcement, one cannot talk about 
                                               
85 See Section IV. 
86 Since no international courts with compulsory jurisdiction existed back in 1945, Kelsen argues: “it may 
be doubted whether general international law really stipulates a duty of reparation [since] general 
international law does not provide a procedure by which the contents of this duty can be determined.” Hans 
Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge HUP 1945) p 357,  
 45 
individual rights.87 In his view, since rights in HR treaties are always conferred upon 
individuals by a sovereign national act, individuals only have ‘domestic’ rights unless 
there is an established international procedural remedy to enforce them. It is only then 
that the individual becomes independent of the will of the state: ‘[He]/she can then assert 
his/her rights directly, even if the respondent, the state of nationality, may disagree with 
“‘internationalizing” the dispute […]’.88  
 
Tomuschat argues that since there is no universal human rights court, it is clear that 
individuals do not enjoy rights under CIL. Following Tomuschat’s rationale, the Tokyo 
High Court denied a reparation claim by the ‘comfort women’89 based on international 
law, referring to the fact that no right can exist because there is no international procedure 
under which the individual could exercise such rights.90  
 
However, there is strong evidence showing that regardless of established procedural 
remedies, individuals can have rights under treaty and customary law. The PCIJ said in 
Jurisdiction for the Courts of Danzig that ‘it cannot be disputed that the very object of an 
international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the 
adaptation by the parties of some definite rules creating individual rights and 
                                               
87 C Tomuschat, ‘Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human Rights Violations: The 
Position under General International Law’ in Randelzhofer and Tomuschat  (n 71) 1.  
88 C Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (OUP 2003) 305. 
89 On the initiative of the Japanese military, ‘comfort stations’ were set up and operated between 1930 and 
1945. Here an estimated 200,000 ‘comfort women’ were pressed into prostitution. For a discussion of the 
facts and the Japanese court rulings see  M Igarashi, ‘Post-War Compensation Cases, Japanese Courts and 
International Law’ (2000) 43 Japanese Annual of International Law 45.  
90 High Court Tokyo, So Shinto, 30 November 2000, analysed by  H Kasutani and S Iwamoto, Japan, 
(2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 544 [hereinafter So Shinto case]. 
 46 
obligations…’.91 The ICJ held in LaGrand that Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations ‘creates individual rights’.92  Article 33(2) of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles has corroborated the view that individuals can be the beneficiaries 
of treaty provisions. The ILC Commentary on this rule makes it clear that individuals 
may be regarded as the ultimate beneficiaries of international norms and thus the holders 
of the relevant rights. 93 
 
In the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory,94 the ICJ does seem to acknowledge that certain secondary individual rights 
exist under CIL when the fundamental rights of individuals are breached. The Court 
stated in this case that Israel was obliged under international law to afford reparation to 
all natural and legal persons injured by the construction of the wall.95 The Court seems to 
                                               
91 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of Danzig Railway Officials who have Passed 
into the Polish Service, against the Polish Railways Administration) (Advisory Opinion) (1928) PCIJ Series 
B no 15 [17], [18], [37]. [Hereinafter Danzig]. 
92 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) [2001] ICJ Rep 29 [77]. As explained in more detail in 
Chapter 4, while states can protect their nationals through consular assistance and diplomatic protection, 
there are fundamental differences between these two mechanisms. Any intervention, including negotiation, 
on inter-state level on behalf of a national vis-à-vis a foreign state for an international wrongful act is 
‘diplomatic protection’. While something that starts as consular assistance may end up as diplomatic 
protection at a later stage, the latter forms part of the secondary rules of international law and belong only 
to states. States and not individuals have a right to exercise diplomatic protection. In contrast, consular 
assistance forms part of a body of primary rights to which states and individuals may be the holders. If 
these (primary) rights are breached, then the state is allowed to exercise its right to reparation directly 
(when its state-rights are breached) or indirectly, through its secondary right of diplomatic protection on 
behalf of its national. For a detailed analysis of the difference between consular assistance and diplomatic 
protection see: A Kunzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection: the fine line between litigation, demarches 
and consular assistance’ (2006) 66 ZaöRV /HJIL 321. 
93 ‘This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which 
may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’, Article 32 (2), Report of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles (n 23). See also the Commentary to Article 32, reproduced in the Report of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles (n 23).  
 [3-4].  
94 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 131. [hereinafter Wall Opinion]. 
95 Wall Opinion (n 94) 198 [152-153]. 
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derive this obligation from general international law. Firstly, it cites the Chorzów case to 
refer to the appropriate forms of reparation, applying, therefore, state responsibility 
principles to reparation to individuals.96 Secondly, it can only be derived from CIL since 
there is no treaty between Israel and Palestine that explicitly provides reparation to 
individuals for the breaches alleged (and as will be shown below, the Court does not 
derive this right from the treaties in force in Israel).97  
 
The Court found violations of the Hague Regulations of 1907, Articles 46 and 52, as well 
as the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 49 and 53. These provisions do not 
contain any references to an obligation to make reparation to individuals. In fact, some 
commentators contend that these provisions do not even contain individual rights.98 On 
the other hand, it has been argued that these norms do contain individual rights99 – or that 
                                               
96 Wall Opinion (n94). 
97 Following the Wall Opinion (n94), the ICJ has given reparations for HR and IHL violations in two 
subsequent occasions. In the Armed Activities Case against Uganda, the Court considered that given the 
nature and gravity of the violations,  ‘those acts resulted in injury to the DRC and to persons on its 
territory’, and thus imposed upon Uganda an obligation to make reparations accordingly. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court relied generally on its previous decisions, including the Chorzów (n 22), and Case 
Concerning Armed Activities Case in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Uganda)(Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 82 [259] [hereinafter Armed Activities Case]. On the other hand, by 
acknowledging the responsibility of Uganda for injuries suffered by persons in the DRC, the Court 
implicitly seems to acknowledge the obligation to repair that harm accordingly. The DRC therefore 
arguably has the right to request individual reparations on behalf of its citizens who were wronged by 
Uganda’s conduct. In Diallo, a diplomatic protection case brought by Guineas against DRC, the Court 
recalled the fundamental character of the human rights obligations breached when affording reparation in 
accordance with the Chorzów principle. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic 
of the Congo) (Judgment) [30 Nov 2010] IJC Rep 639 [161]. 
98 R Hofmann, ‘Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Do they Have and Individual 
Right to Reparation against States under International Law?’ in P-M Depuy et al (eds) Völkerrecht als 
Wertordnung/Common Values in International Law: Festschrift für/Essays in Honour of Christian 
Tomuschat (NP Engel Verlag 2006) 341; R Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 27. 
99 See e.g.: F Kalshoven, ‘State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces’ (1991) 40 ICLQ. 
827. 
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today they must be interpreted as containing individual rights100 – and that Article 3 of 
The Hague Regulations and Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions provide for an obligation to make reparation to individuals.101 The Court is 
silent in this regard. It only mentions that these IHL violations are fundamental and give 
rise to erga omnes obligations.102  
 
The Court also determined that Israel had breached several HR treaty obligations by 
constructing the wall, including Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and several other rights under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Yet, the Court does not refer to these treaties as 
the source for a secondary right to reparation. It determines nonetheless that the manner 
in which Israel is breaching these obligations constitutes a violation to the right to self-
determination, which is a fundamental right giving rise to erga omnes obligations.103 In 
other words, the ICJ seems to be implying that there is an obligation under international 
law to make reparation to individuals for violations of HR and IHL in breach of erga 
omnes obligations. Not even the Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, which is highly 
critical of the Court’s analysis of human rights and IHL, disagrees on this point.104  
                                               
100 The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur states that even if Article 3 of the 
Hague Convention IV was not initially intended to provide compensation for individuals, it does so in the 
present day, as the emergence of human rights in international law has altered the concept of state 
responsibility. See: ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General’ (25 January 2005) Security Council Res 1564 [593 et seq.]. [Hereinafter Darfur 
Report]. 
101 See, for example, the Preamble of the UN Principles and Guidelines (n 2) and Expert Opinions by F 
Kalshoven, E David, and C Greenwood in H Fujita, I Suzuki, and K Nagano (eds) War and the Rights of 
Individuals, Renaissance of Individual Compensation (Nippon Hyoron-sha 1999), 31, 49, 59. See further 
discussion in Chapter 3. 
102 Wall Opinion (n94) [154-159]. 
103 Wall Opinion (n94) [122]. 
104 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Wall Opinion (n94) [24-37]. 
 49 
 
Interestingly, Tomuschat recognises a set of core individual rights under customary 
international law: ‘It is indeed my conviction that the crimes listed in the draft Code of 
Crimes and in article 19 of the draft Articles on State responsibility – you could call them 
also crimes or erga omnes violations – prove that the individual can be considered a 
holder of rights under international law if he or she is protected by such basic rules’.105 
So one is left wondering whether Tomuschat actually acknowledges that individuals do 
have some fundamental rights under CIL (but no secondary right to reparation). 
However, this conclusion would contradict his previous premise that an established 
procedural international remedy is a precondition to proving the existence of a primary 
right. 
B. Position 2: Regardless of primary rights, individuals only have a partial right to 
reparation under some treaty regimes and have no secondary rights under CIL  
 
For some commentators, the Chorzów principle does not apply to individuals.106  It is not 
sufficient to establish that individuals have primary rights to assert that they also have 
corresponding secondary rights to reparation. ‘Secondary’ rights need to be specifically 
established by treaty or customary law.107 Pisillo-Mazzeschi, for example, considers the 
European and Inter-American HR protection systems as exceptional and in no manner 
reflecting general international law or contributing to the formation of a right to 
                                               
105 Randelzhofer and Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Individual (n 71) 250.  
106 Chorzów (n. 22) 
107 See, for example, Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘International Obligations to Provide for Reparation Claims’ in 
Randelzhofer and Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Individual (n 71) 149. 
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reparation under CIL.108 Likewise, Tomuschat believes that the existence of international 
remedies in human right treaties is not sufficient to create a secondary right outside the 
treaty regimes.109 
 
Tomuschat backs this proposition by arguing that under universal and regional human 
rights treaties individuals do not enjoy a ‘full right to reparation’ because the reparations 
awarded do not always include ‘financial compensation’. In his view, even though the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) changed its reparation practice after 
Papamichalopoulos v Greece,110 it still ‘considers that in a vast group of cases the official 
acknowledgment of a violation constitutes sufficient reparation’.111 He also points out 
that the Court refuses to afford compensation if, in its view, the victim was engaged in 
reprehensible activity.112 For Tomuschat, this is evidence that the individual does not 
hold a true right to reparation under the ECHR.113  
 
In a similar way, Tomuschat sees Article 63 of the American Convention of Human 
Rights (ACHR) enjoining the Court to ‘rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the 
                                               
108 Idem 160-164. 
109 Tomuschat Between Idealism (88) 296.  
110 Series A no 260-B, App no 14556/89 16 EHRR 440.  
111 C Tomuschat ‘Individuals’, in J Crawford et al, State Responsibility (n 51) 987. 
112 The ECtHR has denied compensation when the victims are engaged in misconduct or organised crime. 
For example, in McCann v. United Kingdom, the Court found it inappropriate to make an award because 
‘the three terrorist suspects who were killed had been intending to plant a bomb in Gibraltar’. McCann v. 
United Kingdom (n 112). 
113 Note that when establishing the compensation for Guinea on behalf of Mr Diallo, the ICJ, in a departure 
from its usual style, actively looked to the practice in other international bodies; including the European 
Court of Human Rights. It established that these bodies have applied general principles governing 
compensation when fixing its amount. The Court referred in detail to the practice of the ECtHR in 
affording compensation for human rights violations. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Compensation Judgment) [19 June 2010] ICJ [13], [24], [33], [40], 
[49], [56]. [hereinafter Diallo (Compensation)]. 
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measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and 
that fair compensation be paid to the injured party’, as introducing a considerable 
measure of discretion. He explains that if individuals do not enjoy a ‘full right to 
reparation’ under treaty law, no such entitlement can exist under general international 
law, ‘as customary law does not go further in scope that the most advanced treaties on 
that same subject’.114  
 
While he acknowledges the Inter-American Court’s clear pronouncement in favour of 
victims’ right to reparation, he argues that ‘the jurisprudence is not yet sufficiently 
consolidated to definitive conclusions to be drawn from it’.115 He reaches this conclusion 
despite the fact that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has, according 
to many, made extensive use of Article 63.116 More recently, Tomuschat has explained 
that the IACtHR has not handled many cases (therefore there is not sufficient 
jurisprudence to draw definitive conclusions) but more importantly, that the Court’s 
jurisprudence on reparations ‘is predicated on a basic misunderstanding’.117 According to 
Tomuschat, the IACtHR doesn’t understand that the principle that every violation of an 
international obligation entails the duty to make reparation only applies in inter-state 
relations. In his view, the well-known Velasquez Rodriguez118 dictum, as well as the 
                                               
114 Tomuschat, Between Idealism, (n 88) 306. 
115 Tomuschat ‘Individuals’, (n 111) 987.  
116 See, for example, R Bernhardt, ‘Just Satisfaction under the European Convention on Human Rights’ in 
M Ragazzi, International Responsibility Today: Essays in memory of Oscar Schachter (Martinus Nijhoff 
2005), citing B Saul, ‘Compensation for Unlawful Death in International Law: A Focus on the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ (2004) 19 American University International Law Review 523, 85. 
117 Tomuschat, Between Idealism (n 88) 407. 
118 Velásquez Rodríguez (n 164) 
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Court’s references to the Chorzów119 principle, are erroneous since neither the PCIJ nor 
the ICJ have said that states are under an obligation to fully compensate their own 
citizens where they have suffered harm at the hands of public authorities.120  
 
On the other hand, he views the jurisprudence of the HRC under the ICCPR as the 
boldest in respect of an individuals’ right to reparation in universal (UN) treaties. 
However, he claims that the Committee’s ‘Views’ are not decisions with binding effect, 
but constitute recommendations or suggestions, and that this is the way in which state 
parties to the ICCPR perceive them.121  
 
There seem to be several flaws in Tomuschat’s analysis, particularly because both the 
powers of international HR bodies and tribunals to afford reparation and the actual 
reparations afforded generally reflect international law practice – specifically on state 
responsibility for injury to aliens.122 So HR bodies generally follow the practice of 
international tribunals, affording reparation to individuals according to principles of 
general international law. This is not only the practice of HR courts and bodies, but also a 
practice accepted by states in general. 
 
It is hard to understand how the discretion enjoyed by HR bodies to assess the nature of 
violations and the appropriate form of reparation demonstrates that individuals do not 
have a full right to reparation under these treaty regimes. International jurisprudence 
                                               
119 Chorzow (n 22). 
120 Tomuschat, Between Idealism (n 88) 407. 
121Tomuschat ‘Individuals’ (n 111) 988 
122 Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 56. See also Chapter 2. 
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recognises that judicial discretion is important to assess the nature of a breach and the 
type of reparation needed on a case-by-case basis.123 It is the common practice of 
international courts and bodies to rule that no further reparation (e.g. compensation) is 
applicable when they consider that a declaratory judgement is sufficient relief. The ICJ 
has ruled that an authoritative finding of a breach constitutes sufficient satisfaction.124 
There are numerable examples of HR cases where the monitoring courts have followed 
the practice of the ICJ, even when in some cases more substantial remedies might have 
seen justified.125  
 
In addition, ‘restitution’, as opposed to ‘compensation’, is the traditional form of 
reparation in international law: ‘It is only where restitution is not possible that other 
forms are substituted’.126 Financial compensation is only a subsidiary remedy.127 The 
Commentary on the ILC Responsibility Articles explains that the role of compensation is 
to fill in any gaps to ensure full reparation for the damage suffered – as long as the 
damage is financially assessable.128 For example, the ECtHR has always insisted on its 
competence to decide whether ‘just satisfaction’ is necessary, and it has underlined that 
‘just satisfaction’ means that also the extent and amount of compensation can vary and 
depends upon circumstances of each case. The ECtHR has often awarded financial 
                                               
123 See, for example, Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United states of America) (Judgment) 
[2004] ICJ Rep 12 [119]. 
124 See, for example, the Corfu Chanel (n 343), Avena and other Mexican National (n.123), and Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n. 55). 
125 For an analysis of national and international practice see Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 255-268. 
126 Crawford and Olleson, ‘International Responsibility’ (n 61) 467.  
127 Bernhardt, ‘Just Satisfaction’ (n 116) 251. 
128  Commentary, Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23) cph. IV.E. 
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compensation for moral damage under Article 41 (before Article 50) of the ECHR.129 It is 
not obvious that the texts of this article permit such compensation, but the practice of the 
Court and the acquiescence of the state parties to the Convention leave no doubt that such 
compensation can and should be awarded.130 In other words, the ECtHR is applying 
principles of state responsibility in awarding reparation to individuals.   
 
It is undeniable that the discretion claimed, for example by the ECtHR, cannot exclude 
some arbitrariness. But if compensation is not included in some reparation awards, it does 
not necessarily demonstrate that individuals do not have a full right to reparation under 
these treaty regimes. It might simply show that compensation was not necessary in the 
specific case; and/or that the damage was not financially assessable; and/or that indeed 
the specific award failed to comply with international law principles on state 
responsibility. Certainly the ICJ has indicated that the basic principle of reparation 
articulated in the Chorzów case applies to reparation for injury to individuals, even when 
a specific jurisdictional provision on reparation is contained in the statute of the 
tribunal.131 In any case, the jurisprudence of both the European and the Inter-American 
Courts of HR afford in most cases compensation for moral and/or material damage 
caused by serious human rights violations.132  
 
                                               
129 ECHR (n 39). 
130 Bernhardt, ‘Just Satisfaction’ (n 116) 247. 
131 Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion (1973) ICJ Rep 166, 197-98 [hereinafter Application for Review] (citing Chorzów Factory 
(Germany v. Poland) (Indemnity) [September 2013] 1928 PCIJ Ser A) No. 17  [hereinafter Chorzów 
(Indemnity)] -. In the Chorzów case, the Court found that its jurisdiction extends to method of payment, 
beneficiaries, and other aspects of reparation. See: Chorzów, (n 22) 61–62. 
132 Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 56 -58.  
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While it is true that decisions under treaty-based individual complaints procedures are not 
stricto sensu legally binding, the monitoring bodies’ Views cannot be seen as mere 
recommendations or suggestions.  For example, the HRC has established that when states 
parties ratify the Optional Protocol in good faith, they intend to respect its Views. Indeed, 
the HRC, which applies general principles of state responsibility,133 has emphasised the 
close link between the good faith fulfilment of the treaty obligations contained in Article 
2(3) of the ICCPR and compliance with the Views concerning remedies when a violation 
has been found in an individual case. Some domestic courts have implemented the Views 
accordingly.134 Additionally, some countries have adopted specific legislative procedures 
to give effect to the HRC views in individual cases.135  
 
Van Alebeek and Nollkaemper, after a thorough examination of the status of decisions of 
UN treaty bodies in national law, reach two conclusions. Firstly, that from an 
international law perspective, states ‘[…] have an obligation to allow Views and interim 
measures to take legal effect within their national legal order’.136 Secondly, that ‘[T]reaty 
bodies are the principal interpreters of the UN human rights treaties. They clarify the 
normative content of the often broadly phrase rights and obligations in these treaties’.137 
Referring specifically to the Views of the HRC, Steiner also explains that this monitoring 
                                               
 133 D McGoldrick, ‘State Responsibility and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in M 
Fitzmaurice & D Sarooshi (eds), Issues of State Responsibility Before International Judicial Institutions 
(Hart Publishing 2004)161-199. 
134 See Enforcement Report (n 40) 42.  
135 See Enforcement Report (n 40) 42. For a detailed analysis of enabling legislations, see R van Albeek 
and  A Nollkaemper, ‘The legal status of decisions by human rights treaty bodies in national law’ in H 
Keller and G Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University 
Press 2012) 362-367. 
136 Van Albeek and Nollkaemper ‘The legal status’ (n 123) 358. 
137 ibid. 
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body confronts the ICCPR’s ‘ambiguities and indeterminacy, [resolve] conflicts amongst 
its principles and rights [and work] out meanings of its grand terms’.138  
 
In this respect, the ICJ recently acknowledged in Diallo the interpretative capacity of the 
HRC:  
 
The interpretation above is fully corroborated by the jurisprudence of the Human 
Rights Committee established by the Covenant to ensure compliance with that 
instrument by the States parties (see for example, in this respect, Maroufidou v. 
Sweden, No. 58/1979, para. 9.3; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
No. 15: The position of aliens under the Covenant). 
 
Since it was created, the Human Rights Committee has built up a considerable 
body of interpretative case law, in particular through its findings in response to 
the individual communications which may be submitted to it in respect of States 
parties to the first Optional Protocol, and in the form of its ‘General 
Comments’.139  
 
C. Position 3: Individuals have no capacity to make international law claims under 
CIL despite having primary and secondary rights 
 
Even commentators agreeing that individuals enjoy secondary rights under treaty or/and 
customary law still disagree on whether individuals have the capacity to bring claims 
directly under international law. As will be explained, some commentators argue that 
individuals do not have ‘claims rights’ or ‘tertiary rights’ to assert their international 
entitlements without the mediation of a state.  
 
                                               
138 HJ Steiner, ‘Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights 
Committee’ in P Alston and J Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies (Cambridge 
University Press 2000) 39. 
139 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), (Preliminary 
Objections: Judgment) [24 May 2007] ICJ Rep 2007 [66]. 
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Under this position, individuals have a right to reparation under CIL, but only states can 
claim reparation for them. Today there is no international mechanism where individuals 
can bring claims under general international law (i.e. there is no universal human rights 
court). The only option to bring such claims would be before domestic (national or 
foreign) courts. According to this view, individuals have no procedural capacity to bring 
a claim before a domestic court on the basis of international law. States can therefore 
establish procedures for individuals to claim international reparations (e.g. through HR 
conventions). However, where no such procedure is in place, individuals have to rely on 
the state of their nationality to bring diplomatic protection claims on their behalf.140  
 
Contrary to the principle that acknowledges the capacity to bring claims as inherent in the 
substance of a right (ubi jus ibi remedium), this approach distinguishes between: 1) the 
duty of states to provide reparation to other states; 2) the duty to provide reparation owed 
by states to an individual; and 3) the right of an individual to claim such reparation from 
a state. Even if a state has an international obligation towards an individual – and it must 
be assumed that the state is responsible if it violates that obligation – it is argued that 
state practice does not support the proposition that there is an individual right under 
international customary law to claim reparation in case of a breach.141  
 
                                               
140 According to Article 48 of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n. 23), in cases of serious breaches of erga 
omnes obligations any state could in principle espouse a claim on behalf of injured individuals. However, 
there is no international practice in this regard and it is not clear how such claims would relate to the 
practice of diplomatic protection. 
141 See, for example, R Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘International Obligations to Provide for Reparation Claims?’ in 
Randelzhofer and Tomuschat (n 71) 171. 
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McCorquodale142 argues that Hohfeld (1913) demonstrated that a ‘right’ could mean a 
claim-right, a privilege, a power, or immunity (or a number of these at once). He further 
observes that the PCIJ in the Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro/Czechoslovak 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal case declared that ‘it is scarcely necessary to point out that the 
capacity to possess civil rights does not necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those 
rights oneself’.143 Additionally, he points out that many of the international institutions 
that determine claims, such as the ICJ, are barred to individuals even when cases arise 
from actions by or against individuals, like in the East Timor case.144 The two cases cited 
as evidence that international law can afford individual rights without granting 
individuals the capacity to claim/exercise those right themselves will be examined in 
detail to show that they are by no means conclusive in regards to such a proposition.  
 
In the Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro/Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
the PCIJ in fact disagreed with the position of Czechoslovakia that the Royal Hungarian 
Peter Pázmány University did not enjoy legal personality in Hungarian Law to claim 
restitution before the Hungaro/Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, i.e. an 
international procedural remedy. The PCIJ highlighted that:  
 
…it is scarcely necessary to point out that the capacity to possess civil rights 
does not necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights oneself. No 
argument against the University’s personality in law can therefore be 
deduced from the fact that it did not enjoy the free disposal of the 
property in question.145 
                                               
142 McCorquodale (n 66) 284-310. 
143 Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro/Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Judgement (1933) PCIJ 
Series A/B no 61, 208, 231 [hereafter Hungaro/Czechoslovak Tribunal]. 
144 East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep, 90 [hereinafter East Timor Case].  
145 See Hungaro/Czechoslovak Tribunal (n 143) 208, 2031(emphasis added). 
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The first part of this sentence has often been cited to argue that individuals and other non-
state entities can have international rights without the capacity to exercise them; that is, to 
bring claims based on international law when these are breached.146 But when making the 
statement, the Court is specifically looking at the domestic law of Hungary not at 
international law. It concludes that the fact that the University could not exercise civil 
rights in domestic legislation did not affect its personality in domestic law. The 
University therefore still had capacity as legal person to submit an international claim to 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal for the property in question. 
 
So even if the above statement is considered as ‘not confined to civil law, but typical of 
any legal order’,147 the Court may only be saying that the fact that juridical entities cannot 
exercise their rights themselves in certain circumstances does not mean that they have no 
legal personality. This is a different proposition than the one maintaining that individuals 
can have rights under international law but can only exercise them and claim redress via 
the state of their nationality. There are important differences between domestic and 
international law, and arguing today that individuals can only claim violations of their 
human rights through their state of nationality – when international law recognises that 
states can breach the human rights of their own citizens – would be like arguing that 
children could only claim parental abuse through the parents themselves. At the 
international level, there is no supranational state that could seize jurisdiction in cases 
                                               
146 In addition to McCorquodale, see, for example, A Randelzhofer, ‘The Legal Position of the Individual 
under Present International Law’, in Randelzhofer and Tomuschat (n 71) 233-234. 
147 Randelzhofer says that a closer reading of the judgment shows that the Court is ‘of the opinion that this 
proposition is not confined to civil law, but typical of any legal order’. Ibid 234. 
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where the state of nationality is the wrongdoing party, and as it will explained in Part IV, 
there is no real prospect of other states bringing claims even in cases where serious 
breaches of erga omnes obligations are committed.  
 
It is important therefore to understand the court’s statement as referring to the capacity of 
a juridical entity to exercise its rights in Hungarian law. The Court only establishes that 
despite having limited civil rights under domestic law, the University still enjoys legal 
personality and, arguably, rights, albeit unenforceable at the national and perhaps 
international level. Importantly, the PCIJ looks specifically at whether the University 
itself has the right to submit an international claim to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal for the 
property in question, which it answered in the affirmative. In other words, this case 
confirms the validity of an arbitral judgment recognising the University of Budapest’s 
right to claim and obtain reparation before an international procedure (in the form of 
restitution in kind). Hence, this judgment can be read as acknowledging the validity of 
claims by legal persons for violations of international law against states at the 
international level.  
 
The other case often cited as evidence that individuals may have rights in international 
law but cannot claim any violations thereof is the East Timor case.148 However, the ICJ 
never examined the ‘claim question’ of non-state entities in this case. It never looked at 
                                               
148 For example, P Kooijmans points out: ‘[I]n the East Timor case, the International Court of Justice 
explicitly said that the people of East Timor are indisputably entitled to the right of self-determination as a 
right erga omnes. Actually the Court says here that entities which themselves have no right to bring a 
claim, like the people of East Timor, are entitled to a right which must be respected by everyone. […] If 
one has the primary right, however, one has also the secondary right to compensation if this primary right is 
not respected; this does not coincide, however, with the right to bring a claim as is clear from the East 
Timor case’. See: ‘Discussion (Part 1)’ in Randelzhofer and Tomuschat (n 71) 45. 
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whether the people of East Timor could actually claim an injury of their right to self-
determination caused by the treaty between Australia and Indonesia. It simply rejected 
Portugal’s claims as administering power based on the Court’s lack of jurisdiction.149 It 
applied the Monetary Gold150 principle and concluded that it could not decide on the 
merits of the case in the absence of Indonesia, as this would have required the Court to 
determine the rights and obligations of a third state in the absence of the consent of that 
state.   
 
It is true that while the Court explicitly said that the people of East Timor were entitled to 
the right to self-determination as a right giving rise to erga omnes obligations,151 in 
practice, it denied East Timorians access to an international remedy through their 
administering power. But it would be wrong to infer from this decision that individuals 
can be subjects of international law with primary and secondary rights without the 
capacity to claim a breach of international law. The Court simply avoided this legal 
question. As explained by Judge Werramanty in his Dissenting Opinion: ‘The Court’s 
Judgment stops, so to speak “at the threshold of the case” […]’. 152 It fails to examine for 
example the duties flowing from Australia from the right to self-determination of the 
people of East Timor or the jus standi of Portugal to bring a claim on behalf of them. In 
this sense, the East Timor case, if anything, just proves that certain relief mechanisms 
like the ICJ are barred even to states representing individuals. More importantly, this case 
                                               
149 East Timor Case (n 144) [36-37]. 
150 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and United states of America) [1954] ICJ Report 19. 
151 East Timor Case (n 144) [102]. 
152 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, East Timor Case (n 144) [56]. 
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shows how the international law model where individuals rights are in principle protected 
by states (whether by the home state or third ones) is not always functional. Judge 
Weeramanty further explains: ‘The preliminary objection to the ius standi of Portugal 
calls into question the adequacy of the entire protective structure fashioned by the UN 
Charter for safeguarding the interests of the non-self governing territories […]’.153   
 
While it is true that in practice, the people of East Timor were left with no remedy when 
the ICJ rejected Portugal’s claim on behalf of them, it would seem inappropriate to draw 
far-reaching conclusions from this decision.154 The same result would have occurred if, 
for example, Australia had rejected the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Importantly, the ICJ 
recently confirmed that states do have a duty to afford reparation directly to natural or 
legal persons for, among others, the breach of their right to self-determination.155 
 
D. Position 4: If individuals have primary rights, they also have the corresponding 
actionable secondary right to reparation  
 
As explained, the view that individuals are also holders of rights in international law is 
increasingly accepted. Already in 1928, the PCIJ said in Jurisdiction for the Courts of 
Danzig that ‘it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, 
                                               
153 ibid 56. 
154 Kooijmans goes further and proposes that a distinction between ‘legal personality’ and ‘subjectivity’ can 
be made based on this judgment: ‘If for arguments’ sake we assume that international legal personality (eg 
of a state or an international organisation, like in the Reparation Case) entails the capacity to bring a claim, 
then the lesson of the East Timor Case is that the concepts of international legal personality and that of 
being a subject of international law are not by necessity identical or interchangeable’. See ‘Discussion (Part 
1)’ in Randelzhofer and Tomuschat (n 71) 45. 
155 Wall Opinion (n94) [152-153]. 
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according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the adaptation by the parties 
of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations…’.156 The ICJ held 
recently in LaGrand that Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations  
‘creates individual rights’.157 Article 33(2) of the ILC Responsibility Articles has 
corroborated the view that individuals can be the beneficiaries of treaty provisions. The 
ILC Commentary on this rule makes it clear that individuals may be regarded as the 
ultimate beneficiaries of international norms and thus the holders of the relevant rights.   
 
Equally, there is evidence that a set of ‘core individual rights’ exist under CIL. Indeed, 
recent ICJ jurisprudence confirms that there are certain customary rights of the 
individual.158 On the other hand, as Kooijmans asserts, ‘already in 1968 the international 
community stated in the Declaration of Tehran that the Universal Declaration [of Human 
Rights] constitutes an obligation for all States’.159 Such a statement can be read as an 
acknowledgment that fundamental human rights are part of CIL. He views this assertion 
as opinio juris and argues that the constant denial of human rights violations by the states 
that are accused of such violations reflects state practice. Like in Nicaragua,160 
                                               
156 Danzig (n 91) [36]. 
157 LaGrand  (n 92) [76].  
158 See: Wall Opinion (n94) and Armed Activities Case (n 97) and accompanying text. 
159 P Kooijmans, ‘Contribution to Discussion (Part 4)’, Tomuschat and Randelzhofer (n 71) 247. 
160 ‘It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have 
been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of 
force or from intervention in each other’s internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be 
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the 
rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of 
States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with 
a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition 
of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognised rule, but defends its 
conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the 
State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to 
weaken the rule’ – Case Concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua 
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Kooijmans argues that it is not the widespread violations but the constant denials of 
human rights violations that constitute state conduct. Such denials are a confirmation of 
the norm in support of the opinio juris. For him, this means that a great part of human 
rights law is customary law. He further explains that in cases of erga omens obligations, 
the bearers of the corresponding substantive rights – that is, the individuals – have ‘an 
international legal status that cannot be dependant upon state consent’.161 
 
Even Tomuschat, who affirms that individuals do not have primary rights unless they 
have access to an international procedural remedy, acknowledges a set of fundamental 
individual rights under CIL (despite a lack of universal human rights remedy). He goes 
even further by explaining that states tend to deny any role of individuals in international 
law because is not convenient to them:  
[…] legal positions of the individual can be derived that are not dependent on 
the will of any State. Yet States do not like these constructs. They wish to 
remain the masters of international law. The concept of an individual acting 
independently on the international level is to them more a nuisance than an 
achievement as became manifest in the Francovich case under the law of the 
European Communities which did not meet with unreserved welcome by all 
governments of the member States.162 
 
Similarly, when looking at the traditional sources of international law, it becomes clear 
that the legal basis for a right to reparation for individual victims has become firmly 
enshrined in the elaborate corpus of international HR instruments, now widely accepted 
by states.163 Not only is this right firmly embodied in international HR treaties and 
                                                                                                                                            
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Judgment) (merits)  (27 June 1986) ICJ Rep 98 [186] [hereafter 
Nicaragua Case]. 
161 P Kooijmans, ‘Contribution to Discussion (Part 4)’ Randelzhofer and Tomuschat (n 71) 248. 
162 ibid.  
163 See (n 39) and accompanying text. 
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declarative instruments, but it has also been further refined by the jurisprudence of a large 
number of international and regional courts, as well as other treaty bodies and complaints 
mechanisms.164  
 
The bearing of a right has to be differentiated from the delivery and enforcement of such 
right. In the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, the PCIJ affirmed the existence of a 
right for an individual under international law, even though it could not be enforced by 
the individual at the international level: 
 
[...] it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, 
according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the adaptation by the 
parties of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and 
enforceable by national courts.165  
 
Accordingly, the enforcement of rights of individuals could in principle be pursued 
before domestic courts. While Lauterpacht considered this decision to be evidence of 
individual personality,166 Friedmann disagreed. Not only did he write that Lauterpacht’s 
view of the Danzig Opinion was ‘somewhat overenthusiastic’,167 but he also said that the 
precedents established were ‘products of a power of victors in a major war, to impose, by 
virtue of their temporary political or military superiority, not only their political 
conditions, but also their legal concepts’.168 Of course, this criticism has been said of 
almost every post-WWII judicial precedent, including those decisions from the 
                                               
164  See I-ACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Compensatory Damages (21 July 1989) Series C no 7  
[174] [hereafter Velásquez Rodríguez]. See also Papamichalopoulos vs. Greece (n 110) 36. 
165 Danzig (n 91) (emphasis added). 
166 Lauterpacht, Human Rights  (n 57) 21, 28.  
167 W Friedmann, The General Course in Public International Law, 127 Recueil des Cours at 125-126 
(1969). 
168 Ibid. 238. 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. Importantly, the ICJ recently reaffirmed in LaGrand 
that individuals can have international rights despite their lack of general international 
standing and that these rights should be enforced domestically.169 Equally, the ICTY 
judges seem to acknowledge that there can be a right under international law irrespective 
of an international procedural remedy. For them, ‘[t]he question…is not so much is there 
a right to compensation but how can that right be implemented’.170 The Tribunal has 
already taken an approach in favour of a secondary actionable right of individuals in 
cases of serious human rights violations. In Furundzija, the Tribunal addressed the 
question of compensation for individuals in the case of a violation of the prohibition of 
torture as a norm of jus cogens character, holding that:  
 
[…] Proceedings could be initiated by potential victims if they had locus standi 
before a competent international or national judicial body with a view to asking it to 
hold the national measure to be internationally unlawful; or the victim could bring a 
civil suit for damage in a foreign court, which would therefore be asked inter alia to 
disregard the legal value of the national authorising act.171  
 
One can deduce from the ICTY decision that the individual victim of a violation of a 
norm with jus cogens character is entitled to claim reparation before an international or 
national judicial body, as well as a foreign national court. The wording quoted above 
shows that the Tribunal assumes the existence of an actionable secondary right to 
reparation under international law in the absence of any requirement for national 
measures to provide for the respective right.  
 
                                               
169 LaGrand (n 92) [77]. 
170 Victims’ Compensation and Participation, Appendix to the Letter  from the Secretary-General addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2000/1063, 12, [22]. 
171 Furundzija (n 53) 155. 
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Furthermore, in the Wall Opinion, the ICJ stated that Israel is obliged under general 
international law to afford reparation to the natural and legal persons injured by the 
construction of the wall.172 It would appear that the Court, following the reasoning of its 
predecessors in Danzig,173 recognised that there can be individual rights in international 
law regardless of whether these are enforceable through international procedural 
remedies or by domestic courts.  
 
There would be a clear gap in the human rights protection system if one recognised the 
existence of individual rights under customary law but contested the existence of a 
corollary right to reparation. Put simply, if one refutes the idea that individuals enjoy 
primary rights under CIL, it seems reasonable to maintain that individuals do not enjoy a 
right to reparation under general international law either. The paradox lies, however, in 
recognising some basic individual rights under general law but not believing that 
reparation is owed to the individuals when these rights are breached. What happens when 
the state of nationality is the wrongdoer? Who has the secondary right to reparation?  
i. Can the international community be the guardian of individual rights? 
 
In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ made it clear that human rights obligations, or at 
least some of them, are due to the international community as a whole.174 However, the 
international community is not a subject of law. So while it is in the interest of the 
community of nations to protect and enforce these rights, it is difficult to argue that all 
                                               
172 Wall Opinion (n94)198 [152-153]. 
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states should be the beneficiaries of the actual reparations owed. The tension between the 
bilateral origins of international law and its current aim of protecting community interests 
was evident during the drafting process of the ILC Responsibility Articles. For example, 
while Ago held that the correlation of obligations with subjective rights ‘admit[ted] of no 
exception’, he had no doubt that some rights belonged to all states and that the 
wrongfulness of an act in breach of jus cogens would not be precluded by the consent of 
the injured state.175 Finding a balance between the bilateralism and communitarianism 
aspects of state responsibility and reparation, the ILC adopted as a ‘measure of 
progressive development’176 Article 48(2)(b) of the ILC Responsibility Articles.177  This 
rule allows any state in cases of serious erga omnes violations to claim reparation from 
the responsible state. Such a claim must be made in the interest of the injured state, if 
any, or of the beneficiaries of the obligations breached. According to the ILC 
Commentary on Article 48, this measure is justified since it provides a means of 
protecting the community or collective interest at stake.178 
 
However, it is still unclear how the ‘Article 48 system’ would operate in practice: how it 
relates to traditional diplomatic protection and to procedural rules like the exhaustion of 
local remedies norm or the requirement of a nationality link. For example, the ICJ 
recently acknowledged the existence of rules of jus cogens in the Armed Activities on the 
                                               
175 R Ago, ‘Third Report on State Responsibility’, YB ILC (n 41) 3, 199, 221; R Ago, ‘Eighth Report on 
State Responsibility’ (1979) 2(1) YB ILC 3, 38. 
176 Article 48(2)(b) (n 32).  
177 Koskenniemi, ‘Doctrines of State Responsibility’ (n 51) 49.  
178 Commentary to Art 48, Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles,  (n 23) [12]. 
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Territory of the Congo case.179 However, it rejected a counterclaim brought forward by 
Uganda concerning the ill treatment of individuals by the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo because Uganda had failed to establish the relevant, Ugandan, nationality of the 
individuals concerned.180 Judge Simma, in a strong separate opinion to the judgment, 
argued that the nature of the breaches of international law provided Uganda with legal 
standing regardless of nationality links: 
The specific construction of the rights and obligations under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention as well as the relevant provisions of Protocol I 
Additional to this Convention not only entitles every State party to raise 
these violations but even creates an obligation to ensure respect for the 
humanitarian law in question. The rules of the international law of State 
responsibility lead to an analogous result as concerns the violations of 
human rights of the persons concerned by the Congolese soldiers.181 
 
But while there has been willingness on behalf of third states to request cessation and/or 
non-repetition, the entitlements provided for in Article 48 do not have much weight in 
practice.182 The lack of clarity regarding which rules of state responsibility are applicable 
in these limited number of cases makes it hard to see how third states could claim 
reparation on behalf of individuals under Article 48.183 On the other hand, there are only 
a few instruments of general application which provide for the enforcement of erga 
omnes partes obligations by other states, and even when these instruments are applicable, 
states are reluctant to exercise such rights.184  
                                               
179 Armed Activities Case (n 97). 
180 Armed Activities Case (n 97) [333]. 
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Thus, even if it is recognised that erga omnes obligations exist and that in a limited 
number of cases, states can exercise the corresponding rights to reparation for the benefit 
of individuals, in practice the current legal framework cannot sufficiently secure 
individual rights. States may either have no standing or may not be interested in pursuing 
remedies. There is nothing individual victims can do to ensure these claims are pursued 
and/or that their perspectives are taken into consideration. This lack of a realistic 
mechanism for enforcement at the inter-state level has the unfortunate effect of rendering 
erga omnes obligations largely theoretical. For this reason, if it is recognised that today 
there are truly human rights under customary law, then arguing that individuals do not 
have a right to reparation when these are breached – but only states – leaves a big gap in 
the human rights protection system. 
ii. Can customary rules of state responsibility be applicable to the relationship 
between states and individuals? 
 
The fact that HR protection has been confined under specific treaty regimes does not 
mean that state responsibility is inapplicable to human rights breaches.185 In this context, 
it seems valid to ask whether the customary rules of state responsibility, including the 
obligation to afford and the right to receive reparation, could be applicable to individuals. 
After all, while there has been a tendency to view international responsibility as 
essentially a bilateral matter between states (without wider consequences for others or for 
the international system as a whole), ‘international law now contains a range of rules 
                                               
185 Koskenniemi, ‘Doctrines of State Responsibility’ (n 51) 47. 
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which cannot be broken down into bundles of bilateral relations between states but cover 
a much broader range’.186 
 
As mentioned earlier, Article 33 of the ILC Responsibility Articles confirms that 
reparation by the liable state may be owed both to other states and to injured individuals. 
In addition, the Commentary affirms that, at the international level, individuals can 
invoke the responsibility of a state on their own account and without the intermediation 
of any state.187  
 
The Wall Opinion seems to acknowledge that there are certain fundamental HR under 
general international law and that all natural and legal persons are entitled to reparation if 
states breached these rights.188 In the Furundzija case, the ICTY also assumed that an 
individual secondary right to reparation under international law arises when there is a 
breach of peremptory norm.189  The Judges specifically expressed in a separate report that 
there is a secondary individual right under international law, which includes 
compensation.190 
 
In 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted the Principles and Guidelines.191 As 
explained in its preamble, this set of principles and guidelines recognise that an 
                                               
186 Crawford and Olleson, ‘International Responsibility’ (n 61) 470. 
187 See: Article 33(2) and its Commentary [233], Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). For 
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obligation to afford reparation to victims exists under HR and IHL. Its purpose is 
therefore to ‘identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the 
implementation’ of these existing legal obligations’.192 To a certain extent therefore, the 
adoption of this instrument reflects an acknowledgment by the international community 
of the existence of a secondary right to reparation for victims under CIL. However, 
Tomuschat sees the specific provisions only as ‘a collection of recommendations, and not 
a codification of existing customary law’.193  
 
While the Chorzów principle194 was originally applied to inter-state reparation, the ICJ 
indicated that it applies equally to reparation for injury to individuals.195 The IACtHR 
refers in its decisions to the principle of state responsibility, according to which 
reparation has to be made for every violation of a right under international law, which 
results in a loss.196 It usually mentions the Chorzów decision as a reference. In this sense, 
the Chorzów judgment, as well as the principles of state responsibility clarified in it, are 
understood to also apply in the relationship between individuals and states. The ICJ 
recently confirmed this approach in its advisory opinion concerning the Israeli Wall in 
the occupied territories.197  
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It therefore seems possible for individuals to have rights in international treaty and 
customary law. In principle, if these are breached, individuals have an actionable 
secondary right to reparation. Individual claims can be pursued at the international level 
by the home state representing its national or, when possible, by the individual 
him/herself (e.g. before a HR court, monitoring body, claims commission or arbitral 
tribunal). Otherwise, individual claims can be pursued at the domestic level before 
national courts or before foreign courts when the claims involve fundamental breaches. 
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Chapter 2: State responsibility, diplomatic protection and the 
obligation to afford reparation to individuals 
 
 
‘Now, both the " international standard of justice " and the 
principle of equality between nationals and aliens, hitherto 
considered as antagonistic and irreconcilable, can well be 
reformulated and integrated into a new legal rule […] The 
basis of this new principle would be the "universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms" referred to in the Charter of the United Nations 
and in other general, regional and bilateral instruments.’ 
 
 
1. The notion of diplomatic protection and its relationship to human rights law 
 
Under the doctrine of state responsibility, when a state commits an international wrong it 
becomes liable to a) cease the wrongful conduct and b) afford adequate reparation.  The 
leading opinion in this regard is set out in the Chorzów judgment of the PCIL: ‘It is a 
principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparation in an adequate form’.198  
 
According to the Court, this is not only ‘a principle of international law’, but is ‘even a 
general conception of law’.199 The Court further explained: ‘reparation must, as far as 
                                               
 FV Garcia Amador, ‘First Report on State Responsibility’ (1956) 2 YBILC 202, [156]. 
 
198 Chorzów (n 22) 47. 
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possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’.200 
Reparation thus may be defined as the various forms to redress an international wrong 
and discharge the liable party from international responsibility towards the injured party. 
In this sense, reparation as a consequence of state responsibility is understood as a 
secondary obligation/right of states.  
 
This understanding of primary and secondary rules in the context of state responsibility 
was applied by the ILC when drafting the Responsibility Articles. Specifically, Roberto 
Ago introduced the idea as a central organising device of the articles.201 He explained 
‘[I]t is one thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes, and another 
to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the 
consequences of the violation’.202 The ILC created a set of articles dealing with the 
secondary obligations associated with breach since it did not believe that there was a 
possibility of codifying the substantive international law of obligations in a general way. 
Still, the ILC believed that international law emerged as a general conception of the 
rights and duties of states, and of the consequences of breaches of those rights. The 
codification of the secondary obligations therefore aimed to generalise international 
law.203 According to James Crawford, Ago’s distinction responded to what the ILC 
                                               
200 ibid 47. 
201 J Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A 
Retrospect’ (2002) 96 Am. J Int’l L. 876. 
202 R Ago, ‘Second report on State Responsibility’ (1970) 2 YB Int’l L. Comm’n 177, 306 (UN Doc 
A/CN.4/1970/Add.1). 
203 Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Articles’ (n 201) 877. 
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Commentary now refers as the principle of independent responsibility204: the principle 
that State responsibility is specific to the State concerned.205 He further explains: 
 
[T]he key idea is that a breach of a primary obligation gives rise, immediately 
by operation of the law of state responsibility, to a secondary obligation or 
series of obligations (cessation, reparation…). The articles specify the default 
rules that determine when a breach occurs and, in general, the content of the 
resulting secondary obligations. In their final form they also specify when 
other states may do to invoke responsibility, by claiming cessation or 
reparation or, in default, by taking countermeasures.206 
 
While there was much criticism of the differentiation between primary and secondary 
rules in this context, and specifically in relation to the concept of independent 
responsibility,207 the ILC Responsibility Articles have been well received and have been 
applied by numerous international tribunals, including the ICJ. Additionally, the 
distinction between primary rules and secondary rules of state responsibility is also 
invoked in the Principles and Guidelines, which are the main object of analysis of this 
thesis. Therefore, despite the many flaws that this distinction might create in theory and 
in practice (as will be discussed, for example, in the case of denial of justice), the present 
study uses the same classification of primary and secondary rules used by the ILC 
Responsibility Articles. It aims to investigate if individuals, as opposed to states, can be 
the beneficiaries of the secondary obligation to afford reparation. 
 
                                               
204 ibid 877. 
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Before the WWII and the advent of HR treaties there were no formal procedures 
available to the individual under international law to challenge treatment by his or her 
own state. On the other hand, if the individual suffered abuses by a foreign state while 
abroad, the individual’s national state had the option to intervene to protect him or her or 
to claim reparation for the injuries that he or she suffered. Under these norms, the right to 
reparation was attributed to the state of the injured national to claim against the offending 
state at the inter-state level.208 Whether in war or peacetime, a state had the right (but not 
the obligation) to take up the claims of its nationals before an international body.  
 
The establishment of human rights law after WWII widened the concept of international 
law in respect of the rights of individuals – both procedural and substantive rights. Today 
the individual is protected under international law against acts of states that breach his or 
her human rights, including those committed by the state of nationality. Notwithstanding, 
individual procedural remedies in international human rights law are scarce. State 
responsibility for injuries to aliens still protects natural and legal persons from abuses by 
foreign nations. In this sense, diplomatic protection – the procedure employed by the 
injured alien’s state of nationality to secure redress in cases of denial of justice – is not 
only the predecessor to the individual right to reparation in HR law, but it is also a co-
existing and well-established mechanism that allows foreign states to obtain reparation on 
behalf of its nationals for human rights violations.  
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It is in this context that the present chapter will look at the notion of diplomatic protection 
and its relationship to human rights law. The focus of this dissertation is not to look at 
reparation obtained through inter-state agreement or inter-state legal action, but to 
investigate whether individuals have a right to reparation under general international law 
for human rights and humanitarian law violations as presupposed by the Principles and 
Guidelines. For this reason, the present chapter analyses the relationship that exists 
between diplomatic protection and human rights claims. In particular, it investigates the 
relationship between diplomatic protection and the right to reparation and the right to an 
effective domestic remedy. IHL claims on behalf of nationals injured by foreign nations 
during wartime, including claims as part of war settlements and peace treaties, will be 
addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
The current chapter concludes that denial of justice entails an obligation to afford 
foreigners access to a system of justice that guarantees due process in accordance with 
the international minimum standard. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies 
therefore is not a procedural precondition that can be waived; it is an inherent part of the 
international wrong of denial of justice. The chapter also advances the proposition that in 
the same way that denial of justice is understood as a system failure, where exhaustion of 
domestic remedies is an inherent material element of the IWA of denial of justice, 
international HR violations also materialise as IWAs after states fail to redress the 
breaches in accordance with international standards. 
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As already mentioned, states have nowadays an obligation to protect aliens and nationals 
alike from acts or omissions that breach international law (like torture, slavery, arbitrary 
detentions, undue process, unfair trials, enforced disappearances, and so on). If states are 
unable to protect individuals and then fail to redress these violations in accordance with 
international standards, they commit and international wrong (a denial of 
justice/international human rights violation) and are responsible under international law 
to afford reparation. Clearly, if the violations are committed against aliens, the state of 
nationality has the right to exercise diplomatic protection to obtain reparation on their 
behalf. But what happens to the nationals of the state or to the aliens directly injured 
when the state of nationality refuses to exercise diplomatic protection on their behalf? By 
doing a comparative analysis between the law on diplomatic protection and human rights 
law, the current chapter helps clarify if the reparation is also due to the injured 
individuals (as opposed to only the state of nationality or the community of states) and 
whether individuals can claim reparation directly under international law. It investigates 
how state responsibility principles apply to the relationship between individuals and 
states and assesses in this context the understating of breaches of HR and IHL as IWA of 
states. 
 
2. Diplomatic protection: the predecessor to reparation claims under human rights 
law 
A. Notion of diplomatic protection 
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A state is not obliged to admit aliens into its territory, but if the aliens are already in its 
territory then ‘it is under an obligation toward the alien’s state of nationality to provide a 
degree of protection to his or her person or property in accordance with an international 
minimum standard of treatment for aliens’.209 diplomatic protection is the procedure 
employed by the injured alien’s state of nationality to secure compliance with the primary 
rules of international law governing the treatment of aliens and to claim reparation under 
the rules of state responsibility (secondary rights) for the injury inflicted upon the alien.  
 
Although often confused with consular assistance, diplomatic protection is different.210 
While both are exercised for the benefit of a national, there are fundamental differences 
between the two, as reflected by the fact that diplomatic relations and consular relations 
are regulated by two separate conventions.211 Consular activities are purely of a 
representative nature at the local level and are limited by the non-intervention principle in 
Article 55 of the VCCR. A consul does not have the power to intercede in a judicial 
process to prevent a denial of justice. As pointed out by Shaw: ‘[Consuls] have a 
particular role in assisting nationals in distress with regard to, for example, finding 
lawyers, visiting prisons and contacting local authorities, but they are unable to intervene 
in the judicial process or internal affairs of the receiving state or give legal advice or 
investigate a crime’.212 Diplomatic agents are also not to interfere with domestic affairs of 
the receiving state in accordance with Article 41 (1) of the VCDR. But diplomatic 
                                               
209 Dugard ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in Crawford, The Law of State Responsibility (n 51) 1061.  
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protection, if exercised in accordance with international law, is never an interference with 
the domestic affairs of the receiving state, since the sending state exercises diplomatic 
protection in its own right.213 After exhaustion of local remedies it is no longer a dispute 
between an individual and a state, but between two states; it is not an internal affair, but 
an international dispute. 214    
 
In sum, any formal intervention, including negotiation, on an inter-state level on behalf of 
a national vis-à-vis a foreign state for an international wrongful act is ‘diplomatic 
protection’. While something that starts as consular assistance may end up as diplomatic 
protection at a later stage, the latter forms part of the state responsibility rules of 
international law and belongs only to states. States and not individuals have a right to 
exercise diplomatic protection. In contrast, consular assistance forms part of a body of 
rights of which states and individuals may be the holders.  
 
The distinction between consular assistance and diplomatic protection becomes more 
obvious if we apply the concept of primary and secondary rules used by the ILC 
Responsibility Articles.215 Consular assistance involves a number of primary rights. 
These rights belong to states and, as recognised by recent international jurisprudence, 
also to individuals.216 Diplomatic protection on the other hand is the mechanism used by 
states to exercise their secondary right to reparation for denial of justice to one of their 
nationals. Denial of justice to a foreigner is an international wrongful act. Therefore, if 
                                               
213 A Kunzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection’ (n 93) 321, 333. 
214 ibid 333. 
215 See: section ‘1.The notion of diplomatic protection and its relationship to human rights law’, Chapter 2.  
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the (primary) rights to consular assistance are breached, state responsibility arises and the 
victim-state is allowed to exercise its (secondary) right to reparation. It can claim 
reparation directly when its state-rights are breached (e.g. for a breach of a bilateral or a 
multilateral convention). But it can also claim reparation indirectly, through diplomatic 
protection on behalf of its national when the host state fails to afford his or her consular 
rights. 
 
Consular assistance often has a preventive nature and takes place before the exhaustion of 
effective local remedies (e.g. before an international wrong has occurred). As stipulated 
in the VCCR, consular assistance will only be provided if the individual concerned so 
requests.217 In contrast, a diplomatic demarche intends to bring the matter to the 
international level and is ultimately capable of resulting in international litigation. The 
individual concerned cannot prevent his national state from taking up the claim or from 
continuing procedures.218   
 
The ICJ clearly distinguished between consular assistance and diplomatic protection in 
La Grand, accepting Germany’s assertion that individual rights arising under a treaty on 
consular relations could be claimed through the vehicle of diplomatic protection.219 
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Diplomatic protection is thus a mechanism that states can resort to after an internationally 
wrongful act (denial of justice) has occurred causing an injury to an alien.  
 
B. Overview of diplomatic protection 
 
The roots of diplomatic protection can be traced back to the eighteen-century.220 
However, ‘it was mainly the nationals of the powerful Western states that enjoyed the 
privileged position of exercising it, as it was those states that most readily intervened to 
protect their nationals who were not treated ‘in accordance with the ordinary standards of 
civilization’ set by Western states’.221 In the 19th and early 20th centuries, a flurry of 
activity occurred in the field of diplomatic protection, mainly in regards to the protection 
of investments/companies abroad. The means by which states exercised this protection 
was not yet limited by the prohibition of the use of force and the obligation to settle 
disputes peacefully.222 This resulted in the frequent indiscriminate and disproportionate 
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abuse of power.223 In its rawest form, state protection of foreign nationals was the pretext 
for substantial gunboat diplomacy.224  
 
The international law of state responsibility would not have developed so vigorously but 
for Western colonialism and economic imperialism that reached their zenith during this 
period. Transnational business operations centred in Europe, and later in the United 
States, penetrated those regions now known as the ‘Third World’ or ‘developing’ 
countries. Given the links between the success and wealth of corporations in their foreign 
ventures and national wealth and power, the security of the person and property of a 
national or corporation operating in a foreign part of the world became a concern of his or 
its government.225 
 
Many emerging nations, and in particular, Latin American countries, were wary of these 
interferences, which resulted in strong criticism and several efforts to neutralise the 
abusive effects of diplomatic protection. 226 For example, the Drago doctrine – conceived 
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 85 
in the aftermath of the German, British and Italian intervention in Venezuela in 1923 –
sought to establish the principle that the public debt of a state could never justify armed 
intervention provided that the borrowing state accepted international arbitration.227  
 
A passage by Judge Padilla Nervo’s separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction case 
reflects the disapproval that the developing world had of the way that powerful nations 
were applying the principle of protection of aliens:  
 
The history of the responsibility of States in respect to the treatment of foreign 
nationals is the history of abuses, illegal interference in the domestic jurisdiction 
of weaker States, unjust claims, threats and even military aggression under the 
flag of exercising rights of protection, and the imposing of sanctions in order to 
oblige a government to make the reparations demanded [...].228 
 
 
According to Garcia-Amador: 
 
 
The origin of the alien treatment standard can be traced back to the sort of 
reasoning which gave rise to the system of capitulations or extraterritoriality that 
was for long imposed upon the peoples of Asia and Africa by European nations. 
The consequent discrimination in favour of the foreign groups of the population, 
and the infringement of the principle of equality among nations, became 
repugnant to public opinion and to legal thinking in the countries concerned.229  
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Paulson on the other hand explains that prior to diplomatic protection, controversies in 
respect of the denial of justice to aliens would be solved through the medieval regime of 
reprisals.230 With the emergence of the modern state, the system of reprisal fell into 
disuse; the injured alien did not need to seek his or her government’s license to authorise 
private justice because the foreign state was bound by the law of nations. In the case of 
denial of justice, it would be held to its international responsibility at the initiative of the 
complainants of its own state, which, rather than issuing letters of marque, could exercise 
the right of diplomatic protection. He explains that the ‘[a]cceptance of international 
authority to control national dispensation of justice was neither instant nor universal. To 
the contrary, many states maintained that foreigners should not have any greater 
entitlement than citizens to challenge the national system’.231   
 
According to Paulson, to understand the context of the reluctance to international scrutiny 
and the insistence on national treatment, which found its historical spokesman in the 
Argentinean Carlos Calvo, ‘one must be aware of another difficulty in the transition from 
the regime of reprisal to that of diplomatic protection, namely the draping of violent 
interventions in the raiments of international law’. 232 The problem was that the old 
methods of reprisals were revived in the form of gunboat diplomacy and the continued 
tendency of the powerful to view the right of protection as a warrant for the use of 
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unilateral force: ‘The diplomatic component of the expression “diplomatic protection” 
was, in such circumstances, an ironic but hardly subtle fiction’.233   
i. The Calvo Doctrine:  international standard v. national treatment  
 
The main problem with the ‘international treatment’ standard – setting a baseline below 
which state conduct could not fall – was that its content and scope (e.g. the primary rules 
of international law defining what constituted ‘international’ denial of justice) was utterly 
vague.234 Garcia Amador observed in his first report as Special Rapporteur on State 
Responsibility: 
 
[T]he principle of the “international standard of justice”, whether it is taken on its 
own merits or as a complement of diplomatic protection, has always suffered 
from a fundamental defect: its obvious vagueness and imprecision. None of the 
international bodies which have accepted and applied the principle have been able 
to define it: either no attempt to do so has been made, or, in the few cases where it 
has been made, it has been with little success. They have usually merely referred 
to it as a ground for their decision, or applied it to particular cases on which they 
tried to build up a general rule by means of inductive reasoning […].235  
 
This view reflected the core of the claim by Latin American countries: that the vague 
definition of what constituted international minimum standards allowed stronger 
countries to intervene almost without limitation, simply arguing that its nationals had not 
                                               
233 Paulsson (n 222) 15. 
234 Despite the ambiguity of the international standard, its existence and application in the context of 
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received adequate treatment.236 Even the most determined advocates of the alien standard 
at the time recognised that ‘powerful States have at times extracted from weak States a 
greater degree of responsibility than from States of their own strength’.237 Following 
Calvo’s principles, Latin American states called for a ‘national treatment’ standard, i.e. 
complete equality between foreigners and nationals under the laws of the countries 
concerned.238   
 
The Calvo Doctrine sought to achieve equality of states in international relations through: 
treating foreigners and nationals equally; setting the treatment of aliens to a national 
treatment standard; affording aliens only those rights and privileges extended to 
nationals; and seeking relief only in national courts. For most of the twentieth century, 
there was a lack of international consensus on whether treatment of foreigners was ruled 
by the national treatment principle and the international treatment standard or whether 
both were conflicting and irreconcilable principles. While the PCIJ recognised in 1926 
‘[t]he existence of a common or generally accepted international law respecting the 
treatment of aliens….which is applicable to them despite municipal legislation’,239 the 
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1929 Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners used a draft Convention generally based 
on the principle of national treatment.240  
 
Many industrialised states had no interest in supporting the Calvo Doctrine for political 
and economic reasons. An extreme example of a ‘colonial’ understanding of the 
‘international minimum standard’ can be found in the 1961 Draft Convention on the 
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, prepared by Harvard Law 
School. 241 Under the heading ‘Adverse decisions and judgments’, Article 8 paragraph (b) 
makes clear that the authors of the draft were proposing that a judgement should be held 
internationally wrongful ‘if it unreasonably departs from the principles of justice 
recognised by the principal legal systems of the world’.242 On the other hand, as capital 
importers, Latin American nations were eager to follow Calvo’s theories to protect their 
sovereignty. But opponents to this doctrine observed that the principle of equality or non-
discrimination affirmed by Calvo set no affirmative standards for state behaviour, leaving 
aliens open to abuse where states chose to treat their own citizens equally poorly. As 
observed by Brierly, ‘facts with respect to equality of treatment of aliens and nationals 
may be important in determining the merits of a complaint of mistreatment of an alien. 
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But such equality is not the ultimate test of the propriety of the acts of the authorities in 
the light of international law’.243 Still, the abuse of diplomatic protection led to a scenario 
where Latin American nations began to implement the principles of the Calvo Doctrine 
unilaterally. These countries routinely placed a clause of national treatment in foreign 
investment contracts as well as in some of their constitutions and legislations.244 The 
Calvo Clause became a required contractual stipulation for foreign investors doing 
business in Latin America.245  
ii. Shaping the exhaustion of local remedies rule 
 
While the Latin American criticism of state responsibility did not question the principle 
of denial of justice but the arbitrariness of its application, it was often perceived as a 
direct attack on international law.246 The so-called Guerrero Report, arguing for an 
unreasonable limitation to the scope of denial of justice, was often cited as evidence of 
the intention of Latin American countries to deconstruct international law.247 Most 
commonly, however, jurists in the region – perceiving the rule of minimum treatment as 
too readily traduced into hypocritical cover for arbitrary intervention – often referred to 
the narrowest possible view of the scope of denial of justice (without denying it was an 
international delict) and took the broadest possible view of the exhaustion of local 
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Report’ (1927) V.Legal,V.I. Document C.196.M.70.1927.V 104 [6b]. See: Paulsson (n 222) 24.  
 91 
remedies as a precondition of the exercise of diplomatic protection. Indeed, when the 
Second International Conference of American States adopted the Convention relative to 
the Rights of Aliens in Mexico City in 1902, its general rule of national treatment 
explicitly reserved an exception for international claims in the case of ‘manifest denial of 
justice, or unusual delay, or evident violation of the principles of international law’. 248 
 
This understanding of the Calvo Doctrine – that is, the demands to resort to national 
remedies first as opposed to international proceedings – strengthened the reasonability of 
offering the host state the possibility of redressing the wrong through its domestic judicial 
system before claiming its international responsibility.249 As explained by Jimenez de 
Arechaga: 
[O]therwise, the foreigner would be a privileged individual for whom neither the 
internal law nor local courts would exist, and who would interpose at once the 
political influence of the State of his nationality upon the emergence of the 
slightest difficulty with another government. A premature diplomatic intervention 
of this type would constitute an affront to the independence of the local sovereign 
and to the competence of its laws and courts over all the people submitted to its 
authority.250 
 
The Calvo Doctrine was born when international law offered no options other than local 
courts or foreign warships. The 1907 Convention for the Peaceful Resolution of 
International Disputes, which promoted the institution of compulsory bilateral arbitration 
treaties, created a new tool to ensure equality between states at the moment of dispute 
                                               
248 Quoted in Dugard, ‘The Addendum to the Third Report on Diplomatic Protection’ (2002) International 
Law Commission UN Doc A/CN.4/523/Add.1, 4 [8]. 
249 See, for example, Freeman, ‘Calvo Doctrine’ (n 246) 121,131. 
250 E Jimenez de Arechaga, ‘El Derecho Internacional Contemporaneo’ (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos 1991) 
37. Cited in English in Sepulveda Amor, Bernardo, ‘International law and national sovereignty: the 
NAFTA and the claims of Mexican jurisdiction’ (1997) 19(3) Houston Journal of International Law, 586. 
 92 
resolution, notwithstanding vast differences in economic or military power. The Latin 
American states en masse signed the convention. Examples of the type of inter-state 
arbitration of the time abound in the well-known mixed claims commissions constituted 
to deal with alleged expropriations in the region, notably in Venezuela and Mexico. But 
such tribunals were not necessarily evidence of conformity or harmony. As Paulson 
notes: 
Latin Americans still resented the fact that agreements to such adjudication were 
negotiated out of what was for them a position of weakness, and were offended by 
the eagerness and presumptuousness with which some claimants were obtaining 
redress for what the local governments simply were not, with the best will in the 
world, able to ensure for their own citizens.251  
 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some such arbitrations occurred under the 
pressure of actual or threatened military force by the claimant states.252  
 
In 1926, the validity of the Calvo Clause was contested in the North American Dredging 
Company claim where the US-Mexican Claims Commission sought a balance between 
freedom of a corporation to decide on the contents of a contract and the right of its state 
of nationality to exercise protection. The final award reads: ‘[u]nder the rules of 
international law may an alien make such a promise? The Commission holds that he may, 
but at the same time holds that he cannot deprive the government of his nation of its 
                                               
251 Paulsson (n 222) 22. To show that not all representatives of the industrialised world displayed unfair or 
impartial assessments, Paulsson cites the speech of the US Secretary of State Elihu Root, before the 
American Society of International Law in 1910 (two years before winning the Nobel Peace Prize), where 
he criticised the superfluous complaints of denial of justice – ‘denied justice’ – by U.S. nationals in 
developing nations. See: E Root, ‘The Basis of Protection of Citizens Abroad,’ (1910) 4 AJIL 517, 526-527 
in Paulsson (n 222) 23,24. 
252 Steiner, Alston, and Goodman, Human Rights in context (n 225) 88. 
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undoubted right of applying international remedies to violations of international law 
committed to his damage’.253  
 
Accordingly, the rights protected in the exercise of diplomatic protection may belong to 
the individual national, but the right to exercise diplomatic protection belongs to the state 
of nationality.254 The Commission established, however, that the Calvo Clause 
commitment precluded the individual from presenting to its government any claim 
relative to the interpretation or fulfilment of the contract.255 The Commission stated: ‘As 
the claimant voluntarily entered into a legal contract binding itself not to call as to this 
contract upon its Government to intervene in its behalf, and as all of its claims relates to 
this contract, and as therefore it can not present its claim to its Government for 
interposition or espousal before this Commission’.256 
 
Despite the fact that the treaty under which the Commission operated contained a waiver 
of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Dredging decision limited the claims to those 
‘rightfully presented’, with the effect of barring a claimant who had failed to comply with 
the fundamental contractual term, namely the Calvo Clause. Since the contractual 
obligation under this clause was precisely to resort to national remedies, this aspect of the 
case has been criticised by some scholars.257 Still, as Shea points out, the Dredging 
formula, holding the right of the state of nationality to intervene diplomatically in cases 
                                               
253 Dredging (n 218) 29. 
254 Borchard, Diplomatic Protection (n 227) 805-806. 
255 Dredging (n 218) 30. 
256 ibid 33. 
257 Freeman, ‘Calvo Doctrine’ (n 246) 121-147 and 481-482; EM Borchard, ‘Decisions of the Claims 
Commissions, United States and Mexico’ (1926) XX AJIL 540; and K Lipstein, ‘The Place of the Calvo 
Couse in International Law’ (1945) 22 BYIL 130, 144-145. 
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of denial of justice but denying to the individual the right to request such protection on 
his own initiative without prior exhaustion of local remedies, ‘became the understating 
between the leading nations towards the Calvo Clause’.258  
 
Dredging differentiated between breaches of national law (related to the investment 
contract) and international law (denial of justice). If the Calvo Clause had not been 
included in the contract, the Commission could have reviewed the case without looking at 
the exhaustion of local remedies given that the US and Mexico had waived this 
requirement. No matter the type of breach alleged (municipal or international) the 
Commission would have looked into the question. However, the Commission 
distinguished in this case a diplomatic protection claim based on an international wrong 
(denial of justice) and a claim of breach of contract. Since the individual agreed to the 
terms of the Calvo Clause, the Commission argued that it prevented him from bringing a 
claim before the Commission in regards to anything related to the contract. While the 
Clause was not binding on the state of nationality, the government could only bring a 
claim of diplomatic protection and not a claim for simple breaches to the contract. The 
Commission argued that the Calvo Clause barred the right of the individual to bring the 
claim before its government unless it exhausted domestic remedies, in which case, the 
breach would be a denial of justice (an IWA) and the state of nationality would have the 
right to bring an international (diplomatic) claim regardless of any contractual obligation 
binding on the individual.  
 
                                               
258 Shea (n 223) 221. 
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The Commission noted that the Calvo Clause could not take from a foreign national: ‘his 
undoubted right to apply to his own Government for protection if his resort to the 
Mexican tribunals or other authorities available to him resulted in a denial or delay of 
justice as that term is used in international law’.259 But since the claimant’s grievance 
arose under a contract which it had agreed should be subjected to the authority of the 
Mexican courts, the Commission refused to recognise the claim because it was not ‘based 
on an alleged violation of any rule or principle of international law’ and therefore fell 
under the authority of the local courts which the claimant had wrongfully ignored.  
 
This decision has been simultaneously praised and criticised for trying to balance the 
right of states to exercise diplomatic protection and the obligation of individuals signing 
the Calvo Clause. As mentioned earlier, some scholars censured this decision as a 
political compromise, establishing a legally unsound formula in regards to the Calvo 
Clause and a waiver to the exhaustion of local remedies.260 Paulson on the other hand 
notes that the nuanced manner in which the award in this case upheld the relevant Calvo 
Clause was so successful in terms of articulating a viable distinction that it may be 
described as a watershed. From 1926 onward, it became exceedingly difficult for 
foreigners to deny the validity of the Calvo Clause, and equally difficult for the local 
government to insist that its scope extended to alleged violations of international law.261   
 
                                               
259 Dredging (n 218) 30. 
260 ‘While, in my opinion, the Dredging case is by far the most important decision in the jurisprudence that 
has involved the Calvo Clause, and while it enjoys great authority because of its acceptance by statesmen 
and jurists, it is nevertheless not a well-reasoned or logically consistent decision […]’, Shea (n 223) 211. 
See also, Borchard, ‘Claims Comissions’ (n 257) 540.  
261 Paulsson (n 222) 31.  
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A controversial aspect of this decision is the understanding of denial of justice as a 
systemic breach where the exhaustion of local remedies is a substantive part of the breach 
(and not simply a question of admissibility that can be waived by the parties).262 Within 
this understanding, the delict of denial of justice requires exhaustion of domestic 
remedies irrespective of any general waiver. Paulson advances this proposition. 
According to him, there can be no denial before exhaustion: ‘States do not have an 
international obligation to ensure that no individual judge is ever guilty of a miscarriage 
of justice. The obligation is to establish and maintain a system which does not deny 
justice; the system is the whole pyramid’.263  In a similar way, Francioni explains that: 
[O]nly when ‘justice’ is not delivered either because judicial remedies are not available 
or the administration of justice is so inadequate, deficient, or deceptively manipulated as 
to deprive the injured alien of effective remedial process, can the alien invoke ‘denial of 
justice’: a wrongful act for which international responsibility may arise and in relat ion to 
which an interstate claim and diplomatic protection may be made by the national state of 
the victim.264    
 
Paulson further explains that denial of justice is by definition to be distinguished from 
situations where international wrongs materialise before exhaustion of local remedies. 
                                               
262 ‘The fundamental effect of such [Calvo] Clauses, generally accepted as such since the North American 
Dredging case, is to deny to international tribunals the power to try (or review) dispositions of national law. 
Conduct that is alleged to generate international responsibility may of course be brought to such 
international forums as may have jurisdiction ratione personae. But claims that arise because of the manner 
in which the national system has administered justice do not fall within the scope of authority of claims 
submitted to it, and such an international wrong is not consummated until its remedies have been 
exhausted’ – Paulsson (n 222) 112. 
263 ibid 111. 
264 F Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’ (2009) 20 (3) EJIL, 
731. 
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‘[T]here is no impediment to perceiving that exhaustion of local remedies, […] with 
respect to such wrongs is a waivable procedural precondition’.265 Paulson recognises that 
actions of a lower court may breach international obligations under a treaty. He makes 
reference to the point made by Jimenez de Arechega that ‘State responsibility for acts of 
the Judiciary does not exhaust itself in the concept of denial of justice’.266 He then gives 
the example that a treaty may contain promises of ‘fair and equitable treatment’, which 
are held not to be confined to matters covered by the exhaustion of local remedies. But 
such grievances must according to Paulson ‘find their basis in the lex specialis of the 
treaty; for want of the exhaustion of local remedies, they have not matured as claims of 
denial of justice’.267 Modern bilateral or multilateral investment treaties contain waivers 
of the customary international law requirement that disputing investors exhaust local 
remedies available to them prior to filing an international claim.268 In contrast, all human 
rights treaties require exhaustion of effective and available domestic remedies when 
submitting a claim before an international monitoring body or court.269 
 
                                               
265 Paulsson (n 222) 111. 
266 E Jimenez de Arechaga, 'International Responsibility' in M Sorensen, Manual of Public International 
Law (St. Martin's P. 1968), 555. 
267 Paulsson (n 222) 111. 
268 ‘[F]our key features of investment treaties: they permit investor claims against the state without 
exhausting local remedies; they allow claims for damages; they allow investors to directly seek 
enforcement of awards before domestic courts; and they facilitate forum-shopping. […] investment 
arbitration is best analogized to domestic administrative law rather than to international commercial 
arbitration, especially since investment arbitration engages disputes arising from the exercise of public 
authority by the state as opposed to private acts of the state’ – G van Harten and M Loughlin, ‘Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17(1) EJIL 121. On the other hand, 
Francioni makes the point that ‘[T]he major leap forward in the field of foreign investment law is 
represented by the recognition and consolidation of an indisputable right of access to international justice 
by private investors and by the extension of this right to the courts of third states to the extent that their 
cooperation is necessary in order to enforce international investment awards’. Francioni,‘Access to Justice’, 
(n 264) 731. 
269 For an overview see: Shelton, Remedies (n 12). 
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iii. The renaissance of denial of justice claims under human rights law 
 
Contrary to the belief that HR law would supersede diplomatic protection270 –since it 
affords individual rights for nationals and foreigners alike and allows in many instances 
direct individual claims before international bodies – the post WWII establishment of 
human rights law revived the significance of this institution precisely as a means of 
protection of such rights.271 As explained in the introduction of this chapter, human rights 
law widened the concept of international law in respect of rights of individuals. At 
present, individuals are protected under international law against acts of states that breach 
their HR, including acts or omissions of their state of nationality. Nevertheless, individual 
procedural remedies in international human rights law are scarce. These remedies still 
depend on states establishing them and then complying with their decisions. In addition, 
the great majority of the world population does not have access to a regional HR court 
and there is still no universal HR court under the UN system. 
 
In this context, it is not surprising that aliens have turned to diplomatic protection as an 
option to enforce human rights. The Diallo272 case discussed below is a recent 
                                               
270 Amador and Bennouna questioned the relevance of diplomatic protection in current international law. 
The former attempted to create a synthesis between the international minimum standard and the doctrine of 
national treatment. See: Garcia Amador ‘First Report’ (n 229) [151-159]. The latter questioned the 
relationship between diplomatic protection and the position of the individual in international law, the 
discriminatory nature of diplomatic protection and the measure of discretion invested in states with the 
decision to exercise protection. See: Bennouna, ‘Preliminary Report on Diplomatic Protection’ (1998) 
Document A/CN.4/484, 10-11 [33-37]; [14-15], [49-54]; 3 [8]; and 13 [47] respectively).   
271 M Salazar Albornoz, ‘Legal Nature and Legal Consequences of Diplomatic Protection. Contemporary 
Challenges’ Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 2. (Vol 6 2006) 380.  
272 Diallo, (Preliminary Objections) (n 139). 
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example.273 Even when this mechanism pertains to states as opposed to individuals (the 
espousal of a claim of diplomatic protection is completely discretionary on the will of the 
state of nationality), it is a well-established institution under customary international law. 
As long as states are willing to bring claims on behalf of their nationals, diplomatic 
protection can function as an avenue to seek redress for human rights violations.  
 
At the same time, HR law has influenced the law on diplomatic protection in many 
different aspects. In 1985, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Human 
Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live 
(Declaration of not Nationals).274 The Declaration provides no machinery for its 
enforcement, but it does reiterate the right of the alien to contact his or her consulate or 
diplomatic mission for the purpose of protection. As will be described below, the concept 
that the injury claimed at the international level is an injury of the state as opposed to an 
injury of an individual has departed from its traditional understanding.275 Likewise, the 
notion that individuals have a right to have their claims espoused by their state of 
nationality through diplomatic protection is increasingly accepted. It has been argued 
before domestic courts with a relative degree of success that the obligation to provide 
                                               
273 The ICJ cases of LaGrand (n 92) and Avena (n 123) are arguably human rights cases. However, while 
the Court asserted that the right to consular assistant was an individual right, it did not find it necessary to 
answer the question of whether it was also a human right. See also Armed Activities Case (n 97) [133], 
where the ICJ rejected a counterclaim brought forward by Uganda concerning the ill treatment of 
individuals by the Democratic Republic of the Congo because Uganda had failed to establish the relevant, 
Ugandan, nationality of the individuals concerned. 
274 GA Res 40/144, 13 December 1985. 
275 As shown by the drafting history of Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection and the 
reference to this provision by the ICJ in the Diallo case, there has been a departure from the traditional 
Mavromatis (n 279) understanding of diplomatic protection. While it was not evident that the innovative 
element of the definition of diplomatic protection in the ILC Draft Articles would be accepted – i.e. leaving 
out the part stipulating that a state was ‘adopting in its own right’ the claim of its national – the ICJ 
reference to this provision seem to confirm that it is indeed the up-to-date understating of diplomatic 
protection. See: (n 283-287) and accompanying text.  
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access to justice and effective remedies under international human rights law should be 
construed to oblige states to exercise diplomatic protection in case of serious human 
rights violations.276 
 
At the same time, the conceptualisation of HR challenged some of the traditional 
foundations of the law of diplomatic protection (such as the discriminatory treatment 
between locals and foreigners). It facilitated the acceptance of international scrutiny or 
adjudication in cases of protection of aliens. The international minimum treatment 
standard, while not replaced by human rights law in its entirety, has been clearly 
supplemented by this branch of international law. HR have given a clearer content to the 
minimum treatment standard and the primary rules protecting foreigners. In this sense, 
the introduction of human rights law has improved the notion of what kind of treatment 
aliens and nationals should be accorded. 277  
3. Conditions for the exercise of diplomatic protection 
A. Injuries to aliens as international wrongful acts  
 
                                               
276 A Vermeer-Künzli,  ‘Restricting Discretion: Judicial Review of Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 75(2) 
Nordic Journal of International Law 279, 29. 
277 The focus is less on why aliens should be entitled to treatment in accordance with international 
standards and more on why their own citizens should not be accorded the same level of protection even as a 
matter of national law. As Higgins notes, ‘[t]he national’s standards must be moved up to those required for 
the foreigner under international law; they must not be tied down in misery together’. Higgins, Problems 
and Process (n 63) 159. Sometimes the customary international norms on treatment of aliens and human 
rights treaties require higher than national standards of treatment, sometimes not. That is a matter of 
substance, to be enforced by the competent jurisdiction. This means today: international adjudication.  
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As early as 1758, de Vattel claimed in his treatise, The Law of Nations, that ‘whoever 
uses a citizen ill indirectly offends the State which is bound to protect this citizen’.278 
This notion was confirmed in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, where the 
PCIJ held that ‘a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to 
international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to 
obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels’.279 In extending such protection, 
reasoned the Court, a state was merely preserving its own rights; namely, ‘its right to 
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law’.280 In this 
sense, the understanding of diplomatic protection has a broader meaning than simply 
consular access in foreign states. It includes an international proceeding, constituting ‘an 
appeal by nation to nation for the performance of the obligation of the one to the other, 
growing out of their mutual rights and duties’.281  
i. An injury to the state?  
 
Human rights law has influenced the understating of diplomatic protection in a different 
way. The notion that an injury to the individual is an injury to the state itself is not 
consistently maintained in judicial proceedings. When states bring proceedings, they 
seldom claim that they assert their own rights and often refer to the injured individual as 
the ‘claimant’. In addition, the transfer of compensation received to the injured individual 
                                               
278 de Vattel (n 220) 298. 
279 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case [1924] PCIJ Rep, Ser. A, No 2, at 12 [hereinafter 
Mavrommatis]. 
280 ibid 16. 
281 Borchard, Diplomatic Protection (n 227) 354. 
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is widely supported in state practice.282 Thus, it has been suggested that the state acts as 
agent on behalf of the injured individual. As shown by the drafting history of Article 1 of 
the ILC Draft Articles on diplomatic protection and the reference to this provision by the 
ICJ in the Diallo case,283 the understanding of diplomatic protection has arguably 
departed from the traditional Mavrommatis conception. In the first ILC Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection, draft Article 1 reflected the exact language of Mavrommatis and 
was adopted at the first reading: 
Article 1 
Definition and Scope 
 
Diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or other 
means of peaceful settlement by a State adopting in its own right the 
cause of its national in respect of an injury to that national arising from an 
internationally wrongful act of another State.284 
  
Despite the lack of willingness on behalf of the Special Rapporteur to re-open the debate 
on this draft article, the comments and observations received from governments and 
suggestions from other ILC members triggered a substantial discussion on this point.285 
Italy, in its comments and observations to the draft articles, stated that: 
 
The Government of Italy believes that draft article 1, in giving a definition of the 
concept of ‘diplomatic protection’ and of its scope of application, adopts a 
wording which is too traditional, especially when it speaks of a State ‘adopting in 
its own right the cause of its national’. The wording implies not only that the right 
of diplomatic protection belongs only to the State exercising such protection, but 
also that the right that has been violated by the internationally wrongful act 
belongs only to the same State. However, the latter concept is no longer accurate 
in current international law. The International Court of Justice, in the LaGrand 
                                               
282 J Dugard, ‘Seventh Report on Diplomatic Protection’ 2006 A/CN.4/567 [93-103]  
283 Diallo (Merits) (n 97) [639]. 
284 Dugard, ‘Seventh Report’ (n 282) 5. (emphasis added). 
285 A Vermeer-Künzli, ‘The protection of individuals by means of diplomatic protection: diplomatic 
protection as a human rights instrument’ (Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University 2007) 55. 
<https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/12538> ,accessed 15 March 2016. 
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case and in Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Avena), has established that the 
breach of international norms on treatment of aliens may produce both the 
violation of a right of the national State and the violation of a right of the 
individual. The same conclusion has been reached by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, in its Advisory Opinion OC-16/99.  
 
Therefore the Government suggests that draft article 1 be modified in order to 
codify more clearly current international law. The new wording (which has been 
extracted from the Avena case, para. 40) could be the following:  
 
Diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or other means of 
peaceful settlement by a State claiming to have suffered the violation of its own 
rights and the rights of its national in respect of an injury to that national arising 
from an internationally wrongful act of another State.  
 
One should note that this wording leaves unchanged the basic concept according 
to which the right to exercise diplomatic protection belongs to the State.286 
 
 
While not adopting the Italian proposal in its entirety, its underlying idea, that of the right 
of the individual and of abandoning too much focus on the state as the supreme holder of 
all international rights, received some support in the ILC. As a result, the wording was 
changed significantly to bring the definition on diplomatic protection more in line with a 
modern approach to international law. It left out the part stipulating that a state was 
‘adopting in its own right the claim of its national’:  
 
Article 1 
Definition and Scope 
 
For the purposes of the present draft articles, diplomatic protection 
consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other 
means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an 
injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural 
or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the 
implementation of such responsibility. 
 
                                               
286 Diplomatic Protection: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 58th Session (2006) 
A/CN.4/561/Add.2 2. 
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While it was not evident that the innovative element of the definition of diplomatic 
protection would be accepted (i.e. leaving out the part stipulating that a state was 
‘adopting in its own right’ the claim of its national), the ICJ reference to this provision in 
Diallo seems to confirm that it is indeed the up-to-date understanding of diplomatic 
protection.287 Judge Cançado Trindade stressed in his Separate Opinion that, although the 
formal claimant in the case was Guinea exercising diplomatic protection, ‘the subject 
(titulaire) of the rights breached in the present case is not the applicant State, but the 
individual concerned, Mr A.S. Diallo, who is also the ultimate beneficiary of the 
reparations due’.288  Similarly, Judge Greenwood noted in his Declaration that although 
Guinea had brought the action in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection, ‘the 
case is in substance about the human rights of Mr. Diallo’.289 The Court itself emphasised 
the point when it stated ‘that the sum awarded to Guinea in the exercise of diplomatic 
protection of Mr Diallo is intended to provide reparation for the latter’s injury’.290 
 
Nevertheless, the right to diplomatic protection (i.e. the right to exercise it) belongs to or 
is vested in the state,291 and for a claim to be espoused by a state there must be an 
international wrong attributable to the injuring state. Diplomatic protection can only be 
exercised by states in response to an internationally wrongful act.  
                                               
287 The ILC Commentary to this provision however states that it ‘is formulated in such a way as to leave 
open the question whether the State exercising diplomatic protection does so in its own right or that of its 
national – or both’–Commentary to Article 1, [5] 26. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with 
Commentaries, (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission. [Hereinafter ILC Diplomatic 
Protection Articles]. 
288 Separate Opinion, Diallo (Compensation) (n 113) [203]. 
289 Greenwood’s Declaration, Diallo (Compensation) (n 113) [1]. 
290 ibid [57]. 
291 ‘A State has the right to exercise diplomatic protection in accordance with the present draft articles’. Art 
2 of the ILC Diplomatic Protection Articles (n. 287). 
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The recognition that it is an injury to the individual and not to the state is consistent with 
the development of human rights law and the acknowledgment of the role that individuals 
have in international law. Paradoxically, the rationale behind Vattel’s legal fiction is 
ultimately coherent. If the injury is to the state and not to the individual (because the 
other state failed to afford the minimum treatment required by international law to its 
national), then the state should be the one to have a remedy for such a breach. However, 
if the legal or natural person is the injured party, the party whose rights have been 
breached, shouldn’t the individual have access to remedy directly under international law 
(regardless of the capacity of states to ‘represent’ them in diplomatic procedures)?  
 
ii. The nature of denial of justice: primary and secondary norms 
 
For a state to exercise diplomatic protection, one of its nationals abroad must have 
suffered a denial of justice in accordance with the international minimum standard. Put 
differently, minimum treatment precludes a ‘denial of justice’.  
 
Exactly what sort of treatments constituted an international wrong in the context of state 
responsibility for injuries to aliens prior to the emergence of modern human rights has 
been rather obscure.292  However, the development of human rights law  – the definition 
                                               
292 ‘Denial of justice’ had a broad meaning including any internationally cognizable injury befalling an 
alien. See: Brownlie, Principles (n 24) 429 noting that the expression ‘has been employed by claims 
tribunals so as to be coextensive with the general notion of responsibility for harm to aliens’; Restatement 
3rd of the Foreign Relations Law of the US (1987), para 71. See also Brierly, The Law of Nations (n 243) 
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of which rights individuals are entitled to under international human rights law and what 
types of state acts are prohibited— has certainly clarified the content and understanding 
of the ‘international minimum standard’. The content of the minimum treatment are 
concepts now generally covered by international human rights law (e.g. due process 
violations, arbitrary government use of force, curtailing of freedom of speech, and failure 
to afford effective domestic remedies), but their violation in relation to an alien remains a 
justification for diplomatic protection (for example, the Declaration of not Nationals 293 
or the recent Diallo case294). 
 
States do not have an international obligation to ensure that no individual judge is ever 
guilty of a miscarriage of justice. However, they do have an obligation to establish and 
maintain a system which does not deny justice; the system is the whole pyramid.295 But 
while diplomatic protection is clearly a mechanism to enforce a secondary rule of 
international law (i.e. the procedural action responding to a breach to claim reparation), 
denial of justice is sometimes considered a primary rule and sometimes a part of the 
procedure to claim reparation and therefore a secondary rule (there is a well-established 
obligation to exhaust domestic remedies prior to bringing an international claim). 
Whereas the local remedies rule is a criterion of admissibility, it is closely related to the 
concept of denial of justice/access to justice. Still, denial of justice has generally been 
                                                                                                                                            
286 (‘[t]he term ‘denial of justice’ is sometimes loosely used to denote any international delinquency 
towards and alien for which a state is liable to made reparation . . . There are many possible ways in which 
a court may fall below the standard fairly to be demanded of a civilized state . . . [including] corruption, 
threats, unwarrantable delay, flagrant abuse of judicial procedure, a judgment dictated by the executive, or 
so manifestly unjust that no court which was both competent and honest could have given it’).  
293 (n. 274)  
294 Diallo (Merits) (n 97) 639. 
295 Paulsson (n 222) 109. 
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regarded as part of the primary rules. As Francioni points out, an integral part of the 
‘minimum standard of justice’ is the principle of access to justice, since this principle 
presupposes that the individual who has suffered an injury in a foreign country at the 
hands of public authorities or private entities must be afforded the opportunity to obtain 
redress before a court of law or appropriate administrative agency.296 
 
Access to justice therefore forms part of the content of the minimum standard of justice 
that states need to afford to foreigners residing in their territories. If these primary rights 
are not afforded then the state of nationality has a right to bring an international claim. 
However, in order to institute an international claim of reparation (secondary right) the 
individual has to exhaust all domestic remedies as matter of admissibility. Only if there is 
no effective domestic remedy will the state be able to claim that there was a denial of 
justice. The failure to afford justice is both the procedure to bring and the substance of 
the claim.  
 
In sum, the occurrence of a denial of justice as a primary rule has a bearing on the 
requirement to exhaust local remedies as a secondary rule, but the two are not always 
easily distinguishable. The same occurs in human rights law. The right of access to 
justice (right to an effective remedy) and the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies 
interconnect in a complex relationship where it is difficult to distinguish one from the 
other. All human rights treaties allowing international claims for alleged breaches 
guarantee access to justice and also require as a matter of admissibility prior exhaustion 
                                               
296 Francioni, ‘Access to Justice’ (n 264) 731. 
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of domestic remedies. For example, Article 13 of the ECHR provides that everyone is 
entitled to an effective remedy before a national authority.297  On the other hand, Article 
35 of the ECHR establishes that the Court ‘may only deal with the matter after all 
domestic remedies have been exhausted’.298 In this sense, the substantive/primary right to 
an effective remedy is closely connected to the procedural (admissibility) requirement to 
exhaust local remedies. The ECtHR has acknowledged this relationship: ‘The rule (of 
exhaustion of local remedies) is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the 
Convention – with which it has close affinity – that there is an effective remedy available 
in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system whether or not the provisions are 
incorporated in national law’.299 
 
Complex questions arise as to the inter-relationship between these two articles (and with 
similar provisions in other human rights treaties). The Court is obliged by Article 35 to 
determine whether an application is ‘manifestly ill-founded’, which can involve taking a 
position on the legal and/or factual merits of a claim.300 In this sense, if a complaint is 
declared ‘manifestly ill-founded’, it will not satisfy the threshold test for reliance on 
Article 13. At the same time, if there is no remedy that complies with Article 13, then 
there can be no obligation to have recourse to it.301  
 
                                               
297 Article 13, Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 (4 November 1950) ETS 5 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html> accessed 11 February 2016. 
298 Article 35, idem.  
299 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (16 September 1996) ECHR 65. 
300 D J Harris, M O'Boyle, and C Warbrick, Law of the European convention on human rights (OUP 2009) 
561. 
301 ibid. 
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Under customary rules of state responsibility, the occurrence of an internationally 
wrongful act is both a criterion of admissibility and the primary rule, being part of the 
merits of the claim. The questions of nationality and local remedies will generally be 
dealt with first since failure to comply with the nationality of claims rule or the 
requirement to exhaust local remedies will render the claim inadmissible. If both criteria 
are fulfilled, the merits phase will consider the occurrence of an internationally wrongful 
act. Denial of justice, however, may be a source of international legal responsibility 
independently of the act that created in the first place the basis for resorting to the courts. 
Sometimes, ‘[…] the international responsibility of the State is not engaged by the action 
complained of: it can only arise out of a subsequent act of the State constituting a denial 
of justice to the injured party seeking a remedy for the original action of which he 
complains’. 302 Indeed, it may be that the denial of justice is the result of the failure of 
domestic remedies and therein lies the international wrong. 
B. Exhaustion of domestic remedies  
i. Effective remedies 
 
Under the law on diplomatic protection, a state may not bring an international claim 
arising out of an injury to a national before the injured national has exhausted all 
available and effective local legal remedies in the state alleged to be responsible for the 
injury. In the Interhandel case the ICJ stated that: 
The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings 
may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law; the 
                                               
302 JES Fawcett, ‘The exhaustion of Local Remedies: Substance or Procedure?’ (1954) 31 BYIL 452, 456. 
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rule has been generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause 
of its national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State 
in violation of international law. Before resort may be had to an international 
court in such a situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the 
violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, 
within the framework of its own domestic legal system.303 
 
The court has reiterated that it is ‘an important principle of customary international 
law’.304 Article 44(b) of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that the 
responsibility of a state may not be invoked if ‘the claim is one to which the rule of 
exhaustion of local remedies applies and any available and effective remedy has not been 
exhausted’.305 
 
Local remedies include all effective remedies available to natural or legal persons under 
the domestic law of the state concerned and capable of redressing the situation 
complained of, whether judicial or administrative, at the first, second, or third instance, 
including procedural means and other formal remedies. Extralegal remedies or remedies 
as of grace or favour do not qualify as local remedies.306 In the Ambatielos claim, the 
Arbitral Tribunal declared that ‘it is the whole system of legal protection, as provided by 
municipal law, which must have been put to the test’.307  
 
Ineffective remedies, i.e. those that hold out no real prospects of obtaining the redress 
sought, need not be used: ‘There can be no need to resort to the municipal courts if those 
                                               
303 Interhandel Case (Preliminary Objections) [1959] ICJ Rep. 6, 27.  
304 Elettronica Sicula Spa (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy) [20 July 1989] ICJ 15, 42.  
305 ILC Responsibility Articles (n 16). 
306 Finnish Ships Arbitration (Finland v. United Kingdom) [1934] 3 R.I.A.A. 1479; and see: AP Fachiri, 
‘The Local Remedies Rule in Light of the Finnish Ships Arbitration’ (1936) 17 Brit Y B Int’l L19.  
307 Ambatielos Case (Greece v. UK) [1956] 12 R.I.A.A 91, 12. 
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courts have no jurisdiction to afford relief; nor is it necessary again to resort to those 
courts if the result must be a repetition of a decision already given’.308 The remedies 
must, moreover, be available, effective, and not futile both in theory and practice.309 The 
‘futility rule’ is well established310 and it involves the case where the body allegedly able 
to grant the remedy is in fact limited in its powers and not free to decide upon the 
question that lies at the heart of the complaint. For example, ‘where it is clear that a 
national law justifying the acts of which the alien complains would have to be applied by 
the local organs or courts thus rendering recourse to them obviously futile, local remedies 
need not be exhausted’.311  
ii. Direct, indirect and mixed claims 
 
 
The exhaustion of local remedies rule applies only to cases in which the claimant state 
has been injured ‘indirectly’, that is, through its national. It does not apply where the 
claimant state is directly injured by the wrongful act of another state. In practice, it is 
difficult to decide whether the claim is ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ where it is ‘mixed’, in the 
sense that it contains elements of both injury to the state and injury to the nationals of the 
state.  
                                               
308 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (1939) P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 76, 18.  
309 Interhandel (n 303) (determining whether plaintiff has exhausted all probable remedies before reaching 
the stage of litigating the case in the United States courts). See also: U.S. case Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 
(Sarei IV) 550 F. 3d 822, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) where the Court analysed the principle of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies in international law and concluded that the ‘remedy must be available, 
effective, and not futile’ (Sarei IV, 550 F. 3d at 832). 
310 (i) Forest of Central Rhodope Case (1933) 3 UNRIAA 1405: Local remedies did not have to be 
exhausted where the individual sought to challenge confiscation of forest areas under a national law 
permitting such confiscation; (ii) ILC Third Report on Diplomatic Protection (A/CN.4/523), para 40: 
‘where for instance legislation has been adopted to confiscate the property of an alien and it is clear that 
the courts are obliged to enforce this legislation there will be no need to exhaust local remedies’.  
311 CF Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (2nd edn, CUP 2004) 208. 
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The Diallo case is a recent example of a classic diplomatic protection case, where the 
injury is to the individual national of the claimant state. But the ICJ has also dealt 
recently with the question of mixed claims (direct and indirect injuries) in the context of 
diplomatic protection. Most notably are the decisions in the LaGrand and Avena cases, 
both dealing with the same violation (Article 36.1.b. of the VCCR) but deciding the issue 
in different ways.  In LaGrand, the ICJ remarkably qualified Article 36.1.b of the VCCR 
as an individual right, therefore allowing Germany to claim responsibility for a violation 
of this right vis-à-vis its nationals. In Avena the situation was different. Mexico had 
advanced a ‘mixed claim’ argument, implying there were both direct and indirect injuries 
present. However, the ICJ decided that diplomatic protection was not the mechanism 
Mexico needed to resort to in order to protect its nationals. Instead, it accepted Mexico’s 
claim only as a direct claim, based on direct injury.312  
  
The Court found that the VCCR creates special circumstances through the 
‘interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights’, an interdependence 
already established in LaGrand: ‘Article 36, paragraph 1, establishes an interrelated 
régime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection’.313  
This interdependence, or ‘interrelatedness’, is supposed to exist between Article 36(1)(b) 
as an individual right on the one hand and Article 36(1)(a) and (c) as a state’s right on the 
                                               
312 It is worth noting that the ICJ avoided in both cases any decisions regarding the request by Germany and 
Mexico respectively in regards to the qualification of Article 36(1)(b) as a human right. See, for example, E 
Milano, ‘Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights before the International Court of Justice: re-fashioning 
tradition?’ (2004) 35 NYbIL 85, 127. 
313 LaGrand (n 92) 492 [74].  
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other. According to the Court, those rights do not exist separately, but should be seen as 
parts of one regime for consular protection. It is by virtue of this regime that a violation 
of Article 36(1)(b) necessarily entails a violation of Article 36(1)(a) and (c). Mexico 
therefore ‘may, in submitting a claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the 
violation of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through the violation 
of individual rights conferred on Mexican nationals…’.314  
 
Accordingly, it was not necessary to exhaust local remedies and the Court would not 
‘deal with Mexico’s claims of violation under a distinct heading of diplomatic 
protection’.315 Vermeer-Künzli finds that the Court’s construction of this case as a direct 
injury to the state as opposed to indirect injury (and therefore a case of diplomatic 
protection) is artificial: ‘[…] what is exactly the difference between an indirect injury and 
an injury through nationals? Indeed the phrasing “both direct and through the violations 
of individual rights” suggests that there is a difference’.316  
 
Avena does seem at odds not only with the judgment in LaGrand, but also with some of 
the previous practice of the Court in respect of mixed claims. When presented with this 
type of case, the ICJ generally examined the different elements of the claim and decided 
whether the direct or the indirect element was preponderant. In doing this, it gave regard 
to factors such as the subject of the dispute, the nature of the claim and the remedy 
                                               
314 Avena (n 123), 35-36 [40].  
315 ibid [40]. 
316 A Vermeer-Künzli (n 285)144 <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/12538> accessed 15 
March 2016. 
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claimed. From the jurisprudence in the Hostages,317 Interhandel,318 and ELSI319 cases, it 
would seem that where a subject of the dispute is a diplomatic official or state property 
the claim would normally be direct, but where the state seeks monetary relief on behalf of 
its national the claim would be indirect. While Mexico was not seeking monetary relief in 
Avena (and neither did Germany in LaGrand), it was clearly bringing a case on behalf of 
its nationals who were not diplomatic officials and seeking a remedy on their behalf. In 
the ELSI case, the Court rejected the argument of the United States that part of its claim 
was premised on the violation of a treaty and that it was therefore unnecessary to exhaust 
local remedies, holding that: ‘The Chamber has no doubt that the matter which colours 
and pervades the United States claim as a whole is the alleged damage to Raytheon and 
Machlett [United States corporations]’.320 
 
The view that Avena was indeed a case of diplomatic protection was expressed by some 
of the judges in their separate opinions.321 Specifically, Judge ad hoc Sepulveda observed 
that in keeping with the Court’s previous recognition of violations of individual rights in 
the LaGrand case: 
[…] the Court, in response to Mexico’s submission, should have 
recognised, as a matter of its right to exercise diplomatic protection, the 
espousal by Mexico at the international level of the claims of the 52 
Mexican nationals whose individual rights have been denied, amounting to 
the denial of justice through the judicial process of the United States. […] 
since the application of the doctrine of procedural default by United States 
                                               
317 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3. 
318 Interhandel (n 303). 
319 ELSI (n 304). 
320 ELSI (n 304) 43 [52]. 
321 See generally: Separate Opinion Judge Toka and Separate Opinion Judge ad hoc Sepulveda, Avena (n 
123). 
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courts means, for all practical purposes, that there are no remedies to 
exhaust, and that the futility rule becomes fully operative. […].322 
 
It goes without saying that in deciding upon the futility of the local remedies a court may 
find itself in a difficult situation.323 However, the ICJ had already discussed the 
procedural default rule in LaGrand, concluding that the rule rendered appeals to local 
remedies ineffective. In Avena, the Court recognised that no fundamental change had 
been made to the rule, implying that the continued application of the procedural default 
rule made resort to local remedies ineffective. The Court therefore could simply have 
concluded that the procedural default rule barred effective recourse to local remedies and 
that the remedies had to be regarded as exhausted accordingly. In contrast, by choosing to 
qualify Avena as direct violation, it failed to address the denial of justice claim and the 
continuing failure of the United States to afford effective remedies for aliens.  
 
On the other hand, as observed by Vermeer-Künzli, the Court did not answerer the 
question of whether the right to consular notification and communication under the 
VCCR is a human right. Without considering that it should be, she makes the point that if 
the Court had answered in the affirmative, the case would have been an example of the 
function of diplomatic protection as an instrument to protect human rights.324  
 
                                               
322 Separate Opinion Judge ad hoc Sepulveda, Avena (n 123) [22].  
323 The Chamber of the Court in the ELSI case acknowledged that ‘it is never easy to decide, in a case 
where there has in fact been much resort to the municipal courts, whether local remedies have truly been 
“exhausted”’, ELSI (n 304) [63]. 
324 Vermeer-Künzli (n 285) 156-157 <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/12538> accessed 15 
March 2016. 
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C. Nationality of claims 
 
The state’s right to exercise diplomatic protection is based on the link of nationality 
between the individual and the state. This is reflected in Article 3(1) of the Draft Articles 
on Diplomatic Protection, which provides that: ‘The State entitled to exercise diplomatic 
protection is the State of nationality’.325 This is one of the main criticisms of diplomatic 
protection as a tool to protect human rights.326 The institution is inherently discriminatory 
as it only protects nationals of states that are aliens in the wrongdoing state and not 
everyone suffering from the same international wrong. In contrast, human rights 
conventions protect all individuals under the jurisdiction of the wrongdoing states.  
 
In the Armed Activities case327 the ICJ rejected a counterclaim brought forward by 
Uganda concerning the ill treatment of individuals by the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo because Uganda had failed to establish the relevant, Ugandan, nationality of the 
individuals concerned328:  
 
333. [,,,] The Court is of the opinion that in presenting this part of the 
counter-claim Uganda is attempting to exercise its right to diplomatic 
protection with regard to its nationals. It follows that Uganda would need 
to meet the conditions necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection 
as recognised in general international law, namely the requirement of 
Ugandan nationality of the claimants and the prior exhaustion of local 
remedies. The Court observes that no specific documentation can be found 
                                               
325 ILC Diplomatic Protection Articles (n. 287). 
326 See, for example, Bennouna who questioned the relationship between diplomatic protection and the 
position of the individual in international law, the discriminatory nature of diplomatic protection and the 
measure of discretion invested in states with the decision to exercise protection [Bennouna (n 270) 10-11 
[33-37]; 14-15 [49-54]; 3 [8]; and 13 [47] respectively). 
327 Armed Activities Case (n 97). 
328 ibid [333]. 
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in the case file identifying the individuals concerned as Ugandan 
nationals. The Court thus finds that, this condition not being met, 
Uganda’s counter-claim concerning the alleged maltreatment of its 
nationals not enjoying diplomatic status at Ndjili International Airport is 
inadmissible. 
 
Judge Simma, in a strong separate opinion to the judgment, argued that the jus cogens 
nature of the breaches of international law provided Uganda with legal standing 
regardless of nationality links: 
 
The specific construction of the rights and obligations under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention as well as the relevant provisions of Protocol I 
Additional to this Convention not only entitles every State party to raise 
these violations but even creates an obligation to ensure respect for the 
humanitarian law in question. The rules of the international law of State 
responsibility lead to an analogous result as concerns the violations of 
human rights of the persons concerned by the Congolese soldiers.329 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, it is unclear if or how international law allows any state in 
cases of serious erga omnes violations to claim reparation on behalf of the injured 
individuals (irrespective of nationality) from the responsible state.330 What is clear is that 
international custom and general principles of law set limits in the conferral of nationality 
for the purpose of diplomatic protection by describing the linkages between states and 
individuals, which will result in the nationality conferred by a state being recognised by 
international law. Birth (jus soli), descent (jus sanguinis), and naturalisation are the 
connections generally recognised by international law. When drafting the Articles on 
diplomatic protection, the ILC considered whether in addition to one of these connecting 
                                               
329 Separate Opinion Judge Simma, Armed Activities Case (n 97) [37]. 
330 See: Article 48(2)(b) of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). This rule allows any state in cases of 
serious erga omnes violations to claim reparation from the responsible state. Such a claim must be made in 
the interest of the injured state, if any, or of the beneficiaries of the obligations breached. According to the 
ILC Commentary on Article 48, this measure is justified since it provides a means of protecting the 
community or collective interest at stake. Commentary to Article 48, in Report of the ILC Responsibility 
Articles (n 23) [12]. 
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factors – and particularly in the case of naturalisations – there must be a ‘genuine’ or 
‘effective’ link between the state asserting the claim and the individual.  
 
The Nottebohm case, in which Liechtenstein sought unsuccessfully to claim reparation on 
behalf of a naturalised national from Guatemala, with which the national (Nottebohm) 
had had a close ties for over thirty-four years, is seen as authority for the proposition that 
there should be an ‘effective’ or ‘genuine’ link between the individual and the State of 
nationality, not only in the case of dual or plural nationality, but also where the national 
possess only one nationality.331  
 
In codifying the law of diplomatic protection, the ILC took the view that a state is not 
required to demonstrate an effective or genuine link between itself and its national.  332  In 
                                               
331 According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinion of writers, 
nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, 
interest and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to 
constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred either directly by 
the law or as a result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the 
state conferring nationality than with that of any other state. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State 
to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the 
individual’s connection that has made him its national. [Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) [1955] ICJ 
Rep 4, 23]. 
332 The Commentary to Article 4 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection states: ‘Despite divergent 
views as to the interpretation of the case [Nottebohm], the Commission took the view that there were 
certain factors that served to limit Nottebohm to the facts of the case in question, particularly the fact that 
the ties between Mr Nottebohm and Liechtenstein (the Applicant State) were ‘extremely tenuous’ 
compared with the close ties between Mr Nottebohm and Guatemala (the Respondent State) for a period of 
over 34 years, which led the International Court of Justice to repeatedly assert that Liechtenstein was ‘not 
entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala’. This suggests that the Court did not 
intend to expound a general rule applicable to all States but only a relative rule according to which a State 
in Liechtenstein’s position was required to show a genuine link between itself and Mr Nottebohm in order 
to permit it to claim on his behalf against Guatemala with whom he had extremely close ties. Moreover, it 
is necessary to be mindful of the fact that if the genuine link requirement proposed by Nottebohm was 
strictly applied, it would exclude millions of persons from the benefit of diplomatic protection as in today’s 
world of economic globalization and migration there are millions of persons who have moved away from 
their State of nationality and made their lives in States whose nationality they never acquire or have 
acquired nationality by birth or descent from States with which they have a tenuous connection’. 
Commentary to Article 4, ILC Diplomatic Protection Articles (n. 287). [5]. 
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its view, the Court was determined to propound a relative test only, i.e. that Nottebohm’s 
close ties with Guatemala trumped the weaker nationality link with Liechtenstein. In 
these circumstances, the Nottebohm requirement of a ‘genuine link’ should be confined to 
the peculiar facts of the case and not seen as a general principle of all cases of diplomatic 
protection. 333  
 
The ILC articles also deal with other aspects of nationality and diplomatic protection. 
Article 6 describes the principles of multiple nationality and claims against a third state. 
Article 9 recognises that incorporation confers nationality on a corporation, but provides 
an exception for cases where there is no significant connection between the corporation 
and its state of incorporation. This article, together with Article 11, outlines clear 
exceptions to the rule expounded in the Barcelona Traction,334 specifically in cases in 
which the court will lift the corporate veil in order to allow the state of nationality of the 
shareholders to exercise diplomatic protection. Where an exception applies, as the 
shareholders in a company may be nationals of different states, several states of 
nationality may be able to exercise diplomatic protection. Article 11 outlines the 
exceptions in favour of the right of the state of the shareholders of a corporation to 
intervene against the state of the incorporation when it is responsible for causing injury to 
the corporation. In the Diallo case,335 the ICJ left open the question of whether the rule 
contained in Article 11(b), which requires the claimant state to show that the company 
                                               
333 See: Commentary to Article 4, ILC Diplomatic Protection Articles (n. 287). [5]. 
334 Barcelona Traction (n 174). For a brief explanation of the ILC reasoning, see: Dugard ‘Diplomatic 
Protection’ in Crawford, The Law of State Responsibility (n 51). See also Commentary to Article 9[4]; 
Commentary to Article 11[3], ILC Diplomatic Protection Articles (n. 287). 
335 Diallo (Preliminary Objections) (n 139). 
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was compelled to incorporate in the respondent state, is a rule of customary international 
law.336  
 
Finally, the ILC considered the codification of the rule of continuous nationality – that a 
state may exercise diplomatic protection only on behalf of a person who was a national of 
that state at time of the injury on which the claim is based and who had continuously 
been a national of that state up to and including the time of the presentation of the claim. 
According to Dugard, the ILC refused to accept the dictum in Loewen Group Inc. v 
USA,337 which proclaims an absolute requirement of continuous nationality, but Article 
5338 does accept the principle which formed the basis for the Tribunal’s factual finding 
that a state may no longer exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who 
                                               
336 ibid [91-93]. 
337 (2005) 7 ICSID Reports 442, 485 [225]. 
338 Continuous nationality of a natural person  
1. A State is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who was a national of 
that State continuously from the date of injury to the date of the official presentation of the claim. 
Continuity is presumed if that nationality existed at both these dates.  
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person 
who is its national at the date of the official presentation of the claim but was not a national at the 
date of injury, provided that the person had the nationality of a predecessor State or lost his or her 
previous nationality and acquired, for a reason unrelated to the bringing of the claim, the 
nationality of the former State in a manner not inconsistent with international law. 
3. Diplomatic protection shall not be exercised by the present State of nationality in respect of a 
person against a former State of nationality of that person for an injury caused when that person 
was a national of the former State of nationality and not of the present State of nationality.  
4. A State is no longer entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who 
acquires the nationality of the State against which the claim is brought after the date of the official 
presentation of the claim. 
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acquires the nationality of the state against which the claim is brought after the date of 
presentation of the claim.339 
D. Assessment of individual damage  
 
 
In reality, despite compensation being the most commonly sought form of reparation in 
international practice,340 it is not so in the practice of ICJ cases. It is the declaration of 
non-compliance that is most often sought. Still, the Court has laid plenty of guidelines to 
assess individual damage and the adequate forms of reparation that need to be afforded 
by states.   
 
The ICJ has indicated that the basic principle of reparation articulated in the Chorzów 
case applies to reparation for injury to individuals, even when a specific jurisdictional 
provision on reparation is contained in the statute of the tribunal.341 In the Chorzów, the 
Court found that its jurisdiction extends to method of payment, beneficiaries, and other 
aspects of reparation.342 Later, in the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ decided that it had 
competence to assess the actual amount of damages due in any case where it had 
competence to say that there was a duty to pay compensation.343 The Court relied on the 
principle of effectiveness in finding that it was required to set the amount: ‘If, however, 
the Court should limit itself to saying that there is a duty to pay compensation without 
deciding what amount of compensation is due, the dispute would not be finally decided. 
                                               
339 Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in Crawford, The Law of State Responsibility (n 51) 1061. 
340 See: ILC commentary to Article 36 of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). 
341 Chorzów (Indemnity) (n 131). 
342 Chorzów (n 22) 61–62. 
343 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Alb.) (Merits) [9 April 1949] ICJ Rep 4, 23–24. 
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An important part of it would remain unsettled’.344 The Court afforded compensation 
once more in the Diallo case, this time for individual non-material damage. The context 
and criteria of this decision will be analysed below.  
     
Non-material and moral damage to states may, in several cases, be redressed by 
satisfaction. In the Rainbow Warrior arbitration, the tribunal noted:  
There is a long established practice of States and international Courts and 
Tribunals of using satisfaction as a remedy or form of reparation (in the wide 
sense) for the breach of an international obligation. This practice relates 
particularly to the case of moral or legal damage done directly to the State, 
especially as opposed to the case of damage to persons involving 
international responsibilities. 345  
 
On the other hand, it is generally accepted that where restitution is not provided or does 
not fully eliminate the consequences of the harm, the state responsible must compensate 
for any financially assessable damage, including loss of profits, that its wrongful act 
caused the injured state or its nationals.346 Prior practice firmly supports this rule.347 In 
the same way, an award of compensation should redress moral damage caused to 
individuals as long as is assessable in economic terms.348 The applicable principles of 
                                               
344 ibid 26. 
345 Rainbow Warrior, France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal, 82 I.L.R. 500 (1990), 272–73; see also: 
Arrest Warrant finding by the Court of international responsibility deemed satisfaction for the moral injury 
suffered by the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (Case concerning Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 [48] [hereinafter Arrest Warrant]; Corfu Channel (Merits) (n 343) 35-36 
(finding the declaration of a violation in itself appropriate satisfaction). 
346 Article 36 of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). The commentary to Article 36 specifies in 
paragraph 1 that compensation is intended to exclude moral damage to a state, which is the subject matter 
of satisfaction and is dealt with in Article 37. The Commentaries are reproduced in the Report of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles (n 23).  
347 Chorzów (Indemnity) (n 131) 47; Corfu Channel (Merits) (n 343).  
348 See: Commentary to Article 36, Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). 
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international law for moral damage caused to individuals were first reflected in the 
Lusitania opinion:   
That one injured is, under the rules of international law, entitled to be 
compensated for an injury resulting in mental suffering, injury to his 
feelings, humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social position or injury 
to his credit or to his reputation, there can be no doubt... Such damages are 
very real, and the mere fact that they are difficult to measure or estimate 
by money standards makes them none the less real and affords no reason 
why the injured person should not be compensated therefore as 
compensatory damages....349  
 
Apart from the Corfu Chanel case in 1949, the ICJ judgment of Diallo is only the second 
time that the ICJ has awarded an amount of compensation owed by a state to another with 
respect to violations of international law found by the Court.350 However, Diallo is the 
first time that the Court itself had to come up with an amount of compensation. In Corfu 
Chanel, Albania refused to appear at the compensation stage since it had contested the 
jurisdiction of the Court to fix an amount of compensation on the basis of the Special 
Agreement.351 Notwithstanding, the ICJ held that the Special Agreement could not be 
regarded as narrowing the ICJ’s jurisdiction for a case it had already decided. The Court 
                                               
349 Lusitania case, (United States v. Germany) (1923) 7 R.I.A.A. 32, 40. 
350 Sometimes parties have reserved the right to ask the Court for compensation but then have failed to do 
so. For example, in the late 1980s, Nicaragua was poised to pursue its compensation claim after its 
successful case against the U.S. with regard to the ‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua’- Nicaragua Case (n. 160). In fact, Nicaragua had filed its memorial on compensation in which 
it claimed billions of US dollars, and the Court had written to Nicaragua to say it was minded to fix oral 
hearings on compensation for October 1990. However, in 1990 there was a change of government in 
Nicaragua that led to a decision to drop the compensation claim. See: D Akande, ‘Award of Compensation 
by International Tribunals in Inter-State Cases: ICJ decision in the Diallo Case’ 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/award-of-compensation-by-international-tribunals-in-inter-state-cases-icj-
decision-in-the-diallo-case/> accessed 9 April 2013. 
351 The Compromise did not explicitly authorise the ICJ to decide on the amount of damages. In a letter 
dated 29 June 1949, the Agent for the Albanian Government informed the Court that in the opinion of his 
Government: ‘in accordance with the Special Agreement signed between the Agents of the People's 
Republic of Albania and of Great Britain, on March 25th, 1948, and presented to the Court on the same 
day, the Court had solely to consider the question of whether Albania was, or was not, obliged to pay 
compensation for the damage caused to the British warships in the incident of October 22nd, 1946, and the 
Special Agreement did not provide that the Court should have the right to fix the amount of the 
compensation and, consequently, to ask Albania for information on that subject’ – Corfu Channel Case 
(Assessment of the Amount of Compensation) [Dec 1949] ICJ 15, 245. 
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applied Article 53, para. 2, of the Statute352 and through an expert opinion decided the 
amounts claimed by the UK were ‘well founded in fact and law’.353 The Court did not 
have to make an evaluation of its own. Albania was ordered to pay the UK £843,947 in 
compensation, establishing a first precedent for the award of damages for material injury. 
With respect to the UK’s violation of Albania’s sovereignty, the ICJ found that its 
declaration of illegality served as satisfaction for immaterial damage.354 
 
In Diallo, the Court for the first time decided the amount of compensation. In a 
judgement of 19 June 2012, the ICJ noted that Guinea required compensation under four 
heads of damage: non-material injury and three heads of material damage. It sought a 
total of US$11,590,148 [US$250,000 for mental and moral damage, including injury to 
his reputation; US$6,430,148 for loss of earnings during his detention and following his 
expulsion; US$550,000 for other material damage; and US$4,360,000 for loss of 
potential earnings] plus a further US$500,000 for its ‘unrecoverable costs’ as a result of 
instituting the proceedings. In contrast, the DRC argued that only US$30,000 was due to 
Guinea to make good the non-pecuniary injury suffered by Mr Diallo as a result of his 
detentions and expulsions in 1995-1996.355 
 
                                               
352Article 53(2). ‘The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in 
accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law’. Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&, Accessed 10 
April 2013. 
353 Corfu Channel (Compensation) (n 351) 245. 
354 ibid. 
355 Diallo, (Compensation) (n 113) [10].  
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The Court rejected as unfounded the material damages claimed by Guinea, either for lack 
of evidence356 or because they fell beyond the scope of the proceedings, except for the 
claim of loss of property from his apartment. While according to the Court, Guinea had 
also failed to prove concrete losses in this respect, it was satisfied that the DRC’s 
unlawful conduct had caused some material injury. For this reason it decided on the basis 
of equitable considerations to award US$10,000. 357 
 
Notably, the Court made it clear that ‘non-material injury can be established even without 
specific evidence’358 and that ‘quantification of compensation for non-material injury 
necessarily rests on equitable considerations’.359 The Court said it was ‘reasonable to 
conclude that the DRC’s wrongful conduct caused Mr Diallo significant physiological 
suffering and loss of reputation’.360 In order to decide upon the amount of compensation 
for moral damage, the Court took into account various factors, including the arbitrary 
nature of his arrest and detentions, the unjustifiably long periods during which he was 
detained, the unsupported accusations against him, and his wrongful expulsion from a 
country where he had resided for thirty-two years and where he had engaged in 
significant business activities. It also gave weight to the link between Mr Diallo’s 
expulsion and the fact that he had attempted to recover debts which he believed were 
owned to his companies by the Zairean state or companies in which the state held a 
                                               
356 See, in particular, the Declaration by Judge Greenwood, where he is highly critical of the amounts 
sought by Guinea and the contradictory evidence on the merits and the compensation stages regarding the 
financial situation of Mr Diallo. Declaration, (Compensation) (n 113) [3-5]. Available at: <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/103/17044.pdf> accessed 11 April 2013.  
357 Diallo, (Compensation) (n 113) [30-60]. 
358 ibid [21]. 
359 ibid [24]. 
360 ibid [22]. 
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substantial portion of the capital. Still the Court took into account ‘[…] its earlier 
conclusion that it had not been demonstrated that Mr. Diallo was mistreated in violation 
of Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant (ibid., p. 671, para. 89)’.361 It decided that 
‘With regard to the non-material injury suffered by Mr. Diallo, the circumstances 
outlined in paragraphs 21to 23 lead the Court to considered that the amount of 
US$85,000 would provide appropriate compensation […]’.362  
 
There is an immense gap between the amount of compensation sought by Guinea (more 
than US$11.5 million) and the compensation ordered by the Court of a total of 
US$95,000, less than 1 percent of that claim. Two reasons seem to be given in the 
Judgement for this decision. First, Guinea was unsuccessful in convincing the Court to 
reconsider its restrictive ruling in the two earlier judgements (preliminary objections and 
merits), where the Court rejected the claim for alleged infringements of the rights to 
Diallo’s two companies and then of Diallo’s rights as a shareholder of the companies.363 
The second reason for the Court’s award was the lack of supporting evidence. Indeed, 
Guinea did not offer any specific evidence on most of the claims. While the ICJ noted 
that the abruptness of Mr Diallo’s expulsion from the DRC made it difficult for him and 
Guinea to locate certain documents,364 the award was wholly based on ‘equitable 
considerations’.365 Finally, referring to Article 64 of the Statute, the Court also decided 
                                               
361 ibid [22]. 
362 ibid [25]. 
363 For a more detailed analysis, see: M Andenas, ‘Ahmadou Sadio Diallo’ (January 2013) 107(1) AJIL 
178-183. 
364 Diallo, (Compensation) (n 113) [16]. 
365 ibid [24] and [33]. 
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each party should bear its own costs. The Judgment was by a strong majority of 15-1 and 
was a clear win for the DRC with regards to the quantum of damages. 
 
Diallo highlights the challenge of calculating damages for injuries suffered by an 
individual within the framework of the ICJ, a court designed to settled questions of 
international law in inter-state disputes. In a departure from its usual style, the ICJ 
actively looked to the practices of other international bodies,366 including the ECtHR, the 
IACtHR, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission (EECC), and the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC). As noted by 
Judge Greenwood in his Declaration, the sums awarded for moral damage in human 
rights courts are usually quite small.367  This is one of the reasons he highlights in order 
to explain why Guinea recovered ‘what seems at first sight to be so little’.368  
 
The correctness of the Court’s reliance on the jurisprudence of regional human rights 
courts as a reference to the assessment of compensation for non-material injuries is a 
complex question. While these bodies undoubtedly have the most qualified expertise in 
affording reparation for international human rights violations, compensation for 
individual non-material damage varies greatly in domestic jurisdictions. Sometimes the 
awards afforded by domestic tribunals are starkly higher than those of international 
human rights tribunals; sometimes they are lower. In addition, the criteria used by human 
                                               
366 ibid [13]. 
367 Greenwood’s Declaration, ibid  [9]. 
368 ibid [1]. 
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rights courts when affording compensation for non-material damage is generally blurred 
since the amount is always difficult to quantify or assess.369  
 
It is also worth considering that Diallo is the first time that a violation of the ICCPR 
carried an undoubtedly legally binding order of compensation for an in individual. It is 
also the first case where a state brought a classic diplomatic protection claim (i.e. on 
behalf of its national) based on breaches of human rights treaties.  Clearly, this was a 
relatively lengthy and probably much more costly litigation than similar cases before 
regional human rights courts. Given the amount of compensation afforded to Guinea, it is 
difficult to imagine analogous cases being brought before the ICJ in the future. Perhaps 
the Court was not interested in setting this case as general precedent for this type of 
litigation. After all, Judge Greenwood makes it clear that ‘this case is very far from being 
one of the gravest human rights violations’.370 
4. Relationship between diplomatic protection and human rights claims 
 
In its historical evolution, the ‘minimum standard of treatment to aliens’ is inseparable 
from the right to access to justice. The rule requiring prior exhaustion of local remedies 
as a precondition for diplomatic protection proves this symbiotic relation. This rule 
presupposes the international obligation of every state to ensure that aliens have access to 
courts and to administer justice in accordance with minimum standards of fairness and 
due process. In a similar way, and obviously influenced by the law on protection of 
aliens, international human rights law also requires the exhaustion of effective domestic 
                                               
369 See: Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 301.  
370 Greenwood’s Declaration, Diallo (Compensation) (n 113) [11]. 
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remedies prior to bringing individual claims before international HR bodies. The local 
remedies rule presupposes access to justice for everyone under the jurisdiction of any 
state.  
  
It is clear therefore that state responsibility for treatment of aliens and reparation for 
human rights violations are closely related. Evidence shows that there has been ample 
cross-fertilization between the two bodies of law (e.g. in addition to exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, human rights law also allows inter-state claims). But the notion that 
an international (HR) standard of justice applies to individuals at home and foreigners 
abroad led some to argue that diplomatic protection would be superseded by human 
rights law.371 Clearly, the international HR standard, which accords to nationals and 
aliens the same standard of treatment, covers the equality-of-treatment-with-nationals-
standard and the international minimum standard of treatment of aliens.372  However, as 
pointed by John Dugard, Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, ‘[w]hile the 
individual may have rights under international law his or her remedies are limited[…]’.373 
The position of the alien abroad is no better. Outside the field of foreign investment, there 
is no multilateral convention that seeks to provide remedies for the protection of his or 
her rights.374 Dugard argues therefore that until the individual acquires comprehensive 
                                               
371 Garcia Amador attempted to create a synthesis between the international minimum standard and the 
doctrine of national treatment based on the new law of human rights and fundamental freedoms Amador (n 
229) [151-159]. 
372. Idem 
373 ‘…The sad truth is that only a handful of individuals, in a limited number of States that accept the right 
of individual petition…have obtained or will obtain satisfactory remedies from these conventions’. Dugard 
‘Diplomatic Protection’ in Crawford, The Law of State Responsibility (n 51) . 
374 The Special Rapporteur follows Lillich rationale that ‘pending the establishment of international 
machinery granting third party determination of disputes between alien claimants and States, it is in the 
interest of international lawyers not only to support the doctrine [of diplomatic protection] but to oppose 
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procedural rights under international law, it would be a setback for human rights to 
abandon diplomatic protection. 375 
 
There is no doubt that a substantial gap exists between theory and practice when it comes 
to remedies for human rights violations. Despite the general recognition that victims of 
violations of human rights have a right to reparation in international law, there is an 
abundance of inter-related legal, political, and practical hurdles that continue to hinder 
the fulfilment of this right in practice. When bringing complaints in the state where the 
violation occurred, victims often encounter obstacles like immunities of the state and its 
agents, amnesties, short limitations periods, non-enforcement of judgments, lack of 
protection of victims and witnesses, intimidation campaigns, and so on. These obstacles 
multiply when human rights violations are widespread and/or systematic. In addition, 
international remedies are limited and it is not clear whether individuals can bring human 
rights claims before domestic or foreign courts based solely on international law.  
 
In this context, it is true that diplomatic protection may serve as a tool to assist victims of 
human rights violations seeking remedies and reparation. Recent ICJ jurisprudence on 
diplomatic protection confirms this possibility.376 The court affirmed in Diallo: ‘[o]wing 
                                                                                                                                            
vigorously any effort to cripple or destroy it’ – R Lillich, ‘The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: 
An Elementary Principle of International Law under Attack’ (1975) 69 AJIL 359, cited in Dugard 
‘Diplomatic Protection’ (n 51).. See also: N Rodley, ‘Nationalization by Peru’ in Rodley and Ronning (eds) 
International Law in the Western Hemisphere (Nijhoff 1974) 112, where he distinguishes human rights and 
economic interests in the context of diplomatic protection. 
375 Dugard ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in Crawford, The Law of State Responsibility (n 51). 
376 In addition to Diallo, the ICJ dealt with individual rights in LaGrand (n 92) and Avena (n 123), although 
it did not establish whether these were human rights. The Court also examined human rights law in the 
Wall Opinion (n94) and Armed Activities (n 97). In the latter the Court also examined the question of 
diplomatic protection. 
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to substantive development in international law over recent decades in respect of the 
rights it accords to individuals, the scope ratione materiae of diplomatic protection …has 
subsequently widened to include, inter alia, internationally guaranteed human rights’.377 
 
After all, state responsibility for injuries to aliens is a well-established rule of customary 
international law, albeit only protecting individuals from foreign governments (and not 
others who may suffer from the same situation). But the exercise of diplomatic protection 
is completely discretionary. It protects only nationals of states that are willing to use it – a 
decision that will be influenced by economic and political factors. Under the norms of 
state responsibility for injuries to aliens, states have no obligation to represent their 
citizens in any sort of diplomatic or judicial forum.  The severity of the violations plays 
no role in the decision of states to exercise this remedy. There is nothing individuals can 
do to force states to take diplomatic action and to take their perspective into account 
when bringing claims. As such, diplomatic protection cannot be considered a HR remedy 
but only a subsidiary machinery to enforce (some) HR. As long as diplomatic protection 
is conceived as a well-established mechanism that can fill the gap that exists due to the 
lack of recognition of procedural standing of the individual in international law, 
diplomatic protection should be encouraged and strengthened. But it should not be 
confused with an effective remedy in accordance with HR standards and certainly should 
not bar the implementation or development of independent and enforceable remedies 
under human rights law. 
 
                                               
377 Diallo, Preliminary Objections, (n 139) [ 39]  
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Finally, to conclude this chapter, it is worth considering the following paradox. As clearly 
shown by the history of diplomatic protection, the strengthening of the exhaustion of the 
local remedies rule as a way to protect state sovereignty was born in response to the 
practice of abusive inter-state commercial activities. It was in this context that the 
principle of equality and state sovereignty was vigorously upheld and reinforced (e.g. the 
Calvo Doctrine). However, it is more common nowadays to apply a restrictive reading of 
the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and the protection of sovereign equality in HR 
cases than in cases involving transnational commercial activities. To begin with, 
international HR law applies the exhaustion of local remedies rule for all individual 
claims before international bodies. Likewise, sovereign and diplomatic immunity 
generally bar HR claims before third state courts,378 as well as before the courts of the 
state where the violations occurred (forum state) when the perpetrators are officials of 
another state or the state itself is being sued.379 In contrast, modern commercial 
arbitration allows direct claims by legal persons (without exhaustion of local remedies) 
and binds third states to enforce their judgements. Similarly, commercial activity is an 
exception to the principle of sovereign and diplomatic immunity when governments or 
state officials are sued in foreign courts. 380 
  
                                               
378 See, for example, Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, Merits, App No 35763/97, ECHR 2001-XI; Jones and 
Others v The United Kingdom App nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06 (ECtHR, 14 January 2014). The ICJ 
established that even in criminal cases, diplomatic immunity would bar the jurisdiction against acting heads 
of governments and other officials such as the minister for foreign affairs. See: Arrest Warrant case (n 345)  
379 See: Germany v Italy (n 25) 143. 
380 For an insight into the relationship between human rights law and trade law in the context of access to 
justice, see: Francioni, ‘Access to Justice’ (n 264). 
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Chapter 3: Is there an individual right to reparation for 
violations of International Humanitarian Law against states? 
 
 
Kill one man, and you are a murderer. Kill millions of men, and you are a conqueror. 
Kill them all, and you are a god. 
Jean Rostand, Thoughts of a Biologist (1939) 
 
 
1. Reparation and remedies for IHL breaches 
 
Previous chapters analysed whether individuals have rights in international law and 
therefore an enforceable right to reparation when such rights are breached. As shown, the 
ILC Responsibility Articles do not exclude this possibility in cases of fundamental rights. 
The development of human rights law and the law on diplomatic protection also support 
this interpretation. However, recent events in the area of IHL have been interpreted as 
pointing into a different direction. The ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
established that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign immunity by allowing WWII claims 
to proceed in Italian courts. The Court did not find it necessary to address the question of 
individual reparation for serious violations of IHL;381 it simply looked at whether 
Germany enjoyed immunity in Italian courts according to present customary international 
law and answered this question affirmatively. However it did ‘regret’ leaving the victims 
without a remedy.382 While this decision is specific to the circumstances of the case (i.e. a 
WWII claim brought before a foreign court), it has been read as ‘putting an end to a 
                                               
381‘[B]ecause immunity is upheld, no need to examine questions whether individuals are directly entitled to 
compensation for violation of IHL and whether states may validly waive the claims of their nationals in 
such cases’ – Germany v Italy (n 25) [108].  
382 See: (n 26).  
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debate that arose out of the noble motive to improve the fate of victims of armed conflict 
but failed to fully grasp the complexity of financial settlement after armed conflict’. 383 
 
The Principles and Guidelines recognise the existence of a right to a (procedural) remedy 
and (substantive) reparation for individual victims of gross violations of HR and serious 
violations of IHL (including, when applicable, a right to compensation). For this reason, 
the present chapter will analyse the question of reparation and remedies for IHL breaches. 
It will give a brief description of the status of the law at the time the set of Principles and 
Guidelines was drafted and the more recent developments in this area of law after its 
adoption by the UN General Assembly. The chapter will confine the discussion mainly to 
compensation. Financial reward is among the most frequent issues arising in the context 
of the right of individuals to reparation in cases of serious violations of IHL.384 Having 
this in mind, it will analyse a) whether there is a right to a (procedural) remedy and 
(substantive) reparation for individuals directly under IHL, and b) whether there is a right 
to reparation for victims of serious violations of IHL under the general principles of state 
responsibility. The first part describes the ambiguities of the relevant provisions on 
compensation enshrined in the Hague Convention IV of 1907 (Hague IV) and Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts (‘AP I’) 385 and investigates if these provisions 
can apply to individuals. It shows that while the evidence is inconclusive to establish that 
the IHL provisions on compensation apply to individuals, nothing in IHL prevents 
                                               
383 Tomuschat, ‘The Individual before National Courts’ (n 27) 826. 
384 Gaeta, ‘Compensation’ (n 28) 307. 
385 Adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977, entered into force on 7 December 1978; 1125 UN Treaty Series, 3. 
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reparation to individuals. The second part asks if the traditional state-to-state reparation 
for victims of armed conflict is a matter of policy or a legal norm. It investigates whether 
the emergence of human rights has altered the concept of state responsibility, adapting 
the modalities of reparation for IHL violations to the new developments of international 
law, or whether there is a rule that excludes reparation to individuals in cases of IHL 
breaches. It briefly re-examines individual reparation in the context of state responsibility 
(including an overview of these issues in the ILC Responsibility Articles) and provides 
examples of contemporary state practice, applying principles of state responsibility to 
individual reparation in cases of IHL violations. It then explores the question of 
individual reparation under ICL and its relationship to state liability. The recent 
developments in this area of law are briefly discussed, to the extent that they may help 
clarify the question of the existence of the right of individuals to reparation vis-à-vis the 
responsible state for IHL violations.  
2. Is there an obligation for states to provide individual reparation under IHL 
provisions?  
 
It is well known that if a state commits a wrongful act under international law, it is liable 
to make reparation,386 and that reparation consists of various forms, including but not 
limited to monetary compensation.387 The principle of responsibility with a view to 
compensation for violations of international humanitarian law is set forth in Article 3 of 
the Hague IV: 
 
                                               
386 See the dictum of the PCIJ in the Chorzów (n 22) [21]. 
387 See Articles 28 to 39 of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 16). 
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A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulation 
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces.388 
 
Article 91 of AP I almost literally reproduced this rule:  
‘A party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to 
pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by 
persons forming part of its armed forces’.389 
 
While these provisions clearly state that a breach of the law of armed conflict by a 
belligerent party entails a duty to pay compensation, it does not clarify to whom it should 
be paid to (the individual victim or the belligerent state) or for what type of IHL 
violations. There has been much debate over these articles in regards to both its intent and 
scope. The debate can broadly be divided into two positions: that this provision does not 
apply to individuals (the traditionalist approach) and that it does (the modern approach). 
The following paragraphs will give a brief overview of these two approaches. 
A. The Traditionalist Approach: Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV does not 
apply to individuals  
 
                                               
388 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted on 18 October 1907 in The 
Hague, entered into force on 26 January 1910, in A Roberts and R Guelff (ed), Documents on the Law of 
War, (3rd edn, OUP 2000) 69 et seq. 
389 Responsibility of states for IHL violations is also recognised in Article 51 of Geneva Convention I, 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Article 52 Geneva Convention II, Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Article 131 Geneva Convention 
III, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; and Article 148 Geneva Convention IV, Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
287.  
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The traditional understanding is that Article 3 of the Hague IV and Article 91 of AP I 
simply codify the rule of international law according to which, when private individuals 
are injured by an international wrongful act, the responsible state is liable to provide 
reparation (and therefore compensation) to their state of nationality, and not to the 
individuals who have suffered concrete damage.390 Therefore, when a violation of the 
Regulations annexed to Hague IV or a rule contained in AP I occurs, the obligation to 
pay compensation enshrined in these two provisions is towards the other belligerent 
party391 to which the individuals belong and not to the individual victims as such. 
 
This reading is consistent with the traditional approach to international law, where the 
rules of international humanitarian law are considered standards of treatment or conduct, 
rather than rights of protected persons.392 The individual is seen merely as a beneficiary 
of the rules rather than the holder of a right.393 Within this context, individuals cannot 
claim reparation for losses suffered as a result of an infringement of a rule of 
international humanitarian law.  
 
                                               
390 See: Provost (n 98) 45. 
391 Since the Hague Convention IV and AP I only regulate international armed conflicts, the belligerent 
parties are only states. 
392  Provost (n 98) 27 et seq. 
393 KJ Partsch, ‘Individuals in International Law’ in R Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law II (1995) 957, 959. However, Lopes and Quenivet argue that the regime of ‘protected 
persons’ under IHL offer protection and assistance in the form of certain rights to individuals who do not 
play a role in the hostilities. They also contend that treaty law also holds special rights for individuals by 
virtue of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. See: C Lopes and N Quenivet, 
‘Individuals and Subjects of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in R Arnold and N 
Quenivet (eds), International humanitarian law and human rights law: towards a new merger in 
international law (Nijhoff 2008) 214. 
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The traditionalist approach is, however, more complex. As the analysis of the domestic 
case law below shows, the debate surrounding rights of individual victims in IHL is not 
divided into two opposing positions:  in other words, that individuals on the one hand do 
not enjoy (substantive) rights in IHL and therefore they do not have a (secondary) right to 
reparation; and on the other, that individuals do have rights in IHL and therefore do have 
a right to reparation. There is a third position acknowledging protection rights of victims 
under IHL (substantive rights) but no (secondary) right to reparation and/or standing 
under international law. While this position acknowledges post-WWII developments 
regarding individual rights in IHL, it still maintains that reparation for IHL violations 
falls within the traditional ambit of state-to-state relations.  As it will be explained, the 
end result is the same as if no recognition of substantive rights is acknowledged in this 
area of law.  
i. Case law 
 
The traditionalist approach has been followed by some domestic courts, particularly in 
the courts of states sued directly for violations of IHL (as opposed to claims brought 
before domestic courts against other states). The cases below show how individual claims 
have been rejected on the basis that there is or was no individual right to reparation for 
damages caused by a violation of IHL. Whereas in certain cases, the courts explicitly 
state that individual victims under IHL have no procedural standing, in other cases, the 
judgements seem to presuppose the absence of substantive individual rights altogether. 
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Japanese courts have dealt with claims arising out of the Second World War and 
especially out of the fate of the ‘comfort women’.394 Generally, the courts did not 
consider norms of international humanitarian law self-executing and consequently 
capable of conferring individual rights to persons protected by the respective treaties.395 
The Tokyo High Court held in So Shinto that the damage to an individual should be 
considered as one of the state to which the individual belongs.396 It ruled that: ‘Article 3 
of the Hague Convention should be interpreted, from its wording itself, to provide state 
responsibility between states, not individual rights for compensation’.397 The Tokyo High 
Court refers also to the fact that there is no procedure under which the individual could 
exercise his/her rights.398 
 
Similarly, U.S. courts have ruled that the Hague Convention IV is not self-executing and 
therefore it does not grant individuals the right to seek damages for violation of its 
                                               
394 On the initiative of the Japanese military, ‘comfort stations’ were set up and operated between 1930 and 
1945, where an estimated 200,000 ‘comfort women’ were pressed into prostitution. For a discussion of the 
facts and the Japanese court rulings see Igarashi, ‘Post-War Compensation' (n 89) 45-82. Non-
governmental organisations have organised a ‘Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s 
Military Sexual Slavery’ and held proceedings in Tokyo in 2000. They found Emperor Hirohito guilty and 
ruled that Japan’s international responsibility was engaged and recommended reparations. C Chinkin, 
‘Women's International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery’ (2001) 95 ACIL 335, 338.  
395 Shimoda et al v. The State, District Court of Tokyo, Judgment of 7 December 1963, 32 ILR (1964), 626; 
X et al. v. the State of Japan, Tokyo High Court, Judgment of 7 August 1996, 40 Japanese AIL (1996) 117, 
188. 
396 So Shinto case (n 90). 
397 High Court Tokyo, 8 February 2001, 45 Japanese AIL (2002), p. 143, see also High Court Tokyo, X et 
al. v the Government of Tokyo, 11 October 2001, 45 Japanese AIL (2002), p. 145; So Shinto case (n 90). 
398 High Court Tokyo, 8 February 2001, 45 Japanese AIL (2002), p. 143. In Hwang Geum Joo v Japan, the 
‘comfort women’ also brought their claim for compensation before US courts. On remand from the 
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case presented a 
‘nonjusticiable political question, namely, whether the governments of the appellants’ countries foreclosed 
the appellants’ claims in the peace treaties they signed with Japan’. US Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, Hwang Geum Joo, et al., v. Japan, Minister Yohei Kno, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Case No. 01-7169, 28 June 2005. As the U.S. Court denied its jurisdiction, it did not have to deal with the 
question of rights for individuals to compensation. 
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provisions.399 In Tel-Oren et al v Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Bork argued further that 
such ‘lawsuits might be far beyond the capacity of any legal system to resolve at all’, and 
that ‘the prospect of innumerable private suits at the end of a war might be an obstacle to 
the negotiation of peace and the resumption of normal relations between nations’.400 
 
The German Federal Supreme Court found in the Distomo case – which concerned claims 
of dependents of a German massacre in 1944 in the Greek village of Distomo – that, at 
least at the time of WWII, the individual was not directly protected by international law 
and that international law did not therefore provide an individual right to 
compensation.401 Similarly, in 1996, the Tokyo High Court rejected the existence of a 
private right to compensation, grounding its decision on existing customary international 
law at the time of the incident. The Court implicitly admitted that the existence of such a 
rule could not be excluded at present.402 However, when judging a claim for 
compensation of victims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention 
in Yugoslavia, a German Regional High Court dismissed the claim by arguing that the 
individual neither has any rights under international humanitarian law nor can avail him 
                                               
399 Tel-Oren et al v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (US App.D.C. 1984), 810; Goldstar (Panama) SA 
v. United States (4th Cir. 1992), 96 ILR (1994), 55, 58-59; Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 
1166 (US App.D.C. 1994).  
400 Tel-Oren et al v. Libyan Arab Republic (n 399) 810; See also L Handel v A Artukovic, ‘District Court 
for the Central District of California’, in M. Sassòli  and A.A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? 
(1999) 713. 
401 Distomo case, Bundesgerichtshof, III ZR 245/98, 26 June 2003, (2007) 129 ILR 556. 
402 ‘When the incident occurred, there was no evidence of any general practice, or the existence of opinio 
juris that when a state acts in violation of the obligation of international human rights law or humanitarian 
law, that state has the responsibility of compensating for the damages of any individual who was a victim. 
Therefore, international customary law against which the applicants’ claim did not exist at the time 
of the incident’ (emphasis added). The decision in X et al. v. The State of Japan (n 395). 
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or herself of any procedure to enforce them.403 Citing Article 2 of the Hague 
Convention,404 the Regional High Court emphasised that the Hague Convention would 
only apply between the State parties to the treaty.405 The ruling in this respect was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal, which held that there are no individual claims under 
international humanitarian law.406 
 
In contrast, some national courts have recognised the existence of individual primary 
rights in the field of IHL but still deny the existence of an individual (secondary) right to 
seek compensation for a violation of the (primary) rights. For example, in its decision on 
claims of the ‘Italian Military Internees’,407 the German Federal Constitutional Court 
acknowledged that individuals enjoy rights under international humanitarian law.408 Still, 
the Court ruled that there is no individual right to compensation. The Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany established: 
[…] claims for damages under secondary law exist only in the 
international legal relationship between states concerned. The claim for 
                                               
403 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Regional High Court, LG Bonn, decision of 10 December 2003, NJW 
2004, 526.  
404 ‘Article 2. The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as well as in the present 
Convention, do not apply except between Contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are 
parties to the Convention’. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. 
405 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia (n 403) 526. 
406 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, OLG Köln, decision of 28 July 2005, 7 U 8/04.  
407 Contrary to their POW legal status, this term was assigned by Hitler to members of the Italian Forces 
who were captured by the German army immediately after Italy had quit the Axis and had concluded a 
truce with the Allied Powers. Several hundred thousand soldiers were detained by Germany and – after 
they had refused to join in on the side of the German forces – were regarded as traitors by the German 
Reich and often treated harshly. In order to avoid the supervision by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and any claims that they should be treated in accordance with international humanitarian law, 
Hitler applied the term ‘military internees’ which used to be applied to combatants detained by a neutral 
power. See: Bank and Schwager, ‘Compensation for Victims of Armed Conflict’ (n 16) citing G Schreiber, 
Die italienischen Militärinternierten im deutschen Machtbereich 1943-1945 (1990) 97 et seq.  
408 Italian Military Internee case, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Joint Constitutional Complaint, 
28 June 2004, (English translation at Oxford Reports on International Law). Available at: 
http://oxfordlawrerports.com accessed 10 April 2016 
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damages accordingly differs from the claim under the primary law of the 
persons concerned to adherence to the obligations under humanitarian 
international law, as existing in the international legal relationship 
between the state occupying a territory and the population living in that 
area.409 (emphasis added)  
 
The Court ruled that Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV does not contain an individual 
right; rather, the Court argued that the article simply reiterates the general principle under 
international law according to which liability for infringements of a treaty obligation 
exists only between the states concerned. The Court mentioned Article 1 of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles as a reference for its statement and did not provide further 
argumentation.410 Article 1 of the ILC Responsibility Articles reads: ‘Every 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State’.411 
 
Further confirming this view, the German Federal High Court of Justice explained in the 
Bridge of Varvarin case: 
 
Article 3 of the Hague Convention, which originally – due to the then 
predominant legal view on the mediatization of the individual – without a 
doubt was only of an inter-State character (comp. Federal Court of Justice, 
judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, ‘Distomo case’), does not give 
rise to a direct individual compensation claim for violations of the 
international law of war, even if taking into account the change of view of 
international law regarding the rights of the individual in the meantime 
(Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 26 October 2004, BVerfgE 112, 
1, 32 et seq.; Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006, 2 
BvR 1476/03, ‘Distomo case’). Indeed, the drafting history of the norm 
shows that it is intended to protect the individual and is therefore of a 
nature indirectly protecting human rights. However, it does not follow from 
                                               
409 ibid [39a].  
410 ibid.  
411 ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23). 
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this that the provision is the basis of a direct, originally international law 
compensation claim of the concerned individual vis-à-vis the State. 
According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, it is still 
only the home State which is entitled to secondary compensation claims 
due to international wrongful acts of a State against foreign nationals, 
irrespective of the development on the level of human rights protection, 
which has led to the recognition of the individual as a partial subject of 
international law as well as to the establishing of individual complaint 
procedures under treaty law (Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 28 
June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, ‘Italian military detainees’; Federal 
Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, 
‘Distomo case’).412  
 
Accordingly, this and other courts recognise the existence of individual rights in IHL, but 
still reject claims that individuals have a right to reparation when these rights are 
breached. The rationale is that secondary rights belong to the state of nationality even if 
the primary rights now belong to the individual.  
ii. Are ‘war reparations’ relevant state practice for violations of IHL rules? 
 
It is often argued that post-war settlements dealing with war related claims have shown 
that states have considered the issues on compensation to be regulated within an inter-
state framework, as a matter of purely inter-state concern.413 However, as Gaeta points 
out, the inter-state post-war settlement establishing schemes of ‘war-reparations’ are 
‘patently at odds with the obligation to compensate violations of the rules of jus in 
bello’.414 As she explains, the post-war settlements were aimed at repairing the injuries 
stemming from the war, regardless of whether the injuries resulted from the infringement 
                                               
412 Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Bridge of Varvarin case, Judgement, 2 November 2006, para 10a 
(English translation of relevant paragraphs available at the ICRC website https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_de_rule150). (emphasis added) 
413 R Dolzer and A Stefan, ‘The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law Recognize a 
Victim’s Private Right of Action?’ (2002) 20 Berkley Int’l L 296. See also Tomuschat ‘The Individual 
before National Courts’ (n 27).  
414 Gaeta ‘Compensation’ (n 28) 310-311. 
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of a rule of IHL. The latter is, however, a condition for the applicability of the obligation 
set forth in Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 91 of AP I.415 Additionally, war reparations 
were imposed on the vanquished country, and did not cover any injury or loss inflicted by 
the victorious states as a result of a violation of IHL. Gaeta refers to the ICRC 
Commentary on AP I to show that the purpose of both Article 3 of Hague IV and of 
Article 91 of AP I ‘is specifically to prevent the vanquished from being compelled in an 
armistice agreement or peace treaty to renounce all compensation due for breaches 
committed by persons in the service of the victor’.416 The Commentary states: 
On the conclusion of a peace treaty, the Parties can in principle deal with the 
problems relating to war damage in general and those relating to the 
responsibility for starting the war … On the other hand, they are not free … 
to deny compensation to which the victims of violations of the rules of the 
Conventions and the Protocol are entitled.417  
 
Accordingly, Gaeta argues, post-conflict settlements dealing with war-related claims 
have no bearing on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Hague IV and AP I. 
This practice does not relate to the application of the obligation to provide for 
compensation enshrined in those provisions, being in clear contrast with their wording, 
scope, and purpose.  
iii. CIL on reparation for IHL violations   
 
Tomuschat argues that post-war settlements dealing with war-related claims have shown 
that states have considered the issues on compensation to be regulated within an inter-
                                               
415 ibid. 311 
416 See ICRC Commentary to AP I (Art 91) (n 441) 3640, 3651. 
417 ibid 3651 (emphasis added). 
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state framework, as a matter of purely inter-state concern.418 As explained earlier, it is 
important to differentiate between ‘war reparations’ (jus ad bellum) and reparation for 
IHL violations (jus in bello). Specifically on the latter, d’Argent argues that since Article 
3 of Hague IV was adopted at a time when it was unthinkable that individuals might 
enjoy rights under international law, this provision cannot but reflect the inter-state 
structure of the international legal order.419 Hence, since nothing in the text of Article 3 
of Hague IV expressly provides that individuals must be compensated, it cannot be 
maintained that such provision lays down the right of individual victims to obtain 
compensation from the responsible state. The same argument is made as regards Article 
91 of AP I, which simply mirrors Article 3 of Hague IV.420 According to d’Argent 
subsequent state practice confirms this conclusion and notes that national case law has 
refused to recognise that these provisions grant individuals the right to compensation.421  
 
However, Gaeta notes that while important, these arguments are not conclusive. She 
stresses that some scholars have tried to demonstrate on the basis of the travaux 
préparatoires that the scope of Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 91 of AP I implies that 
the individual victims are the beneficiaries of the obligation to make compensation (these 
analyses will be described in detail in the following section). Gaeta demonstrates on the 
other hand that the reasoning of domestic courts often amounts to petition prinipii. She 
explains that it is often simply maintained that Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 91 of 
                                               
418 Tomuschat, ‘The Individual before National Courts’ (n 27) 826-827. See also Dolzer and Stefan (n 413) 
296.  
419 d’Argent Reparations de guerre (n 16) 536-537.  
420 d’Argent Reparations de guerre (n 16) 748. 
421 d’Argent Reparations de guerre (n 16) 785-788. 
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API restate the rule on state responsibility, according to which only a state can present an 
international claim towards another state to enforce the latter’s international 
responsibility. However, these judicial decisions fail to look into the developments in the 
field of international law on state responsibility. As Gaeta notes, ‘If one assumes that 
those provisions on compensation intended to codify the rules of customary international 
law on state responsibility, it is therefore necessary to examine what the content of these 
rules is at present’.422  
 
As shown in the analysis of the jurisprudence of domestic courts above, the majority of 
the findings deal with WWII claims. Most judgments simply rule that there was no right 
to compensation for individuals at that time. These decisions do not exclude that, at 
present, the aforementioned provisions may be interpreted differently, so as to recognise 
the right of individuals to compensation for violations of rules of IHL. For example, the 
decision in X et al v the State of Japan, as mentioned earlier, did not afford compensation 
to the claimants but it recognised that current CIL on the obligation to afford 
compensation to individuals did not exist at the time of WWII:     
When the incident occurred, there was no evidence of any general 
practice, or the existence of opinio juris that when a state acts in 
violation of the obligation of international human rights law or 
humanitarian law, that state has the responsibility of compensating 
for the damages of any individual who was a victim. Therefore, 
international customary law against which the applicants' claim did 
not exist at the time of the incident.423  
 
On the other hand, those decisions that establish that there is currently no right to 
compensation for individuals based their reasoning on the fact that Article 3 of Hague IV 
                                               
422 Gaeta ‘Compensation’ (n 28) 305. 
423 X et al. v. The State of Japan (n 395) (emphasis added) 
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and Article 91 of AP I simply restate the law on state responsibility; they fail to analyse 
whether this law has evolved to now include the liability of state towards the individual 
victims.   
B. The Modern Approach: Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV does apply to 
individuals  
 
Referring to the travaux préparatoires of the Hague Conventions, Kalshoven found that 
Article 3 of Hague IV was intended to contain an individual right to compensation in the 
case of violations of the jus in bello vis-à-vis the state responsible for such violation.424 
Other scholars follow this approach,425 and the Principles and Guidelines affirm this 
interpretation.426 In Paragraph 1 of its Preamble, the Principles and Guidelines name 
Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 91 of the AP I as provisions establishing a right to a 
remedy for victims.427 The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
states that even if Article 3 of Hague IV was not initially intended to provide 
                                               
424 Kalshoven, ‘State Responsibility’ (n 99). 
425 C Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law (Law of War)’ in F. Kalshoven (ed), The Centennial of 
the First International Peace Conference (2000) 161,250; Zegveld,  ‘Remedies for victims of IHL (n16) 
506; David, ‘Expert Opinion’ (n 99); different view from d’Argent, Reparations de guerre (n 16). 
426 Principles and Guidelines (n 2). 
427 The provision reads: ‘Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims of violations of 
international human rights law found in numerous international instruments, in particular article 8 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1 article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 2 article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, and article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and of international 
humanitarian law as found in article 3 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land of 18 October 1907 (Convention IV), article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, and articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’. 
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compensation for individuals, it does so in the present day, as the emergence of HR in 
international law has altered the concept of state responsibility.428  
i. The travaux préparatoires of the Hague Convention 
 
As mentioned, scholars have claimed that the discussions during the negotiation of Hague 
IV generally show that the concept of individual rights was not alien at the time.429 They 
argue that the obligation to provide reparation is enshrined in its Article 3– a right that the 
drafters intended be afforded to individuals. The article reads as follows ‘A belligerent 
party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be 
liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons 
forming part of its armed forces’.430 Kalshoven explains that the preparatory works 
during the drafting process show clearly that the states’ intention was to recognise an 
individual’s right to obtain compensation for violations of the Regulations imputable to a 
belligerent Party.431  
 
Like Article 3 of Hague IV, the records of the Conference of 1907 are also silent on the 
procedure to be followed in order to give effect to the rules of compensation for victims 
of a violation of the laws of war. However, as noted by Kalshoven, the original German 
proposal differentiates between compensation of neutral persons (to grant them 
compensation as soon as possible) and persons belonging to an adverse party (to be 
                                               
428 Darfur Report (n 100). 
429 See: Expert Opinions by Kalshoven; David; Greenwood (n 100).  
430 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annexed Regulations, 
Article 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539. 
431 Expert Opinion; Kalshoven (n 100) 51.  
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settled at the conclusion of peace).432 The reasoning for the provision given by the 
German delegate is as follows: 
 
The situation, which will most frequently occur, will be the one where the 
Government will not be directly liable of negligence. If, in this case, 
individuals injured by breach of the Regulations, could not ask for 
compensation from the Government, and instead they had to turn against the 
officer or soldier responsible, they would, in the majority of cases be denied 
their right to obtain compensation.433  
 
The object of the proposed provision was to allow individuals injured to obtain 
compensation for an act by an officer or soldier by addressing himself directly to the 
responsible government. Further, it was clear in the debate that the individual was vested 
with this right. In referring to the distinction between nationals of the enemy and 
nationals neutral countries, the Swiss representative observed that beyond that distinction 
the proposal conferred a ‘right to compensation’ in favour of individuals: 
(…) with regards to the German Proposal, it would be wrong to say that it 
created an unacceptable privilege in favour of neutrals. The principle that 
it lays down is applicable to each injured individual, whether nationals of 
neutral States or nationals of enemy States. The only distinction 
established between these two categories of victims and of rightful 
claimants concerns the regulation of compensation, and the distinction 
between them, on this point, is in the vary nature of things. The payment 
of compensation due to neutrals could most often take place without delay, 
for the simple reason that the warring State responsible is at peace with 
their country and continues peaceful relations which will enable both 
states to settle easily all cases. The same facility or possibility does not 
exist between Parties at war, by the very fact of the war, and even thought 
the right to compensation arises in favour of their respective nationals as 
well as in favour of neutrals, the payment of compensation between those 
                                               
432 ‘La Partie belligérante qui violera les dispositions de ce Règlement, au préjudice de personnes neutres, 
sera tenue de dédommager ces personnes du tort qui leur a été causé.’ Deuxième Conférence internationale 
de la Paix: actès et documents III (1908) 144. For an English translation see: Y. Sandoz, "Unlawful 
Damages in Armed Conflicts and Redress under International  Humanitarian Law", 22 ICRC (1982), 137.  
433 Deuxième Conférence (n 432) 145. 
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at war could scarcely be established or provided for until peace is 
concluded.434  
 
The British delegate added:  
Article 1 [of the German Proposal] accords to neutral persons a right 
against the belligerent Party to claim compensation for the wrong cause to 
them…I do not contest the obligation which exists for a belligerent Power 
to compensate those who have been victims of violations of the law and 
customs of war and Great Britain does not wish to in any way to avoid its 
obligation.435 
 
In the report about the discussion, the German delegate speaks of a ‘right’ of the neutral 
person,436 and concludes that no difference should be made between the right of a neutral 
person and an enemy person.437 Indeed, the original German proposal was only criticised 
in respect of this differentiation438 and thus it was abandoned by drafting a single article 
dealing with compensation.439 In this short version, which is Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention IV in its current form, the bearer of the right to compensation is no longer 
mentioned.  
ii. State practice 
 
Gaeta observes that in recent times, countries have established specific funds to make 
reparation to the victims of violations of humanitarian law and other human rights abuses. 
As she points out, these funds clearly indicate that the relevant states considered that 
victims are entitled to obtain redress outside inter-state settlements or mechanisms. But 
                                               
434 Cited and emphasised in the Expert Opinion of David (n 83) (emphasis added). 
435 Deuxième Conférence (n 432) 147. Kalshoven ‘Expert Opinion’ (n 100) 35-39. 
436 Deuxième Conférence (n 432) 103,147. 
437 ibid 104 
438 ibid 103 
439 ibid 104 
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for Gaeta this practice is of no avail to the interpretation of the obligation to compensate 
under IHL. She points out that states that have established these funds considered that 
they were not acting to fulfil a specific obligation arising from the laws of jus in bello, 
and therefore no inference may be drawn from this practice.440 
 
However, the picture of compensation schemes, as with domestic cases, is far from 
straightforward and/or uniform. There are two reasons why it is important to examine this 
practice. First, a close look at compensation schemes in general shows that while 
compensation funds have traditionally been created under state-to-state mechanisms, the 
intention has largely been to compensate individual victims (therefore the state to state 
practice can show a policy concern rather that the aim and intention of a legal norm). 
Second, the lack of opinio juris in order to establish state practice as evidence of CIL in 
cases of ex-gratia payments for IHL violations is questionable. Recent compensatory 
funds were created to settle or avoid litigation for damages caused by HR and IHL 
breaches. It is important therefore to question the legal source of this practice and its 
impact on the formation of CIL.  
 
The ICRC study on Customary International Humanitarian Law has several examples of 
domestic reparation programmes affording compensation and other forms of reparation 
directly to individuals. While not all of them are evidence of states affording reparation to 
fulfil an IHL obligation, they certainly show a ‘tendency to recognize the exercise of 
                                               
440 Gaeta ‘Compensation’ (n 28) 311. 
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rights by individuals’.441 Post-WWII Germany provides ample examples of compensation 
programmes that created individual rights. As early as 1953, eight years after the end of 
World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany adopted the Federal Law on 
Compensation, providing individual compensation for victims of Nazi persecution based 
on an individualised assessment of the loss suffered.442 However, the official position of 
Germany today is that while such rights were created under domestic law, there are no 
corresponding rights in international law. This approach was confirmed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in its decision of 13 May 1996 concerning forced labour claims. 
According to the Court, the individual was not a subject of international law at the time 
of World War II: 
The traditional concept of international law as law applying between states 
does not accord the role of a subject of international law to the individual 
but only provides for indirect international protection: In the case of 
violations of international law vis-à-vis foreign nationals, the claim does 
not pertain to the individual but to his home state. (…) This principle of an 
exclusive entitlement of the state also applied to violations of human rights 
in the years 1943 to 1945.443 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany addressed its post-WWII compensatory payments to 
the State of Israel and the Commission for Jewish Claims against Germany – an NGO 
composed of numerous Jewish member organisations. This shows, to some extent, that it 
                                               
441 Back in 1987, the ICRC noted that ‘[…] persons with a foreign nationality who have been wronged by 
the unlawful conduct of a Party to the conflict should address themselves to their own government, which 
will submit their complaints to the Party or Parties which committed the violation. However, since 1945 a 
tendency has emerged to recognize the exercise of rights by individuals’ – Y Sandoz et al, Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International 
Committee of the Red Cross 1987) 1067, MN 3656. This tendency has taken further steps, as reported in 
the ICRC Commentary by J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Bexk, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, vol 1: Rules (CUP 2005) 549. 
442 Bundesentschädigungsgesetz (Federal Compensation Law) of 18 September 1953, Bundesgesetzblatt 
(BGBl. - Federal Law Gazette) I 1953, 1387 
443 Forced Labourers Case, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, decision of 13 May 1996, 2 BvL 
33/93, BVerfGE 94, 315, 329. See: Bank and Schwager, ‘Compensation for Victims of Armed Conflict’ (n 
16), 57-59. English translation by the authors of the cited article. 
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was not the ‘state to state’ relationship which inspired the compensation programmes, but 
rather, the obligation towards the individual victims.444 On the other hand, even if such 
activities were conditional on the non-recognition of any rights existing independently 
from the corresponding treaties, the wording of these and other similar treaties makes 
clear that the payments afforded by the Federal Republic of Germany were intended for 
the compensation of individual victims.445 
 
Another example is the 1999 compensation fund for Nazi-era forced and slave labour. 
Following a substantial number of compensation claims filed in U.S. courts, the German 
government and a group of sixty-five German corporations agreed in December 1999 to 
commit 10 Billion DM (approximately US$4.4 billion) to a fund to compensate 
individuals who had been forced to work for the companies as forced and slave-labourers 
during the Nazi era. The German Prime Minister conceded that the threat of U.S. 
litigation finally brought Germany to reverse its previous position on the issue.446 In July 
2000, the German Bundesrat adopted a law establishing a foundation to provide financial 
compensation to these former slave and forced labourers, and certain other victims of 
Nazi injustice.447 The law finally adopted carefully seeks to avoid granting a legal right to 
                                               
444 As Bank and Schwager note, victims of the Nazis in Central and Eastern European States were not 
similarly taken into account. Bank and Schwager, ‘Compensation for Victims of Armed Conflict’, (n 
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445 ibid. 58. 
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beneficiaries vis-à-vis the German State or the Foundation; there is no direct legal 
relationship between the claimant and the Foundation or the German State.448 Instead of 
this, the law seeks to provide only for an ex-gratia entitlement.449  
 
While Germany maintained throughout the process of adopting this law that the 
establishment of the Foundation was voluntary, it was the forced labour claims against 
German companies brought in the U.S. that ultimately resulted in the adoption of the 
agreement.450 The latter example begs the question of whether a state establishing a fund 
to prevent legal suits can simply argue that it is compensating victims out of a moral 
                                                                                                                                            
injustice, see R Bank, ‘The New Programmes for Payments to Victims of National Socialist Injustice’ 
(2001) 44 GYIL 307. Other examples include the programme established in Canada in 1988 to compensate 
Canadian nationals of Japanese descent for their forced removal and internment during the Second World 
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lost because of any discriminatory act by the Government and the review of any conviction based on 
wartime legislation (Civil Liberties Act (1988), 10 August 1988, Public Law 100-383, [H.R.442], paras 1, 
102-104, 108). This fund also included redress for the Aleuts as well as the agreement resolving a 1996 
civil suit filed by four Japanese Latin Americans who were deported from their homes in Latin America 
during WWII and held in internment camps in the U.S. Mochizuki v. United States 43 Fed. Cl. 97 (1999) 
was a class action lawsuit brought by survivors of Japanese Latin Americans interned during World War 
II by the U.S. government. 
448 In particular, Section 10 paragraph 1 of the Foundation Law provides: ‘The approval and disbursal of 
one-time payments to those persons eligible under Section 11 will be carried out through partner 
organizations. The Foundation is neither authorized nor obligated in this regard.’ 
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450 Hofmann, ‘Victims of Violations of IHL’ (n 98). 
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obligation. The ICRC study on CIL examines similar cases.451 Should the legal context in 
such cases play a role in establishing the necessary element of opinio juris when forming 
customary international law?  
iii. Case law 
 
As it will be shown from the case law analysed in this section, while the majority of 
domestic courts do not explicitly recognise an individual right to compensation under 
Article 3 of Hague IV or Article 91 of AP I, some do recognise individual rights under 
IHL, and there are in fact some court decisions acknowledging an individual right to 
compensation under these provisions. 
 
As early as 1952, a German Higher Administrative Court ruled that Article 3 of Hague IV 
provides for an individual right to compensation.452 The decision did not address a claim 
arising directly out of an armed conflict, but dealt with the claim of a German individual 
who was seriously injured by a vehicle of the British occupying power. Compensation 
was granted, inter alia, based on Article 3 of Hague IV. 
 
In 1997, a Greek court dealing in the first instance with the Distomo case (Prefecture 
Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany) found that the victims, and respectively the 
dependents of the victims of the massacre, had a right to claim compensation under 
                                               
451 https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule150 accessed 10 April 2016 
452 OVG Münster, 9 April 1952, ILR (1952) 632-634.  
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Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV.453 Germany appealed to the Greek Supreme Court 
but the Areios Pagos dismissed its jurisdictional immunity claim.454 The decision 
however did not deal with Article 3 of Hague IV since it did not discuss war crimes but 
judged the massacre as a crime against humanity.455 
 
The efforts to enforce the Leivadia judgment eventually failed because the Minister of 
Justice denied his approval – a necessary prerequisite for executing a judgment against a 
foreign state under Greek law.456 This decision was upheld by the Athens Court of 
Appeal on 14 September 2001. A complaint before the ECtHR was lodged but was 
equally unsuccessful; the Court ruled that the application was inadmissible.457 In 2003, 
                                               
453 Prefecture Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, Court of First Instance of Leivadia 137/1997, 30 
October 1997, analysed by I Bantekas, ‘International Decisions, Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic 
of Germany’ (1998) 1 ACIL 92, 765. The Court of First Instance of Leivadia gave a verdict holding 
Germany liable for the Distomo massacre and damages in the amount of approximately US$30 million. 
The ruling of the Areios Pagos (Greek Supreme Court) in the same matter does not deal with Article 3 of 
the Hague Convention IV (4 May 2000) Case no 11/2000, analysed by Gavounelli and Bantekas (2001) 95 
ACIL 198. The Areios Pagos does not discuss war crimes, but judges the massacre as a crime against 
humanity, which can also be committed in time of peace. The reason for this approach can be seen in the 
exception of state immunity in peace time, E Micha, ‘Correspondent's Reports, Cases’ (2000) 3 YIHL 511; 
M Gavounelli and I Bantekas, ‘International Decisions, Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of 
Germany’ (2001) 95 ACIL198, 198-204. 
454 The Court denied German immunity applying Article 11 of the European Convention on State 
Immunity. According to the court Article 11 reflects customary international law. Moreover, the Court held 
that violation of peremptory norms would have the legal effect of implicitly waiving the jurisdictional 
immunity. It reasoned that torts in breach of rules of peremptory international law cannot be claimed to be 
acts jure imperii, concluding that Germany, by breaching jus cogens, had implicitly waived its immunity. 
Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, Areios Pagos (Supreme Court), Greece, Case No. 
11/2000, 4 May 2000, analysed by Gavounelli and Bantekas ‘International Decisions’ (n 453) 198.  
455 A crime against humanity can also be committed in time of peace. While several international 
provisions stipulate immunity for foreign troops for acts committed during war, they do not apply during 
peacetime, E Micha, ‘Correspondent's Reports, Cases’ (2000) 3 YIHL 511; M Gavounelli and I Bantekas 
(n 453) 198. 
456 Article 923 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
457 ‘Referring to judgment no. 11/2000 of the Court of Cassation, the applicants appeared to be asserting 
that international law on crimes against humanity was so fundamental that it amounted to a rule of jus 
cogens that took precedence over all other principles of international law, including the principle of 
sovereign immunity. The Court does not find it established, however, that there is yet acceptance in 
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for 
damages brought against them in another State for crimes against humanity (see Al-Adsani, cited above, § 
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the German Federal Supreme Court rejected the enforcement of the Greek judgment in 
Germany,458 ruling that, at least at the time of the WWII, the individual was not directly 
protected by international law and that international law did not therefore provide an 
individual right to compensation.459 The German Constitutional Court in 2006 affirmed 
the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof.460 
 
In the meantime, the Special Supreme Court of Greece indirectly overruled the Areios 
Pagos in parallel proceedings granting immunity to Germany for WWII claims.461 
Importantly though, the Margellos decision, while granting immunity, considered the 
possibility that compensation could be claimed in Germany either by the home state of 
the victims or the victims themselves.462  
 
The Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione in Ferrini had to answer the question of 
whether Germany could claim immunity in Italian courts against legal action initiated in 
Italy arising out of situations involving war crimes and crimes against humanity 
(deportation and submission to forced labour).463 Even though the scope of the decision 
                                                                                                                                            
66). The Greek Government cannot therefore be required to override the rule of State immunity against 
their will. This is true at least as regards the current rule of public international law, as the Court found in 
the aforementioned case of Al-Adsani, but does not preclude a development in customary international law 
in the future’. App. No. 59021/00, Kalogeropoulou v. Greece and Germany (12 December 2002) 129 ILR 
(2007) 537 et seq. 
458 Distomo (n 401) 556. 
459 Distomo (n 401) 3491. 
460 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1476/03, 15 Feb. 2006. 
461 Margellos and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, Anotato Eidiko Diskastirio (Greek Special 
Supreme Court), 6/2002, 129 ILR (2007) 526.  
462 Federal Republic of Germany v. Miltiadis Margellos, Highest Special Court, decision of 17 September 
2002; in: M Panezi, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Violation of Ius Cogens Norms’ (2003) 56 RHDI 199. 
463 Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy), Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany, 11 March 2004, 87 
Rivista di diritto internazionale (2004) 540. 
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was limited to the issue of immunity, which had to be resolved before any other legal 
question in the respective case could be addressed, the Court explicitly presumed a 
possibility of individual rights to compensation to be enforced through civil litigation.464  
 
After the Ferrini decision, the Distomo plaintiffs instituted proceeding in Italy to execute 
the Greek judgment against Germany there, and registered a legal charge over a property 
near Lake Como owned by Germany.465 In response to these developments, Germany 
instituted proceedings against Italy in the International Court of Justice.466 The ICJ 
rejected Italy’s claims and fully agreed with Germany’s point that customary 
international law holds that states are immune from the jurisdiction of foreign national 
courts.  
 
Importantly, however, Germany v Italy does not look at the question of reparation and 
does not analyse the IHL provisions on compensation, namely Article 3 of Hague IV and 
Article 91 of AP I. The Court simply followed its Arrest Warrant precedent stating that 
immunities are merely a procedural bar that may be waived and may not be permanent:  
 
[…] as the Court has said, albeit in the different context of the immunity of State 
officials from criminal proceedings, the fact that immunity may bar the exercise 
of jurisdiction in a particular case does not alter the applicability of the 
substantive rules of international law (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, 
p. 25, para. 60; see also Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 244, para. 196). In 
that context, the Court would point out that whether a State is entitled to 
                                               
464 ibid [9]. 
465 Corte di Cassazione (Italy), Federal Republic of Germany v. Prefecture of Voiotia, Judgment no. 4199 
(29 May 2008). Rivista di diritto internazionale (2009), 594 
466 Germany v Italy case (n 25).  
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immunity before the courts of another State is a question entirely separate from 
whether the international responsibility of that State is engaged and whether it has 
an obligation to make reparation.467 
 
The Court concluded that at the moment, states enjoy immunity in the courts of other 
states as a matter of customary international law: ‘The Court can find no basis in the State 
practice from which customary international law is derived that international law makes 
the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent upon the existence of effective 
alternative means of securing redress’. 468  
 
Judge Yusuf is very critical of the decision of the Court in its Dissenting Opinion. He 
disagrees with both the finding that Italy violated its obligation to respect the immunity of 
Germany and the reasoning and consideration on which this finding is based: 
 
My disagreements relate in particular to the marginal way in which the 
core issues in dispute between the Parties have been dealt with in the 
Judgment; the lack of an adequate analysis of the obligation to make 
reparations for violations of international humanitarian law (hereinafter 
IHL), which is intimately linked to the denial of State immunity in the 
dispute before the Court; the reasoning and conclusions of the majority on 
the scope and extent of State immunity in international law and the 
derogations that may be made from it; and the approach adopted in the 
Judgment towards the role of domestic courts in the identification and 
evolution of international customary norms, particularly in the area of 
State immunity.469 
 
While there is not enough space to go into the details of this and other dissenting 
opinions, it is important to note that Judge Yusuf does look into the obligation to make 
                                               
467 Germany v Italy (n 25) [100]. 
468 ibid [101]. 
469 Dissenting opinion of Judge Yusuf, Germany v Italy (n 25) [3]. 
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reparation for violations of IHL and concludes that the Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 
91 of AP I should be interpreted in light of the recent evolution of international law.  
 It may therefore be stated that Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV — 
or for that matter, Article 91 of Protocol I — does not exclude the right 
of individuals to make claims for compensation for damages arising 
from breaches of IHL, despite the fact that the practice of States has 
been for a very long time to establish bilateral mechanisms through 
peace treaties and other agreements, and to have the issue of 
compensation handled by the State whose nationals have suffered 
damage as a result of such breaches.470 
 
He differentiates between policy and practical reasons resorted to after mass atrocities 
like inter-state treaties or commissions and whether individuals are or were intended to be 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the compensation awarded: 
 
16. Historically, there is ample evidence that compensation for such 
breaches was for a long period of time handled at the inter-State level 
[…] This does not however mean that individuals are not or were not 
intended to be the ultimate beneficiaries of such mechanisms; or that they 
do not possess the right to make claims for compensation. It only 
indicates that the national State of the victims receives a lump sum to be 
distributed to the victims of such breaches. Such arrangements appear to 
have been resorted to for policy or practical reasons aimed at avoiding the 
prospect of innumerable private suits, or a delay in the conclusion of 
peace treaties and the resumption of normal relations between formerly 
belligerent States. 
 
The ICJ judgement has been both praised and criticised for its stance on sovereign 
immunity. There has been an ample array of responses and comments from scholars and 
practitioners.471 In terms of states’ reactions, it is interesting to note that on 22 October 
2014, only eight months after the ICJ ruling, an Italian Constitutional Court Judgment 
declared ‘customary international law on state immunity inapplicable in the Italian legal 
                                               
470 ibid [9]. 
471 See, for example, A Peters, E Lagrange, S Oeter, and C Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in the Age of 
Constitutionalism (Martinus Nijhoff 2014).  
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order as far as war crimes and crimes against humanity are concerned’.472 Even though 
the ICJ decision would have seemed to satisfy both governments involved in the 
dispute,473 the highest judicial body in Italy appears to disagree with the outcome of the 
inter-state litigation and has declared unconstitutional the laws enacted by the Italian 
parliament to comply with the ICJ judgment.  
 
The Italian Constitutional Court did not directly question the ruling of the ICJ, but rather 
applied its ‘counter-limits’ doctrine. It declared that the customary international norm of 
immunity does not apply in the Italian legal order in cases concerning war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in breach of fundamental human rights. The Court explained 
that it conflicts with the ‘qualifying essential principles’ of the Italian constitutional order 
– in particular, the right of access to justice enshrined in Article 24 of the Constitution, in 
conjunction with the principle of protection of fundamental human rights in Article 2 of 
the Constitution.474 While the decision recognises the ultimate authority of the ICJ’s 
interpretation, as observed by de Sena, the Constitutional Court also ‘recalls the decisive 
support given by the Italian case law to the restrictive doctrine of state immunity, and 
                                               
472 P de Sena, ‘The judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on State immunity in cases of serious 
violations of human rights or humanitarian law: a tentative analysis under international law’ (2014) QIL, 
Zoom Out II, 17-31. 
473 While the Government of Italy had to defend the decision of its courts in Ferrini and subsequent cases 
before the ICJ, as O’Keefe notes, it is no secret that its position on the issue was that of the Government of 
Germany. He explains that the view expressed by the Italian government in the joint declaration issued in 
Trieste on 18 November 2008 at the conclusion of German Italian governmental consultations on the 
matter, quoted in Germany v Italy, Application Instituting Proceedings (noting in the relevant part: ‘Italy 
respects Germany's decision to have recourse to the International Court of Justice for a pronouncement on 
the principle of State immunity . . . [I]t considers that a pronouncement by the International Court on State 
immunity will be useful in clarifying a complex question’. (O’Keefe translation) – R O’Keefe, ‘State 
Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and Minds’ (2011) 44 Vanderbilt J of Transnational 
Law 999. 
474 Italy’s Diplomatic and Parliamentary Practice on International Law, 
http://italyspractice.info/judgment-238-2014/, Accessed 10 April 16 
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advances the idea that its judgment ‘may also contribute to a desirable – and desired by 
many – evolution of international law itself’’.475 He further notes that such statement 
means ‘the Court is well aware that it is infringing the current customary regime on State 
immunity, but also that it hopes to be able to promote a change of this regime, insofar as 
such a change is clearly perceived – by the Court itself – as being imposed by a sort of 
widespread opinio necessitatis’.476 It might be too early to evaluate, but given the reaction 
by the Italian Constitutional Court, it would seem that that the ICJ judgement has failed 
to bring ‘certainty’477 on this matter.  
C.  Nothing in treaty or customary IHL excludes the possibility of an individual 
right to reparation  
 
As observed by the ICRC in its commentary on Additional Protocol I, ‘since 1945 a 
tendency has emerged to recognize the exercise of rights by individuals’.478 A close look 
at the jurisprudence, compensation schemes, and the drafting history of Articles 3 of 
Hague IV and Article 91 of AP I show that nothing in treaty or CIL of IHL excludes the 
possibility of an individual right to reparation for victims of armed conflict (including 
compensation).   
                                               
475 De Sena (n 472) 17-31. 
476 ibid. 
477 Soon after the ICJ decision, Bianchi stated that,  ‘At last we have certainty. After almost twenty years of 
heated debate on how to reconcile the law of state immunity with human rights, we now know. State cannot 
be sued for serious human rights violations before the municipal courts of another state. The International 
Court of Justice by its holding in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy) case provided 
us with a two-fold certainty. It told us what the law is on a controversial point and, at the same time, it 
reassured us, as international lawyers, that the Court is always there to tell us what the law is. As long as 
we know this, all the rest can be set aside’. A Bianchi, ‘On Certainty’ (EJIL Talk) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/on-certainty/> accessed 10 April 16  
478 ICRC Commentary on the APs by Sandoz (n 441). This tendency has taken further steps, as reported in 
the ICRC Commentary on IHCL by Henckaerts and Doswald-Bexk (n 441). 
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The idea of individual rights was discussed during the drafting discussions of Article 3 of 
the Hague IV. At the same time, even if post WWII settlements were inter-state 
agreements aimed at repairing the injuries from war (regardless of whether these resulted 
from the infringement of a rule of IHL), as described earlier, the intention of the 
payments and sometimes the actual practice were to compensate individual victims.479 
This shows that the aim of compensation in these cases was to remedy individual victims 
of armed conflict even when the vehicle to do so was at the inter-state level. On the other 
hand, while states establishing funds to compensate WWII victims specifically for IHL 
violations have avoided legal recognition of any individual rights, the funds were created 
as a result of litigation and/or to settle judicial claims. Their ex-gratia nature is therefore 
questionable.  
 
Finally, a close look at the jurisprudence shows that the cases where no individual 
entitlement is recognised under Article 3 of Hague IV and 91 of API are generally WWII 
cases. Since these provisions are silent on who is the beneficiary of the compensation 
(e.g. the state or the individual victim), the judgments typically look at CIL of Article 3 
of Hague IV and 91 of API at the time of WWII and establish that individual rights did 
not exist in international law. However, these decisions fail to examine contemporary 
CIL on the right to reparation to see if the relevant IHL provisions can apply today to 
individual victims vis-à-vis the responsible state.480 Other judgements do not look into the 
                                               
479 See Section 2.B.ii.of this chapter. 
480 As described in Part 1, some courts have ruled that Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 91 of AP I do not 
grant an individual right to compensation because international humanitarian law, as international law in 
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substantive question of individual reparation. They simply reject reparation claims based 
on procedural aspects like sovereign immunity and lack of jurisdiction (i.e. act of state or 
political question doctrine).481 Importantly, however, many decisions upholding 
sovereign immunity in cases of individual claims consider that an alternative remedy for 
the victims exists in other forums.482 The material question of whether an individual right 
to reparation exists has therefore rarely been addressed on the merits.483 
 
Domestic courts have not found it difficult to state that individuals have primary rights 
under IHL. The controversy lies in whether individuals have a right under international 
law to bring claims against states for IHL breaches. As described, there are a few court 
decisions acknowledging an individual right to compensation under relevant IHL 
provisions484 and there are a few cases establishing specifically that individuals do not 
                                                                                                                                            
general, should be understood as a law between states. On the other hand, some courts have ruled that 
individuals had no rights under international law during WWII, but that the law of nations has evolved and 
today individuals have certain rights under international law. On some occasions, courts have 
acknowledged that individuals do enjoy rights under IHL. Still, these courts argue without analysing 
contemporary CIL, that IHL does not afford secondary/procedural rights to individuals, and therefore, that 
Article 3 of the Hague Convention and Article 91 of the AP I cannot be interpreted as affording a private 
right of action.   
481US courts have ruled that the Hague Convention IV is not self-executing and that therefore it does not 
grant individuals the right to seek damages for violation of its provisions: Tel-Oren et al v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, (n. 399), 810; Goldstar (Panama) SA v. United States (n 399) ; Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 
24, 30 (2d Cir.1976); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D.Cal.1985). Princz v. Federal 
Republic of Germany (n 399). See also analysis of Markovic case in M. Frulli, 'When Are States Liable 
Towards Individuals for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law? The Markovic Case', 1 IJCJ (2003) 406 
at 417. 
482 For example, the Slovenian Constitutional Court decision, cited by the ICJ in Germany v Italy, 
considered immunity as a proportional limitation to the right to judicial remedy, but based on the erroneous 
premise that the plaintiff could claim compensation before German courts. For an analysis of these and 
other examples, see M Bothe, ‘Remedies of Victims of War and Crimes against Humanities: Some Critical 
Remarks on the ICJ’s Judgement on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States’ in A Peters et al (n 471). 
483 Exceptions concern, for example, the decision rendered by the German Federal Court in the Distomo 
case (n 401), the Italian Military Internees case (n. 412) and the Federal Court of Justice Bridge of 
Varvarin case (n. 412). In both decisions, the court held that Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV applies 
only between states; it denied an individual right to reparation based on this provision.  
484 In the Distomo case, the first instance Court found that the victims had a right to claim compensation 
under Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV. Prefecture Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, Court of 
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have secondary rights in contemporary IHL.485 While there is a general tendency to 
recognise individual rights in contemporary international law, a review of the 
jurisprudence shows that relevant IHL case law is still inconclusive.  
 
IHL has traditionally contemplated that harms committed in armed conflict would be 
compensated between states and that the receiving state in turn would be responsible for 
affording compensation to its citizens. However, this policy was developed for 
international armed conflicts between states, and such compensation regime is not well 
suited for remedying harms in modern non-international armed conflicts between states 
and non-state armed groups.  International law now recognises non-state actors as parties 
to a conflict with international rights and obligations. While armed groups may share 
similar features with states—like being collective entities, organised, exercising control 
over a territory, etc.—they are not legal entities, nor do they have the permanency of 
                                                                                                                                            
First Instance of Leivadia, Greece, Case No. 137/1997, 30 October 1997.  The Areios Pagos appeal 
dismissing Germany’s jurisdictional immunity claim did not deal with Article 3 of the Hague Convention 
IV since it did not discuss war crimes but judged the massacre as a crime against humanity. Prefecture 
of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, Areios Pagos (Supreme Court), Greece, Case No. 11/2000, 4 
May 2000. The Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione in the Ferrini case explicitly presumed a possibility of 
individual rights to compensation to be enforced through civil litigation. Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 
Ferrini, 11 March 2004, 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2004) 540. Mantello and Milde corroborate the 
Ferrini view: Germany v Mantello and others, (Preliminary order on jurisdiction, No 14201/2008; ILDC 
1037 (IT 2008), 29 Mai 2008); Milde v. Italy, (Supreme Court of Cassation, Cass. sez. I pen. Sentenza 
n. 1072 ud. 21/10/2008, (IT 2008), 21 October 2008)]; and on 22 October 2014, the Italian Constitutional 
Court rendered Judgment 238/2014. In this decision, the Court declared the unconstitutionality of certain 
domestic provisions that obliged Italian courts to comply with the Judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in the case of Germany v. Italy (n 25), and thus to deny their jurisdiction in cases concerning actions 
for damages for war crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of fundamental human rights, 
committed by German military forces during World War II (Judgment no. 238 of 2014, Italian 
Constitutional Court). 
485 German courts have consistently rejected individual claims for IHL violations. While some decisions 
denied WWII claims on the basis that there were no individual rights at the time [Distomo (n 401)], more 
recent decisions have established that either there are no individual rights under IHL [LG Bonn (n 403) 526; 
Judgment confirmed by the Court of Appeal in OLG Köln (n 381)] or that while individuals enjoy 
primary/substantive rights, they do not enjoy secondary rights to reparation. See  ‘Italian Military Internees 
case’ and Bridge of Varvarin case (n. 412).  
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states.486 The traditional policy of state-to-state reparations therefore fails to take into 
account the new characteristics of modern conflicts. While liability of non-state actors for 
IHL breaches is widely acknowledged, the asymmetrical nature of the conflict as well the 
varying degree of liability of the different actors in the conflict  (e.g. whether acts of non-
state entities can be attributed to states or whether armed groups can be directly liable 
under international law) makes the traditional reparations framework obsolete.487 At the 
same time, HR case law on the right to a remedy, the right to an investigation, and the 
right to reparation have influenced the understating of humanitarian law.488 The limitation 
of affording reparations to states only has been significantly eroded in the European and 
Inter-American human rights systems, both of which have applied the individual remedial 
provisions of the regional human rights conventions to states’ violations arising in armed 
conflict settings. 489 Finally, as it will be explained in the section on ‘Reparations for IHL 
violations in the context of individual responsibility under ICL’, the ICC has confirmed 
                                               
486 Jann K. Kleffner ‘The collective accountability of organized armed groups for system crimes’ in H. Wilt 
and A. Nollkaemper (eds.) System criminality in international law, (CUP 2009) 238-269, p265.  Reparation 
is possible when armed opposition groups become the new government of a state (e.g. under Article 10 of 
the ILC Responsibility Articles) conduct of an ‘insurrectional movement which becomes the new 
Government of a State shall be considered an act of that State under international law’). See n 23. 
487 A number of studies have explored the topic of armed groups and reparations looking at options to hold 
non-state actors accountable for reparations. See for example R Dudai, ‘Closing the Gap: Symbolic 
Reparations and Armed Groups’, International Review of the Red Cross 93 (2011): 783–808; L Moffett, 
‘Beyond Attribution: Responsibility of Armed Non-State Actors for Reparations in Northern Ireland, 
Colombia and Uganda’, Queen’s University Belfast Law Research Paper No. 20 (2013), and M. Sassòli 
‘Taking armed groups seriously: ways to improve their compliance with international humanitarian law’ 
International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 1, 2010, p.6 
488 C Droege, ‘The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
in situations of armed conflict’ (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review. 
489 See e.g. analysis of the relationship between the ECHR and IHL in C Droege and L Arimatsu, 
‘Conference on the European Convention on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: 
conference report’, in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 12, (2009), 435–449, and with the 
ICHR in F Martin, ‘The application of international humanitarian law by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 844 (2009). 
 167 
that victims (as opposed to only states) have a right to reparation for international crimes, 
including those committed in armed conflicts.490 
In sum, there is nothing in IHL preventing individual reparation. On the contrary, the idea 
of individual remedies was present during the drafting discussions of the IHL 
compensation provisions. Equally, the intention and sometimes the practice of post-
WWII settlements were to compensate individual victims. Additionally, human rights law 
has influenced the understating of IHL in the context of individual entitlements. The 
following section therefore looks at recent developments in international law to 
investigate if reparation to individuals for serious IHL breaches is possible under the 
principles of state responsibility or whether there is a norm (as opposed to a post-conflict 
policy) that excludes individual reparation. It will also question whether the state-to-state 
reparation is the most adequate regime in contemporary IHL, considering the 
applicability of human rights law during wartime and the IHL regulation of non-
international armed conflicts.  
1.  Is there an obligation to afford reparation to individual victims of IHL breaches 
under the law on state responsibility? 
 
In the Chorzów case in 1928, the PCIJ stated that: ‘It is a principle of international law, 
and even a general conception of the law, that any breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation … Reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure 
to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention 
                                               
490 Lubanga (n. 599) 
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itself’.491 The ILC Responsibility Articles provide that ‘the responsible State is under an 
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful 
act’.492 
 
The duty to make reparation for violations of IHL is explicitly referred to in the Second 
Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property.493  As the 
ICRC notes, it is also implied in the rule contained in the Geneva Conventions, according 
to which states cannot absolve themselves or another High Contracting Party of any 
liability incurred in respect of grave breaches.494 
 
Clearly, the ICJ applied a ‘general conception of law’ to the relationship between states 
in Chrozow (liability to make reparation for a breach of an engagement). This principle is 
the essence of the ILC Responsibility Articles and there is no question that the Chrozow 
dictum applies to violations of IHL that constitute IWA.495 In this sense, if it is 
recognised that individuals today enjoy rights in IHL vis-à-vis states (as well as vis-à-vis 
other non-state actors), then reparation – as a general rule of international law – should in 
principle apply to a breach of an engagement towards the holder of the right, whether it is 
                                               
491 Chorzow (n 22) [102]; see also PCIJ Statute, Article 36, which states that ‘the States Parties to the 
present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special 
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all 
legal disputes concerning: … (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an 
international obligation’. Article 36 of the ICJ Statute contains similar wording. 
492 ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23), Article 31, [86] 
493 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property (n 757) Article 38, 
[80] 
494 Rule 150 on Reparation of the ICRC Customary IHL database, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule150, accessed on 1 February 2016. 
495 ‘The inter-State consequences of violations are laid down in the rules on State responsibility. This article 
will try to show how those rules apply to violations of international humanitarian law’. M Sassòli, ‘State 
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law', Vol. 84, No. 846, International Review of 
the Red Cross, June (2002), p. 402 
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stated or not in IHL conventions. Part A of this Chapter already established that nothing 
in IHL prevents individual reparation. Part B will analyse whether individuals enjoy 
secondary rights under general international law for serious violations of IHL (as 
established in the Principles and Guidelines) or whether the nature of IHL excludes 
individual reparation. 
 
A. State responsibility and individual reparation for IHL breaches 
 
Van Boven argues that the construction of the concept of state responsibility to the inter-
state context only, ignores the historic evolution of international law since World War II.  
He explains that human rights are now an integral and dynamic part of international law, 
as evidenced by numerous widely ratified international instruments.496 Indeed, the duty of 
affording remedies for governmental misconduct is so widely acknowledged that the 
right to an effective remedy for violations of human rights may be regarded as forming 
part of customary international law.497 Chapter 2 of this thesis also shows that the law of 
diplomatic protection (based on state responsibility) has been influenced by human rights 
law to the point where it has evolved in its treatment of denial of justice as a right 
belonging also to individuals, not only states.498 
                                               
496 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 26. See also M Kamminga, ‘Final Report on the Impact of 
International Human Rights Law on General International Law’ in M Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds), 
The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009). 
497 Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 28-29. 
498 Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of the concept of diplomatic protection from the traditional 
Mavrommatis (n 279) conception to the contemporary understanding in Diallo, where the state, instead of 
exercising diplomatic protection in its own right, does so as an agent on behalf of the injured individual: 
‘the sum awarded to Guinea in the exercise of diplomatic protection of Mr Diallo is intended to provide 
reparation for the latter’s injury’ – Diallo (Compensation) (n 113) [57]. It also notes that the International 
Court of Justice, in the LaGrand (n 92) case and in Avena (n 123), has established that the breach of 
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Against this background, it is relevant to note once again that the Darfur Report states 
that that the universal recognition and acceptance of the right to an effective remedy 
cannot but have a bearing on the interpretation of the international provisions on state 
responsibility. According to the Commission, these provisions may now be construed as 
obligations assumed by states not only towards other states, but also vis-à-vis the victims 
who suffered from war crimes and crimes against humanity.499  
 
As mentioned, Article 33 of the ILC Reparation Articles confirms that reparation by the 
liable state may be owed both to other states and to injured individuals.500 In addition, the 
Commentary affirms that at the international level, individuals can invoke the 
responsibility of a state on their own account and without the intermediation of any 
state.501 The ILC Commentary says that the primary rule will determine whether non-
state entities can invoke responsibility on their own account.  Clearly, it is a matter of 
interpretation of the primary norm, and in principle this could be done before an 
international body or in national courts. The ILC Commentary makes clear that ‘state 
responsibility for a breach of an obligation under a treaty concerning the protection of 
human rights may exist towards all the other parties to the treaty, but the individuals 
concerned should be regarded as ultimate beneficiaries and in that sense as the holder of 
                                                                                                                                            
international norms on treatment of aliens may produce both the violation of a right of the national State 
and the violation of a right of the individual. The same conclusion reached by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, in its Advisory Opinion OC-16/99.  
499 Darfur Report (n 100)  [597]. 
500 ‘This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which 
may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’, Article 32(2). See also the Commentary on 
Article 32, Report of ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23) [3-4].  
501 See Article 33 (2) and Commentary [233], Report on ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23).  
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the relevant rights’.502 The commentary cites the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, as 
well as LaGrand, to prove that individual rights under international law may also arise 
outside the framework of human rights. Notably, the PCIJ affirmed in Danzig the 
existence of a right for an individual under international law despite the lack of an 
international procedural mechanism. It stated that national courts could enforce such 
rights.503 Similarly, the ICJ reaffirmed in LaGrand that individuals can have international 
rights despite their lack of general international standing and that these rights should be 
enforced domestically.504  
 
In this sense, it is fair to say that individuals can enjoy rights under contemporary IHL.505 
It has been observed, in this context, that it would be ‘preposterous to affirm that the 
position of the individual as a holder of rights dissolves when their need to be protected 
against abuses reaches its peak, i.e. in the situations of armed conflicts, when individuals 
are more vulnerable than ever’.506 In addition, it is well established that HR law applies in 
situations of armed conflict, and there is a set of HR that continues to apply even when 
                                               
502 Commentary, Report on the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23) 234 et seq.   
503 [...] it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, according to the intention of 
the contracting parties, may be the adaptation by the parties of some definite rules creating individual rights 
and obligations and enforceable by national courts. [emphasis added]. Danzig (n 91) 17. 
504 LaGrand (n 92) 77. 
505 Lopes and Quenivet argue that the regime of ‘protected persons’ under IHL offer protection and 
assistance in the form of certain rights to individuals who do not play a role in the hostilities. They also 
contend that treaty law also holds special rights for individuals by virtue of the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols. See Lopes and Quenivet, ‘Individuals as subjects’ (n 393) 214. Gaeta points out 
as an example that Article 12 of the Geneva Convention 1, provides that members of the armed forces who 
are wounded or sick ‘shall be respected and protected in all circumstances’ and they ‘shall be treated 
humanely and cared for by the Party to the conflict in whose power they may be’. Gaeta ‘Compensation’ (n 
28) 319. 
506 Gaeta ‘Compensation’ (n 28) 319. 
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the state makes a declaration under the derogation clause contained in the human rights 
treaties.507  
 
In principle, therefore, if a state breaches a norm containing an individual right, it is liable 
to afford reparation to the individual victim. The question of whether individuals can be 
holders of secondary rights, and whether the secondary right to reparation entails the right 
to access a procedural avenue to enforce it, has been addressed in Chapter 1. The chapter 
concludes that if individuals’ rights are breached, individuals have an actionable 
secondary right to reparation. Claims can be pursued at the international level by the 
home state representing its national or, when possible, by the individual him/herself (e.g. 
before a HR court, monitoring body, claims commission or arbitral tribunal). When the 
claims involve fundamental breaches, individuals can pursue these claims at the domestic 
level before national courts or before foreign courts.508   
 
However, since reparation in the context of war has traditionally been awarded to states, 
it has been argued that reparation for IHL can only be made between states. In addition, 
none of the IHL instruments contain monitoring mechanisms with individual standing as 
the human rights treaties do. This section will investigate whether there is a norm in CIL 
that provides for state-to-state reparation excluding individual remedies for victims of 
                                               
507 The International Court of Justice stated that ‘the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights does not cease in times of war’ – The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Reports 226 [25] [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. There is ample literature on 
this subject. See, inter alia, L Doswald-Beck and S Vité, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law’ (1993) 293 IRRC 94; F Hampson and I Salama, The Relationship between Human Rights Law 
and International Humanitarian Law’, UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, Working Paper (June 21, 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14; Droege, ‘The Interplay’ (n. 488). 
508 As explained in previous chapters, personal and state immunities might prevent the exercise of 
jurisdiction by some domestic courts. 
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armed conflict or if the practice of interstate reparation responds to policy concerns rather 
than being established by a legal norm.  
B. Human rights and the laws of armed conflict 
 
Before looking at general international law practice in this regard, it is important to look 
at human rights law. It is widely recognised that human rights law applies during armed 
conflict; there is a set of fundamental rights during armed conflict that individuals enjoy 
and when these are breached, victims have a right to a remedy and reparation. The ICJ 
recognised this in the Nuclear Weapons509 and more recently in the Wall Advisory 
Opinion: ‘[…] the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case 
of armed conflict’.510 In Hassan, the ECtHR made clear that ‘the protections offered by 
human rights conventions and that offered by international humanitarian law co-exist in 
situations of armed conflict’.511  
 
In this sense, regardless of whether there is an individual right to reparation under 
principles of state responsibility for victims of armed conflict, it is clear that certain 
prohibited acts or omissions, whether committed in peace or wartime, give rise to an 
individual right to a remedy in international law by virtue of the right contained in human 
rights conventions. However, some insist that there is no individual right to a remedy for 
                                               
509 Nuclear Weapons (n 507).  
510 Wall Opinion (n94) 136 [106]. 
511 Hassan v United Kingdom A no 29750/09 (16 September 2014) ECtHR 4 [102]. 
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IHL violations because of the ‘particularities’ of this legal regime.512 This reasoning has 
led to positions like that of the U.S. before the Committee Against Torture (CAT) arguing 
that while the UNCAT applies in time of war, Article 14 is inapplicable since claims of 
IHL violations are to be resolved on a state– to–state level and war reparation under CIL 
are subject to government-to-government negotiations.513 The CAT referred to its 
General Comment 3514 on the applicability of Article 14 in its Concluding 
Observations.515 Under the heading ‘Inquiries into allegations of torture overseas’, the 
Committee urged the State Party to: ‘(c) Provide effective remedies and redress to 
victims, including fair and adequate compensation, and as full rehabilitation as possible, 
in accordance with the Committee’s general comment No. 3 (2012) on the 
implementation of article 14 of the Convention by State parties’.516 
 
There has been much written on the relationship between HR and IHL, for example, how 
both regimes apply in practice; what ‘lex specialis’ or ‘complementarity’ mean; the 
extent of ‘conflict’ or the characteristics of ‘mutually reinforcing regimes’. While this is 
not the place to go into a detailed discussion of these topics, it is important to clarify how 
                                               
512 The majority of the arguments are of a policy nature. For example, Tomuschat argues that ‘grave 
violations of humanitarian law, in particular, constitute essentially a mass phenomenon which cannot be 
successfully addressed by way of individual suits’. Tomuschat, Between Idealism (n 88) 414. Others argue 
that armed conflicts are harder to monitor than situations not amounting to war or that judicial review can 
hamper the achievement of peace at the end of a conflict.  
513 US Third Periodic Report to UN Committee Against Torture. Nov. 12-13, 2014. See the full unofficial 
transcript by JustSecurity at 
<http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/cat_complete_transcript_from_just_security.pdf> 
accessed 2 February 2016. The official version of the opening statement by Amb. Keith Harper, U.S. Rep. 
to the Human Rights Council is available at: <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/11/12/ambassador-
harper-opposition-to-torture-is-a-fundamental-american-value> accessed 2 February 2016. 
514 CAT, General Comment No. 3 of the Committee against Torture: Implementation of article 14 by States 
parties, 19 Nov 2012, CAT/C/GC/3. 
515 CAT, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic reports of the United States of 
America, 19 Dec 2014, CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5. 
516 idem. 
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does HR law applies during armed conflict and what the effect on the right to a remedy 
and reparation for victims of human rights violations is. The idea that IHL and 
international HR law are complementary, rather than alternative regimes, has largely 
replaced the former convention that maintained that the two regimes are mutually 
exclusive.517 As explained by Ben-Naftali: 
[t]he coupling of the consciousness of the changing face of war from inter-state to 
intra-state or mixed conflicts, with the experience that ‘the first line of defence 
against international humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at all,518 generated 
a new paradigm according to which IHL is not an alternative to IHRL but an 
exception to the full application of the latter.519  
 
Normative developments520 and international and domestic jurisprudence,521 together 
with a wide scholarly support, seem to confirm that the confluence of the regimes is the 
new canon. Still some scholars maintain that both regimes do not and indeed should not 
meet,522 while others are concerned that it may result in less rather than more protection 
                                               
517 See e.g. GIAD Draper, ‘Humanitarian Law and Human Rights’, Acta Juridica (1979)193-206.  
518 R R Baxter ‘Some existing Problems in Humanitarian Law’ in The Concept of International Armed 
Conflict: Further Outlook (Proceedings of the International Symposium on Humanitarian Law, Brussels, 
1974) 
519 Orna Ben-Naftali ‘International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law –Pas de Deux’ 
in Ben-Naftali (n 28) 4. 
520 ‘Normative developments originating in the 1968 International Conference in Teheran, and including 
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions; the 1990 Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards; and the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which proscribes crimes against humanity 
and genocide in both peace and wartimes situations, confirmed the validity of the new paradigm’. Ben-
Naftali (n 28) 4-5. 
521 See e.g. Nuclear Weapons (n 507); Wall Opinion (n94); Arrest Warrant Case (n 345) 69-70 [216-217]. 
On the domestic level, the practice of the Israeli Supreme Court operating in its capacity as High Court of 
Justice and exercising judicial review over actions of the military in the occupied Palestinian Territory is 
noteworthy. See, for example, Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 7957/04, Israel: Supreme 
Court, 15 September 2005, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4374aa674.html> accessed 3 
February 2016; Public Committee Against Torture v. State of Israel (Targeted Killings), HCJ 769/02, 
Israel: Supreme Court, 13 December 2006, available at 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf > accessed 3 February 2016. 
522 See, for example, Bowring, ‘Fragmentation, Lex Specialis and the Tensions in the Jurisprudence of the 
European Committee of Human Rights’ (2009) J.C. and S.L. 1-14.   
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to human rights.523 Modirzadeh for example, argues that the convergence approach 
avoids doing the hard work of actually transforming and re-envisioning IHL to establish 
real accountability mechanisms and remedies for IHL violations (as opposed to arguing 
complex jurisdictional legal points in order to apply HR law during armed conflict and 
provide the possibility of state accountability before HR bodies and domestic courts). 
Convergence of IHL and international HR law, according to Modirzadeh, ‘leaves 
unaddressed and untheorized the broader implications for how law functions in war’.524 
Most scholars, though, hold that there is a large measure of convergence between IHL 
and international HR law, and as such, both legal regimes can be used for interpretative 
purposes to improve the law and advance its humanistic purpose. Opinions diverge, 
however, on the scope and methods of dealing with norm conflicts: some hold that 
existing interpretative mechanisms – most specifically the lex specialis principle – 
adequately resolve the relatively narrow scope of norm conflicts.525 Droege argues that 
two main concepts should govern the interaction between IHL and HR law: 
complementarity and mutual influence (in most cases), and precedence of the more 
specific norm (lex specialis) when there is contradiction between the two bodies of law 
(in some cases).526 Although, as she notes, ‘the question is: in which situation is either 
                                               
523 See N Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying Human rights Law to Armed Conflict’ (2005) International 
Review of the Red Cross 860, 737-754; W Shabas, ‘Lex specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel 
Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus and Bellum’ 
(2007) 40 Is LR 592-613; Y Shany, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal Paradigms 
for Fighting Against Terror’ in Ben-Naftali (n 28). 
524 N K Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro-Civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict’ US Naval War College, International Law Studies 
(Blue Book Series 2010) 86, 390-393, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1543482> accessed 3 February 2016. 
525 See: M Sassoli, ‘The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the New Types of 
Armed Conflicts’, in Ben-Naftali (n28). 
526 C Droege, ‘Elective affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90(871) IRRC 501. 
 177 
body more specific?’527 For others, only political processes are capable of harmonizing 
these regimes.528 Some scholars believe that the convergence is as substantive as 
substantial, indicating a ‘movement towards a new merger’ of both bodies of law into 
one.529  
 
The United States’ position that the UNCAT and IHL are ‘complementary’ and ‘mutually 
reinforcing’ in wartime settings except in case of ‘conflict’ seems to assume that IHL will 
always take precedence as the more ‘specific’ rule. But what is relevant for this 
discussion is that even if one takes this position as accurate, the claim of a ‘conflict’ 
between a norm of IHL and the individual right to enforceable compensation under 
Article 14 is still disputable. Is there really a ‘norm’ of IHL establishing that reparation 
for HR and IHL violations committed during armed conflicts have to be resolved on a 
state-to-state level? Is there a ‘norm’ under CIL establishing that war reparations are 
subject to government-to-government negotiations?  
 
Prima facie, nothing precludes the application of the obligation to afford compensation 
under Article 14 to victims of torture occurring in armed conflict.  This is a narrow 
obligation and the UNCAT was intended to strengthen the universal prohibition on 
torture.  The competing rule of ‘state-to-state reparation only’ is questionable. Even if 
claimed that it does exists, it is clearly unwritten in non-international armed conflict, and 
certainly lacks the qualities of precision and specificity that characterised the Geneva 
                                               
527 Idem. 502. 
528 M Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in Ben-Naftali 
(n 28). 
529 Arnold and Quenivet (eds) (n 393). 
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Convention provisions applied in Hassan over Article 5 of the ECHR.530 There is no 
practice showing that HR bodies typically refrain from applying the remedies afforded by 
HR law in deference to IHL rules.531 Finally, as explained in the previous section, 
nothing in IHL precludes states from expanding the remedies contemplated by that 
system through the creation of civil remedies enforceable by individuals, whether through 
their domestic legislation or through international agreements such as the UNCAT.532 
 
After a detailed analysis of domestic and international jurisprudence, particularly that of 
HR bodies and courts, Dorege observes: 
 
there is no conflict between human rights law and humanitarian law in respect of 
legal remedies. Humanitarian law is simply silent on the question of an individual 
right to a remedy; it does not preclude individual remedies where they exist under 
other international law or domestic law. Human rights law has reinforced the 
possibility of alleged victims of violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
bringing cases before courts and other human rights bodies. This is not in conflict 
with humanitarian law, but can indeed strengthen compliance with it, albeit 
through the lens of human rights law.533 
 
While there is clearly an earlier practice of war reparations afforded at state level, the law 
and practice on reparation for HR and IHL violations has evolved greatly since WWII. It 
is important to differentiate between policy considerations and legal norms. The premise 
that a rule of international law exists excluding individual remedies in IHL is legally 
questionable. As shown in Part I, while the evidence of the compensation rules of IHL 
                                               
530 Hassan (n 511). 
531 See n 489 and accompanying text 
532 Indeed, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which prohibits torture and humiliating and degrading 
treatment, expressly provides that ‘[n]o provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or 
infringing any other more favourable provision granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of 
international law’. Article 75(8).  This savings clause suggests that IHL in this context would welcome the 
additional remedies afforded by the UNCAT (n. 9).  
533 Droege, ‘Elective Affinities’ (n 526) 546. 
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applying to individuals is inconclusive, there is nothing in IHL that prevents reparation to 
individuals. Importantly, such a rule would clearly be at odds with non-international 
armed conflicts where non-state actors (as opposed to only states) are bound to comply 
with IHL provisions. Under CIL, such a norm would be directly in conflict with existing 
obligations in HR law to afford remedies to victims whether the violations are committed 
in times of peace or during armed conflicts.  
C. Reparation for IHL violations outside HR mechanisms and with no 
reference to Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 91 of API 
 
The International Law Association recognises the right of victims of armed conflict to 
reparation.534 The Committee on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict enacted a 
Declaration of International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict. 
It established that: 
 
[t]he old provisions contained in the Hague Convention IV and restated in 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, according to which a 
Party to the conflict is responsible for the violations of the law of armed 
conflict and is liable to pay compensation, should me modernized and 
brought in conformity with the developments of International 
Humanitarian Law.535  
 
This section examines these developments to assess if victims of armed conflict have a 
right to a remedy and reparation outside HR conventions and despite the ambiguities of 
the compensation provisions in IHL instruments.  
 
                                               
534 The ILA Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict Committee concluded the first part of its work with 
the adoption of the Declaration of International Law Principles for Victims of Armed Conflict at the 74 th 
ILA Conference (Res 2/2010). 
535 ibid, 1. 
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There are a number of examples in which a right for individuals to obtain compensation 
in case of a violation of IHL is clearly mentioned in a peace treaty or a Security Council 
Resolution without explicitly grounding the right on Article 3 of the Hague Convention 
IV or the respective provisions in the Geneva Conventions or in relation to HR 
obligations. Some of these examples are described below.  
i. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) 
 
To a certain extent, the individual is the bearer of a right to compensation for violations 
of IHL before the EECC. Article 5, Para. 1 Sentence 2 of the Agreement between the 
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the 
State of Eritrea stipulates: 
 
The mandate of the Commission is to decide through binding arbitration all claims 
for losses, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals 
(including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against the Government 
of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) 
related to the conflict that was the subject of the Framework Agreement, the 
Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and 
(b) result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law.536 
 
According to this rule, individuals are entitled to obtain reparation for their loss suffered 
from a violation of international law in the context of the conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. Even though the individual has no standing before the EECC, the individual is 
the bearer of the material right to reparation under the Agreement. The wording of Article 
                                               
536 Agreement of 12 December 2000 (2001) 40 ILM 260. 
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5 Para. 8, 9 of the Agreement, of the Rules of Procedure537 and of Decision No. 5538 
indicate that the state, when claiming for a loss suffered by an individual, is not invoking 
its own right, but is acting on behalf of the individual. In its Partial Award on Eritrea’s 
Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, the EECC confirmed this classification by ruling that claims 
brought by Eritrea on its own behalf for non-nationals are outside the scope of 
jurisdiction of the Commission. These claims should have been made on behalf of the 
individuals themselves (under Article 5 paragraph 9), as ‘the claim remains the property 
of the individual and that any eventual recovery of damages should accrue to that 
person’.539  
 
The EECC observed in its Final Award Decision that the option to bring large claims on 
behalf of individual victims was not used by the parties to the Agreement. As noted by 
the Commission, this was probably due to lack of time and resources: 
 
 25.  […] For reasons that are readily understandable, given limits of time 
and resources, both Parties filed their claims as inter-State claims. Although 
Eritrea filed claims on behalf of six individuals, neither Party utilized the 
option, available under Article 5(8) of the Agreement and the Commission’s 
Rules of Procedure, of presenting claims directly on behalf of large numbers 
of individuals. Nevertheless, some of both States’ claims are made in the 
                                               
537 Article 23 and 24(3)(b), available at: 
< http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EECC/Rules%20of%20Procedure.PDF, (accessed 8 April 
2016). 
538 Available at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EECC/Decision%205.pdf> (accessed 8 April 
2016). 
539 Partial Award of 17 December 2004, Civilians Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27–32, [19], 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVI/195-247.pdf accessed 10 April 16. Claims for injuries of Eritrean 
nationals were only brought on behalf of Eritrea and not explicitly on behalf of the individuals. However, 
they are within the jurisdiction of the Commission, as Article 5(8) of the Peace Agreement states that 
claims shall be submitted on behalf of the parties and the nationals themselves. The Commission seems to 
consider the formulation chosen by Eritrea to be sufficient to include claims of the individuals. 
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exercise of diplomatic protection, in that they are predicated upon injuries 
allegedly suffered by numbers of the Claimant State’s nationals[…].540 
 
As the Commission further explains, Article 5(9) of the Agreement allowed ‘[…]claims 
on behalf of persons of Ethiopian or Eritrean origin who may not be its nationals’. 
According to the provision, ‘[s]uch claims shall be considered by the Commission on the 
same basis as claims submitted on behalf of that party’s nationals’.541 However, this 
innovative article was not used. While Eritrea sought to bring claims predicated upon 
injuries to Ethiopian nationals, it did so on behalf of the state of Eritrea, and not on behalf 
of the injured individuals. Albeit not used, it is clear that while the EECC is an inter-state 
agreement, it conferred an individual right to obtain reparation for a violation of the jus in 
bello.542 
 
At this point, it is not clear what the practical results of the Commission’s final awards 
will be. Unlike some other recent international claims processes (such as the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal and the UNCC), there is no dedicated source of funding for EECC 
awards. Even if awards are promptly paid, they are predominantly state-to-state claims 
that are not directed to specific recipients. Outside of the six individual claims, the 
                                               
540 Under Article 5(9) of the Agreement, ‘[i]n appropriate cases, each party may file claims on behalf of 
persons of Ethiopian or Eritrean origin who may not be its nationals. Such claims shall be considered by the 
Commission on the same basis as claims submitted on behalf of that party’s nationals’. This unusual 
provision was not utilised. While Eritrea sought to bring claims predicated upon injuries to Ethiopian 
nationals, it did so on behalf of the State of Eritrea, and not on behalf of the injured individuals. 
541 ibid. 
542 The US Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, however, ruled in 2003 that the remedy offered by 
the EECC was not effective: ‘We conclude that the Commission’s inability to make an award directly to 
Nemariam, and Eritrea’s ability to set off Nemariam’s claim, or an award to Eritrea based upon her claim, 
against claims made by or an award in favor of Ethiopia, render the Commission an inadequate forum; […] 
In so saying, we recognize that the decision is a close one, particularly in the light of our limited standard 
of review and the district court’s observation, with which we agree, that there is nothing in the record to 
suggest the plaintiffs’ awards will be set off against debts owed by Eritrea to Ethiopia. Neither, however, is 
there any legal barrier to such a set off’. Hiwot Nemariam et al., Appellants, v. The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia and The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Appellees. No. 01-7142. United States Court 
of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 315 F.3d 390, January 24, 2003. Para 22. 
 183 
payments would be received by the two governments, which technically would have 
discretion as to whether to keep the funds, provide them to the affected individuals, or 
use them for alternative forms of assistance or relief to the affected population groups.  In 
this respect the process is also unlike those of the Iran US Claims Tribunal and the UN 
Compensation Commission, where specific awards were made for specific recipients.543  
ii. United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) 
 
Another example of reparation for IHL violations outside HR mechanisms and with no 
reference to Article 3 of Hague IV and Article 91 of API is the UNCC544. It was set up 
after the gulf war in 1980 and rules upon claims resulting from Iraq’s unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait. In the framework of the UNCC, there is one situation in which 
a payment can be made for a violation of IHL (jus in bello) even though the UNCC 
usually grants compensation for damages resulting in the violation of the prohibition of 
the use of force by Iraq (jus ad bellum). These cases concern claims by the members of 
the Allied Coalition Armed Forces, who are usually excluded from submitting claims 
before the UNCC. They are entitled to obtain compensation from the commission only if 
they were prisoners of war and had suffered mistreatment contrary to the rules of IHL.545  
 
The UNCC regime is special not only because it was imposed on Iraq by a resolution of 
the UN Security Council, but also because the resolution also provided for a source from 
                                               
543 M.J. Matheson, “The Damage Awards of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission,” 9 The L. & 
Practice of Int’l Courts & Tribunals 1 (2010), 1–15. 
544 Established by SC Res 692 (20 May 1991). 
545 Decision No. 11 of the Governing Council, UN Doc S/AC.26/1992/11. 
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which reparation was to be paid. According to Resolution 687: ‘Iraq … is liable under 
international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and 
corporations, as a result of the unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’.546  
 
The wording of the resolution seems to suggest that individual victims are entitled to 
redress for Iraq’s violation of the jus ad bellum under international law. However, the 
exact wording does not specify the owner of the right. It only enumerates the damages 
and persons who may have suffered such harm. Nonetheless, the procedural rules and the 
Commission’s practice clearly demonstrate a concept endowing the individual who has 
suffered damages, as described in the resolution of the Security Council, with a right to 
reparation.547  
 
According to the wording of Article 5, Para 1(a) of the Provisional Rules for Claims 
Procedure: ‘a Government may submit claims on behalf of its nationals’.548 
Consequently, whereas the individual has no standing before the UNCC, the state acts as 
representative for the individual before the Commission. It is not the same as diplomatic 
protection, since states are also representatives for individuals who are not their nationals, 
                                               
546 SC Res 687 (3 April 1991). 
547 C Alzamora, ‘The UN Compensation Commission: An Overview’ in RB Lillich (ed), The United 
Nations Compensation Commission (Transnational Publishers 1995) 3, 8-9; JR Crook, ‘Is Iraq Entitled to 
Judicial Due Process?’ in RB Lillich (ed), The United Nations Compensation Commission (Transnational 
Publishers 1995) 77, 80; N Wühler, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission’ in Randelzhofer and 
Tomuschat (n 53) 213, 216. 
548 UNCC Governing Council Decision ‘Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure’, UN Doc 
S/AC.26/Dec.10 (June 1992). 
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but who are residing within the states’ territory.549 Further, claims filed by states on 
behalf of individuals are dependent on the consent of the individual, as they have to be 
accompanied by a signature of the individual whose claim is covered.550 The states have 
also to assure the individual claimant that any damage paid is distributed to that 
individual if successful.551 The status of the state as representative for the individual is 
affirmed by Article 5, Para. 3 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, according to 
which a corporation or other private legal entity may itself make a claim to the 
Commission, independently from any assistance of a state, if the respective state fails to 
do so.552 Persons, who were not in a position to have their claims submitted by their 
governments, will not be deprived of their claim, as according to Article 5, Para. 2 of the 
Rules, an appropriate person, authority or body shall be appointed to submit claims on 
their behalf.  
 
The UNCC had to deal with more than 1.7 million claims resulting from the 1990-91 
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC Governing Council gave first 
priority to the hundreds of thousands of individuals who were displaced or injured. They 
were offered modest fixed sums without the need to prove actual losses. This programme 
                                               
549 Article 5 para.1 UNCC Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure; V Heiskanen, ‘The United Nations 
Compensation Commission’ (2002) 296 RdC 259, 328. 
550 UNCC Governing Council Decision ‘Criteria for Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims’, UN Doc 
S/AC.26/Dec.1 (2 August 1991) [19]. 
551 UNCC Governing Council Decision 'Distribution of Payments and Transparency', UN Doc 
S/AC.26/Dec.18 (24 March 1994). 
552 ‘Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure’ (n 548). 
 186 
was very successful and resulted in relatively prompt awards and payments of fixed 
amounts, totalling more than $ 3 billion USD, to more than 800,000 individuals.553  
 
While the EECC dealt with both jus ad bellum liability of Eritrea and violations of jus in 
bello of both belligerent parities, the UNCC Security Council Resolution 687 establishes 
an individual right to obtain reparation for the loss suffered as a result of Iraq’s unlawful 
invasion of Kuwait (jus ad bellum). 554   
iii. Security Council Resolutions and Peace Agreements 
 
The Security Council made another explicit link between a violation of international 
humanitarian law and an individual right to compensation in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In its Resolution 471, the Security Council stated that the violation of 
Article 27 of the Geneva Convention IV by Israel established the obligation ‘to provide 
the victims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of these 
crimes’.555 The resolution does not contain any reference to Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention IV or the general principles of state responsibility, nor does it give other 
basis for the existence of such a right. It is not therefore clear whether the document 
                                               
553 Matheson “The Damage Awards of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission,” (n 543) 6. Matheson 
directs to the ‘Status of Claims Processing’ on the UNCC website, <www.uncc.ch> accessed 8 April 2016.  
554 The entire mandate of the UNCC is based on the violation of the jus ad bellum by Iraq. It has been 
argued that with a view to such violations the Security Council has created individual rights for 
compensation, as opposed to implying that the Governing Council of the UNCC only acted in recognition 
of rights existing independently of the Security Council Resolution establishing the entire framework. For 
the competence of the Security Council to do so see A Gattini, ‘The UN Compensation Commission: Old 
Rules, New Procedures on War Reparations’ (2002) 13 EJIL 161, 164 et seq. However, the example of the 
Security Council in its Resolution 471 concerning Israel could hardly be clearer in grounding the individual 
right to compensation in a violation of international humanitarian law. 
555 UNSC Res 471 (5 June 1980)  [2-3]. 
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presupposes and confirms an existing individual right to compensation under 
international law or whether it intends to establish an individual right by treaty or by 
resolution.556  
 
Similarly, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur proposed an Ad hoc 
Compensation Commission to the Security Council in 2004. In its report, the 
Commission pointed out that: ‘there has now emerged in international law a rights of 
victims of serious human rights abuses (in particular war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide) to reparation (including compensation) for damage resulting from those 
abuses’.557 
 
There are some peace agreements that do not differentiate between losses resulting from 
an infringement of the jus in bello or other breaches.  The Treaty of Versailles, concluded 
after the First World War, ordered in its Article 231 reparations to be paid by Germany 
and its allies for a war of aggression.558 In other words, reparation was due for a violation 
of the jus ad bellum.559 However, the US-German Mixed Claims Commission’s mandate 
                                               
556 This is also true for those peace agreements which do not differentiate between losses resulting from an 
infringement of the jus in bello or others, such as the US-German Mixed Claims Commission or the 
Property Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina established under the Dayton Peace Agreement. The 
Dayton Peace Agreement explicitly states the rights of persons deprived of their property to restoration or 
compensation (Annex VII, Article 1 Para 1): ‘Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons: All refugees and 
displaced persons have the right to freely return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have 
restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be 
compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.’ The right also seems to cover compensation for 
property that was destroyed during the conflict; however, the right is not dependent on any violation of 
international humanitarian law. 
557 Darfur Report (n 100).  
558 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles) 13 AJIL 
Supp. 151, 385 (1919).See generally: C Brezina, The Treaty of Versailles, 1919: A Primary Source 
Examination of the Treaty That Ended World War I (Primary Sources of American Treaties 2006).  
559 I Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon Press1963) 138; P d'Argent 
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was much broader than those of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals under the Treaty of 
Versailles,560 covering also losses suffered by individuals as a consequence of ordinary 
measures of the war.561 Individual claims of US nationals were represented by their 
government before the Commission562 and no differentiation was made as to whether the 
loss was a consequence of a violation of international humanitarian law or not.  
 
Another example is the Property Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina established 
under the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The DPA explicitly states the rights of persons 
deprived of their property to restitution or compensation:  
 
Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons: All refugees and displaced persons have the 
right to freely return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored 
to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and 
to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. (…).563  
 
The right seems also to cover compensation for property destroyed during the conflict; 
however, the right to restitution is not dependent on any violation of international 
humanitarian law. 
 
On the other hand, while the Treaty of Versailles reparation system was based on the 
breach of the jus ad bellum and consisted of inter-governmental payments, it also 
contained some individual rights. Especially interesting is Article 297 lit e) of the Treaty 
                                                                                                                                            
Reparations de guerre (n 16) 50, 77.  
560 The U.S. did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles but concluded a separate treaty with Germany on 25 
August 1921, according to which the U.S. enjoyed all the rights resulting from the Treaty of Versailles. 
Treaty of Berlin, 16 AJIL Supp. 10, 13 (1922); Brezina (n 527). 
561 See Decision No 1 of the Commission of 1 November 1923, (n. 562)  p. 174 et seq. 
562 The US-German Mixed Claims Commission was established by an agreement on 10 August 1922, RGBl. 
(1923), 113, 18.   
563 Dayton Peace Agreement (Annex VII, Article 1 Para 1). 
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of Versailles, according to which nationals of Allied or Associated Powers could claim 
compensation for damage or injury suffered by the application of an ‘exceptional war 
measure’ or ‘measures of transfer’ before Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. The scope of these 
claims was restricted, as ‘exceptional war measures’ were defined as measures that were 
taken with regard to enemy property and which were lawful.564 Other losses of 
individuals resulting from the war could not be claimed by the individuals themselves, as 
they were part of the reparation owed to their national government.565  
IV. The ICJ Wall Opinion 
 
In the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory,566 the ICJ seems to acknowledge that certain secondary individual rights exist 
under CIL when fundamental rights of individuals are breached, including violations of 
the laws of war. The Court stated in this case that Israel was obliged under international 
law to afford reparation to all natural and legal persons injured by the construction of the 
wall.567 The Court seems to derive this obligation from general international law. Firstly, 
it cites the Chorzów case to refer to the appropriate forms of reparation, applying, 
therefore, state responsibility principles to reparation to individuals.568 Secondly, the 
obligation to afford reparation to all natural and legal persons injured by the construction 
of the wall can only be derived from CIL since there is no treaty between Israel and 
                                               
564 See Annex 1-3 to Section IV of the Treaty. 
565 Article 232 Treaty of Versailles (n 558) 47 et seq. 
566 Wall Opinion (n 94) 131. 
567 Wall Opinion (n 94) 198 [152-153]. 
568 Wall Opinion (n 94) 
 190 
Palestine that explicitly provides reparation to individuals for the breaches alleged (the 
Court does not derive this obligation from the treaties in force for Israel).569  
 
The Court found violations of the Hague Regulations of 1907, Articles 46 and 52, as well 
as the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 49 and 53. These provisions do not 
contain any references to an obligation to make reparation to individuals. As explained 
earlier, some commentators argue that these provisions do not even contain individual 
rights.570 On the other hand, it has been argued that these norms do contain individual 
rights571 or that today they must be interpreted as containing individual rights,572 and that 
Article 3 of the Hague Regulations and Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions provide for an obligation to make reparation to individuals.573 The 
                                               
569 Following the Wall Opinion (n 94), the ICJ has given reparations for HR and IHL violations in two 
subsequent occasions. In the Armed Activities case against Uganda, the Court considered that given the 
nature and gravity of the violations, ‘those acts resulted in injury to the DRC and to persons on its territory’ 
imposing upon Uganda an obligation to make reparations accordingly. In reaching that conclusion, the 
Court relied generally on its previous decisions, including the Chorzów case (n 22); Armed Activities Case 
(n 97) [259]. On the other hand, by acknowledging the responsibility of Uganda for injuries suffered by 
persons in the DRC, the Court implicitly seems to acknowledge the obligation to repair that harm 
accordingly. Therefore, arguably the DRC has the right to request individual reparations on behalf of its 
citizens who were wronged by Uganda’s conduct. In Diallo, a diplomatic protection case brought by 
Guineas against DRC, the Court recalled the fundamental character of the human rights obligations 
breached when affording reparation in accordance with the Chorzów principle. Diallo, (Merits) (n 97) 
[161]. 
570 Hofmann, ‘Victims of Violations of IHL’ (n 98) 341; Provost (n 98)27 et seq. 
571 Frits Kalshoven, ‘State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 827 et 
seq.; C Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law (Law of War)' in F Kalshoven (ed), The Centennial of 
the First International Peace Conference (Kluger Law International  2000) 161, 250; Zegveld, ‘Remedies 
for victims of IHL' (n 16). 
572 The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur states that even if Article 3 of the 
Hague Convention IV was not initially intended to provide compensation for individuals, it does so in the 
present day, as the emergence of human rights in international law has altered the concept of state 
responsibility. Darfur Report (n 100). 
573 See for example, the Preamble of the Principles and Guidelines (n 2) and expert opinions by Kalshoven, 
David; and Greenwood (n 100). 
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Court, however, is silent in this regard. It only mentions that these IHL violations are 
fundamental and give rise to erga omnes obligations.574  
 
The Court also determined that Israel had breached several HR treaty obligations by 
constructing the wall, including Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and several other rights under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Yet, the Court does not refer to these treaties as 
the source for a secondary right to reparation. It determines nonetheless that the manner 
in which Israel is breaching these obligations constitutes a violation to the right to self-
determination, which is a fundamental right giving rise to erga omnes obligations.575 In 
other words, the ICJ seems to be implying that there is an obligation under international 
law to make reparation to individuals for violations of HR and IHL in breach of erga 
omnes obligations. Not even the Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, which is highly 
critical of the Court’s analysis of human rights and IHL, disagrees on this point.576  
 
As explained by Gaeta, as well as d’Argent, the failure by the Court to clarify which 
violations entitled the obligation to repair damage to private individuals can only mean 
that for the Court, the matter was irrelevant.577  Clearly, the judgement implies that the 
obligation of Israel to repair the injury caused to individuals followed naturally from the 
                                               
574 Wall Opinion (n94) [154-159]. 
575 ibid [122]. 
576 See generally: Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins (n. 104). 
577 Gaeta  ‘Compensation’ (n 28) 321. See also d’Argent, ‘Compliance, Cessation, Reparation and 
Restitution in the Wall Advisory Opinion’ in P-M Depuy et al (eds) (n 570) 463-477. 
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illegality of the Israeli conduct under each of the aforementioned rules of international 
law, including those on military occupation.  
 
Tomuschat on the other hand argues that the ICJ had indeed suggested an individualized 
reparation scheme but only because of the peculiar features of the Palestinian situation. 
He argues that there is no Palestinian government that could assert claims against Israel 
according to the model of diplomatic protection since the Palestinian National Authority 
does not have the full status of national government.578 However, Schwager points out 
that ‘It cannot be argued that in absence of a Palestinian State, the Court was forced to 
rule in favour of individuals, as it could have made a ruling in favour of the Palestinian 
National Authority as the representative for the Palestinian people’.579  
V. National laws granting an individual right to seek compensation under 
international law (ATCA & TVPA) 
 
In the United States, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)580 and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (TVPA)581 provide a basis in law for US federal courts to hear civil claims 
against persons allegedly responsible for serious human rights abuses.  The ATCA, 
adopted in 1789, provides jurisdiction to federal district courts over cases brought by 
non-citizens for torts committed in violation of ‘the law of nations‘.  Beginning with the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ landmark decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,582 US 
                                               
578 Tomuschat ‘The Individual and National Courts’ (n 27) 825. 
579 E Schwager, ‘Compensation for Victims of an Armed Conflict’ (2005) 4(2) Chinese J of Intl L 417. 
580  28 U.S.C. Section 1350.  
581 28 U.S.C. ch 85 Section 1350 
582  630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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courts have held that conduct which violates the ‘law of nations’ under the ATCA 
includes human rights abuses prohibited by norms of ‘customary international law’.  In 
June 2004, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain583 upheld the validity of the 
ATCA. In so doing, the court cited with approval Filartiga and other cases that have 
permitted claims for violations of ‘specific, universal and obligatory’ international norms. 
Which claims can go forward under the Supreme Court’s definition remains to be seen, 
but the list likely includes torture, extrajudicial killing, slave labour, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide.  The TVPA, passed by Congress in 1992, extended the 
ATCA by providing a cause of action to US citizens and non-citizens alike for 
extrajudicial killing and torture. 
 
The ATCA of 1789 states: ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States’. It seems that the ATCA not only provided a rule establishing 
jurisdiction, but also constituted a cause of action. However, in its judgment in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, the US Supreme Court ruled that the ATCA is a strictly jurisdictional 
statute.584 It held that the ATCA was enacted on the understanding that the common law 
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations 
thought to carry personal liability at the time.585 Nowadays, federal courts could 
recognise claims under federal common law for violations of a norm of international law 
if the norm has a definite content and acceptance among civilized nations, such as the 
                                               
583  542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004). 
584 Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct., p. 2739, 2754. 
585 ibid. 2761. 
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18th-century paradigms in place when the ATCA was enacted.586 In allowing actions 
under the ATCA for violations of widely accepted international norms,587 the US legal 
system recognised a right of individuals to compensation resulting from a violation of an 
international norm having the required qualifications.  
 
However, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum588, the US Supreme Court held that under 
the Alien Tort Statute, there is a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law. The Court reasoned that such presumption, derived from a traditional canon of 
interpretation that serves to protect against clashes between U.S. law and the law of other 
nations. The Court established that nothing within the text, history, or purpose of the 
statute indicates that it was intended to apply extraterritorially. In order to rebut this 
presumption, the petitioners’ claim would have to touch and concern the territory of the 
United States with ‘sufficient force’.589  
 
Compensation claims before US courts resulting from acts committed during armed 
conflicts have had very different outcomes. A considerable number of cases resulting 
from WWII have been settled.590 In these cases, the courts did not have to rule whether 
claims by victims of an armed conflict could succeed in court proceedings. Other claims 
                                               
586 ibid.  
587 C Ryngaert, ‘The U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain’ (2004) 6 International 
Law Forum du droit international 116, 121. 
588 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
589 ibid. IV 
590 For example, Rosner v. US, a case concerning claims against the US resulting from the confiscation of a 
train loaded with stolen Jewish property. Rosner v US, 231 F.Supp.2d 1202, (S.D.Fla.) Docket No. 01-
1859-CIV-SEITZ, Settlement Agreement, approved in a written order dated 8 April 2005, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87320.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2016]. 
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have been dismissed on procedural grounds.591 Relying on the political question doctrine, 
the court ruled in Burger-Fischer et al. v. Degussa AG, that ‘under international law 
claims for compensation by individuals harmed by war-related activities belong 
exclusively to the state of which the individual is a national’.592 However, the Court of 
Appeal in Alperin v. Vatican Bank interpreted the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Republic of Austria v. Altmann concerning assets looted in the Second World War,593 to 
allow the case to proceed as an affirmation that courts have a place in deciding 
Holocaust-era claims.594 Importantly, the Supreme Court judgment and an earlier 
decision to grant certiorari on the same issue dealt only with the limited question of 
immunity.595 In its decision, the Court of Appeal differentiated between claims 
concerning conversion, unjust enrichment, restitution, a right to accounting with respect 
to lost and looted property and other claims including slave labour claims. As the latter 
would require a retroactive political judgment, such claims would concern a political 
question that is not justiciable.596  
 
It is important to note that the practice of US Courts (the assumption of extraterritorial 
civil jurisdiction) under the ATCA and the TVPA has been controversial. A Joint 
Separate Opinion of three of the judges in ICJ Arrest Warrant case stated that: ‘While 
                                               
591 See overview given in Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 405 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2005) 740 et seq. 
592 65 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999), 273. See also Tel-Oren et al v Libyan Arab Republic (n. 399), 810;  
Goldstar (Panama) SA v. United States (n 399); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany (n 399).   
593 Republic of Austria v Altmann, 7 June 2004, 124 S.Ct., 2240. 
594Alperin v. Vatican Bank (n.591) 
595 The Court held that the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies retroactively to 
the claim. 
596 ibid. 
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this unilateral exercise of the function of guardian of international values has been much 
commented on, it has not attracted the approbation of States generally’.597 The House of 
Lords in Jones v Saudi Arabia also referred to US practice as ‘unilateral extension of 
jurisdiction … which is not required and perhaps not permitted by customary 
international law’.598  
D. Reparation for International Humanitarian Law violations in the context of 
individual responsibility under International Criminal Law 
 
The need to make reparations to victims of international crimes, including war crimes, 
recently crystalised in the Lubanga decision before the ICC.599 The judgment establishes 
that individuals can be held responsible for reparations to victims of international 
crimes.600  
 
A close look at the history of ICL shows that reparation for victims within the ICL 
context derives from the principle of state responsibility. In this sense, the redress system 
in ICL is relevant in two ways. First, it shows that the international community 
recognises a right to reparation for victims of international crimes and therefore victims 
of both HR and IHL. Second, it shows that while reparations under ICL are made at the 
                                               
597 ‘In civil matters we already see the beginnings of a very broad form of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the United States, basing itself on a law of 1789, has asserted a 
jurisdiction both over human rights violations and over major violations of international law, perpetrated by 
non-nationals overseas. Such jurisdiction, with the possibility of ordering payment of damages, has been 
exercised with respect to torture committed in a variety of countries (Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, 
Guatemala), and with respect to other major human rights violations in yet other countries. While this 
unilateral exercise of the function of guardian of international values has been much commented on, it has 
not attracted the approbation of States generally’. Arrest Warrant Case (n 345) [48].  
598 Jones v Ministry of Interior of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] 2 WLR 1424.  
599 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Appeals Judgments) ICC Case No ICC-01/04-01/06 (February 
28, 2015).  
600 Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, 07 August 2012, ICC-
01/04- 01/06-2904, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf> accessed 8 April 2016. 
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level of individual responsibility, the state on whose behalf the individuals acted is still 
responsible to afford reparation. Morris and Scharf affirm that ‘the prosecution and 
punishment of individuals responsible for war crimes does not relieve the State of its 
responsibility for the violations of international law and its obligation to provide 
compensation’.601 As Gaeta explains, the contention can be made that if victims of 
international crimes have the right to reparation vis-à-vis the responsible individual, a 
fortiori they should possess the same right vis-à-vis the state on behalf of which the 
responsible individual has acted: ‘Once it is recognized that individuals who have acted 
qua state agents are liable to reparation under international law towards the victims of 
their crime, it is only logical to also recognize that the state on behalf of which they have 
acted shares this form of liability to the extent that the wrongful conduct can be attributed 
to it’.602 The question that remains open however is whether the individual victim can 
bring an action directly against the liable state under international law and if so, in what 
forum. As will be described below, the drafting discussions during the ICC Preparatory 
Committees as well as the reparation provisions of the Rome Statute, considered the 
question of international liability of both the individual and the state. Nonetheless, at the 
end it was agreed that the ICC was not the adequate forum to address questions of state 
responsibility.  
 
While it is widely known that the ICC establishes a reparation regime for victims, the 
following paragraphs will show that the International Criminal Tribunals for Former 
                                               
601 V Morris and M P Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (Transnational Juris Publications 1995) 288. 
602 Gaeta  ‘Compensation’ (n 28) 321. 
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) had already addressed the question of reparation 
for victims of international crimes (therefore victims of both HR and IHL violations). 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the recognition of victims rights were scarce in 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals. As pointed out by Evans, ‘[f]ollowing the standstill in 
international criminal law during nearly half a century following the International 
Military Tribunals after the Second World War, the creation of the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 
failed to provide significant progress in the recognition of victims. Nevertheless, the 
experiences of victims in the ad hoc Tribunals have provided an impetus for advocacy 
towards recognition of victims’ rights’.603 
 
To understand the development of this right in ICL, this section will first describe the 
reparation provisions of the International Tribunals and the Special Court. It will then 
analyse the right to reparation for victims of international crimes under the ICC with the 
aim of clarifying how international law already recognises this right not only against 
individual perpetrators, but also vis-à-vis the responsible state.  
i. The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the Special Court 
 
The question of individuals' duty to make reparations was addressed in the statutes of the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals.  Although the provisions of the Statute of the 
ICTY on penalties only refer to restitution, the Rules of Procedure address the question of 
reparations more generally.  Thus, Article 24(3) the Statute provides that ‘in addition to 
                                               
603 C Evans Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, (n 11), 89. 
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imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and proceeds 
acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners’. 
Rule 105 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence established procedures for 
the restoration of property, according to which the ICTY and national courts will 
cooperate in locating the rightful owners of the property.  To date, however, no such 
orders have been made and no fines have been imposed.604 Rule 106 deals with 
compensation to victims.605 Although the Statute is silent on the question of 
compensation, this rule establishes a system of cooperation between the tribunal and 
national authorities, under which a person found guilty by the tribunal of a crime that has 
caused injury to a victim can rely on the tribunal’s judgment in proceedings under 
national law.606  The ICTY itself will not recommend the award of compensation and the 
existence of such a remedy is still entirely dependent on the provisions of the relevant 
national laws.607 
 
                                               
604 J C Ochoa, The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings for Serious Human Rights Violations 
(Nijhoff 2013) 209. 
605 Rule 106: 
Compensation to Victims 
(A) The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of the States 
concerned the judgement finding the accused guilty of a crime which has caused 
injury to a victim. 
(B) Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or persons claiming 
through the victim may bring an action in a national court or other competent 
body to obtain compensation. 
(C) For the purposes of a claim made under Sub-rule (B) the judgement of the 
Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the criminal responsibility of the 
convicted person for such injury. 
606 Rule 105B of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that ‘pursuant to the relevant national 
legislation, a victim or persons claiming through the victim may bring an action in a national court or other 
competent body to obtain compensation’. 
607 Article 23(3) of the Statute of the ICTR repeats verbatim the provisions of Article 24 of the Statute of 
the ICTY, and Rules 105 and 106 of its Rules and Procedure and Evidence. 
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The ICTR and the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) share the same rule of 
procedure providing compensation to victims, but as explained, the compensation 
provision contained in Rule 106 is rather vague and needs interpretation to apply it. 
Although it makes clear that victims have a right to obtain compensation, it does not 
clarify where they can claim such compensation. The ICTY (or the ICTR or the SCSL) 
do not have the power to award damages (except for restitution of property in some 
cases).608 While at some stage the ICTY envisioned the creation of a claims commission 
for victims609-reason why all the assets of Serbia and Bosnian Serbs were frozen pursuant 
                                               
608 Rule 105: 
Restitution of Property 
(A) After a judgement of conviction containing a specific finding as provided in Sub-rule 98 ter (B), the 
Trial Chamber shall, at the request of the Prosecutor, or may, proprio motu, hold a special hearing to 
determine the matter of the restitution of the property or the proceeds thereof, and may in the meantime 
order such provisional measures for the preservation and protection of the property or proceeds as it 
considers appropriate. 
(B) The determination may extend to such property or its proceeds, even in the hands of third parties not 
otherwise connected with the crime of which the convicted person has been found guilty. 
(C) Such third parties shall be summoned before the Trial Chamber and be given an opportunity to justify 
their claim to the property or its proceeds. 
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shall order the restitution either of the property or the proceeds or make such other order as it may deem 
appropriate. 
(E) Should the Trial Chamber not be able to determine ownership, it shall notify the competent national 
authorities and request them so to determine. 
(F) Upon notice from the national authorities that an affirmative determination has been made, the Trial 
Chamber shall order the restitution either of the property or the proceeds or make such other order as it may 
deem appropriate. 
(G) The Registrar shall transmit to the competent national authorities any summonses, orders and requests 
issued by a Trial Chamber pursuant to Sub-rules (C), (D), (E) and (F). 
609 The ICTY Statute was adopted unanimously along with SC Res 827. The Resolution addresses 
compensation:  ‘The work of the International Tribunal shall be carried out without prejudice to the right of 
the victims to seek, through appropriate means, compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations 
of IHL’[ 7]. Michael Scharf co-drafted Res 827, and comments: ‘What we had in mind was a procedure 
similar to that devised for the victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in which frozen Iraqi assets and 
proceeds from Iraq oil sales would be dispersed to victims through a UN Compensation Commission’. M P 
Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Tribunal Since Nuremberg 
(Carolina Academic Press 1997) 63.   
 201 
to a Security Council Resolution – the assets were later unfrozen and no commission was 
ever created.610 
 
As a result, there is no forum to bring compensation claims other than domestic courts. It 
is necessary, therefore, to interpret the provisions in Rule 106 ‘pursuant to the relevant 
national legislation’ and ‘in a national court’ to identify the adequate forum to bring a 
civil claim for compensation. A brief mention of Rule 106 arose during the Bagosora 
trial at the ICTR.611 Belgium wanted to appear as amicus curiae before the ICTR in 
relation to Belgian nationals with an alleged civil claim against Bagasora; however, there 
was no discussion of how Rule 106 is to be applied.  The ICTR rejected the request as a 
finding of guilt had not been made at that time. 
 
Rule 106 explicitly states that the victims may bring a cause of action pursuant to the 
relevant national legislation, reflecting that the ICTY does not have the power to alter 
domestic law or jurisdictional grounds.612 On the other hand, the rule says a victim may 
bring an action in a national court meaning no specific national court is presumed as the 
                                               
610 The creation of a victim compensation fund from frozen assets was contemplated for the ICTY. 
Although the statute of the Tribunal does not give it the power to award victim compensation, a clause was 
included in SC Res 827 (which approved the Statute of the Tribunal), declaring that the creation of the 
Tribunal was without prejudice to the future establishment of a victim compensation program; UNSC Res 
827 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/827 UNSCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th. However, the Security Council later unfroze 
the assets of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs ending any possibility of a compensation program for victims of 
IHL/HR violations in the Balkans; UNSC Res 1074 (1995) UN Doc. S/RES/1074, UNSCOR, 50th Sess., 
3700th.  
611 Case no ICTR-96-7-T (Decision on the Amicus Curiae Application by the Government of the Kingdom 
of Belgium) <http://srch0.un.org/ictr.org/ENGLISH/decisions/Bagosora%20decisins.html> accessed 8 
April 2016. 
612 At the time of adoption, several states emphasised this limitation on the tribunal, and its inability to alter 
domestic law, including the UK; China; Brazil; and Russia. The Morocco and Djibouti delegates noted the 
importance of providing compensation for victims though there was no mention of a mechanism for doing 
so. UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993) and Verbatim Record of the 3217th Meeting S/PV.3217, 25th May 1993. 
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adequate forum. The exercise of this right depends on whether the courts have 
jurisdiction to pursue the case. 
 
There can be two broad interpretations of Rule 106 of the ICTY and ICTR (or Rule 105 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone).613 The first one rests on the assumption of an 
existing possibility for victims to bring compensations claims before national courts. It 
establishes only the obligation of states to recognise the judgment of the Tribunal to be 
final and binding as to the criminal responsibility of the convicted person. The second 
one implies that this provision establishes a specific right for victims of crimes tried in 
the international criminal tribunals to bring a claim of compensation in a national court 
pursuant to the relevant legislation. Each of these interpretations will be discussed in turn. 
 
a. There is no right to compensation under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
 
One interpretation is that the Rule reflects the right of all victims to obtain compensation 
in national courts and establishes only an obligation on states to recognise the judgments 
of the Tribunal to be final and binding as to the criminal responsibility. Kirk McDonald 
and Swaak-Goldman seem to take the view that specific national legislation would be 
required to bring a claim of compensation in a national court: ‘A victim, or persons 
                                               
613 See: Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as amended 2 December 
2015. The Rules have been amended several times since their adoption on16 January 2002, but Rule 105 is 
still the same. See: http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/RSCSL-Rules.pdf accessed 15 April 2016. 
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claiming through her or him, may bring an action in a national tribunal under the 
applicable local law after the ICTY has found an accused person guilty’.614  
 
If this is the case, then the only forums in which to claim compensation would be a) the 
territorial states where the crimes were committed (Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the 
succeeding states of the former Yugoslavia pursuant to the rules of succession of 
states),615 or b) the United States, which has legislation allowing extra-territorial civil 
jurisdiction for international human rights violations – for both, US citizens, and 
aliens.616 Other national courts would only have jurisdiction in exceptional 
circumstances.617 
 
Following this line of interpretation would imply, for example, that a civil claim for 
compensation could be brought in the Former Yugoslavia (i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
and in the U.S. independently of the ICTY ruling. The only advantage of the Tribunal 
judgement would be that, pursuant to Rule 106, the criminal responsibility of the accused 
would have been proved.618 
                                               
614 KM Gabrielle and S-G Olivia (eds), The Experience of Internation: Commentary (Kluwer Law Int. 
2000) 478.  
615 See: the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties (1978) UN Doc A/CONF. 
80/83. 
616 The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) (n 581) and the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) (n 580) in 
the US. There is no other domestic legislation in any other county that expressly grants courts jurisdiction 
with respect to these matters. See generally: J Terry. ‘Taking Filartiga on the Road: Why Courts Outside 
the United States Should Accept Jurisdiction Over Action Involving Torture Committed Abroad’ in Scott 
(ed), Torture as Tort (Hart Publishing 2001). 
617 For example, it would depend on whether the perpetrator or the victim had the nationality of another 
state (at the time the crimes were committed) or in certain circumstances, if the perpetrator or his/her assets 
are domiciled in another state. 
618 It would also help in case personal immunity is claimed in the case of high military commanders, former 
head of states, etc.  
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b. There is a right to compensation under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
 
Another interpretation is that the Rule establishes a specific right for victims of crimes 
tried in the ICTY to claim compensation in national courts (pursuant to relevant domestic 
legislation). The question that arises here is whether the Rule creates an obligation for all 
states to afford a civil remedy for victims of crimes tried in the ICTY/ICTR to claim 
compensation – and therefore an obligation to implement legislation to this end or to 
interpret existing legislation in favour of this right? 
 
Bassiouni suggests that ‘relevant legislation’ means enabling legislation: ‘Rule 106(B) 
appears to anticipate that states will enact enabling legislation pursuant to their 
obligations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Article 29 of the Statute’.619 The 
implication is that where a State has implemented legislation incorporating the ICTY 
Statute and Rules, they are bound by the obligations therein, and Bassiouni’s thinking is 
that ‘106(C) appears to refer to a state’s obligations under Article 29’. Article 29(2)620 of 
                                               
619 M Cherif Bassiouni and P Manikan, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers Inc 1996) 704. 
620 ICTY Statute 
Article 29 
Cooperation and judicial assistance. 
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons 
accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial 
Chamber, including, but not limited to: 
(a) the identification and location of persons; 
 
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;  
 
(c) the service of documents; 
 
(d) the arrest or detention of persons; 
  
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal. 
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the Statute is very broadly drafted: ‘States shall comply without undue delay with any 
request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to: 
(a) the identification and location of persons…(e) the surrender or transfer of the accused 
to the International Tribunal’. 621 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that Rule 106 expands the right of victims to bring 
actions for compensation to different forums: ‘pursuant to relevant legislation… in a 
national court or other competent body’. Taking this into consideration makes it difficult 
to believe that the judges, when drafting these Rules, were limiting the right of victims to 
claim compensation only to the national courts where the conflict occurred,622 or in a 
national court where existing extraterritorial legislation would allow such a claim (the 
only possibility being the US Federal Courts).623  
 
Similarly, it would also be hard to imagine that the drafters were limiting the right to 
compensation to these forums when some civil law countries afford damages in criminal 
cases. If a criminal case based on universal jurisdiction is brought against an alleged 
perpetrator from the Former Yugoslavia, victims acting as parte civile can be awarded 
compensation for the injuries suffered. Giving a limited interpretation to Rule 106 would 
result in the absurd situation whereby victims of cases where the Tribunal has not 
                                               
621 Bassiouni and Manikan, The law of the ICTY (n 619) 704. 
622 Part of the reason for creating an international tribunal was the incapacity of the national courts where 
the atrocities were committed to afford impartial justice. See JE Alvarez, ‘Rush To Closure: Lesson of the 
Tadic Judgment’ (1998) 96(7) Michigan Law Review 2031.  
623 See: n 616 
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interfered would have a better opportunity to obtain compensation than those were the 
ICTY has exercised its jurisdiction. 
 
Finally, in order to comply with its obligations pursuant to Article 29 of the ICTY 
Statute, many states enacted implementing legislation,624 but others chose to interpret 
their existing laws in a manner consistent with their obligations towards the ICTY.625 
This means that even if states have no specific legislation implementing some provision 
of the Statute and/or the Rules and Procedure and Evidence, existing laws should be 
interpreted in a consistent manner. 
 
It is not clear the extent to which these provisions have arisen in the practice of the Ad 
hoc Tribunals and Special Court.626 However, as noted by Tomuschat, regardless of 
which interpretation is given to these provisions – whether the phrase ‘pursuant to the 
relevant national legislation’ suggest that the cause of action for compensation depends 
on domestic law or whether domestic law has no more to do than to set forth the 
                                               
624 For example, the following states enacted legislation for the ICTY: Italy, Finland, Netherlands, 
Germany, Iceland, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand, United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Republic of Croatia, 
Austria, Hungary, and Venezuela. See: A Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution 
and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, in A Cassese, The Human Dimension of 
International Law: Selected Papers (2008 OUP), 426 
625 At the time of the establishment of the ICTY, ‘four countries have indicated that they do not need 
implementing legislation (Korea, Russia, Singapore and Venezuela). See Security Council Resolution 
establishing the ICTY (n. 612)  
626 According to K Kress and G Slutier, ‘Fines and Forfeiture Orders’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta, and JRWD 
Jones (eds), II The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (OUP 2002) 1823, 
1833, the issue has arisen in the practice of the ICTY ‘only to a very limited extent’. Ochoa (n 604) 
explains that the compensation provisions have not been applied citing: Zahar and Sluiter, International 
Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (OUP 2007) 77; J RWD Jones and S Powels, International Criminal 
Practice (3rd edn, Transnational Publishers & OUP 2003) 804, [9.154]; and P Chifflet, 'The Role and Status 
of the Victim' in Boas, G and Schabas, W (eds), International criminal law developments in the case law of 
the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) 103. 
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modalities for the vindication of a right to reparation directly anchored, or codified, in the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence – it would appear that no substantial legal 
consequences flow. He argues that domestic tribunals cannot decline jurisdiction to hear 
a case for reparation. Since Rule 106 of the ICTY implies that an accused convicted by 
the Tribunal cannot argue immunity, whoever is debarred from invoking immunity in 
criminal proceedings is also prevented from relying on that defence in subsequent civil 
proceedings design to obtain compensation for the damaged caused. On the other hand 
Tomuschat notes that such provision has no great potential since persons standing trial 
before the ICTY are unable to compensate by their assets or through the proceeds from 
their work all the damage they have caused. 
 
Irrespective of practical hurdles, what is clear is that an individual right to reparation for 
international crimes (i.e. serious violations of human rights and IHL) is recognised. 
Whether a collective method of settlement would be more appropriate under certain 
circumstances, as argued by Tomuschat, or not, it is clear that it is not only the 
perpetrator who is made liable under international law but as he explains ‘the nation on 
whose behalf—or rather, in whose name—he committed his evil deeds’.627 
 
ii. The International Criminal Court  
 
The ICC is the first international criminal tribunal where victims can assert their right to 
reparation directly before the court itself.  According to Article 75 of the Rome Statute, 
                                               
627 Tomuschat, Between Idealism (n 88) 411. 
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the ICC may award reparations, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, 
either on request from the victims or, in exceptional circumstances, of its own volition 
(Article 75 (1)).  Reparations can be awarded either on an individual or collective basis 
(or potentially both), depending on the ‘scope and extent of the damage, loss, or 
injury’.628  Furthermore, reparations orders can be made in the name of individual 
beneficiaries, or, where it is ‘impossible or impracticable to make individual awards 
directly to each victim’ or where ‘the number of the victims and the scope, forms and 
modalities of reparations makes a collective award more appropriate’, the Court may 
order reparations to be awarded through the Trust Fund.629  Reparations so deposited may 
also be awarded through an international, inter-governmental or national organisation 
(Rule 98(4)).  Finally, the ICC can also order protective measures following either arrest 
or conviction that involve tracing, identifying, freezing, and seizing of assets.   
 
With respect to reparations awards, Article 75(5) of the Rome Statute indicates that the 
obligations of State Parties are the same as those set out in Article 109 relating to the 
enforcement of fines and forfeitures.  Article 109 provides that State Parties must give 
effect to an ICC order in accordance with their national laws, and ‘without prejudice to 
the rights of bona fide third parties’ (Article 109(1)).  In case of the inability to give 
effect to a forfeiture order, a State must ‘take measures’ to recover the equivalent value of 
the award (Article 109(2)).  Finally, any funds recovered by the State in this respect must 
be transferred to the ICC (Article 109 (3)). 
                                               
628 Rule 97(1) in ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2000).UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1  
629 See: ibid Rule 98(2) and (3), and Article 79 of the Rome Statute (n 39). 
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The Trust Fund serves both as a repository of funds paid out by sentenced individuals 
(Article 75(2)) and as a potential supplementary source of funds where reparation awards 
cannot be enforced against insolvent perpetrators. Article 79 of the Rome Statute 
establishes the Trust Fund, providing inter alia that the Fund is to operate for the benefit 
of victims and their families, and that the ICC may order any assets obtained through 
fines and forfeitures to be deposited into the Fund.  Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence further provides that, where it is ‘impossible or impracticable’ to make 
individual awards directly to the victim, the reparation amount may be deposited with the 
Trust Fund (Rule 98(2)).  Furthermore, where a collective award is more appropriate in 
light of the number of victims and the scope of reparations, this can also be made through 
the Trust Fund (Rule 98(3)). 
 
The inclusion of Article 75 in the ICC Statute shows that the international community 
recognises that victims of international crimes have a right to reparation vis-à-vis the 
perpetrators. International crimes as defined by the Rome Statute encompass the most 
serious breaches of both human rights and international humanitarian law.  Article 75 
does not differentiate between these two bodies of law.   
 
As far as state responsibility is concerned, the drafting history of Article 75 clearly shows 
that the drafters considered the possibility of binding reparation orders or 
recommendations to states when state liability was engaged. The reparation provisions in 
Article 73 (now 75) of the 1998 Draft Statue read: 
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[…] 
(b) [The Court may also [make an order] [recommend] that an appropriate form of 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation, be made by a State]:  
[-  If the convicted person is unable to do so himself/herself; [and  
- If the convicted person was, in committing the offence, acting on behalf of 
that State in an official capacity, and within the course and scope of his/her 
authority]];  
(c) [In any case other than those referred to in subparagraph (b), the Court may 
also recommend that States grant an appropriate form of reparations to, or in 
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation].630 
 
However, these provisions were left out in the final version of the article. According to 
Muttukumaru, ‘the decision to abandon the principles of awards against States was not 
lightly taken by States’.631 He explains that the rationale of abandoning the provisions 
relating to state responsibility was that the Court was intended to adjudicate individual 
criminal liability. It was argued that if awards of reparations could be made against states, 
the principle of individual responsibility would have become meaningless. In addition, 
the provisions on jurisdiction and admissibility in Part 2 of the Statute would have 
required substantial reconsideration. On the other hand, the possibility of enabling 
recommendations was seen as adding very little to the Court’s armoury. It formalised the 
notion of a recommendation, but in practice it remains open to the Court to make 
recommendations anyway. The negotiations on Article 75 of the Rome Statute were 
largely driven by the French and the United Kingdom delegations. As Muttukumaru 
observes, the fact that two states with very different legal traditions were able to attain a 
                                               
630 See Article 73 of the Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court A/CONF.183/2 
631 C Muttukumaru, ‘Reparations to Victims’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court The 
Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, Cooperation with the Project on International 
Courts and Tribunals (Kluwer Law International 1999) 268. 
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consensus reflects the central importance of ensuring that victims’ interests were given 
proper recognition in the Statute.  
E. Is there a norm excluding individual reparation for violations committed in 
armed conflicts 
 
Chapter I already demonstrates that if individuals are holders of international rights they 
also have an enforceable right to reparation by virtue of international law (although there 
might be circumstances where procedural bars like sovereign immunity might apply). 
The current chapter analysed whether individual reparation also applies to victims of 
armed conflict or if by virtue of its nature, individual reparation is inapplicable to IHL 
violations. Section B establishes that current evidence in the applicability of IHL 
provisions on compensation to individuals is still inconclusive, but that nothing in IHL 
prevents individual reparation. On the contrary, an analysis of the law and practice of 
reparation makes it clear that the intention of reparation has generally been to redress the 
victims (even when the vehicle to do it was at the inter-state level) and that there is a 
clear tendency since 1945 to afford reparation directly to individuals.  
 
International law, particularly human rights law and international humanitarian law, has 
evolved greatly since the end of WWII. As described in this section, there is a set of 
fundamental rights that protect individuals in times of peace and war. When these 
substantive rights are breached, victims have a right to reparation by virtue of the 
applicable human rights conventions and CIL. There is no clear competing rule in IHL 
that excludes individual reparation. The state-to-state compensation schemes and the 
government-to-government negotiations for war reparations respond to policy 
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considerations rather than legal norms. Even the law on diplomatic protection today 
recognises that the right to a remedy belongs to both the state of nationality and the 
individual victim (see Chapter 2). There is clear evidence of state practice affording 
reparation directly to victims of armed conflict. The claimed ‘state-to-state only 
reparation’ rule is inapplicable in non-international armed conflicts (where states and 
non-states actors are equally bound by IHL rules) and contrary to the right to reparation 
for victims recognised in HR law and ICL. The claimed rule would leave victims of IHL 
violations by their state of nationality completely unprotected and other victims would 
depend on the political will and capability of states to bring claims on their behalf.632 As 
established in the ICC Lubanga decision,633 an individual right to reparation for 
international crimes exists (i.e. serious violations of HR and IHL). It is clear that not only 
the perpetrator is liable under international law, but also the state on whose behalf he or 
she committed the crimes.  
 
While claims of individuals were traditionally denied, the dominant view in 
contemporary literature is that an individual right to reparation exists for victims of 
international humanitarian law violations. The same shift is evident in state practice. Of 
course there are still many questions on how to implement this right in practice, 
particularly in cases of mass atrocities (whether these fall under human rights law or/and 
international humanitarian law). However, it is not viable to ignore the evolution of 
international law since the end of WWII. A better strategy is to recognise the changes and 
                                               
632 In some cases, even when diplomatic protection claims are brought before the ICJ, these are not 
enforced. For example, the Avena case (n 123). Or like Diallo (n 97) shows, diplomatic representation can 
be too costly for individual claims. 
633 Lubanga (n. 599). 
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the reasons this transformation occurred in the first place to create effective mechanisms 
to enforce individual rights.634 
 
  
                                               
634 See for example, S Furuya (Co-Rapporteur), ‘Draft Procedural Principles for Reparation Mechanisms’ 
(International Law Association; International Committee on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, 
Conference, Washington 2014).  
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Chapter 4: The Principles and Guidelines  
 
The groans and cries to be heard…are 
never uttered by the most wretched 
victims. These, throughout the ages, 
have been mute. Wherever human 
rights are completely trampled 
underfoot, silence and immobility 
prevail, leaving no trace in history, for 
history records only the words and 
deeds of those who are capable, to 
however slight degree, of ruling their 
own lives, or at least trying to do so. 
There have been – there still are— 
multitudes of men, women and children 
who, as a result of poverty, terror or 
lies, have been made to forget their 
inherent dignity, or to give up the 
efforts to secure recognition of that 
dignity by others. They are silent. The 
lot of the victim who complains and is 
heard is already a better one.* 
 
 
1. Drafting and adoption process of the Principles and Guidelines 
 
A. Origins and background 
 
The very nature of large-scale victimisation in the aftermath of World War II brought 
about a new social basis for redress.635 Attention was focused on the victims themselves, 
                                               
* Preface by René Maheu in: J Hersch, Birthright of man: a selection of texts prepared under the direction 
of Jeanne Hersch (UNESCO 1969). 
635 Bassiouni,‘International Recognition’ (n 18) 210. 
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to their needs and rights, marking the birth of ‘victimology’ as a scientific study of 
victimisation and an international movement on victims’ rights.   
 
The new discipline victimology focused its attention on the person of the victim – in 
counter position to criminology, which is centred on the person of the offender or 
criminal.636 As noted by Robert Elias, victimology started as an international pursuit 
stimulated by post-WWII humanitarianism637 and focused on all victims (of war, 
violence, ignorance, poverty, and disease), not solely on crime victims. However, the 
victimology movement lost its international drive during the Cold War. In the 1960s, 
national mechanisms concerned with criminal victimisation expanded in some 
countries.638 These procedures offered an incentive to governments by linking 
compensation to victims’ cooperation in the pursuit of criminal prosecutions.639 The 
focus of these mechanisms, however, was on victims of common crimes (not crimes of 
the state or international crimes).  
 
With the introduction of domestic compensation schemes,640 the victims’ rights 
movement recovered some momentum, regaining full prominence in the 1980s.641 
                                               
636 A A Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice (OUP 2011) 126 citing CF. E 
Neuman, Victimología - El Rol de la Víctima en los Delitos Convencionales y No Convencionales (Editorial 
Universidad 1994) 27-28. 
637 R Elias, The Politics of Victimization: Victims, Victimology and Human Rights (OUP USA1986). 
638 According to Bassiouni, these were countries where political circumstances and economic affluence 
diminished concerns regarding compensation. Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition’ (n 18), 210. 
639 Bassiouni cites as examples of these mechanisms Canada and several states within the United States or 
Canadian legislation. Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition’ (n 18), 210. 
640 Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition’ (n 18), 210. Bassiouni cites in footnote 27 Canadian and U.S. 
legislation establishing this type of compensation programs.  
641 At the regional level, the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes was 
adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe in 1983. The Convention however dealt with minimum 
standards for national schemes for compensation of victims of crime based on social solidarity (European 
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Experts of victimology and other fields were seeking to extend monetary compensation to 
other forms of redress, including medical, psychiatric, and psychological treatment, and 
to expand the basis of such compensation and redress modalities to violations committed 
by state agencies and state officials.642 In 1985, the UN adopted the Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.643 The cause of victims’ 
rights was furthered throughout the 1990s as a result of the establishment of the ad hoc 
criminal and hybrid tribunals and the ICC. In this period, the plight of victims became so 
central to any notion of justice that it served as one of the arguments – albeit secondary – 
in favour of the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, and of the ICC.644 The statutes for these 
courts address, though in different degrees and ways, procedural and substantive rights of 
victims.645 Specifically, the Rome Statute of the ICC provides for the right to 
participation and reparation of victims – rights that were confirmed by the Court’s first 
decision.646 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes [24 November 1983] European Treaty 
Series 116). 
642 See: PM Tobolowsky, ‘Victims Participation in the Criminal Justice Processes: Fifteen Years After the 
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime’ (1999) 25 New Eng J on Crim and Civil Confinement 21; and 
JR Anderson and PL Woodard, ‘Victim and Witness Assistance: New State Laws and the System’s 
Response’ (1985) 68 Judicature 221, 222 3. 
643 Annex to UNGA Res 40/34 (29 November 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/34 [hereinafter Victims’ 
Declaration]. 
644 P d’Argent, ‘Wrongs of the Past, History of the Future?’ (2006) 279, EJIL 4, 17. Zwanenburg on the 
other hand argues that international law attention to victims came later and less prominently since 
criminalisation was the only focus during this period. ‘Since the 1990s the trend in human rights law and 
IHL has been criminalisation. In this process the attention has tended to focus on the perpetrator rather than 
the victim. This is illustrated by the statues of the ICTY and ICTR. With the adoption of the Rome Statute 
of the ICC, the victim’s role has become more prominent, however’. M Zwanenburg, ‘The Van 
Boven/Bassiouni Principles: An Appraisal’ (2006) 24 (4) Netherlands Quarterly of H Rights 647.  The 
section on ICL in Chapter 3 on IHL describes the rights of victims in the statutes of these international 
criminal courts. 
645 I Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 193. See 
also Chapter 3 on IHL and reparation. The section on ICL describes the rights of victims in these criminal 
courts. 
646 On 7 August 2012, Trial Chamber I established principles for providing reparations to victims in 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Sentence) [10 July 2012] ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, and Prosecutor 
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In general, the end of the Cold War opened up new potentials and new perspectives for 
victims’ demands for reparative justice.647 Democratic structures were introduced or re-
established in various continents—notably in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin 
America. Truth and reconciliation commissions were set up in many countries.648 It was 
in this period that the struggle against impunity and the call for reparative justice took 
shape—the victim’s perspective, often overlooked and ignored, ‘was lifted up from the 
stalemate of the Cold War’. 649 
 
Following the major geopolitical changes of the late eighties and early nineties, claims 
relating to past wrongs that had not been given voice for many decades were brought 
back to life, or simply heard for the first time. It was in this climate that demands for 
criminal and reparative justice became visible and vocal, particularly in regards to WWII 
claims. Many individuals decided to challenge the settlements agreed by states in the 
aftermath of the war, which had been mostly partial compared to the damage suffered by 
the victims,650 and claim reparations. Civil society groups in East Asia, Australia, and 
Europe demanded reparations for comfort women (sex slaves of the Japanese Imperial 
                                                                                                                                            
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Reparations) [7 August 2012] ICC-01/04-01/06. The Chamber considered that 
it is of paramount importance that the victims, together with their families and communities, participate in 
the reparations process, and be able to express their points of view, their priorities and the obstacles they 
have encountered in their attempts to secure reparations. It is important to note that the ICC can only decide 
on responsibility of individuals to afford reparation for crimes falling under its jurisdiction. It does not have 
jurisdiction to establish state responsibility. In the present case, Lubanga was declared indigent and 
therefore any reparations afforded would be funded by the ICC Trust fund resources.   
647 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 27.  
648 See generally: P B Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study’.(1994) 
16 (4) Human Rights Quarterly. 
649 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 27. 
650 Boisson de Chazourneds and Heathcote, ‘Mise en oeuvre de la reparation des crimes de l’histoire: une 
possible [re]conciliation des temps passes, presents et futures?’, in L Boisson de Chazourneds, J F 
Queguiner, and S Villalpando (eds), Crimes de l’histoire (Bruylant 2004). 
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Army) and for the victims of Japanese forced labour schemes, whose demands had been 
ignored for so long. Reparation claims for forced labour and for massacres of civilians 
against Germany and Austria were brought in the U.S., Italian, and Greek courts. Claims 
were also brought against Swiss banks for dormant accounts, and for the restitution of 
cultural property and looted works of art. In the same climate, the right to reparation for 
victims of brutal repression by Latin American dictatorships became a persistent claim.651 
 
It was against this background, stressing the importance of criminal and reparative justice 
as a condition for reconciliation and democracy, that in 1989 the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed Theo van Boven as 
Special Rapporteur. His mandate was to study the right to restitution, compensation, and 
rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
with a view to exploring the possibility of developing some basic principles and 
guidelines in this respect.652 Two years later, the Sub-Commission also embarked on 
studies aimed at combating impunity.653 This was a time of political change on various 
continents, with prospects of a higher degree of human rights advancement. It was also a 
time of the creation of transitional justice mechanisms in several countries. In this 
                                               
651 See generally: I Bottigliero, Redress for Victims (n 645), 193. 
652 The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res 1989/13 (31 
August 1989). 
653 In 1991, the Sub- Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities requested 
Mr Louis Joinet to study the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (Decision 1991/110).  In 
1994, the Commission split the study in two, entrusting Mr Joinet with the aspect of civil and political 
rights and Mr El Hadji Guissé with that of economic, social and cultural rights (Decision 1994/34).  In 
1997, Mr Joinet submitted his final report entitled The Administration Of Justice And The Human Rights Of 
Detainees, Question Of The Impunity Of Perpetrators Of Human Rights Violations (Civil And Political) 
(pursuant to Sub Commission decision 1996/119, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1) which contained a set of 
principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity. In 2004 Ms 
Diane Orentlicher was appointed as Independent Expert for the period of one year to update the principles. 
She submitted her report on 9 February 2005 (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1).  
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context, restoring justice implied an increased focus on the criminal responsibility of 
perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and their accomplices. It also opened up the 
exposure of many wrongs inflicted on the victims of these abuses, with a view to 
rendering retributive and reparative justice. This was a time marked by the triumph of the 
human rights discourse in world politics: human rights, it was demanded, would not only 
be proclaimed, but also effectively enjoyed—future violations would be repressed and 
victims would be redressed.654  
 
B. Description and context of the process 
 
The drafting and adoption process of the Principles and Guidelines stretched over 
fourteen years, with repeated requests for comments, but with little substantive discussion 
in the CHR itself.655 After all, the draft instrument was one more project in an overloaded 
UN human rights agenda. In addition, while the subject matter of redress and reparation 
enjoyed broad sympathy, as shown by the wide sponsorship that the procedural 
resolutions of the Commission received, the political interest among state members was 
not strong. As observed by van Boven, ‘this limited political interest may also reflect the 
reticence of many states to accept and implement domestically the consequences of 
victim-oriented policies of reparative justice’.656 As a result, the CHR and even its Sub-
                                               
654 Pierre d’Argent, ‘Wrongs of the Past’ (n 644) 17. 
655 van Boven, ‘Victims’’ Rights’ (n 21), 29. 
656  Bassiouni makes a similar point when he argues that the movement of victims’ compensation started to 
loose momentum when stakeholders sought reparation from states for official acts. ‘States were willing to 
recognize victims’ rights when the harm arose from individual action, but not when the harm was a product 
of State policy or committed by State actors’– Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition’ (n 18) 211. 
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Commission provided little substantive guidance and feedback.657 The policy bodies were 
mainly involved in taking procedural decisions to advance the process, although with 
moderate speed.  
 
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur established that the study had to take into account 
existing international human rights norms and relevant decisions of international human 
rights’ bodies. According to van Boven, the study and the draft principles and guidelines 
as they evolved demonstrated that the gaps in human rights protection were less legal 
than political and that a new instrument was not supposed to entail new international or 
domestic legal obligations, but rather to identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures, and 
methods for making existing legal obligations operational.658 
 
Van Boven’s final report provided the basis for the first draft of the Principles and 
Guidelines.659 While working on the report, the Special Rapporteur received input from 
non-governmental experts from various continents, particularly from countries that had 
been enduring gross violations of human rights.660 Based on the comments received and 
taking into account the deliberations of a workshop co-organised by the International 
Commission of Jurists and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights on this topic, van 
Boven made several revisions to the draft Principles and Guidelines. He prepared two 
                                               
657 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 29. 
658 Idem. 28. 
659 van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution’ (n 17). 
660 Idem. Chapter IX. 
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revised versions between 1993 and 1997,661 submitting the final version to the CHR in 
1997.662  
 
In 1998, the CHR requested its Chairman to appoint an expert to prepare a revised 
version of the Principles and Guidelines elaborated by Mr van Boven.663 The summary 
records are silent on the reasons behind this decision. In the same year, the CHR 
appointed M. Cherif Bassiouni as Independent Expert.664 The following year, Bassiouni 
submitted a comprehensive report comparing the Principles and Guidelines drafted by 
van Boven with the Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity665; with the Victims’ Declaration; and with the 
provisions on reparations in the Rome Statute of the ICC.666 His 1999 report proposed a 
comprehensive round of study, discussion, conferences, and seminars to consider the 
issue. However, the Commission requested the Independent Expert to build on the work 
previously undertaken and submit a final report to the Commission’s 2000 session.667 
Following consultations with governmental and non-governmental experts and after 
reflecting on the recent developments in international criminal law, Bassiouni added new 
                                               
661 Revised set of basic principles and guidelines on the right to reparation for victims of gross violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law prepared by Mr Theo van Boven, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 (May 
24, 1996) and UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/104 (January 16, 1997). 
662 UN Doc E/CN.4/1997, Annex. 
663 The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, CHR Res 1998/43, ESCOR Supp (no 3) 150, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/43 (1998).  
664 The 1985 Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (n 643) were drafted at a 
regional meeting held in Ottawa, Canada, chaired by Professor M Cherif Bassiouni. In addition to this 
relevant background, given Bassiouni’s expertise in international criminal law (ICL), his appointment as 
Independent Expert perhaps reflected the recognition by the Commission on HR of the parallel 
developments of the right to reparation in human rights law and ICL, as well as the narrowing intersection 
between human rights law and the law of armed conflict. 
665 See: (n. 653) 
666 ‘Bassiouni ‘2000 Report’ (n. 668). 
667 Commission on Human Rights, Res 1999/33 (26 April 99), E/CN.4/RES/1999/33 
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dimensions to the draft Principles and Guidelines, with particular reference to IHL.668 
The report submitted to the 56th Session of the CHR in early 2000 annexed a third 
version of the draft Principles and Guidelines.  
 
While the drafting process had regained some impetus after Bassiouni’s appointment, it 
had a new setback after he submitted his report in 2000. The drafting and submission of 
his report coincided with the preparations of the ‘World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ that was being organised by 
the CHR, to be held in 2001 in Durban, South Africa.669 The idea of a duty to repair 
historical wrongs connected with practices of slavery and colonialism had been formally 
discussed during the political process leading to the conference. This was a highly 
politicised issue that deeply divided states and that was relevant to the substance of the 
Principles and Guidelines. Fortunately, the ‘Durban debate’ did not really permeate the 
standard setting process of the draft Principles and Guidelines.670 Still, and 
understandably so, the drafting process lingered in those years in order to avoid 
disruptive influences.  
 
                                               
668 Mr Bassiouni submitted his final report, entitled ‘Civil And Political Rights, Including The Questions 
Of: Independence Of The Judiciary, Administration Of Justice, Impunity, The Right To Restitution, 
Compensation And Rehabilitation For Victims Of Gross Violations Of Human Rights And Fundamental 
Freedoms’ in accordance with Commission Res 1999/33 (18 January 2000) UN Commission on Human 
Rights 56th session Item 11(d) of the provisional agenda, at E/CN.4/2000/62. [Hereinafter Bassiouni 2000 
Report] 
669 On 31 August-8 September 2001. 
670 There was one mention during the first consultative meeting of reparation for past injustices by the 
representative of South Africa who asked the two Experts also to comment on violations committed under 
apartheid and colonialism, which had so ravaged South Africa. See Report of the consultative meeting on 
the draft Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/63 [9]. (Hereinafter Report of the 
First Consultative Meeting). 
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In 2000, the CHR took note of the report by Bassiouni. It requested the UN Secretary-
General to circulate the text of the draft Principles and Guidelines to all member states 
for comments. It also requested the High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a 
consultative meeting in Geneva with a view to finalising the Principles and Guidelines on 
the basis of the comments submitted.671 It made the same requests in 2001, deciding also 
to consider the matter at its fifty-eighth session under the agenda sub-item entitled 
‘Independence of the judiciary, administration of justice, impunity’.672 The CHR made 
the same requests again in 2002.673  
 
This time around, a group of NGOs674 that had been closely following the process 
successfully lobbied stakeholders in highlighting the importance of organising the 
Consultative Meeting to discuss the future of the draft Principles and Guidelines. The 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) scheduled a formal 
consultation for states, and inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations to 
take place on 30 September and 1 October 2002. In order to encourage the process and 
lift the profile of the Principles and Guidelines in the human rights agenda of member 
states, the NGO coalition organised an informative meeting on 29 August 2002 hosted by 
the OHCHR. Both Bassiouni and van Boven were invited, although only the latter was 
                                               
671 For all interested governments, intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations in 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UN Commission on Human Rights 
Res 2000/41 (20 April 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/.RES/2000/41. 
672 Commission on Human Rights, Res 2001/105 (23 April 2001) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/105. 
673 Commission on Human Rights, Res 2002/44 (23 April 2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/44. The Office 
of the High Commissioner requested comments several times, see: UN Doc E/CN/2001/61 (29 December 
2001) and E/CN.4/2002/70 (23 January 2002). 
674 The original group of NGOs was formed by The Redress Trust (REDRESS), ICJ, AI, Medical 
Foundation, APT, OMCT, IRCT and the International Society for Traumatic stress studies. By the first 
consultative meeting other NGOs joined: ICAR foundation, International Service for Human Rights, 
Human Rights Advocates, Asian Human Rights Commission. EAAF, Human Rights First, and CCJO. 
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able to attend. In addition to the NGOs, van Boven, and the representatives of the 
OHCHR, twenty-two state delegations attended the meeting.675 Participants agreed that it 
was time to move forward. Recognising that the project had started more than a decade 
ago, everyone present agreed that it was crucial to determine a procedural mechanism to 
finalise the draft instrument. 
 
Pursuant to Commission Resolution 2002/44, the OHCHR convened a consultative 
meeting in the fall of 2002. Both experts, van Boven and Bassiouni, were present, as well 
as forty-nine member states, IGOs, other independent experts, and the NGO coalition.676 
All attendees supported the initiative to adopt a universal instrument on the right to a 
remedy and reparation for victims of international human rights and humanitarian law 
violations. During the meeting, participants had the opportunity to request clarifications 
from the former Rapporteur and Independent Expert on the substance and drafting of the 
Principles and Guidelines. The main questions raised during the meeting were in 
reference to the scope and limits of the obligations implied within the right to a remedy 
and reparation. What types of violations were covered by the draft instrument (human 
rights and/or IHL violations; gross violations or all violations)? Committed by whom and 
in what context (state and/or non-state actors during peace and/or war time)? Who were 
the beneficiaries or recipients of such obligations (i.e. definition of victim)? The necessity 
to maintain the victims’ perspective on the structure and substance of the instrument was 
considered of paramount importance. Similarly, it was agreed from the start that while 
                                               
675 See: REDRESS Internal Minutes (on file with the author).  
676 In addition, forty-nine member states were present as well as IGOs, NGOs, and other experts. For the 
detailed list see: Annex III of the Report of the First Consultative Meeting (n. 670). 
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the instrument should reflect existing norms of international law, since it was not a treaty, 
it should also reflect emerging concepts as well as allow progressive development on the 
subject.677  
 
The Chilean chairman, Alejandro Salinas, proposed a recommendation to the 
Commission on Human Rights to establish a mechanism to finalise the draft instrument: 
‘Taking into account the discussions held and the Chairperson-Rapporteur’s conclusions, 
[…], that mechanism should consult and cooperate with interested Governments, IGOs, 
NGOs and the two experts, Mr. Theo van Boven and Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, in its 
work’.678  Most of the states agreed with the proposal. Some, however, thought it was 
appropriate to establish in the recommendation a deadline to adopt the Principles and 
Guidelines. Others thought the ambiguity would facilitate the process of adoption. Only 
Cuba commented on the necessity of establishing an ‘inter-governmental’ mechanism for 
proper political debate, and the U.S. proposed to establish the Consultative Meeting as 
the appropriate method in the recommendation to the Commission.679  The Chair 
submitted the results of the meeting to the Commission in 2003, calling for the 
establishment of an effective mechanism to finalise the draft.680 The Commission 
                                               
677 Chairperson-Rapporteur’s Conclusions, Report of the First Consultative Meeting (n. 670). 
678 Report of the First Consultative Meeting (n. 670). 
679 See REDRESS Internal Minutes (on file with the author). 
680 E/CN.4/2003/63 (27 December 2002): Based on discussions during the meeting, the Chairperson-
Rapporteur, as follow-up to the consultative meeting, recommended that the Commission on Human 
Rights: 
 (a) Establish, at its next session, an appropriate and effective mechanism with the objective 
of finalising the elaboration of the set of Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and 
reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, contained in the 
annex to document E/CN.4/2000/62; 
 (b) Taking into account the discussions held and the Chairperson-Rapporteur’s conclusions, 
contained in the report of the consultative meeting, that mechanism should consult and cooperate with 
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conferred on Salinas the mandate to prepare another revision of the draft Principles and 
Guidelines in cooperation with the Experts, taking into account the comments made by 
states, inter-governmental, and non-governmental organisations during the consultative 
meeting. The Commission’s resolution also ordered the OHCHR to hold a second 
consultative meeting.  
 
The fourth revised version was completed and circulated on 15 August 2003. The 
participants considered the revised version and commented on the text during the second 
consultative meeting (20, 21, and 23 October 2003). The most contentious issue that 
arose during the discussions was the scope of the instrument: whether it should cover 
violations of both human rights and international humanitarian law, and whether it should 
cover all breaches or just gross/serious violations. On 23 October 2003, a further revised 
version was circulated together with a proposal put forward by the Chairperson and the 
Experts that arose out of the informal consultations held the day before. The 
‘Chair/Experts’ Proposal’681 addressed the contentious issues related to the scope of the 
instrument and suggested two important modifications. The first was to delete all 
references to human rights or international humanitarian law violations and thus change 
the title to ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Law’. The second, following from the first, 
was a suggested definition of ‘gross violations of international law’. 682 
 
                                                                                                                                            
interested Governments, IGOs, NGOs and the two experts, Mr Theo van Boven and Mr M Cherif 
Bassiouni, in its work.    
681 Annex II, E/CN.4/2004/57. 
682 idem [5]. See definition and analysis of this issue below: (n 710) and accompanying text.  
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It was clear that the participants required time to review the Chair/Experts’ Proposal and 
the new revised text. Thus, at its 2004 session, the Commission again deferred action on 
the draft, calling for Mr Salinas to hold a third consultative meeting. The Commission’s 
resolution also asked the Chair to prepare, together with the Experts, a revised version 
taking into account ‘the opinions and commentaries of states and of intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organisations and the results of the previous consultative 
meetings’.683 Despite the heated discussions on the scope of the instrument, the adopted 
resolution requested the Chairperson-Rapporteur to prepare a revised version of the 
Principles and Guidelines for victims of all violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law.684 With a view to facilitating the consultative process, the Mission of 
Chile invited all interested parties, and inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to an informal exchange of views with the Chair on 2 August 2004 in 
Geneva. At this meeting, it became clear that the Chair/Experts’ Proposal did not achieve 
the desired consensus and that the third meeting would have to concentrate on the further 
reviewed version mandated by the Commission’s resolution. The Chairperson Rapporteur 
and the Experts finalised this version on 5 August 2004 after a two-day drafting meeting 
in Geneva.  
 
The third consultative meeting took place on 29, 30, September and 1 October 2004. As 
expressed by many delegations during the previous informal gathering, this meeting was 
perceived as the last attempt to finalise the draft. It was crucial to achieve consensus over 
the text or there was a real risk that states, even those delegations that had been 
                                               
683 Commission Res 2004/34. See: chap. XI, E/2004/23-E/CN.4/2004/127. 
684 ibid. 
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promoting the text in the past, would oppose continuation of the process. The 5 August 
2004 version introduced by the Chair and the Experts685 included violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law, but limited the scope to ‘gross and serious 
violations’ only. After several proposals and debates over the scope, the language, and 
the applicable standards, on 1 October 2004 the Chairperson-Rapporteur presented a final 
version. With some modifications, this version only covered gross violations of 
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law.  
On 23 February 2005, the Chair requested to hold an informal meeting to discuss the 
follow up to the process of finalising the draft Principles and Guidelines and to examine 
the procedural aspects that could facilitate the completion of the process, but without 
opening a discussion on any substantive or language proposals. During this meeting, it 
was clear that some delegations still had problems with certain provisions of the text 
(particularly on the scope of the instrument), but it was also clear that the majority of 
states agreed on the importance of adopting a UN instrument on the right to reparation.  
 
The draft Principles and Guidelines were finally submitted to the CHR at its 61st session. 
The text was adopted on 19 April 2005 with no votes against, but with thirteen 
abstentions.686 Germany, one of the states that absented, gave an explanation of vote. It 
restated its view expressed during the consultation process that victims of HR violations 
do not have a right to reparation under CIL but only as part of state sponsored 
                                               
685 Although this new version was made on consultation with both Experts, only Theo van Boven was 
present in Geneva during the drafting of the text and at the Third Consultative Meeting. 
686 The countries abstaining were: Australia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mauritania, Nepal, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Togo, and the United States. See: Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 
2005/35 (19 April 2005) E/CN.4/RES/2005/35.  
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mechanisms and that victims of IHL do not have a right to claim reparation under IHL 
instruments.687 Three months later, on 25 July 2005, the Principles and Guidelines were 
adopted by ECOSOC by a vote of forty-three in favour and five abstentions (none 
against).688 On 16 December 2005, the General Assembly adopted the instruments 
without a vote.689 A small number of delegations had some observations but none call for 
a vote.690 Germany referred once again to the explanation of vote it had given at the 
CHR:  
“18. Ms. Beinhoff  (Germany) said that her Government continued to attach the 
highest political importance to the issue of reparation. However, even if not 
breaking the consensus, it wished to uphold the views it had expressed in its 
explanation of vote at the sixty-first session of the Commission on Human Rights” 
(emphasis added).691  
 
Technically, as described by the UN692 as well as by van Boven,693 the General Assembly 
adopted the Principles and Guidelines without a vote and therefore “by consensus”. 
However, van Boven correctly notes elsewhere that “as transpired from the German 
                                               
687 See: n 716 and accompanying text. 
688 In favour:  Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Canada, China, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Guinea, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania./ Against:  None. /Abstain:  Australia, Germany, 
India, Nigeria, and the United States. Absent:  Benin, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Mozambique, Pakistan. See: Annex I, ECOSOC Res 2005/23 (25 July 2005) UN Doc E/2005/23. 
689 See: n 2 
690 Report of the Third Committee to the General Assembly (A/60/509/Add.1, 1 December 2005); General 
Assembly, Summary record of meeting No. 39 held in the Third Committee on 10 November 2005 
(A/C.3/60/SR.39), p 2-3. 
691 See page 3 of the Summary records of the 39th meeting of General Assembly, held in the Third 
Committee on 10 November 2005 (A/C.3/60/SR.39). 
692 UN Press Release “Principles On Right To Reparations For Victims Of Gross Human Rights Violations 
Approved By Third Committee” General Assembly Third Committee, GA/SHC/3838 (10 NOVEMBER 
2005) 
693 T van Boven ‘Introductory note on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law’, available at http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_60-147/ga_60-147.html 
[accessed 17 April 2016]  
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position [...], there appears not to be general consensus as to existence of customary 
international law governing individual reparation claims”.694 
 
Van Boven described the drafting and adoption process of the Principles and Guidelines 
as somehow spontaneous, not following a preconceived plan: ‘It was made up of an 
evolving pattern, entailing non-governmental expertise and, progressively, inter-
governmental participation and input’.695 As observed by the Special Rapporteur, the 
draft Principles and Guidelines underwent a series of revisions and clarifications with the 
aim of reaching consensus, without reducing the text to the lowest common denominator 
level. For him, the process under the Commission’s authority and how it stretched a 
number of years was important for political and psychological reasons: ‘It signified the 
indispensable element of inter-governmental ownership and interest in the process, 
without however losing close links wit the quarters of civil society’.696  
2. The victim’s perspective 
Based on the discussions during the first consultative meeting, the Chairperson made the 
following conclusion: 
Appropriately, the draft Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a 
remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights 
and humanitarian law were drafted to reflect a victim-based perspective, 
organising principles from all legal sources not according to instruments and 
sources, but according to the needs and rights of victims. The victim’s 
perspective, as reflected in the structure and content, should be retained.697 
 
                                               
694 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 27.  
695 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 25. 
696 ibid. 29. 
697 UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/63 [6]. 
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Throughout the drafting process, the importance of the victims’ perspective was not only 
highlighted by the former Special Rapporteur and former Independent Expert, but also by 
most delegations.698 Zwanenburg argues that without a doubt, ‘the most important aspect 
of the Van Boven/Bassiouni Principles is that they take the victim as their point of 
departure’.699   
 
The use of the ‘victims’ perspective’ in the context of the Principles and Guidelines, 
however, seems to have more than one meaning. It often refers to the empowerment of 
victims (i.e. the capacity to reflect the needs and interests of the victims). But it also 
relates to the drafting methodology and structure employed in the instrument – focusing 
on the victims as the point of departure as opposed to the legal body classifying the 
violation. In order to analyse both aspects of the notion of ‘victims’ perspective’, the first 
dimension will be referred as ‘victims’ viewpoint’. The second will be referred as 
‘victim-oriented framework’. 
 
A. The victims’ viewpoint: an empowering instrument? 
 
A dimension of the victims’ perspective often referred to is the capacity to reflect the 
needs and wishes of victims. This aspect of the victims’ perspective requires two 
elements: an accurate reflection of human rights concepts as perceived by victims and the 
need to give voice to the victims in the human rights arena. The juxtaposition of these 
                                               
698 See, for example, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/63 [6] [12], [20], [21] and [66]. 
699 Zwanenburg, ‘An Appraisal’ (n. 644) 641.  
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two elements necessarily entails the possibility of a common narrative that reflects the 
views of a cohesive group: the victims. Referring thus to a victims’ perspective in this 
context (the victims’ viewpoint) would seem to presuppose three premises: first, victims 
are generally silent and/or silenced; second, if victims are in a position to speak, they will 
express themselves in similar terms; and third, the views of the victims have inherent 
authority in the human rights discourse. 
 
For van Boven, all of these premises are accurate.700 He notes that victims regularly 
experience the gap between entitlements and realties. In his first study on the right to 
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation, the Special Rapporteur describes how legal, 
political, social, and economic obstacles regularly affect victims.701 He explains, for 
example, that laws are inadequate; that there are hurdles in getting access to justice; and 
that the courts have restrictive attitudes. There are also references to the political 
obstacles that victims suffer due to the unwillingness of the authorities and society to 
recognise that wrongs were committed, or of economic setbacks as a result of the 
shortage or unjust distribution of resources. Last but not least, van Boven refers to the 
disenfranchisement of victims as a consequence of their lack of knowledge and capacity 
to present and pursue their claims. Victims, and particularly those vulnerable groups 
generally victimised (like women, children, members of specific racial, ethnic or 
religious groups, the mentally and physically disabled and many more), are often silenced 
as a consequence of their actual victimisation, their vulnerability, and their personal 
circumstances.  
                                               
700 See van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 19-20. 
701 van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution’ (n 17). 
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While arguing that victims are silent and silenced, the former Special Rapporteur also 
acknowledges that the victims’ perspective cannot be seen in isolation from the 
perspective of other sectors of society. He recognises that the human rights discourse is 
complex and reflects the interests of different stakeholders. But he maintains that human 
rights notions are better translated from the perspective of victims than from the demands 
of the powerful: 
Governments may be guided by claims of sovereignty; peoples pursue their 
aspirations in terms of self-determination and development; religions entertain value 
systems; political and social institutions look for normative basis in order to attain 
their objectives. The perspectives of these various actors may be human rights 
related but often differ depending on status and power positions. They have to a 
greater or lesser extent the means at their disposal to promote and defend their 
interests. However, victims often find themselves in vulnerable situations of neglect 
and abandonment and are in need of the care, the interest and active recognition of 
the human rights promotion and protection systems.702  
 
For this reason, van Boven explains, one may learn more about the essence and the 
universality of human rights from the voices of victims than from the views of secular or 
religious leaders. After all, ‘if victims are in a position to speak, they will express 
themselves in similar terms’.703  
 
The viewpoint of the victims was clearly a central point of orientation in van Boven’s 
work.  When analysing the drafting and adoption history of the Principles and Guidelines, 
it becomes evident that the Special Rapporteur’s goal was to reflect the views and 
empower the victims of gross human rights abuses. Throughout the process, efforts 
                                               
702 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 1. 
703 ibid 2. 
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concentrated on receiving input from civil society while providing at the same time ‘the 
indispensable element of inter-governmental ownership and interest’.704 The entire 
standard setting exercise aimed at obtaining inter-governmental support without losing 
close links with essential quarters of civil society.  
   
However, while victims are clearly at the centre of the human rights thinking,705 it is not 
easy to speak on behalf of this group or category of persons. As will be described, ‘victim 
and victimhood’ are not only difficult concepts to define, but also experiencing different 
types and degrees of abuse will result in a myriad of demands that are difficult to fix and 
organise under one single instrument.706 The original study assigned in 1989 by the Sub-
Commission of Human Rights concerning the rights of victims of ‘gross violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ had a more narrow focus than the final version 
(which includes serious HR and IHL violations). The scope of the 2000 version of the 
draft Principles and Guidelines prepared by Bassiouni and reviewed during the first 
Consultative Meeting was even broader. It included all HR and IHL violations. 
Throughout the drafting process, IHL violations were included and the gross/serious 
element was removed. Arguably, this made it more difficult to reflect a coherent set of 
                                               
704 ibid 25. 
705 F Klug, ‘Human Rights and Victims’, E Cape (ed), Reconcilable Rights?: Analysing the Tension 
sBetween Victims and Defendant  (Legal Action Group 2004). 
706 The Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence 
explains how important is ‘to keep in mind that “victimhood” is only one dimension of the complex 
identity of a victim and that while transitional justice measures are indeed meant to provide recognition to 
victims and acknowledge the harm and suffering that they endured, their main purpose is to provide 
recognition of their equal status as rights holders’. See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence, 27 December 
2016, A/HRC/34/62, para 30 
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demands and their corollary rights. In the final version, the scope was once more reduced 
to gross/serious violations, but kept both HR and IHL breaches.  
 
Since the very beginning of the Commission’s project, it was debated whether the 
instrument should be conscribed to gross violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms only or whether it should include all types of violations regardless of their 
severity. Debates over the non-hierarchy of rights and the assertion that human rights are 
indivisible played a key role in keeping the word ‘gross’ and later on ‘serious’ (for IHL) 
in brackets throughout the drafting process. Bassiouni deleted the term ‘gross’/ ‘serious’ 
in his 2000 version. This was the draft reviewed during the first Consultative Meeting. 
However, the wider the scope, the more difficult it became to determine the legal 
provisions applicable. Human rights and international humanitarian law involve many 
types of violations. Some of them constitute international crimes; some of them do not. 
For example, a breach of the right to freedom of expression by an unjustified censoring of 
a newspaper is a human rights violation, but it is not an international crime like genocide 
or slavery. Similarly, using the flags of a neutral state in an armed conflict is a breach of 
IHL, but does not constitute a war crime or crime against humanity. While these are all 
violations of human rights and/or IHL, it is difficult to put them into one single group to 
determine ‘victims’ demands’ and to establish the legal consequences and applicable 
principles of international law on reparation and remedies. Still, the idea of limiting the 
instrument to certain types of violations only was questioned throughout the development 
of the instrument. It was argued that all violations of international law give rise to a duty 
to afford some form of reparation, regardless of their severity. As a general rule, all 
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violations of HR and IHL entail responsibility and corresponding legal consequences. 
Bassiouni’s 2000 version included all violations of HR and IHL, albeit having a specific 
principle on the obligation to universally prosecute gross/serious violations constituting 
crimes under international law.  Unfortunately, the draft still lacked clarity in terms of 
other international norms applicable and the legal consequences. During the first 
Consultative Meeting it became clear that participants were not satisfied with the manner 
the different principles and guidelines were organised in this version. 
 
Some delegations also challenged the inclusion of IHL, stating that under IHL, remedies 
vary with respect to different categories of violations. Others argued that IHL norms do 
not contain an individual right to a remedy. The scope of the instrument became a heated 
debate during the second Consultative Meeting. Since the aim of the instrument was to 
reflect the victims’ viewpoint, many of the participants, as well as the Chair and the 
Experts van Boven and Bassiouni, were concerned that proposals to remove IHL 
violations would defeat the purpose of creating a victim-oriented instrument. Many 
argued that a UN document on the right to reparation of victims would be crucial for the 
protection of victims of mass atrocities, particularly those committed during wartime. As 
mentioned earlier, out of this concern, the Chair and the Experts tabled a proposal on 23 
October 2003 that arose out of informal consultations during the second Consultative 
Meeting. The ‘Chair/Experts’ Proposal’ suggested the deletion of all references to human 
rights or international humanitarian law violations and change the title to ‘Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
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Violations of International Law’. It defined ‘gross violations of international law’ as 
follows:  
For the purposes of this document gross violations of international law means 
unlawful deprivation of the right to life, torture, or other cruel, inhuman treatment 
or punishment, enforced disappearance, slavery, salve trade and related practices, 
deprivation of the rights of persons before the law and similar serious violations 
of fundamental rights and freedoms and norms guaranteed under applicable 
international law.707 
 
According to the proposal, its purpose was to achieve consensus to facilitate the adoption 
of the draft Principles and Guidelines. It attempted to avoid the specific debate of 
including/excluding IHL by relying on general principles of international responsibility 
under CIL, as opposed to specific norms of the law of armed conflict. In reality, however, 
the proposal created a wider group of victims – or a less clearly defined group – that 
states were not ready to accept.   
 
In the end, the Principles and Guidelines were limited to ‘gross’ HR and ‘serious’ IHL 
violations. The legal consequences arising from serious violations of HR and IHL that 
constitute international crimes are different than those arising from other breaches (e.g. 
the right to access to a judicial remedy or the non-applicability of statutes of 
limitations).708 One could argue that this is because the demands of victims of less severe 
violations are different from victims of more severe violations or because states recognise 
that the second category requires special treatment (e.g. universal prosecution; aut dedere 
aut judicare), or probably due to a combination of both. Nonetheless, what is important is 
that both categories of serious violations (HR and IHL) share similar legal consequences. 
                                               
707 See: (n 682). 
708 See below: Section D: Content and structure of the Principles and Guidelines. 
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As will be explained in the next section, this amendment helped create consensus in 
adopting the instrument with violations from both bodies of law.  
 
It seems valid to argue that an international instrument drafted by states and containing 
states’ obligations is capable of reflecting victims’ needs (thus being victim-oriented), 
despite the current limits of international law.709 Even when individual victims are not 
recognised as formal actors of international law, the drafting and adopting process of the 
Principles and Guidelines was very inclusive of victims’ voices. It is evident that van 
Boven made a consistent effort to include the point of view of victims organisations 
around the world throughout the process and that the CHR allowed active participation of 
NGOs during the consultative meetings. Still, it is also clear that broadening the scope of 
the instrument to include less defined groups of victims made this task much more 
difficult.  
 
The following section will look at the second aspect of the victims’ perspective: whether 
the Principles and Guidelines were capable of modifying the traditional state centred 
legal structure to use a victim-oriented framework. This proposition implies a much more 
profound change than reflecting the needs and wishes of victims in an international 
instrument. It entails organising a legal instrument taking victims’ needs as the point of 
departure, as opposed to the state’s legal obligations, in regards to victims as recognised 
and categorised in existing treaty and customary law. As will be analysed, Bassiouni used 
this rationale when acting as Independent Expert to expand the scope of the Principles 
                                               
709 See: (n712) and accompanying text. 
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and Guidelines to all types of HR and IHL violations and to include many new 
provisions, particularly in regards to IHL. The subsequent paragraphs will examine this 
proposition in more detail. 
B. Victim-oriented framework: an attempt at harmonising standards from the 
victims’ perspective 
 
In regards to the drafting methodology and structure, Bassiouni explained that ‘[t]he 
Draft Guidelines intentionally adopted a victim-oriented perspective, organising 
principles from all legal sources not according to instruments and sources, but according 
to the needs and rights of victims’.710 Accordingly, if a person is a victim of, for example, 
torture as defined in international law, he/she should have a right to a remedy and 
reparation regardless of the status of the perpetrator (state or non-state actor)711 or the 
context in which he/she was injured (international or non-international armed conflict or 
during peace time). The drafting methodology in this context is inductive rather than 
deductive (i.e. from the perspective of the victim rather than of the state).  
 
While in principle this seems a valid and reasonable approach, it is important to analyse 
whether the Principles and Guidelines have a ‘true’ victim-oriented ‘framework’. Is it 
really possible to achieve this through a drafting exercise in a state-controlled mechanism 
                                               
710 Report of the First Consultative Meeting, (n 670) [20]. 
711 Importantly, torture can only be committed if the act is linked to an official or de facto authority. 
Therefore torture can be committed by a non-state actor if the necessary link to the state or state-like 
authority is present. The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (n 39) defines torture as: ‘Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person, information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include 
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’ (emphasis added). 
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within the current boundaries of international law?712 Clearly, the structure of the original 
study by van Boven and the subsequent set of Principles and Guidelines (i.e. the research 
and codification of applicable standards) were framed to determine states’ obligations in 
regards to victims of gross abuses. The nature of the drafting exercise was always state-
centric. It took place under the auspices of the CHR (a state-composed mechanism) and 
the methodology used was deductive (determining state obligations in order to establish 
rights of victims). Even if one argues that the scope of the study and draft instrument was 
subsequently widened with a view to reflect the needs of victims – when IHL violations 
were introduced in 1996 and when all types of violations were included (not only gross 
violations) in 2000 – the conceptual framework determining states’ obligations was not 
altered.  
 
During the drafting process, Bassiouni explained that if the point of departure is the 
victim, then the source of law could not guide the drafting and structure of the 
instrument. However, the entire drafting exercise had the aim of determining states’ 
obligations in regards to potential rights of victims. These obligations are typically 
                                               
712 It would seem valid to question the current State-focused framework governing the right to reparation 
since liability of non-State actors is now recognised under international law, however it is still uncertain 
whether alternative conceptual frameworks can help clarify and strengthen the status, content and scope of 
the victims’ right to reparation or whether the state-focused frame is necessary to guarantee the maximum 
protection for victims. For a discussion of non-state actors and human rights law, see generally Clapham, 
Non-State Actors (n 82) and Philip Alston ‘Non-State Actors and Human Rights’, New York University 
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (OUP Incorporated 2005). See also Nigel Rodley, who argues 
that the expansion of international human right law to non-state actors as proposed for example by 
Clapham is inappropriate. ‘The alternative idea, claiming to be victim-oriented, that human rights should be 
understood in terms of the harm done, regardless of the character of the perpetrator, means that human 
rights as an idea will be indistinguishable from most kinds of serious crime or terrorism. The perceived 
advantages of this paradigm – use of a term that has acquired a positive resonance (it was not always the 
case) and jurisdiction of international human rights machinery – are evidently opportunistic and fail the test 
of value added, or practical applicability’ –. N Rodley, ‘Non- state actors and human rights’ in S Sheeran 
and N Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013), 523. 
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determined by the sources of law, using a state-perspective methodology. As a result, 
states recognised the existence of victims’ rights during the standard setting process only 
where there were clear state obligations; rights were never inferred. In this context, the 
victim oriented ‘framework’ of the Principles and Guidelines is fairly limited. 
Notwithstanding, delegations kept a flexible attitude towards the framework of the 
Principles and Guidelines, in great part due to the shared conviction that this was a 
victims’ instrument that was very much needed. However, as will be explained, the 
formulas agreed to keep some of its provisions watered down key standards on 
reparation, including access to justice; universal jurisdiction; the duty to afford 
reparation; and collective rights. 
 
Several debates during the consultative meetings confirmed the discrepancy between the 
victim perspective (as in victim-oriented ‘framework’, not victims’ needs) and the state-
focussed framework. For example, one of the most controversial questions during the 
adoption process was the ‘scope’ of the Principles and Guidelines. There was vast 
disagreement in regards to the consequences of including IHL violations in a reparation 
instrument guided by principles of state responsibility – in particular because non-state 
actors can commit IHL violations during non-international armed conflicts.713 It was 
unclear for many what the scope of states’ obligations was in this regard. Equally, several 
delegations had reservations on what rights of victims arise in this type of scenario. 
                                               
713 None of the IHL instruments refer to responsibility for violations by non-state entities, but it is clear that 
if a non-state actor has international obligations it can be responsible for a breach thereof. See generally: L 
Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2002). 
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Others questioned whether an individual right to a remedy exists in the laws of armed 
conflict or if individual rights exist at all under this legal regime.  
 
These were major questions that were difficult to settle in the forum in which they were 
being discussed. After all, as explained in Chapter 3, the precise relationship between HR 
and IHL has been subject to much debate.714 During the consultation stage, the United 
States made the point that there are important differences between these two bodies of 
law, suggesting that the instrument should only address human rights. The U.S. 
delegation made three arguments. The first, that IHL already recognised: specific 
remedies binding on states with respect to criminal sanctions; the duty to search for 
offenders of certain violations; and compensation. Therefore, the United States suggested 
the Principles and Guidelines could create confusion when placed alongside binding IHL 
treaties. The U.S. delegation also argued that under IHL violations, remedies vary with 
respect to different categories of violations and that this distinction was not reflected in 
the draft instrument under review. Ultimately, the state argued that the UN CHR did not 
have the authority to deal with questions of IHL.715 Germany similarly argued that there 
is no right to a remedy and reparation for individual victims under IHL. When Germany 
abstained before the 61st UN CHR on 19 April 2005, it gave the following ‘Explanation 
of Vote’: 
                                               
714 It is clear that the two bodies of law share the same philosophical underpinning and that HR has had an 
important influence on the development of IHL. See: T Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ 
(2000) 94(2) American Journal of Intl Law 239. 
715 General Comments of the United States on the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, UN Doc  (as 
revised August 15 2003; on file with the author).  
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[…] Germany very much regrets not to be able to subscribe to the ‘Basic 
Principles and Guidelines’ annexed to the resolution before us [f]or the following 
reasons: 
Second, despite a claim to the contrary contained in the preamble, the ‘Basic 
Principles’ fail to adequately differentiate between human rights law on the one 
hand and international humanitarian law on the other. While it is true that under 
certain regimes such as the European Convention on Human Rights, violations of 
human rights may lead to an individual claim to reparation, this is certainly not 
true as far as violations of international humanitarian law are concerned. We 
firmly disagree with the proposition that such rights exist under the IV Hague 
Convention of 1907 or the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.716 
 
On the other hand, several delegations argued that the instrument would be crucial for the 
protection of victims of mass atrocities, particularly those committed during wartime, as 
well as having a deterrent effect for future violations. It was also stressed that the 
mandate of the CHR given to the Consultative Meeting covered both types of violations 
and that it would be completely artificial to separate them in an instrument dealing with 
the legal consequences of such violations. As with the Rome Statute of the ICC, it was 
considered necessary to cover serious violations of both international HRL and IHL.717  
 
The substance of this debate is addressed in more detail in Chapter 3. It is important 
nonetheless to highlight here that these arguments reflected a tension between the desire 
to create a victim-oriented framework for the Principles and Guidelines and the state-
focus methodology normally employed when drafting international instruments.718 The 
                                               
716 61st UN Commission on Human Rights, Explanation of Vote, Item 11-L.48, Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Geneva (19 April 2005) 
Permanent Mission of Germany (on file with author).  
717 The Rome Statute, note 39, also provides for reparation to victims of the crimes covered by the Statute 
(Article 75). 
718 Even human rights treaties deal with primary obligations between states to ‘respect and implement 
human rights’. The unique nature of the UN Principles and Guidelines is that it deals with secondary rights, 
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reading of international law standards by the U.S. and Germany in this regard clearly 
establishes different remedial rights to victims of the same violations, and presumably of 
the same international crimes (e.g. torture, disappearance, slavery). The rights would 
vary, therefore, depending on whether the violations are committed during war, peace, 
international conflict, non-international conflict, and so on. Without discussing the merits 
of these arguments, it is clear that such reading organises principles based on specific 
instruments and isolated sources as opposed to according to the needs of the victims.  
 
At the end, it was agreed by the majority of participants that by restricting the scope of 
the Principles and Guidelines to ‘gross’ HR violations and ‘serious’ IHL breaches, it was 
appropriate to retain IHL in the text. While according to the Preamble these are distinct 
but complementary regimes,719 it is clear that the legal regime that applies to serious and 
gross violations is more similar to each other than the legal regime for other types of 
violations. The amendment therefore facilitated the finalisation of the instrument during 
the Third Consultative Meeting in 2004. After all, the legal consequences in regards to 
the rights of victims arising from gross and serious violations of human rights and IHL, 
which in principle also constitute crimes under international law, are the same: the right 
to a judicial remedy, universal jurisdiction, the non-applicability of statutes of limitations, 
and so on.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
like the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, but under the premise that these rights belong to 
individuals against states or other non-state actors directly under international law.  
719 Emphasising that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new international or 
domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the 
implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their norms [emphasis added]. UN 
Principles and Guidelines (n.2) . 
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The decision to restrict the instrument to serious violations was nonetheless highly 
controversial. Those states that were not in favour of this limitation asserted two main 
arguments: firstly, the draft instrument had for many years covered all violations. It was 
argued that restricting its scope in the final stages could give the wrong impression that 
the right to reparation – particularly the forms of reparation described in the Principles 
and Guidelines – would only apply to the most severe violations. Secondly, it was argued 
that the Principles and Guidelines are a declarative instrument only, and that no other 
similar instrument dealing with victims of human rights abuses differentiates between the 
gravity of the violations.720 Principles 26 was included to address some of these concerns: 
26. Nothing in these Basic Principles and Guidelines shall be construed as 
restricting or derogating from any rights or obligations arising under domestic and 
international law. In particular, it is understood that the present Basic Principles 
and Guidelines are without prejudice to the right to a remedy and reparation for 
victims of all violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. It is further understood that these Basic Principles and 
Guidelines are without prejudice to special rules of international law. 
 
Another heated debate took place in relation to the question of whether legal persons like 
corporations (or other non-state actors) can commit human rights violations.721 As in the 
case of IHL violations committed by non-state actors, states questioned what would be 
the legal consequences of this assertion in an instrument establishing an obligation of 
states to afford remedies and reparation. Can states be liable to afford legal remedies 
under state responsibility principles (like access to justice) when non-state actors are 
                                               
720 The second argument was mainly argued by the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
(‘GRULAC’) during the third consultative meeting in 2004, in particular by Ecuador and Peru. REDRESS, 
summary of the Third Consultative Meeting, (on file with the author). 
721 For example, there are many General Assembly Resolutions qualifying ‘terrorism’ as a violation of 
human rights. See: A/RES/48/122 (20 December 1993); A/RES/49/185 (23 December 1994); 
A/RES/54/164 (17 December 1999); A/RES/56/160 (February 2001). 
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ultimately liable? And more importantly, would such assertion bring more or less 
protection to victims (i.e. recognising non-liability of states for human rights violations)? 
 
Principle 3 establishes that the obligation to respect, ensure respect for, and implement 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for under 
the respective bodies of law, includes, ‘[…], the duty to:  (c) Provide those who claim to 
be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law violation with equal and effective 
access to justice, as described below, irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of 
responsibility for the violation’.722 While in principle this seems like a valid solution to 
the question of non-state responsibility, in practice, there are many questions that remain 
open. For instance, are all states obliged to afford judicial remedies regardless of where 
the serious/gross violations are committed and the nationality of the alleged perpetrators 
or victims?723 What about concurrent liability between state(s) and non-state actor(s)? 
What is the relationship between this principle (access to justice) and jurisdictional 
barriers like immunities? 
 
In general, the inconsistencies encountered during the process as a result of the tension 
between the ‘victims’ perspective’ and the state-centric methodology were not thoroughly 
resolved. The issues were complex and extensive and there was a need to finalise the 
drafting process in order not to abandon the initiative. At the beginning of the 
                                               
722 Principle 3, UN Principles and Guidelines. See: Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition’ (n 18) 210. 
(emphasis added). 
723 See, for example, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (n 588), where the United States Supreme Court 
found that the Alien Tort Claims Act presumptively does not apply extraterritorially. See also amicus 
curiae submitted by the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union 
http://www.cja.org/downloads/EuropeanCommissionEU.pdf, accessed 8 April 2016.  
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consultation stage, the Chairperson had clarified the use of the terms ‘shall’ and ‘should’ 
in the draft. It explained that the term ‘shall’ was used for binding norms and the term 
‘should’ was used for ‘less mandatory’ norms. However, it was unclear what ‘less 
mandatory norms’ means.724 Having this in mind, when a number of delegations were not 
prepared to accept some of the standards as reflected in the draft Principles and 
Guidelines, it was suggested during the Third Consultative Meeting that the Principles 
and Guidelines could be differentiated through the use of ‘shall’ in cases where 
international norms existed and otherwise with the use of ‘should’ for emerging/non-
binding norms.  
 
Many perceived this proposal as a slippery slope. From the very beginning it had been 
agreed that the Principles and Guidelines should reflect the progressive nature of 
international law, particularly in the area of victims’ rights. It was considered 
inappropriate to make such a stringent demarcation when it had not been possible to 
reach an agreement in some of the overall topics/discussions surrounding these rights. 
For example, after the first consultation, some delegations challenged the definition of 
‘victims’ in the draft instrument. Said definition was almost identical to the definition of 
victims in the 1985 Victims’ Declaration.725 The definition stayed in the final version. It 
was argued that the UN CHR should not supersede a definition already adopted by the 
UN General Assembly. But it became clear that the drafters needed to be careful not to 
retreat from accepted standards. Eventually, since previous texts referred to ‘should’ in 
                                               
724 The Chairperson’s report of the First Consultative Meeting tried to clarify the existing use of the terms. 
Report of the First Consultative Meeting (n. 670) 6 [9].  
725  Victims’ Declaration (n 643). 
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certain provisions reflecting long-established principles of law (such as principle 19 on 
restitution), and since it became clear that no consensus could be reached in the use of 
‘shall’ and ‘should’ for binding and non-binding norms, other drafting formulas were 
agreed during the third and last consultation to prevent diluting existing standards on 
reparation. For example, the principles on universal jurisdiction and on statutes of 
limitations used the formula ‘where so provided in an applicable treaty or contained in 
other international legal obligations’. ‘Where appropriate, and in accordance with 
domestic law’ was used in Principle 8 to include as victims’ immediate family or 
dependents, or other types of indirect victims. Similarly, the introductory paragraph to the 
forms of reparation (Principle 18) establishes that ‘in accordance with domestic and 
international law’, victims ‘should’ be provided with full and effective reparation, or 
Principle 12, where right to access to an effective judicial remedy is recognised ‘as 
provided for under international law’.  
 
It is clear that these references defeat the intention to consolidate in one instrument the 
international rules on reparation for individual victims.726 It makes it necessary to look at 
other legal sources in order to clarify what are the international standards or which are the 
legal sources that bind states. Moreover, the Chairperson’s clarification of the use of the 
terms ‘shall’ and ‘should’ in the report of the First Consultative Meeting creates the 
impression that when the instrument uses ‘should’ it is understood to be a non-binding 
guideline. The concept of ‘less mandatory’ norms for those principles using ‘should’ is 
                                               
726 As it becomes evident in the Chairperson’s conclusions of the First Consultative Meeting, the intention 
of the UN Principles and Guidelines was to reflect the existing rules of reparation in international law: 
‘Comment 7. The Draft properly introduces no new legal principles of obligations, but only consolidates 
existing norms as they evolved’. Report of the First Consultative Meeting (n. 670).  
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simply not understood nor accepted. Shelton explains that, ‘the application of this 
criterion appears conservative in some parts of the draft’. She gives as examples the use 
of ‘should’ in the paragraph describing the forms of reparation, in the paragraph that 
contains the definition of restitution ‘that is by no means innovative’, and in the next 
paragraphs saying that ‘compensation should be provided for any economically 
assessable damage’. 727 The truth is that the principles in these paragraphs were seldom 
contested during the consultation stage. Thus the language originally used (before the 
start of the endless discussions on the meaning of the use of the terms ‘shall’ and 
‘should’) was simply copied to the following drafts until the last one was adopted. 
Unfortunately, due to the discussions surrounding the use of these terms and the unclear 
‘clarification’ in the Chair’s report of the first consultative meeting, it can now be 
interpreted as if the drafters considered these principles as non-binding and thus they 
used the word ‘should’.  
 
The weaker or ambiguous result is in part a consequence of the back and forth of the 
terms ‘gross’/‘serious’ or similar wording in the drafting process and the debate on 
whether to include/remove IHL violations. During the negotiations, some delegations 
contended that many of the provisions in Bassiouni’s 2000 draft discussed during the 
First Consultative Meeting did not apply to all violations of HR and certainly not to some 
(or none) of the violations of IHL. This discussion continued during the next round of 
negotiations. As a result, the words ‘gross’ and ‘serious’ were put back in brackets after 
the second Consultative Meeting. At the end of the third and last consultation, the scope 
                                               
727 Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 147. 
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of the instrument was finally reduced once more to the most severe violations. But at this 
point it was already too late to reopen the debate on the clear application of some of the 
provisions to gross and serious violations. It was the last opportunity to adopt the 
instrument and participants decided to reach a compromise to keep these provisions in the 
instrument, even if they were a weaker version. For example, Principle 5 on universal 
jurisdiction728 and Principle 6 on statues of limitations729 use the formula ‘where so 
provided in an applicable treaty or under other international law obligations’, 
notwithstanding their applicability to severe violations that constitute international 
crimes. Similarly, Principle 12 on access to justice730 establishes equal access to an 
effective judicial remedy, but using the phrase ‘as provided for under international law’. 
Even Principle 18, establishing that victims should be provided with full and effective 
reparation, uses the formula ‘in accordance with domestic law’. This reference may imply 
that the obligation to provide reparation is subject to internal law. It can thus give the 
                                               
728 Principle 5. To that end, where so provided in an applicable treaty or under other international law 
obligations, States shall incorporate or otherwise implement within their domestic law appropriate 
provisions for universal jurisdiction. Moreover, where it is so provided for in an applicable treaty or other 
international legal obligations, States should facilitate extradition or surrender offenders to other States and 
to appropriate international judicial bodies and provide judicial assistance and other forms of cooperation in 
the pursuit of international justice, including assistance to, and protection of, victims and witnesses, 
consistent with international human rights legal standards and subject to international legal requirements 
such as those relating to the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. 
729 Principle 6. Where so provided for in an applicable treaty or contained in other international legal 
obligations, statutes of limitations shall not apply to gross violations of international human rights law and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law which constitute crimes under international law.  
Principle 7. Domestic statutes of limitations for other types of violations that do not constitute crimes under 
international law, including those time limitations applicable to civil claims and other procedures, should 
not be unduly restrictive. 
The final wording of Principle 7 on the application of ‘non restrictive’ statue of limitation in case of civil 
procedures made it unclear whether it refers to civil and other (non-criminal) procedures of non-gross/non-
serious violations only (which are not supposed to be included in the instrument) or whether it refers to all 
non-criminal procedures including violations that constitute crimes under international law.  
730 Principle 12. A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious violation of 
international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effective judicial remedy as provided for under 
international law 
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impression that reparation is more a matter of charity than a legal imperative under 
international law. Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, the use of ‘should’ gives the 
impression that the drafters considered this a non-binding principle, despite clearly 
restating existing law. 
 
It is difficult not to wonder whether the outcome of the Principles and Guidelines would 
have been clearer and stronger if the original scope had been maintained. After all, the 
IHL violations covered under the notion ‘serious violations of IHL’ as applied in the 
Principles and Guidelines would seem to be included in the notion of ‘gross human rights 
violations and fundamental freedoms’. It is not hard to imagine that states would have 
been less reluctant to apply these principles and guidelines to the most serious HR 
violations than to all violations of HR and IHL. 
 
While no agreed definition exists of the term ‘gross human rights violations and 
fundamental freedoms’, the expression has a long history in the United Nations.  The 
well-known ECOSOC resolutions 1235 and 1503, which were at the basis of defining the 
competence of the CHR to deal with violations of human rights, refer to ‘gross’ 
violations and ‘a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human 
rights’. Clearly, the ‘consistent pattern’ related to the scale of the violations and the word 
‘gross’ to the nature of the violations. From the travaux préparatoires of the 1503 
procedure, it appears that the term ‘gross violations’ refer to violations of civil and 
political and economic, social and cultural rights, occurring in any part of the world and 
under any circumstances, including in situations of armed conflict, and breaches of IHL 
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or threat to peace.731 The Vienna Declaration of 1993 also refers to gross violations of 
HR in the context of armed conflicts: ‘23. […] The World Conference on Human Rights 
recognises that gross violations of human rights, including in armed conflicts, are among 
the multiple and complex factors leading to displacement of people’.732 
 
On the request of Sub-Commission members, van Boven, then Special Rapporteur on the 
right to reparation, had to explain what was understood by the term ‘gross violations’. In 
his 1993 report, van Boven clarifies: ‘It appears that the word ‘gross’ qualifies the term 
‘violations’ and indicates the serious character of the violations but that the word ‘gross’ 
is also related to the type of human right that is being violated’.733 He indicates as useful 
guidance the work of the ILC’s draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the 
Third Statement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (section 702).  
 
The relationship between HR law and IHL, as well as the use of ‘serious’ as a specific 
category of IHL violations, is explored in Chapter 3. It is clear nonetheless that the IHL 
violations covered under the notion ‘serious violations of IHL’ as applied in the 
Principles and Guidelines is included in the notion of ‘gross human rights violations and 
fundamental freedoms’ that are understood to apply in times of peace and during periods 
of armed conflict. Therefore, it is valid to ask whether the explicit use of IHL in the 
                                               
731 E/AC.7/SR.638, cited in Frequently Asked Questions, ‘How to submit communications to the Human 
Rights Council’, OHCHR 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ComplaintProcedure/Pages/HRCComplaintProcedureIndex.as
px> accessed 6 April 2014. 
732 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx, accessed 6 April 2014.  
733 van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution’ (n 17). 
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instrument was really necessary and whether it brought more clarity or simply more 
confusion, especially when the scope of the draft instrument was expanded to include all 
types of violations (not only gross and serious). While nothing in IHL precludes the right 
to a remedy and reparation, it is less clear whether there is a direct source affording 
victims a right to a remedy and reparation under this legal regime (as opposed to under 
general principles of international/state responsibility principles or under HR law 
applicable to armed conflicts).734  
 
Still, the final text of the Principles and Guidelines describes the adequate forms of 
reparation under international law and is the first international instrument to clarify the 
difference between the obligation to provide effective access to justice through judicial 
remedies and the obligation to afford substantive reparations. The UN General Assembly 
adopted it in 2005 without a vote, marking a milestone in the lengthy process towards the 
framing of victim-oriented policies and practices.   
 
The drafting history and adoption process reflects the existing back and forth of the 
recognition of victims’ rights within the realm of international law debates. It is clear that 
the instrument was initiated at a time when human rights and victims’ demands were at 
the core of international politics (after the end of the Cold War), coinciding with an 
increasing awareness of the prevalence of victims’ rights (a tendency illustrated by the 
                                               
734 For a detailed discussion see Chapter 3 exploring whether there is a right to a remedy and reparation for 
IHL violations. Generally speaking, there is nothing in IHL that precludes this right [Hampson and Salama, 
‘The relationship’ (n. 507)] and as Cordula Droege puts it, ‘it is now clear that the simple statement that 
there is no right to reparation for violations of IHL is not adequate anymore in light of evolving law and 
practice’. C Droege ‘The interplay’ (n. 488) 2. 
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granting of standing to victims to participate directly in proceeding before the ICC). But 
as described earlier, this changed during the drafting and negotiation process (after 9/11 
and Durban) and has continued to do so.735  
C. Definition of victim  
 
As one of the root concepts of reparation, the notion of ‘victim’ is a central question 
when exploring the right to a remedy and reparation for victims. After all, reparation 
occurs in response to victimhood. But despite being a core concept of reparation, defining 
the notion of ‘victim’ has proved a challenge.736 The drafting exercise of the Principles 
and Guidelines was no exception. The definition of victim was one of the most debated 
standards. The same was true during the debate of the definition of victim in the ICC 
negotiations.737 In both cases, the 1985 Victims’ Declaration738 was taken as the starting 
point: 
A. Victims of crime 
1. “Victims” means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, 
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of 
criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal 
abuse of power. 
 
2. A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of whether the 
perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the 
familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. The term “victim” also 
                                               
735 The history of the drafting process up until its adoption is described at the beginning of this chapter. For 
recent developments in this area see discussion of Germany v Italy in Chapter 3. 
736 See H Robouts and S Vandeginste ‘Reparations for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights 
Violations: the Notion of Victim’ (2003) 16 World Legal Studies. Available at: 
<http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls/vol16/iss1/5> accessed 8 April 2016.  
737 See: S Fernandez de Gurmendi, ‘Definition of Victim and General Principle’, in RS Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crime and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational 
2001) 427. 
738  See: n. 643 
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includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and 
persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent 
victimization. 
 
3. The provisions contained herein shall be applicable to all, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, age, language, religion, nationality, political or other 
opinion, cultural beliefs or practices, property, birth or family status, ethnic or social 
origin, and disability. 
 
Since no compromise was found for a definition of the term during the drafting and 
negotiation of the Rome Statute,739 it was placed in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(RPE).740 Notably, the vast majority of delegations supported in principle a broad 
definition in the RPE based on the Victims’ Declaration. This support lasted long into the 
process. However, various delegations had difficulties with some of the terms used in the 
Victims’ Declaration’s definition. In light of these difficulties, Japan proposed to have no 
definition at all or to have a very broad one that would give ample discretion to the Court 
itself.741 As a result, Rule 85 simply defines ‘victims’ as ‘natural persons who have 
suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC’. Importantly, Rule 85 further provides that ‘victims may include organisations or 
institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property, which is dedicated to 
religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes and to their historic monuments, 
hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes’.742 In other words, the 
definition also recognises legal persons as victims. An interesting development worth 
mentioning is that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber took into account the definition of victim 
                                               
739 S Fernandez de Gurmendi and H Friman, ‘The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 157, 181. 
740 International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000). 
741 See n 737 
742 See n 740 
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in the Victims’ Declaration and in the Principles and Guidelines when determining the 
category and scope of victim participation in ICC proceedings.743  
 
The Principles and Guidelines reproduce almost word for word the definition of victim in 
the Victim’s’ Declaration. Despite the opposing outcomes, the debates during the drafting 
process were similar to those at the ICC. The first draft tabled at the consultation stage 
had, for the first time, a definition of victim.744 This definition was based on the 1985 
Victims’ Declaration, and generally all delegations agreed on the importance of having a 
definition of victims in the instrument and on the need of having one sufficiently broad 
and inclusive. However, during the third and last consultative meeting, some delegations 
started questioning some of the terms used in the definition, including the concept of 
legal persons and the inclusion of a member of the immediate family or a household of 
the direct victim as an indirect victim.  As a result, the term household was removed as it 
did not appear in the definition of victims in the Victims’ Declaration and the phrases 
‘where appropriate’ and ‘in accordance with domestic law’ where added in Principle 8:  
 
8. For purposes of this document, persons who individually or collectively suffered 
harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or 
                                               
743 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Application 
of Participation in the Proceedings, No: ICC-01/04 (17 January 2006). 
744 The 2000 version drafted by Bassiouni contained a definition of victims in Principles 8 and 9 (n 668):  
8. A person is “a victim” where, as a result of acts or omissions that constitute a violation of international 
human rights or humanitarian law norms, that person, individually or collectively, suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or impairment of that person’s fundamental 
legal rights. A “victim” may also be a dependant or a member of the immediate family or household of the 
direct victim as well as a person who, in intervening to assist a victim or prevent the occurrence of further 
violations, has suffered physical, mental, or economic harm. 
9. A person’s status as “a victim” should not depend on any relationship that may exist or may have existed 
between the victim and the perpetrator, or whether the perpetrator of the violation has been identified, 
apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted. 
While previous drafts did not have a definition of victim, van Boven does refer to the Victims’ Declaration 
in his 1993 Report, see: van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution’ (n 17) [3]. 
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substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that 
constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with 
domestic law, the term ‘victim’ also includes the immediate family or dependants of 
the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims 
in distress or to prevent victimisation [emphasis added].745 
 
9. A person’s status as “a victim” should not depend on any relationship that may 
exist or may have existed between the victim and the perpetrator, or whether the 
perpetrator of the violation has been identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or 
convicted. 
 
The following elements are included in this concept of ‘victim’: the harm or loss which 
the person has suffered regardless of whether a perpetrator is identified or his/her 
relationship with the victim; the different types of harm or loss which can be inflicted 
through acts or omissions; direct and indirect victims of violations, and their respective 
entitlement to reparations; and whether the harm suffered is individual or collective. 
 
The importance of recognising the victims’ right to redress regardless of the failure of 
authorities to link their harm or loss to a specific crime and/or a perpetrator is multi-
layered. It is particularly relevant in cases of serious HR and IHL violations, as it is often 
difficult if not impossible to identify a perpetrator. In most cases, victims can only 
provide evidence on the harm endured (fiscal and psychological) and sometimes, 
circumstantial evidence, for example, showing that he/she were detained. In Velásquez 
Rodríguez, the IACtHR explained that circumstantial or presumptive evidence is 
especially important in allegations of serious HR violations, such as torture or 
disappearances, because this type of repression is characterised by an attempt to suppress 
                                               
745 Emphasis added. 
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all evidence, leaving no traces of the torture or the identification of the torturer and/or 
hiding information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim.746 
Human rights jurisprudence establishes that the burden of proof in cases of torture – to 
provide a plausible explanation of the harm suffered during detention – switches to the 
state.747 The same rationale applies to cases of forced disappearances, where authorities 
have the burden of proving the whereabouts of persons who were detained or arrested.748 
In these cases, the state is obliged to investigate and punish the perpetrators, and 
regardless of the success in this endeavour, the state is responsible to afford reparations.  
 
Clearly, there are situations where individual perpetrators are identified and they can be 
held liable to provide reparation to victims. Principle 15 establishes that: ‘[…] In cases 
where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, 
such party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has 
already provided reparation to the victim’. But when violations are executed on a massive 
scale, it is virtually impossible even for willing authorities to match victims with 
                                               
746 Velásquez Rodríguez (n 164) [134] et seq. Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
747 The European Court recognised that because of the specific nature of torture, in cases where an 
individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, a 
clear presumption of responsibility arises under Article 3 of the Convention. See Aksoy v. Turkey (1996) 
ECHR 23 (18th December 1996) EHRR 553 [61]; Tomasi v France (9913) ECHR, (27 August 1992) 15 
EHRR 1 [108-111]; and Ribitsch v Austria, (1996) ECHR 21 (4 December 1995) EHRR 573 [34]. In Albert 
Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, the UN Human Rights Committee explained that because of the nature of 
serious human rights violations like torture, ‘the burden of proof cannot rest alone with the author of a 
communication, especially considering that the author and the State party do not always have equal access 
to the evidence and that frequently the State party alone has access to the relevant information [Albert 
Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, Views on Communication No. 458/1991 (21 July 1994)].  
748 ‘The international protection of human rights should not be confused with criminal justice. States do not 
appear before the Court as defendants in a criminal action. The objective of international human rights law 
is not to punish those individuals who are guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims and to 
provide for the reparation of damages resulting from the acts of the States responsible.... In contrast to 
domestic criminal law, in proceedings to determine human rights violations the State cannot rely on 
the defence that the complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be obtained without 
the State's cooperation [emphasis added]’. Velásquez Rodríguez (n 164)  [134] et seq. 
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perpetrators. In either case, there remains an obligation on the part of the state to provide 
reparation to victims for an act or omission that can be attributed to it. This is irrespective 
of whether a natural or legal person has been found liable (individuals and states can have 
concurrent liability for the same violations). In cases where states are not responsible for 
the violations (for example, in internal armed conflicts insurgents who are parties to the 
conflict might be liable for breaches of IHL),749 the Principles and Guidelines consider 
that ‘States should endeavour to establish national programmes for reparation and other 
assistance to victims in the event that the party liable for the harm suffered is unable or 
unwilling to meet their obligations’.750  
 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I decision in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo751 established that victims have a right to participate during the investigation 
phase, regardless of whether any ‘suspects’ have been identified or formally charged. As 
such, they are recognised as ‘victims’ even before defendants are identified and arrest 
warrants are issued.752 Similarly, the Regulations of the Trust Fund of the ICC allow the 
Board of Trustees to use the voluntary contributions to benefit victims from the init ial 
announcement of the opening of a formal investigation.753 
                                               
749 In these cases, states will have the obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged non-state perpetrators 
when the violations occurred under their jurisdiction, and if the violations were committed by non-State 
actors who then become the new government of the state (for example in a revolution or a war of 
independence) or form a new state (war of cessation), then the new government will have the responsibility 
to afford full reparation.  
750 Principle 16, Principles and Guidelines (n.22). 
751 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Application 
of Participation in the Proceedings, No ICC-01/04 (17 January 2006). 
752 In these cases, potential massive applications to participate in proceedings might be problematic as well 
as the inevitable discrimination between victims that fall within the jurisdiction of the court and those that 
don’t (e.g. situations were formal investigations are opened and those were individuals are charged).   
753 See Regulations of the ICC Victims Trust Fund. Available at: <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/linrary/asp/Partlll_-_Resoultions.pdf> accessed 8 April 2016.   
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The Principles and Guidelines also recognise that the term ‘victim’ may include the 
immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm 
in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation. There is no question 
of who is a direct victim – the person that is unlawfully killed, disappeared, and/or 
tortured. However, there are cases where the immediate family members and/or 
dependants might be considered indirect victims, as they are also affected by the 
violation. For example, a mother can suffer moral damage for the loss of a son, but can 
also suffer material damage if she was economically dependent on him. Furthermore, an 
indirect victim (such as the mother) whom the authorities have treated badly in regard to 
the disappearance of her son may herself be conceived of and claim reparation as a direct 
victim precisely because of her own, separate mistreatment by the official authorities.  In 
such a case, the failure of the authorities to deal properly with the initial breach (that is, 
their failure to investigate and/or to reveal what they know or should know about the 
disappearance) causes additional harm to the mother, over and above what she has 
already suffered by her son’s disappearance.754 
 
                                               
754 ‘The notion of victim, of relevance to reparation, has experienced a necessary enlargement, comprising 
close relatives (of fatal victims) in their own right, in the settled case-law of the international tribunals 
(European ad Inter-American Courts) of human rights’ – AA Cancado Trindade, Access to Justice (n 636) 
131. For a detailed analysis on the evolution of the concept of victim in the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American HR System and its impact on reparations see C Sandoval-Villalba, ‘The Concepts of “Injured 
Party” and “Victim” of Gross Human Rights Violations in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: A Commentary on their Implications for Reparations’ in C Ferstman, M Goetz and A 
Stephens (eds), Reparations for victims of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity: systems in 
place and systems in the making (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) pp. 243–82. See also R Rubio-Marín, C Sandoval, 
C Díaz ‘Repairing Family Members: Gross Human Rights Violations and Communities of Harm’ in R 
Rubio-Marín (ed) The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies while Redressing Human 
Rights Violations (CUP 2009) pp. 215-291. 
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The 2000 Bassiouni version tabled during the First Consultative Meeting also included 
members of the household and legal persons in the range of possible ‘victims’. However, 
these individuals were not included in the final version. There were various debates over 
the terminology and elements used in the definition during the last consultative meeting. 
While several amendments had been made to the original definition during the course of 
the consultations (e.g. from ‘persons who suffer collectively’ to a ‘collective group of 
persons’ to again ‘persons who suffer collectively’), during the last consultative meeting 
a number of delegations questioned some of the references and elements in the definition. 
There were several debates over: the use of the term ‘collectively’; the need to include 
persons intervening on behalf of the victim; the references to an unidentified perpetrator; 
the lack of clarity of the term ‘immediate family’; and the need to include again legal 
persons as potential victims. In order to overcome the various differences, several 
delegations suggested that the text should reflect more faithfully the agreed language 
contained in the 1985 Victims’ Declaration,755 a document that had already been 
approved by the General Assembly. In the end, this was considered the best course of 
action, and for this reason members of the household and legal persons were not included 
in the final version. However, this was not sufficient. In order to reach a compromise, the 
wording ‘where appropriate, and in accordance to domestic law’ (a formula used in many 
principles during the last hours of the Third Consultative Meeting) was added. There is 
no similar reference in the 1985 Victims’ Declaration. The final version of Principle 8 
reads: ‘Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also 
                                               
755 See: (n 643).  
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includes the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have 
suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation’.  
 
The reference to domestic law is problematic since, as noted by Sadoval-Villalba, it 
would seem that ‘These phrases imply States are given the possibility to consider in 
which situations the extension the concept of victim can take place, and confirms that in 
all situations, such decision to extend the concept of victim would have to conform with 
domestic law.’756 She gives the example of the reparations afforded in South Africa in the 
context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which did nor consider appropriate 
to afford a ‘victim’ status to the next of kin of direct victims who were alive: ‘[…] as a 
result, for instance, the domestic reparations programme of South Africa cannot be 
considered to be acting against the Basic Principles, when only awarded reparations to 
relatives and dependents of the direct victim of gross human rights violation had 
died757.’758 Finally, as Sandoval-Villalba observes, “[…] the problem is also how 
domestic law defines 'immediate family' and 'dependents' for the purposes of reparations. 
A narrow definition of these terms would go against the basic idea that gross human 
rights violations produce a domino effect that goes beyond the nuclear family of a 
person.”759 
                                               
756 C Sandoval-Villalba, ‘The Concepts of “Injured Party” and “Victim” of Gross Human Rights Violations 
in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Commentary on their Implications 
for Reparations’ in C Ferstman, M Goetz and A Stephens (eds), Reparations for victims of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity: systems in place and systems in the making (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 
p. 248. (hereafter ‘Injured Party’) 
757 B. Goldblatt, "Evaluating the Gender Content of Reparations: Lessons from South Africa" in R Rubio-
Marin, What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Violations (New York, Social 
Science Research Council, 2006), 48-91. 
758 C Sandoval-Villalba, ‘Injured Party’ pp 248–249. 
759 Idem. 
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The fact that the final draft of the Principles and Guidelines does not specifically mention 
members of the household as possible victims does not mean that they cannot be indirect 
victims. Human rights jurisprudence shows that persons with a close connection to the 
direct victim can also suffer harm attributable to the same violation.760 Similarly, legal 
persons like organisations and institutions with legal personality can also be considered 
victims. For example, a museum could be considered to have been harmed by the theft or 
destruction of cultural property protected by the Second Protocol to the 1945 Hague 
Convention, which is a violation under its Article 15.761 In the context of ICL, as 
mentioned earlier, Article 85(b) of the ICC RPE includes as victims ‘organisations or 
institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property, which is dedicated to 
religion, education, art or science or charitable purposed, and to their historic monuments, 
hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes’.762  
 
The definition of victims also includes persons who have suffered harm in intervening to 
assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation. It is very common for human rights 
lawyers or doctors assisting victims of human rights abuses to be targeted. When 
                                               
760 ‘While the original concept of indirect victim was restricted to persons who could suffer damage as a 
result of the violation or who could have a valid personal interest in securing the cessation of such 
violation, over the years the indirect victim concept has been transformed into a means of third party 
involvement. Indirect victims have been allowed to act on behalf of direct victims who were themselves 
unable to present their cases’. T Zwart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions: The Case Law of the 
European Commission of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1994) 70.  For discussion of the concept of indirect victim see generally AA Cancado Trindade, Access to 
Justice (n 636) and D Rodriguez Pinzon, ‘The “Victim” Requirement. The Fourth Instance Formula And 
The Notion Of ‘Person’ in the Individual Complaint Procedure of the Inter-American Human Rights 
System (2001) 7 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 369. 
761 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict 1999 (26 March 1999) 2253 U.N.T.S. 212. 
762 See: n 740 
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considering the harm suffered, the context in which the violations took place needs be 
taken into account to define his/her victimisation and right to reparation. For example, a 
lawyer defending victims of gross abuses might be molested and intimidated through 
phone calls, written threats, random questionings, short detentions, and/or ‘mistaken’ 
arrests. In these cases, although the person is only a direct victim of non-serious 
violations, the distress, harm, and loss suffered need to be considered in the context of the 
overall pattern of serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law. 
 
Finally, although the final version of the Principles and Guidelines does not include some 
of the provisions relating to collective reparation in previous texts,763 Principle 8 
recognises that persons can suffer collectively. The ninth paragraph of the Preamble goes 
further, noting that groups of persons can also be victims: ‘Noting further that 
contemporary forms of victimisation, while essentially directed against persons, may 
nevertheless also be directed against groups of persons who are targeted collectively’. 
 
The question of collective rights and remedies and the definition of ‘victims’ sparked 
several debates during the consultative meetings. Some states contended that human 
rights are ‘individual’ rights, while other states argued for the recognition of ‘collective’ 
rights (and, accordingly, the definition of victims needed to reflect these positions). 
Conversely, those states (mainly Western countries) that argued that collective rights do 
not exist in international law considered it appropriate to retain a provision giving victims 
                                               
763 For example, the 5 August 2004 draft of the Third Consultative Meeting suggested the deletion of a 
‘collective group of persons’ from the definition of the previous draft that had the following definition of 
victim: ‘A person or a collective group of persons who individually or collectively suffer harm […]’, (on 
file with the author). 
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the procedural right to claim collectively; those states that argued for the recognition of 
collective rights (including African and Latin-American states) did not agree that an 
international obligation to afford collective procedural remedies, like a class action, 
existed under international law. The definition of ‘victim’ in Principle 8 recognises that 
victims can be ‘persons who individually or collectively suffered harm’. On the other 
hand, the Preamble recognises ‘groups’ of victims. 
 
The definition of ‘victims’ is crucial because reparation must be adequate and 
proportionate to the type and gravity of the violation and the needs of victims. If victims 
are targeted as a community and therefore suffer collectively, the appropriate form of 
reparation should also be collective. Still, the question of whether the reparations are due 
to a group of persons that has suffered collectively, as opposed to persons within that 
group, is still unclear. This debate goes to the heart of the discussion of whether ‘groups’ 
(in a ‘corporate’ sense, conceived as single integral entities) can be holders of human 
rights directly or whether only the ‘members ’ belonging to a group who have been 
targeted because they belong to such an entity are the direct holders of these rights.764  
 
                                               
764 Most human rights treaties reflect an individualistic concept of rights and rights-holders. But for many 
indigenous peoples their identity as an individual is inseparably connected to the community to which that 
individual belongs. Therefore the problem is that whilst human rights treaties and instruments guarantee 
individual rights, indigenous peoples ask for protection of their collective rights as a group. See P Jones, 
‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’ (1999) 21(1) Human Rights Quarterly 80. See also D 
Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’ (1991) 13(3) Human Rights Quarterly 368; K Henrard, Devising an Adequate 
System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights, and the Right to Self-
Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000). 
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Human rights mechanisms, notably the Inter-American System, have recognised the need 
for collective reparation.765 While the IACtHR did not initially acknowledged collective 
harm, it sometimes provided reparations that benefitted the community.766  Recent 
jurisprudence has granted reparations to communities and not only individuals.767 
However, Zwanenburg argues that while human rights monitoring bodies have 
recognised a collective element of HR, this has not necessarily been in a ‘corporate’ 
sense. He refers to the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community case and notes the 
wording used by the IACtHR when referring to the violation of the right to property: 
‘155. For all the above, the Court concludes that the State violated article 21 of the 
American Convention, to the detriment of the members of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community, in connection with articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention]’. 768 In his 
view, the use of the phrase ‘the members of’ is not accidental.769 
 
While there is a more explicit recognition of a collective victim by the IACtHR in the 
latter case Saramaka v Suriname, the Court uses the same language: “189. […]  the Court 
considers the members of the Saramaka people as the “injured party” in the present case 
                                               
765 For an analysis of the different approaches to collective reparations by human rights bodies see: C 
Evans, Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (n 11) 82. 
766 IACtHR, Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 15 (10/09/1993), para.96. 
767 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra. n. 8, paras. 155 and 164; Plan de 
Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, supra n. 18, para. 62; IACtHR, Moiwana Community v. Suriname, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 124 (15/06/2005), paras. 176 and 194; 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra n. 8, paras. 188-189; IACtHR, Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra n. 8, para. 204. For a more detailed analysis of collective 
reparations afforded by international bodies, see Aubry, Sylvain, Henao-Trip, Maria Isabel (2011) 
‘Collective Reparations and International Criminal Court’, Reparations Unit Briefing Paper No. 2. 
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/tjn/documents/Paper_2_Collective_Reparations_Large.pdf.> Accessed 16 April 
2016. 
768 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, (Judgment) [August 31, 2001] Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001). (emphasis added).  
769 M Zwanenburg, ‘An Appraisal’ (n. 644) 662. 
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who, due to their status as victims […], are the beneficiaries of the collective forms of 
reparations ordered by the Court [emphasis added].”770It further explains that while it 
normally requires the Commission to individually name the beneficiaries of possible 
reparations, in this case, given the size and geographic diversity of the Saramaka people, 
and particularly the collective nature of reparations to be ordered, it does not find it 
necessary to individually name the members of the Saramaka people in order to 
recognize them as the injured party. Importantly, the Court observes that the members of 
the Saramaka people are “identifiable in accordance with Saramaka customary law, given 
that each Saramaka individual belongs to only one of the twelve matrilineal lös in which 
the community is organized”.771 
 
This approach seems different from that of the IACHR in the case of the 1991 Caloto 
Massacre in Colombia. In this case –where members of an indigenous community were 
massacred with the participation of the police— the Commission recommended that: ‘the 
State adopt the measures necessary to carry out the commitments regarding social 
reparations on behalf of the Paez indigenous community of northern Cauca’.772 It referred 
to the recommendations of a committee set up for the settlement of the case, which had 
concluded that the Caloto massacre affected the entirety of the Paez indigenous 
community of northern Cauca and that the state should attend to its obligation to protect 
the fundamental rights of the indigenous peoples, whose first right, the right to life, 
should be understood in collective terms, as well as the right to ethnic and cultural 
                                               
770 IACHR, Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname.  Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs.  Judgment of November 28, 2007 Series C No. 172. (emphasis added). 
771 Idem para 188 
772 IACHR, Rep No 36/00, Case 11.10, Caloto Massacre (Colombia), (Apr. 13, 2000) [75(3)].  
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reproduction, the right to territory, and the right to self-determination.773  
 
It seems that, as Zwanenburg acknowledges, the ambiguity in the Principles and 
Guidelines on collective rights – i.e. Principle 8, which recognises that persons can suffer 
collectively, while paragraph 9 of the Preamble establishes that contemporary forms of 
victimisation can be directed against groups of persons – is reflective of a wider debate 
under international law.774  
 
3. State responsibility as the legal basis of the right to a remedy and reparation 
 
A. Relationship between the Principles and Guidelines and the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility  
    
The first draft of the Principles and Guidelines was the result of an extensive study of 
legal resources on reparation in conventional and CIL. Its intention was to reflect existing 
norms. However, as the Principles and Guidelines would not constitute a treaty, they 
were drafted with a view to the application of their provisions in the light of current and 
future developments. The first 1993 draft merged existing norms of international law, as 
well as emerging concepts.  
 
The final version, adopted on April 2005 after three consultative meetings, differs 
significantly from the original, but retains the essence of that instrument: (i) what 
constitutes an effective remedy for victims of violations of international human rights and 
                                               
773 Idem [23]. 
774 M Zwanenburg, ‘An Appraisal’ (n. 644) 662. 
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international humanitarian law; and (ii) the various forms of reparation that exist under 
international law and that are considered adequate for such violations.  
 
But what is the legal basis of the Principles and Guidelines? According to van Boven,775 
the essence of the right to a remedy and reparation is reflected in the general principle of 
law of wiping out the consequences of the wrong committed.776 For this reason, he argues 
that is appropriate for the Principles and Guidelines to rely on the doctrine of state 
responsibility codified in the ILC Responsibility Articles.777  
 
In his 1993 Study concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, van Boven 
explains: ‘the issue of State responsibility comes into play when a State is in breach of 
the obligation to respect internationally recognised human rights. Such obligation has its 
legal basis in international agreements and/or in customary international law, in particular 
those norms of customary international law that have a peremptory character (jus 
cogens)’.778  
 
The aim of the Principles and Guidelines is to define the scope of the right to a remedy 
and reparation, and allow for the future development of procedural remedies and 
substantive reparations. Like the ILC Responsibility Articles, the instrument does not 
                                               
775 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 24.  
776 ‘Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’. Chorzów, (n 22) 
47.  
777ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23).  
778 See: van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution’ (n 17) [41]. 
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define what constitutes a substantive violation (in this case of international human rights 
law or international humanitarian law), but only describes the legal consequences (the 
rights and duties) arising from these violations and establishes appropriate procedures 
and mechanisms to implement them. 
 
Although there are many similarities with the reparation provisions of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles, there are also important divergences. The ILC Responsibility 
Articles were drawn up in the context of inter-state relations and are not focused on the 
relationship between states and individuals, though there are still important parallels to 
draw. For example, cessation of a breach is included in Principle 22(a) of the Principles 
and Guidelines as a form of satisfaction, while the ILC Responsibility Articles do not 
include cessation on the reparation section. According to the structure of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles, cessation is part of the general obligation to conform to the 
norms of international law, not a form of reparation.779 The ILC Responsibility Articles 
also treat assurances of non-repetition as a separate and distinct legal consequence of the 
international wrongful act. Equally, the updated principles to combat impunity780 treat 
separately guarantees of non-repetition from reparation. According to the impunity 
principles, assurances of non-repetition may include reform of state institutions, the 
repeal of laws that contribute to or authorise violations of human rights, and civilian 
control of military and security forces and intelligence services (Principles 35-38, and 31-
34). The Human Rights Committee notes that where appropriate, reparation can involve 
                                               
779 Dinah Shelton also argues that cessation is not a part of reparation but part of the general obligation to 
conform to the norms of international law. See: Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 149. 
780 Impunity Principles (n. 653). 
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restitution, rehabilitation, and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public 
memorials, guarantees of non-repetition, and changes in relevant laws and practices, as 
well as brining to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations. 781  
 
On the other hand, the Principles and Guidelines add rehabilitation as a form of 
reparation, which is not a form of reparation recognised at the inter-state level. But 
rehabilitation is an important component of an individual’s reparation and it is a right 
specifically recognised in international instruments.782 Similarly, other forms of non-
monetary remedies such as satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, which are not 
perceived as essential measures or forms of reparation at the inter-state level, are 
extremely important in human rights cases. This is reflected in the Principles and 
Guidelines where satisfaction includes measures such as truth telling or recovery/reburial 
of victims’ remains, and guarantees of non-repetition, including measures to strengthen 
national institutions under the rule of law or even law reform. 
 
While there are clear differences between both instruments, the most significant is that 
the ILC Responsibility Articles deal with inter-state relations while the Principles and 
Guidelines deal with state-individual relations and arguably inter-individual (non-state 
actors) relations. The question of whether state responsibility principles apply to relations 
between states and individuals is discussed at length in Chapter 1. This chapter 
                                               
781 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31 (adopted 29 March 2004); (UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev, 
8 233-238). See in particular [17].  
782 See, for example the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol (n 39); UN 
Convention against Torture (n 39); Declaration on Enforced Disappearances (n 39); and Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (n 39). 
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investigates whether individuals can have primary and secondary rights under general 
international law, including the right to claim reparation directly under international law 
(tertiary rights). However, it is important to review this question again in the context of 
the Principles and Guidelines since this was one of the criticisms raised by Germany at 
the 61st session of the UNCHR: ‘[…] The “Basic Principles and Guidelines” seek to 
apply the principles of state responsibility to relationships between states and individuals. 
This approach fails to take into account that those principles – as developed by the 
International Law Commission – only apply to inter-State relations’. 783  
 
Does the fact that the ILC Responsibility Articles were drawn up with inter-state relations 
in mind mean that the law on state responsibility does not apply to states’ breaches of 
human rights of individual victims? van Boven argues that the construction of the 
concept of state responsibility to the inter-state context only ignores the historic evolution 
since WWII of HR becoming an integral and dynamic part of international law, as 
evidenced by numerous widely ratified international instruments.784 Referencing the work 
of Shelton, he claims that it also ignores the fact that the duty of affording remedies for 
governmental misconduct is so widely acknowledged that the right to an effective remedy 
for violations of human rights may be regarded as forming part of customary 
international law.785 Chapter 2 of this thesis also shows that human rights law has 
influenced the law of diplomatic protection (based on state responsibility) to the point 
                                               
783 See (n 716) and accompanying text.  
784 Van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 26. See also M Kamminga, ‘Final Report on the Impact of 
International Human Rights Law on General International Law’ in M Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds), 
The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009). 
785 See Shelton, Remedies (n 12) 28-29. 
 273 
where it has evolved in its treatment of denial of justice as a right also belonging to 
individuals, as well as states.786 In this context, van Boven cites the Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, where it is argued that the universal 
recognition and acceptance of the right to an effective remedy cannot but have a bearing 
on the interpretation of the international provisions on state responsibility. According to 
the Commission, these provisions may now be construed as obligations assumed by states 
not only towards other states, but also vis-à-vis the victims who suffered from war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.787  
 
Importantly, as mentioned already in Chapter 1, Article 33 of the ILC Responsibility 
Articles confirms that reparation by the liable state may be owed both to other states and 
to injured individuals.788 In addition, the Commentary affirms that individuals at the 
international level can invoke the responsibility of a state on their own account and 
without the intermediation of any state.789  
 
                                               
786 Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of the concept of diplomatic protection from the traditional 
Mavrommatis (n 279) conception to the contemporary understanding in Diallo, where instead of exercising 
diplomatic protection in its own right, the state does so as an agent on behalf of the injured individual: ‘the 
sum awarded to Guinea in the exercise of diplomatic protection of Mr Diallo is intended to provide 
reparation for the latter’s injury’ – Diallo (Compensation) (n 113) [57]. It also notes that the International 
Court of Justice, in LaGrand (n 92) and in Avena (n 123), has established that the breach of international 
norms on treatment of aliens may produce both the violation of a right of the national state and the violation 
of a right of the individual. The same conclusion was reached by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, in its Advisory Opinion OC-16/99.  
787 Darfur Report (n 100). 
788 ‘This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which 
may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’, Article 32 (2), ILC Responsibility Articles 
(n 23). See also Commentary to Article 32 [3-4] reproduced in the Report of the ILC Responsibility 
Articles (n 23).  
789 Commentary to Article 32 reproduced in the Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23)  233. 
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Zwanenburg, however, argues that Article 33 only makes clear that the ILC 
Responsibility Articles do not deal with the possibility of the invocation of responsibility 
by persons or entities other than states. In his view, while individuals might be holders of 
rights in international law and therefore have a secondary right to reparation, this does 
not mean that there is a right under CIL for the individual to claim such reparation 
directly without the intermediation of a state (e.g. via diplomatic protection or by setting 
international courts or other redress mechanisms as procedural means to enforce their 
substantial rights). He notes that the ILC commentary makes clear that ‘It will be a matter 
for the particular primary rule to determine whether and to what extent persons or 
entities other than States are entitled to invoke responsibility on their own account’.790  
 
Chapter 1 already analyses the argument that individuals can have primary (substantive) 
rights and secondary (reparation) rights but that the secondary right to reparation does not 
entail a procedural right to enforce it (‘tertiary’ rights). It concludes that if an 
individual’s rights are breached, he/she has an actionable secondary right to reparation. 
The right to reparation entails both the substance of the relief and the procedure to 
enforce it.   Claims can be pursued at the international level by the home state 
representing its national or, when possible, by the individual him/herself (e.g. before a 
HR court, monitoring body, claims commission, or arbitral tribunal). When the claims 
involve fundamental breaches, individuals can pursue these claims at the domestic level 
before national courts or before foreign courts.791  Still, it is important to clarify that the 
ILC Commentary does not say that primary rules need to establish ‘international 
                                               
790 Commentary to Article 32 reproduced in the Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23) 234 et seq.   
791 Personal and state immunities might prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by some domestic courts.   
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procedural mechanisms’ for non-state entities to be able to claim reparation directly 
under international law. It simply says that the primary rule will determine whether non-
state entities can invoke responsibility on their own account.   
 
Clearly, it is a matter of interpretation of the primary norm, and in principle non-state 
entities could invoke responsibility on their own account before an international body or 
in national courts. In this sense, it can still be argued that certain HR and IHL norms 
afford individual rights under CIL (e.g. jus cogens) and thus responsibility to afford 
reparation for these specific types of violations can be invoked in international or 
domestic fora (an argument implicit in the Principles and Guidelines). The ILC 
Commentary makes clear that ‘state responsibility for a breach of an obligation under a 
treaty concerning the protection of human rights may exist towards all the other parties to 
the treaty, but the individuals concerned should be regarded as ultimate beneficiaries and 
in that sense as the holder of the relevant rights’. 792 The commentary noted by 
Zwanenburg cites the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, as well as LaGrand, to prove 
that individual rights under international law may also arise outside of the framework of 
human rights. Notably, the PCIJ affirmed in Danzig the existence of a right for an 
individual under international law despite the lack of an international procedural 
mechanism. It stated that national courts could enforce such rights.793 Similarly, the ICJ 
                                               
792 Commentary on Article 32, Report on ILC Responsibility Articles, (n 23) 234 et seq.   
793 ‘[...] it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, according to the intention 
of the contracting parties, may be the adaptation by the parties of some definite rules creating individual 
rights and obligations and enforceable by national courts.’ (emphasis added). Danzig (n 91) [17]. 
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reaffirmed in LaGrand that individuals can have international rights despite their lack of 
general international standing and that these rights should be enforced domestically.794  
B. Non-state actors  
 
It is relevant to point out that the final version of the Principles and Guidelines does not 
appear to exclude non-state actors’ responsibility. Principle 3, setting out the obligation to 
respect, ensure respect for and implement the law, and Principle 18, concerning full and 
effective reparation, are not by their wording limited only to states. The 2000 draft 
version, on the other hand, did refer to ‘a State’s duty’ in Principle 3. Furthermore, 
Principle 3 establishes that the obligations to respect, ensure respect for an implement the 
law include ‘[…], the duty to:  (c) Provide those who claim to be victims of a human 
rights or humanitarian law violation with equal and effective access to justice, as 
described below, irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for 
the violation’.795 
 
As mentioned earlier, how to deal with non-state actors was an important question for the 
drafters of the Principles and Guidelines. Arguably, if the standpoint is that of the victim, 
it should not matter whether a state or non-state actor commits the violation. For this 
reason, there was vast disagreement in regards to the consequences of including IHL 
violations in a reparation instrument guided by principles of state responsibility. After all, 
it is indisputable that non-state actors can commit IHL violations during non-international 
                                               
794 LaGrand Case (n 92) [77]. 
795 UN Basic Principles (emphasis added), (n 2). 
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armed conflicts.796 It was unclear for many what the scope of states’ obligations was in 
this regard. Equally, several delegations had reservations on what rights of victims’ arise 
in this type of scenario.  
 
Another contested question was whether legal persons like corporations or other non-
state actors can commit human rights violations. It is generally accepted that non-state 
actors exercising authority (i.e. de facto authorities) or individuals linked to a state can 
commit and be responsible for human rights violations. Clearly, insurgents, rebels, and 
other non-state actors (e.g. terrorists) can commit international crimes, and in certain 
circumstances such acts can be labelled human rights violations (for example, when the 
rebels are in control of a region and are acting as sole authorities over civilians or when 
they are acting under the orders or acquiescence of the State).797 In other cases, where 
non-state entities or individuals commit heinous crimes, the HR violations would not 
consist in the actions of the private individuals/groups (that are not connected to the state 
nor have effective control), but, for example, in the omission of the state in preventing 
their actions. The HR violations are not the acts committed by the private individuals, but 
the acts or omissions of the state.798 
 
The question of non-state responsibility for HR violations is certainly not settled under 
international law. There is some state practice that refers to human rights violations by 
                                               
796 While IHL instruments do not refer to responsibility for violations by non-state entities, it is clear that if 
a non-state actor has international obligations it can be responsible for a breach thereof. See generally: 
Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups (n 713). 
797 See, for example: Elmi v Australia (122/1998), CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (1999); 7 IHRR 603 (2000).  
798 N Rodley, ‘Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?’ in K Mahoney and P Mahoney 
(eds), Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century: A Global Challenge (Nijhoff 1993). 
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non-state actors.799 However, it seems that this practice is not yet sufficient to challenge 
the notion that human rights law only binds states.800 For this reason, certain delegations 
opposed suggestions implicit in the Principles and Guidelines that non-state actors can 
violate HR law.801 Likewise, states questioned what would be the legal consequences of 
non-state responsibility in an instrument establishing an obligation on states to afford 
remedies and reparation. Can states be liable to afford legal remedies under state 
responsibility principles (like access to justice) when non-state actors are ultimately 
liable? During the first consultative meeting, van Boven responded to these objections by 
reminding participants that: ‘[…] HR law was subject to evolution. […] The question of 
non-State responsibility was also evolving. Such new developments must be taken into 
account in the Draft Guidelines. It may be that HR law had not yet developed far enough 
on non-State responsibility, but, as the draft was not a treaty, it could reflect those 
emerging concepts as well’.802  
 
In practice, however, there are many questions that remain open. For instance, in cases on 
non-state responsibility, are all states obliged to afford judicial remedies regardless of 
                                               
799 For example, there are many General Assembly Resolutions qualifying ‘terrorism’ as a violation of 
human rights, see A/RES/48/122 (20 December 1993); A/RES/49/185 (23 December 1994); A/RES/54/164 
(17 December 1999); A/RES/56/160 (February 2001). Similarly, the Security Council declared that 
Sudanese rebel groups were responsible for human rights violations. See UN SC Res 1564 (18 September 
2004), UN Doc S/RES/1564, and Res 1574 (19 Nov 2004), UN Doc. S/RES/1574. See Zegveld, 
Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups (n 713) 47-49.  
800 Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups (n 713) 47-49. For further discussion on this 
subject see: P Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP 2005), and Clapham, HR Obligations 
of non-State Actors (n 82). 
801 For example, during the first consultative meeting, ‘the representative of the United Kingdom reiterated 
its concern about suggestions, implicit in the section, that non-State actors could violate HR law. The 
United Kingdom believed that only States could violate HR law, while others could violate IHL. That was 
the problem of lack of clarity that emerged when HR law and IHL were combined in a single document’. 
UN Doc E/CN/2003/63, 20 [33].   
802 See: n 667 
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where the serious/gross violations are committed and the nationality of the alleged 
perpetrators or victims?803 How does concurrent liability between state(s) and non-state 
actor(s) operate in these cases? What is the relationship between the principle of access to 
justice and jurisdictional barriers like immunities? 
4. Content and structure of the Principles and Guidelines 
 
The Principles and Guidelines have a preamble explaining their purpose and objective, 
and they are subsequently divided into eight sections containing a total of twenty-seven 
provisions. Broadly speaking, states have two obligations under international law: firstly, 
the duty to refrain from violating HR and IHL, and secondly, the duty to guarantee 
respect for such rights. The first is made up of a set of obligations that are directly related 
to the duty of the state to refrain –whether by acts or omissions – from violating 
fundamental rights and norms. This also implies that states shall take all necessary 
measures to guarantee the enjoyment of such rights. The second refers to the obligations 
of states to prevent violations, investigate them, bring to justice and punish perpetrators, 
and provide reparation for the damage they caused.  
 
After recalling in Section I the general obligation to respect and implement international 
law, Section II of the Principles and Guidelines describes the obligations contained in this 
core duty:  
3. The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for under 
the respective bodies of law, includes, inter alia, the duty to:  
                                               
803 See: n 723. 
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(a) Take appropriate legislative and administrative and other appropriate 
measures to prevent violations;  
(b) Investigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially 
and, where appropriate, take action against those allegedly responsible in 
accordance with domestic and international law;  
(c) Provide those who claim to be victims of a human rights or 
humanitarian law violation with equal and effective access to justice, as 
described below, irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of 
responsibility for the violation; and  
(d) Provide effective remedies to victims, including reparation, as described 
below.  
 
The subsequent sections of the Principles and Guidelines describe in detail the scope of 
this obligation, explaining how reparation, prevention, and prosecution are interlinked. 
Following the same structure, the next part of the chapter will give a brief description of 
the obligations to: a) prevent violations; b) investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators; 
c) provide effective access to justice to all individuals alleging a violation (through 
impartial procedural remedies/avenues); and d) afford full reparations to victims.  
 
A. Prevention 
 
States have the responsibility under international law not only to abstain from inflicting, 
but also to protect individuals from HR and IHL violations. The nature of a state’s 
obligation is therefore twofold: a duty to abstain and a duty to protect; the former being a 
negative obligation – to refrain from a certain action – and the latter a positive obligation 
– to ensure individuals are not subjected to a violation. The second refers to the 
obligation of states to prevent violations. The basis for this second duty – to guarantee 
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respect for such rights – is to be found both in CIL and international treaty-based law. 
Indeed, the bedrock of all HR and IHL instruments since the close of WW II has been the 
obligation to guarantee basic rights.804  
 
It is not sufficient for states simply to pass laws prohibiting acts or omissions; they must 
also take all reasonable measures to ensure that such acts or omissions do not occur in 
practice.  For example, to achieve the eradication of torture in practice, states are obliged 
to train law enforcement and other personnel coming into contact with those in custody, 
and are required to review interrogation rules regularly.805  The core idea behind the 
notion of prevention is that an effective system of procedural remedies/safeguards helps 
to deter violations and prevents the occurrence of future crimes. For example, if a 
detainee has a clear right to challenge his/her detention before an independent judiciary 
(through a habeas corpus or an amparo remedy), it is less likely that the police will 
arbitrarily detain a person and less likely that the police will mistreat him/her while in 
detention, as the person will be promptly brought before an impartial judge.  
 
                                               
804 The duty to ensure basic rights is expressly provided for in several treaties. For example: Common 
Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect 
and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’; Article 2.1 of the ICCPR provides: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant [...]’; Article 2.1 of the 
UNCAT provides: ‘Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction’; similar provisions are contained 
in regional human rights treaties, such as the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, and in various 
declaratory texts. See n 39. 
805 See for example, Article 11 of UNCAT (n 39) 
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There is a close link between the obligation to prevent violations and the obligation to 
afford guarantees of non-repetition.806 As mentioned earlier, the ILC Responsibility 
Articles on state responsibility treat assurances of non-repetition as a separate and distinct 
legal consequence of the IWA.807 The updated principles to combat impunity also treat 
guarantees of non-repetition separately from reparation.808 However, human rights 
jurisprudence often refers to guarantees of non-repetition as part of reparation. The 
Human Rights Committee has long established that states have an obligation to “take 
steps to ensure that similar violations… [do] not occur in the future”.809 In 2004, it held 
that the purpose of the ICCPR ‘would be defeated without an obligation integral to article 
2 to take measure to prevent a recurrence of a violation of the Covenant.’810 It specifically 
noted _‘that, where appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation, and 
measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-
repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the 
perpetrators of human rights violations’.811 As it will be explained below, more and more, 
reparation judgements include measures to adapt domestic remedies to international 
standards, including practice and law reform measures, as guarantees of non-repetition.812 
The IACtHR has declared domestic laws or judgments to be in violation of the American 
                                               
806 van Boven argued in his 1993 report that: “There exists a definite link between effective remedies to 
which the victim(s) is (are) entitled, remedies aimed at the prevention of the recurrence of similar violations 
and the issue of the follow-up given by the State party”. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, para. 55.   
807 ILC Responsibility Articles (n. 23). 
808 Updated Impunity Principles (n 653) 
809See communications No. 88/1981, Larrosa v Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 March 1983, para. 13; No. 
124/1982, Muteba v Zaire, decision on admissibility dated 25 March 1983, para. 13; and No. 176/1984, 
Penarriera et al. v Bolivia, Views adopted on 2 November 1987, para. 18.   
810 See CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 17.  
811 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31 (adopted 29 March 2004); (UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev, 
8 233-238) [16].  
812 See generally REDRESS, ‘Enforcement Report’ (n 40) and Echeverria, ‘Genealogy’ (n 7).  
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Convention and states have amended the laws,813 or domestic courts have declared them 
to be unconstitutional814 or have annulled judgments.815 This is reflected in the Principles 
and Guidelines, where satisfaction includes measures such as truth-telling or 
recovery/reburial of victims’ remains, and guarantees of non-repetition, including 
measures to strengthen national institutions under the rule of law or reviewing and 
reforming laws that contribute to or allow the violations to take place.816 
 
Another example of prevention is how states and those acting as official authorities (i.e. 
in internal armed conflicts) are specifically obliged to provide safeguards to those 
arrested, detained, or in custody to protect them from arbitrary detention, extrajudicial 
punishment, and torture. For this reason, several international instruments establish 
specific mechanisms to visit places of detention.817 International law has also established 
other safeguards to protect persons who are taken into custody.818 These measures are 
                                               
813 Cantoral Benavides v. Peru (Reparations) (Judgment) [3 December 2001] Inter-Am.Ct HR Ser.C 
No.88, [76]. 
814 Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador (Reparations) (Judgment) [20 January 1999] Inter-Am Ct HR Ser.C. No.44 
[81-83]. 
815 Cesti-Hurtado v. Peru (Reparations) (Judgment) [31 May 2001] Inter-Am Ct HR Ser C, No.78 [15]. 
816 Section 4.D of this chapter discusses the concept of guarantees of non-repetition as part of the obligation 
to afford reparation. It notes that while this is an effective means of practice and law reform as well as to 
implement victim-oriented policies, it is also problematic as it expands remedies beyond the specific 
victims of a case.   
817 For example, the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture implements a 
double system of prevention: national and international. Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 18 December 2002 at 
the 57th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Res A/RES/57/199. Similarly, the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture visits places of detention and examines the treatment of 
persons deprived of their liberty, with a view to strengthening their protection (n 819). The ICRC, although 
not a states’ mechanism but an independent organisation, plays an important role in the prevention of 
mistreatment of detainees during armed conflicts or political unrests by acting as a neutral intermediary 
between detainees and the authorities. 
818 The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR), adopted in 1957, are the key 
standard for the treatment of prisoners globally. While these Rules still have value and are widely used 
today, there have been major developments in human rights and criminal justice since their adoption. The 
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commonly referred to as ‘custodial safeguards’ and include the right of access to lawyers, 
physicians, family members,819 and, in the case of foreign nationals, diplomatic and 
consular representatives.820  
IHL also has detailed rules on the treatment of persons in custody. The third Geneva 
Convention provides a wide range of protection for prisoners of war. It defines their 
rights and sets down detailed rules for their treatment and eventual release.821 The rules 
protecting prisoners of war are specific and were first detailed in the 1929 Geneva 
Convention.822 They were refined in the third 1949 Geneva Convention, following the 
lessons of WWII, as well as in the AP I of 1977.823 IHL also protects other persons 
deprived of liberty as a result of armed conflict. The fourth 1949 Geneva Convention and 
AP I also provide extensive protection for civilian internees during international armed 
                                                                                                                                            
SMR are often regarded by states as the primary – if not only – source of standards relating to treatment in 
detention, and are the key framework used by monitoring and inspection mechanisms in assessing the 
treatment of prisoners. It is therefore particularly crucial that they are consistent with current standards of 
human rights and criminal justice. In December 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 
65/230, requesting the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) to establish an 
open-ended intergovernmental expert group to: ‘exchange information on best practices (…) and on the 
revision of existing United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners so that they 
reflect recent advances in correctional science and best practices’. The process culminated in a new updated 
draft adopted without vote at the GA 80th plenary meeting. See: UN General Assembly, United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules): resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly, 8 January 2016, A/RES/70/175, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5698a3a44.html [accessed 24 March 2017] 
819 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT), 12th General Report, The CPT Standards: Substantive sections of the CPT's General 
Reports, CPT/Inf/E (2002) - Rev. 2003 [40]: ‘As from the outset of its activities, the CPT has advocated a 
trinity of rights for persons detained by the police: the rights of access to a lawyer and to a doctor and the 
right to have the fact of one’s detention notified to a relative or another third party of one’s choice’. 
Principles 15-19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment (adopted by UNGA Res 43/173 [9 December 1988]). 
820 Principle 16(2) of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment; Rule 38 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The 
International Court of Justice has in the LaGrand (n 92) and Avena (n 123) recognised that Article 36(1) of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations creates individual rights for the national concerned. 
821 Geneva Convention III (n 389) 
822 Idem. 
823 1949 Geneva Conventions and API (n 389). 
 
 285 
conflicts. In non-international armed conflicts, Article 3 (common to both the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II) provide that persons deprived of liberty 
for reasons related to the conflict must also be treated humanely in all circumstances. In 
particular, they are protected against murder and torture, as well as cruel, humiliating, or 
degrading treatment. Notably, those detained for participation in hostilities are not 
immune from criminal prosecution under the applicable domestic law for having done 
so.824  
B. Investigations, prosecutions, and punishment 
 
While states are obliged to prosecute international crimes as a separate and independent 
duty in international law, the Principles and Guidelines restate this obligation from the 
perspective of the victims. The corollary of the basic right to reparation is that those who 
perpetrate serious violations are not entitled to get away with them: impunity is 
incompatible with the victims’ right to a remedy and reparation.825 The ECtHR held 
recently in Shestopalov v. Russia that: 
 
56.  […] in cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents in breach of Article 3, the 
Court has repeatedly found that, in addition to acknowledging of the violation, two 
measures are necessary to provide sufficient redress. Firstly, the State authorities 
must have conducted a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the 
                                               
824 ICRC, ‘Prisoners of war and detainees protected under international humanitarian law’ 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/protected-persons/prisoners-war/overview-detainees-protected-
persons.htm> accessed 5 April 2016.  
825 In her article ‘Prosecution Is a Form of Reparation’, Rosalina Tuyuc, a survivor of the Guatemalan Civil 
War, writes: ‘I can attest to survivors’ desire to see those responsible for these atrocities investigated and 
brought to justice. The current trial of Efraín Ríos Montt, the former military dictator who oversaw the 
genocide, is a critical step in the right direction. But it is also just the beginning: there are hundreds of other 
officials who must also face their day in court’ - New York Times 4 March 2013. Available at  
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/04/can-we-afford-to-forgive-atrocities/human-rights-
prosecutions-are-a-form-of-reparation> accessed 16April 16 
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identification and punishment of those responsible. Secondly, an award of 
compensation is required where appropriate or, at least, the opportunity to apply for 
and obtain compensation for the damage sustained as a result of the ill-treatment (see 
Gäfgen, cited above, § 116).826  
 
It further explained that is not enough to only provide compensation. Effective 
investigations and prosecution need to take place; otherwise it would allow state officials 
to commit torture with virtual impunity.827 Effective investigations and prosecutions as 
well as adequate punishments are an essential means of restoring the dignity of those who 
have suffered and in so doing have the social impact of reducing the risk of resort to 
personal revenge. On the other hand, an effectively functioning domestic system for 
providing redress is ‘one of the best safeguards against impunity’.828  
 
                                               
826 ECtHR, Shestopalov v. Russia, 46248/07 (Judgment) [2017] ECHR 282 (28 March 2017) [56]. 
827 ‘56.  […] In cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents, a breach of Article 3 cannot be remedied only 
by an award of compensation to the victim because, if the authorities could confine their reaction to 
incidents of wilful ill-treatment by State agents to the mere payment of compensation, while not doing 
enough to prosecute and punish those responsible, it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State 
to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity. The general legal prohibition on 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, despite its fundamental importance, would thus be 
ineffective in practice (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461/02, § 78, 24 July 2008, and Gäfgen, 
cited above, § 119). That is why awarding compensation to the applicant for the damage which he sustained 
as a result of the ill-treatment is only part of the overall action required (see Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884/11, 
§ 231, 7 April 2015). The fact that the domestic authorities did not carry out an effective investigation (see 
paragraph 54 above) is decisive for the purposes of the question of whether the applicant lost his victim 
status (ibid., § 229).’ ECtHR, Shestopalov v. Russia, 46248/07 (Judgment) [2017] ECHR 282 (28 March 
2017) [56]. 
828 ‘Comments of Françoise Hampson, The Administration of Justice and Human Rights, Report of the 
sessional working group on the administration of Justice’ (15 August 2000) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/44 [48]. 
The Impunity Principles also deal with the duty to prosecute under rubric of ‘the right to justice’ for 
victims, stressing that it is a general principle that states must take ‘appropriate measures...particularly in 
the area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious crimes under international law 
are prosecuted, tried and duly punished’. The Impunity Principles also contain the following reference to 
the obligation to investigate and prosecute: ‘States should undertake prompt, thorough, independent and 
impartial investigations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and take 
appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of criminal justice, by 
ensuring that those responsible for serious crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and duly 
punished.’  III.A. Principle 19 (n. 653). 
 287 
A number of widely ratified HR and IHL treaties explicitly require states parties to ensure 
punishment of specific offences either by instituting criminal proceedings against 
suspected perpetrators in their own courts or by sending the suspects to another 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.829 For this reason, it is generally accepted that an 
amnesty that foreclosed prosecution of an offence that is subject to this type of obligation 
would violate the treaty concerned.830 Amnesties for gross violations of HR and serious 
violations of IHL are generally considered incompatible with international law 
obligations to investigate, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of international crimes.831  
 
One of the latest efforts by the international community to ensure accountability for 
international crimes is the General Assembly resolution establishing the ‘International, 
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in 
the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011’.832 According to the resolution, it will have 
two main tasks: (1) to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of 
IHL and HR violations and abuses; and (2) to prepare files in order to facilitate and 
expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law 
                                               
829 See, for example, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (n. 30) para. 18; IACtHR, 
Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Case 12.057, Report No. 44/02, (2002) para. 114. Shelton gives a 
through overview of the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish in the context of the right to a 
remedy. She notes how amnesties are generally found inconsistent with these obligations. See: Shelton, 
Remedies (n 12) p 107-112. 
830 See, for example, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, case No. SCSL-2004-
15-AR72(E), and Prosecutor v. Brima Bazzy Kamara, case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on challenge to jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty (13 March 2004), para. 73; 
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 314. 
831 The ICTY suggested that an amnesty for torture (and, by implication, for other conduct whose 
prohibition in international law has the status of a peremptory norm) would be “internationally unlawful.” 
Furundzija (n.53) para. 155. See also Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Prosecutor v. Brima Bazzy Kamara, 
Idem. para. 82.  
832 UN GA Res (Syria) 71/248 (21 December 2016) 
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standards, in national, regional, or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the 
future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law.833 When 
established, the mechanism will assist in the investigation and prosecution of those 
responsible for the most serious crimes under international law, in particular the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined in relevant sources of 
international law.  
 
Part III of the Principles and Guidelines describes the legal consequences that arise after 
the commission of serious violations that constitute crimes under international law. It is 
well recognised that international law requires that perpetrators of international crimes be 
brought to justice.834 It could be argued that the adoption in an increasing number of 
multilateral treaties of the aut dedere aut judicare principle reflects the customary status 
of this rule with respect to crimes under international law, with the consequence that the 
rule is applicable even apart from specific treaties in which it is embodied.835 Judge 
                                               
833 UN GA Res (Syria) 71/248 (21 December 2016), para 4. 
834 For example, the Genocide Convention establishes the obligation to prevent and punish acts of genocide 
(emphasis added). Article IV states: ‘Persons committing genocide or any of the acts enumerated in Article 
III shall be punished…’. Article V calls on the state to ‘provide effective penalties’ for those found guilty 
of genocide. ‘The principles underlying the Convention are recognised by civilised nations as binding on 
States even without any conventional obligation’ – ICJ: Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1950-1951). In 1970, the ICJ reconfirmed this principle in the 
Barcelona Traction Case (n 174). The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid specifically requires states to adopt measures to prosecute, bring to trial, and punish those 
persons accused and found guilty of the crime of apartheid. International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (adopted and opened for signature 30 November 1973 [UNGA 
Res 3068 (XXVIII)] (entered into force 18 July1974) 1976, Article IV(b) and V. The Inter-American 
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons also requires states to extradite or prosecute offenders. 
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 33 I.L.M. 1429 (1994) (entered into force 
March 28, 1996) Article IV. A series of treaties on slavery and slave-like practices, including forced labour, 
also necessitate extradition or prosecution of those implicated. Bassiouni provides an exhaustive list of 
conventions prohibiting slavery and the slave trade; see M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in 
International Criminal Law (M Nijihoff 1992) 767-783. 
835 See, for example, Article 8 of the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft, (adopted 16 December 1970) 860 UNTS 105, (1971) 10 ILM 134; Article 8 of the Montréal 
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Weeramantry, in the Lockerbie Case, affirmed that the principle aut dedere aut judicare 
has become a rule of CIL.836 In other words, international crimes cannot go unpunished. 
 
The Principles and Guidelines refer to the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish 
as follows: 
4. ‘...States have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the 
duty to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations 
and, if found guilty, the duty to punish him or her. Moreover, in these cases, 
States should, in accordance with international law, cooperate with one another 
and assist international judicial organs competent in the investigation and 
prosecution of these violations’. 
 
From the beginning of the consultation process, it was recognised that there exists a long-
standing legal obligation to try perpetrators of international crimes. However, there was 
disagreement in regards to the exact legal implications that such obligation implies, 
particularly in regards to the duty to adapt national legal systems and the role of 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (adopted 23 
September 1971) 10 ILM 1151; Article 10 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
(adopted 17 December 1979) 1316 UNTS 205, (1979) 18 ILM 1456; Article 8 of the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 10 December 1984, 
1465 UNTS 85, (1984) 23 ILM 1027 and (1985) 24 ILM 535. Article 9 of the 1979 Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Articles 3(5) and 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
unlawful acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation; Article 7 of the 1997 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing; and Article 10 of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Financing. 
836 ‘The principle aut dedere aut judicare is an important facet of a state's sovereignty over its nationals and 
the well-established nature of this principle in customary international law is evident from the following 
description: ‘The widespread use of the formula 'prosecute or extradite' either specifically stated, explicitly 
stated in a duty to extradite, or implicit in the duty to prosecute or criminalize, and the number of 
signatories to these numerous conventions, attests to the existing general jus cogens principle’. See: M 
Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (OUP 2014) 22. As with its 
failure to consider the Montreal Convention, so also resolution 731 fails to consider this well-established 
principle of international law’. Dissenting opinion in the ICJ case ‘Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom)’ (1992-2003). Although this was contained in Judge Weeramantry’s 
Dissenting Opinion, there was no dissention between the judges on this point. 
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international legal institutions in complementing national systems and their 
jurisdictions.837  
 
In addition to the obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of 
international crimes, Principle 4 also establishes the obligation of states to cooperate with 
other states and with international tribunals in the investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes.838 However, some states questioned the duty to prosecute outside 
the framework of the grave breaches system in the Geneva Conventions or other serious 
international crimes. It was argued that in many instances states’ duties under 
international law go no further than prevention, suppression, or investigation. The 
obligation to cooperate, together with the obligation to prosecute through implementation 
of universal jurisdiction provisions in domestic law and the extradition or surrender to 
other states or international judicial bodies of alleged perpetrators, was highly 
controversial during the 2nd and 3rd consultations. For this reason, the formula ‘in 
accordance with international law’ was used to reach a compromise in regards to the 
duty to cooperate with one another and assist international judicial organs competent in 
the investigation and prosecution of these violations.  
 
Similarly, the text of Principle 5 on universal jurisdiction was modified during the last 
consultation to reach a compromise. The Principles and Guidelines call on states to 
                                               
837 Report of the First Consultative Meeting, (n. 670) [23-24] 
838 This standard is also recognised in Principle 3 of the 1973 UN Principles of International Co-operation 
in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition And Punishment Of Persons Guilty Of War Crimes And Crimes 
Against Humanity: ‘States shall co-operate with each other on bilateral and multilateral basis with a view 
to halting and preventing war crimes against humanity, and shall take the domestic and international 
measures necessary for that purpose’.UNGA Res 3074 (XXVIII) (3 December 1973). 
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implement appropriate provisions to exercise universal jurisdiction and to otherwise 
extradite suspects of international crimes to other states or international tribunals with a 
caveat: ‘5... where so provided in an applicable treaty or under other international law 
obligations, States shall incorporate or otherwise implement within their domestic law 
appropriate provisions for universal jurisdiction…’ (emphasis added).839  
 
While states accepted treaty obligations in regards to universal jurisdiction, not all of 
them recognised the existence of a general obligation to investigate, prosecute, and 
punish international crimes under universal jurisdiction principles. Nonetheless, these 
delegations agreed that certain international crimes do give rise to universal jurisdiction 
under CIL, like grave breaches of IHL, genocide, and torture.840 While there was 
disagreement with this interpretation of the law, participants reached a compromise to 
keep the reference to universal jurisdiction in the instrument, which had actually been 
removed and was inserted back during the last meeting. Hence the reference to ‘where so 
provided in an applicable treaty or under other international law obligations’.  
 
The principle of universal jurisdiction is classically defined as ‘a legal principle allowing 
or requiring a state to bring criminal proceedings in respect of certain crimes irrespective 
of the location of the crime and the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim’.841 The 
rationale behind universal jurisdiction is that there are certain acts that infringe the most 
                                               
839 Principle 5, Principles and Guidelines (n.2) 
840 Report of the Second Consultative Meeting, E/CN.4/2004/57 [23-26] 
841 See, for example, Kenneth C. Randall, ‘Universal jurisdiction under international law’ (1988) 66 Texas 
Law Review 785–8; International Law Association Committee on International Human Rights Law and 
Practice, ‘Final Report on the Exercise of universal jurisdiction in respect of gross human rights offences’, 
Report of the 69th Conference of the International Law Association, (2000) 2 
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basic values of humanity – intrinsic values that are protected directly under international 
law. Therefore, international law outlaws safe-havens for perpetrators, obliging states to 
prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicare), and considers some domestic systems 
incapable of prosecuting these crimes for lack of independence and/or impartiality.842 
These acts are considered an affront against humanity and constitute international crimes. 
Since the international community has an interest in punishing the perpetrators (who are 
considered enemies of mankind), such crimes give rise to universal jurisdiction.843 Unlike 
most other ‘ordinary’ criminal-like conduct committed within a state, which is left to 
each state to prosecute, a person who, for example, is alleged to have committed torture 
can be prosecuted anywhere in the world where he or she is found.844. The Preamble of 
the ICC Statute affirms ‘that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must 
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
                                               
842 For an analysis of the principles of universal jurisdiction see for example, X Phillippe, ‘The principles of 
Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity’ (June 2006) 88 IRRC 862. Amnesties are generally 
considered incompatible with the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of 
international crimes. For a detailed analysis on amnesties, see Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties, 
2009, HR/PUB/09/1, available at: United Nations, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties, 
2009, HR/PUB/09/1, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Amnesties_en.pdf 
(accessed 16 April2017). 
843 These crimes are considered so harmful to international interests that states are entitled, and in some 
cases even obliged, to bring proceedings, regardless of the location of the crime and the nationality of the 
perpetrator or the victim: ‘Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, as an additional ground of jurisdiction, 
means the competence of a State to prosecute alleged offenders and to punish them if convicted, 
irrespective of the place of commission of the crime and regardless of any link of active or passive 
nationality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognized by international law’.Institut de droit international 
(IDI), Resolution on universal criminal jurisdiction with regard to the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (adopted in Krakow, 2005), available at <http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/2005_kra_03_fr.pdf, para.1 (10 April 16) (hereinafter, ‘IDI Resolution’). 
844 Article 5 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (UNGA 
Res 39/46 (10 December 1984). 
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cooperation’. It recalls ‘that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’.845 
 
There have been a number of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of 
international crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction.846 However, there have also 
been several challenges to the use of this jurisdiction. In 2000, Belgium issued an arrest 
warrant against DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs that was challenged before the ICJ.847 
As a result, the Court ruled that there are some limits on the use of this principle. Acting 
heads of state or other acting officials representing the state, like foreign ministers, enjoy 
immunity from criminal prosecution in foreign courts. The ICJ concluded that immunity 
was not granted to state officials for their own benefit, but to ensure the effective 
performance of their functions on behalf of their respective states; and when abroad that 
they enjoy full immunity from arrest in another state on criminal charges, including 
charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity. However, the Court emphasised that 
‘[w]hile jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a 
question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a 
                                               
845 Preamble, ICC Statute (n 39). 
846 A well-known example is that of former Chilean dictator General Pinochet, arrested in Britain for 
torture; he faced extradition to Spain for prosecution for torture committed in Chile (see overview of the 
Pinochet Cases by Andrea Gattini at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e859, accessed 15 April 16). Other examples include the case of Nikolai Jorgic, who was 
convicted in Germany for genocide committed in Bosnia (Jorgic Case, 2 BvR 1290/99, Federal 
Constitutional Court, 4th Chamber of the Second Senate, Germany); the case of Adolfo Scilingo, a former 
Navy Officer convicted in Spain for crimes committed in Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’ (Sentencia Núm. 
16/2005 Caso Adolfo Scilingo, Sección Tercera de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional; 19 de abril 
de 2005, Audiencia Nacional de Madrid, Spain.); or in the UK, an Afghan warlord was convicted for 
carrying out torture and hostage-taking in his homeland. (R v Zardad, Case No: T2203 7676, UK Central 
Criminal Court, 07 April 2004). 
847 Arrest Warrant Case (n 345). 
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certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies 
from all criminal responsibility’.848  
 
There have also been significant challenges to applying the principle of universal 
jurisdiction outside criminal proceeding (e.g. civil actions). The ICJ established in 
Germany v Italy849 that state immunity applies regardless of the jus cogens nature of the 
acts involved. As analysed in Chapter 3, the Court still left unanswered other relevant 
questions, for example, whether provisions of state immunity apply regardless of the right 
to access to a court where no alterative remedy exists or whether subject matter immunity 
in civil proceedings applies to foreign officials committing acts that give rise to 
international responsibility. The Jones and Others v United Kingdom850 decision of the 
ECtHR was more categorical. While the Court felt no need to examine national 
developments in detail as it considered the ICJ Judgment ‘authoritative as regards the 
content of customary international law’,851 it did establish that there were other traditional 
means of redress for wrongs of this kind available under international law, namely 
diplomatic protection or an inter-state claim, and that therefore the immunity bar to 
universal civil jurisdiction did not affect the applicants’ right to a fair trial.852 Scholars 
and practitioners have criticised the Court’s lack of analysis of whether these other means 
of redress were truly available,853 as well as the Court’s upholding of the immunity of 
                                               
848 Idem 60. 
849 Germany v Italy (n 25). 
850 Jones and Others v UK (n 378).  
851 ibid [198]. 
852 See Mizushima Tomonori, ‘Denying Foreign State Immunity on the Grounds of the Unavailability of 
Alternative Means’ (Modern Law Review 2008) 71. 
853 See, for example, Lorna McGregor, ‘Jones v UK: A Disappointing End’ (January 16, 2014) EJIL: Talk! 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-a-disappointing-end/, accessed 16 April 16 
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state officials. According to Philippa Webb, Jones stretched the meaning of the ICJ 
judgment, going against two emerging trends: the accountability of non-high ranking 
state officials for serious human rights violations and the diversification of various forms 
of immunity.854 Regardless of the validity of these criticisms, it is clear that there is a 
recent trend to limit the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction on the basis 
of sovereign immunity.   
 
The second part of Principle 5 establishes: ‘5. States should facilitate extradition or 
surrender offenders to other States and to appropriate international judicial bodies and 
provide judicial assistance and other forms of cooperation in the pursuit of international 
justice’. Although it remains the rule that states have primary responsibility to exercise 
jurisdiction over serious crimes under international law, international crimes can be tried 
in international tribunals (or in third states exercising universal jurisdiction), and states 
need to cooperate fully with such procedures.855 The ICC, for example, has 
complementary jurisdiction and therefore can exercise jurisdiction over the crimes 
enlisted in its statute when national courts cannot offer satisfactory guarantees of 
independence and impartiality or are materially unable or unwilling to conduct an 
effective investigation. Other international tribunals have primary jurisdiction, like the 
UN International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, since they were 
established on the premise that the national courts of the countries where the conflicts 
                                               
854 See Philippa Webb, ‘Jones v UK: the re-integration of State and official immunity?’ (January 14, 2014) 
EJIL: Talk! http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-the-re-integration-of-state-and-official-immunity/, accessed 
16 April 16 
855See for example: Impunity Principles (n. 653), III.B; Principle 20 
 296 
took place could not guarantee effective investigations and/or independent and 
impractical trials. In both cases, states should facilitate the extradition or surrender of 
offenders, as well as provide judicial assistance and other forms of cooperation to the 
international tribunals.  
 
While the Principles and Guidelines reflect this standard, they use the term ‘should’, 
despite some delegations’ proposals to use ‘shall’ in order to accurately reflect the status 
of international law. Since some noted that there were instances in which certain states 
would not extradite their own national to international tribunals, it was agreed during the 
third consultation to keep the principle, but with the term ‘should’.856 Still, Principle 5, in 
connection with Principle 4, makes clear that if states are not extraditing or surrendering 
suspects, they have the duty to investigate, prosecute, and – if found guilty – punish 
perpetrators of international crimes.857 
 
Finally, Principle 5 clarifies that the duty to cooperate in the pursuit of international 
justice includes the ‘assistance to, and protection of, victims and witnesses, consistent 
with international human rights legal standards and subject to international legal 
requirements such as those relating to the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Previous texts referred to ‘the right to a 
fair trial’, but this was contested by certain delegations as it was suggested that no 
international legal agreement specifically provided for the right to a fair trial as a 
condition or requirement for extradition. The phrase ‘subject to international legal 
                                               
856 Report of the Third Consultative Meeting (n. 690) [27]. 
857 The Impunity Principles are equally clear in this regard. See: III.B. Principle 21 (n. 653).  
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requirements’ was accepted with specific reference to Article 3 of the UNCAT, 
prohibiting extradition or any other type of transfers in cases where torture would likely 
be committed.858 Unfortunately, this formula leaves open the question of what those 
international legal requirements are. It is necessary, therefore, to look elsewhere for the 
precise content of this norm. 859 
 
Principles 6 and 7 address statutes of limitation in the context of reparation. As explained 
earlier, it is well recognised that international law requires that perpetrators of 
international crimes be brought to justice. Procedural or other barriers should not, 
therefore, hinder justice.860 In practice, however, disproportional statutes of limitation are 
a common bar to prosecutions of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations: 
victims face formidable legal hurdles when trying to bring criminal allegations or civil 
claims for grave abuses. Time barriers, in terms of which claims are blocked after a few 
years or less from the time when the breach occurred, often cause difficulty. For example, 
some countries have very short statutes of limitation for crimes such as torture.861 It is 
common for this unlawful practice to occur in the context of police investigations and 
during detention. The period to bring claims for torture normally expires before the 
                                               
858 Report of the Third Consultative Meeting (n. 690)  [28]. 
859 Echeverria, ‘Codifying (n. 8) p 292. 
860 See for example: UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity, preamble (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 44, § 763) and Article 1 (ibid., § 764) (the UN 
Convention has been ratified by 48 States); European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, Article 1 (ibid., § 765) and Article 2 (ibid., § 
766) (the European Convention has been ratified by 3 States). 
861 See for example: REDRESS, Reparation for Torture: A Survey of Law and Practice in Thirty Selected 
Countries (2003) at: http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/AuditReportText.pdf. Accessed 12 
March 2016. For a more recent example see: REDRESS, Torture in Asia: The Law and Practice (2013) at: 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/130729asia-report.pdf Accessed 12 March 2016.  
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person is released from detention (logically most victims are afraid of bringing an 
allegation while they are still in custody).862  
 
It is often difficult for victims of serious HR or IHL violations or his/her relatives to bring 
a claim because he or she is almost always traumatised, facing financial problems, 
coming from a marginalised community, and/or still suffering from on-going political 
persecution. It can be virtually impossible to bring a claim within the proscribed time 
limits, and thereafter it can be too late. In other cases, it may be impossible in practice to 
bring a claim until there is a change of regime and the violation could have occurred 
many years or sometimes decades previously, long past the normal periods laid down in 
statutes of limitation for ordinary crimes.   
 
Reflecting this reality, the Principles and Guidelines had established that:  
 
 6. Statutes of limitations shall not apply to gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law which 
constitute crimes under international law. 
 
7. Domestic statutes of limitations for other types of violations that do not 
constitute crimes against international law, including those time limitations 
applicable to civil claims and other procedures, should not be unduly restrictive, 
procedurally or in other ways, so as to deprive the victim of pursuing a claim 
against the perpetrator or any other body or entity.  Moreover, statutes of 
limitations shall not be applied to periods during which no effective remedies 
exist for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations 
of international humanitarian law.863 
 
                                               
862 There have been cases when domestic statutes of limitation have barred criminal investigations of 
torture allegations, for example: Pantea v. Romania, judgment of 3 June 2003, CM/Del/OJ/DH (2005) 922 
Vol. I Public, p.24; Kmetty v. Hungary, judgment of 16 December 2003, CM/Del/OJ/DH(2005)928 Vol. I 
Public, p.13; BatX and others v. Turkey, judgment of 3 June 2004, p.26. 
863 Revised version of the Principles and Guidelines (05 August 2004), Third Consultative Meeting. 
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Some delegations raised questions about the source of obligations contained in Principle 
6. In response, it was noted that while the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity had not been 
universally ratified, it largely reflected existing international law on this issue.864 The UN 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-
recurrence, notes that ‘international jurisprudence has frequently reiterated that the 
Convention does not create new rights or obligations, but that it is declarative in nature, 
and that the principle of imprescriptibility of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide is a matter of jus cogens’.865  
 
Not only do treaties and conventions proscribe statutes of limitation for the most serious 
crimes of international concern, but national legislation, judicial decisions, and policies 
also provide evidence of widespread state practice, and a belief that exempting these 
crimes from the relevant statutes of limitation is obligatory. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and 
Louise Doswald-Beck have noted that state practice and opinio juris
 
establish this rule as 
a norm of CIL:  
The recent trend to pursue war crimes more vigorously in national and international 
criminal courts and tribunals, as well as the growing body of legislation giving 
jurisdiction over war crimes without time-limits, has hardened the existing treaty 
rules prohibiting statutes of limitation for war crimes into customary law.866  
 
                                               
864 Report of the Third Consultative Meeting (n. 690). 
865 In terms of international jurisprudence, footnote 26 of the report reads: ‘See, for example, The 
Prosecutor v. Klaus Barbie (Supreme Court, France); Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (European Court of 
Human Rights); Priebke, and Arancibia Clavel (Supreme Court, Argentina); Molco (Supreme Court, 
Chile); Barrios Altos, and Gelman (Inter-American Court of Human Rights)’. 2015 Report (n 875) 50. 
866 ICRC Commentary on IHCL Henckaerts and Doswald-Bexk (n 441).  
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Such state practice reflects a widespread concern that providing limitation periods for the 
most heinous crimes would prevent their prosecution, which is necessary to deter the 
commission of such crimes, provide redress to victims, and ultimately protect 
fundamental human rights.867 
 
The IACtHR in the Barrios Altos Case voiced one of the clearest rejections of 
prescription for gross human rights violations, in which it held:  
This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and 
the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are 
inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and 
punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations such as 
torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, 
all of them prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights recognised by 
international human rights law. 868 
 
In Furundzija, the ICTY stated that one of the consequences of the peremptory nature of 
the prohibition of torture was ‘the fact that torture may not be covered by a statute of 
limitations’.869 It is also clear from observations by the UN Committee against Torture 
that it rejects the applicability of statutes of limitation to the crime of torture.870  
Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on torture criticised statutes of limitation that lead to 
                                               
867 Statutes of Limitation, ABA, Report to the House of Delegates, Section of International Law, 107A 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/international_law/2013_hod_annual_meeting_
107A.authcheckdam.pdf accessed 16 April 16. See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Preamble, Nov. 11, 1970, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 
available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/warcrimes.htm accessed 16 April 16 [hereinafter 
‘Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations’]. This discusses ‘that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are among the gravest crimes in international law, ... [and] that the effective punishment 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity is an important element in the prevention of such crimes, the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, [and] the encouragement of confidence [...]’.   
868 Barrios Altos Case, (Judgment) (14 March 2001) Series C No 75 [41]. 
869 Furundzija (n.53)157. 
870 Conclusions and recommendations on Turkey (27 May 2003) CAT/C/CR/30/5, Recommendation [7(c)]; 
Conclusions and recommendations on Slovenia (27 May 2003) CAT/C/CR/30/4, Recommendation [6(b)]; 
Conclusions and recommendations on Chile (14 May 2004) CAT/C/CR/32/5  [7(f)]. 
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the exemption of perpetrators from legal responsibility.871 In cases of disappearances, 
which are continuing offences so long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim has not 
been determined, the international law norm is that any statutory limitation could not 
even begin to run while such a person has no effective remedy.  Article 8(1) of the 
Enforced Disappearance Convention872 imposes two strict requirements on any state 
party ‘which applies a statute of limitations in respect of enforced disappearance’. First, 
its duration must be ‘proportionate to the extreme seriousness of this offence’, and 
second, it may only commence ‘from the moment when the offence of enforced 
disappearance ceases’. That means that, taking into account the continuous nature of the 
crime, as recognised in the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons,873 the statute of limitation period may not start until the fate or whereabouts of 
the victim has been determined.874 Finally, both the Statute of the ICC, and the Enforced 
Disappearance Convention state that, when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed at any civilian population, a ‘forced disappearance’ qualifies as 
a crime against humanity and, thus, is not subject to a statute of limitations.  
 
According to the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-repetition, the reason to make international crimes imperceptible are, 
first, that atrocity crimes raise particular investigatory and prosecutorial challenges that 
                                               
871 Report of visit to Spain, E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.2 [45]: ‘The length of the judicial process is reportedly 
often so great that by the time a trial opens, accused officers may not be tried because the statute of 
limitations for the offence has expired’. 
872 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (n. 39). 
873 Art. VII: ‘Criminal prosecution for the forced disappearance of persons and the penalty judicially 
imposed on its perpetrator shall not be subject to statutes of limitations’ (n. 39) 
874 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (n. 39). 
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usually cannot be met on the same schedule as common crimes; and second, that 
imprescriptibility helps signal that such crimes constitute an affront to humanity, 
communicating that, in theory, neither space nor time will provide escape from 
responsibility.875 
 
In practice, however, it is difficult to apply this principle to past violations when it 
contradicts criminal statutory law. It can be argued, for example, that it contravenes the 
principle of the non-retroactivity of the law. Nonetheless, courts have recognised that 
procedural rules should not precede the fight against impunity in democratic societies.876 
Some countries have used crimes typified in their penal codes at the time the acts were 
committed but concluding that they constitute crimes against humanity (e.g. forced 
disappearances), and as such are not subject to statutory limitation, whatever the date of 
commission.877 Other courts have carried out judicial processes using crimes that may 
have not been typified in national codes at the time of the commission but have argued 
that international law already declared the acts in question to be illegal when they were 
committed.878 In general, jurisprudence shows that it is possible to guarantee 
                                               
875 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence, 7 September 2015, A/HRC/30/42, para 48. 
876 Vera Navarrete case, Constitutional Court of Peru, December 2004. Available at: 
http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2005/2798-2004-HC.html accessed 16 March 16. 
877 Federal Criminal and Correctional Court of Argentina, Case No 30514, in the Process against Massera 
and others on Exceptions, (Judgment) (9 September 1999); Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay, Case No 
585/96, Capitan de Caballeria Modesto Napoleón Ortigoza, (Judgment) (31 December 1996); Supreme 
Court, Argentina : Chile v Arancibia Clavel (Enrique Lautaro), Appeal Judgment, Case No 259, A 533 
XXXVIII, 24th August 2004; and Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación ilegítima de la libertad, 
etc., Case No17.768, No 17.768, S. 1767. XXXVIII, 14 June 2005; and Fujimori Case, Supreme Court 
(Specialized Criminal Law Chamber) (Peru), No. 19-2001 AV, ILDC 1516, para. 711 (2009). 
878 See Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Chamber, STL-11-01/I, paras.132 and 133; Supreme Court 
of Justice of Colombia, Criminal Cassation Chamber, Case No. 33.118, Cesar Pérez García, Decision of 
May 13, 2010, Case No. 33.118. 
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simultaneously respect to the principle of legality as well as due process and fair trial 
standards for the defendants, and to the rights of victims to see the perpetrators of 
violations brought to justice.879 
 
Despite the evidence presented to the Third Consultative Meeting in regards to non-
applicability of statutes of limitation for the most serious crimes, a few delegations 
(mainly Japan) still voiced concerns regarding Principles 6 and 7.880 For this reason, a last 
minute suggestion was made to reinstate the qualifying words ‘where so provided for in 
an applicable treaty or contained in other international legal obligations’, which was 
reflected in the final version of Principle 6. In Principle 7, an amendment within the final 
hour of negotiation was presented so that it would read ‘Domestic statutes of limitations 
or other types of violations that do not constitute crimes against international law, 
including those time limitations applicable to civil claims and other procedures, should 
not be unduly restrictive’, losing the part that established that statute of limitations shall 
not be applied during periods in which no effective remedies existed.  
  
The Impunity Principles, which are an expert-mandated document, are more 
straightforward, requiring that in situations where states have statutes of limitation that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
879 See Scilingo and Pinochet (National High Criminal Court, Spain) (n846); Gelman v Uruguay, Judgment, 
IACHR, 24 February 2011. Serie C No. 221; Erdemovic, ICTY,Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement (7 
October 1997). 
880 REDRESS Internal Minutes (n 675). 
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conflict with international criminal law norms, states should effectively bring their 
national laws and practice into conformity with international law.881  
C. Equal access to justice through effective remedies 
 
A state’s obligation towards victims has a dual dimension: to make it possible for them to 
seek relief for the harm suffered and to provide a final result where the harm is actually 
ameliorated. To put it differently, justice for victims demands genuine procedural 
mechanisms (procedural remedies), resulting in final positive relief (substantive 
reparations). It is generally accepted that international law requires states to provide 
effective procedural remedies under domestic law to guarantee adequate reparation to 
victims of HR violations. This right is firmly embodied in all major international HR 
treaties and declarative instruments.882 The right to a remedy for a violation of a HR 
protected under any of the international instruments is itself a right expressly guaranteed 
by the same instruments and, in the case of fundamental HR, it has been recognised as 
non-derogable.883 Accordingly, there is an independent and continuing obligation under 
                                               
881 ‘Prescription- of prosecution or penalty- in criminal cases shall not run for such period as no effective 
remedy is available. Prescription shall not apply to crimes under international law that are by their nature 
imprescriptible. When it does apply, prescription shall not be effective against civil or administrative 
actions brought by victims seeking reparation for the injuries’. Principle 23, Impunity Principles (n. 653).  
882 See for example: (n. 39) 
883 See, for example: General Comment 29 on States of Emergency (Article 4) of the UN Human Rights 
Committee, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 August 2001) [14]: ‘Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant 
requires a State party to the Covenant to provide remedies for any violation of the provisions of the 
Covenant.  This clause is not mentioned in the list of non-derogable provisions in article 4, paragraph 2, but 
it constitutes a treaty obligation inherent in the Covenant as a whole.  Even if a State party, during a state of 
emergency, and to the extent that such measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, may 
introduce adjustments to the practical functioning of its procedures governing judicial or other remedies, 
the State party must comply with the fundamental obligation, under article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant 
to provide a remedy that is effective’. The Committee considered further that ‘It is inherent in the 
protection of rights explicitly recognized as non-derogable … that they must be secured by procedural 
guarantees…The provisions of the Covenant relating to procedural safeguards may never be made subject 
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HR law to provide effective domestic remedies to protect human rights, during peace or 
war, and irrespective of states of emergency. HR instruments guarantee both the 
procedural right to effective access to justice (through judicial and/or non-judicial 
remedies)884 and the substantive right to reparations (such as restitution, compensation, 
and rehabilitation).885  As explained by the ECtHR: ‘A remedy must be effective in 
practice as well as in law, particularly in the sense that its exercise must not be 
unjustifiably hindered by acts or omissions by national authorities’.886   
 
The nature of the procedural remedies (judicial, administrative, or other) should be in 
accordance with the substantive rights violated and the effectiveness of the remedy in 
granting appropriate relief for such violations.887  In the case of grave abuses, remedies 
need to be judicial. As explained by the UN HRC, ‘administrative remedies cannot be 
                                                                                                                                            
to measures that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights (…)’. Similarly the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights explained that the judicial remedies to protect non-derogable rights are 
themselves non-derogable. (Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of 6 October 1987. Judicial Guarantees in States of 
Emergency (Article 27(2), 25, and 25(8) American Convention on Human Rights. Series A no 9).  
884 Some instruments explicitly call for the establishment of judicial remedies for the rights they guarantee: 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, for example, provides that all remedies should be 
judicial.  See Article 7 of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 
1981) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force 21 October 1986). 
885  See J McBride, ‘Access to Justice and Human Rights Treaties’ (1998) 17 Civil Justice Q. 235. 
886  See Aksoy v. Turkey (n 747). 
887  Article 13 of the ECHR requires ‘the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national 
authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate 
relief’ although states have some discretion as to how to comply, see: D v. United Kingdom (Judgment) (2 
May 1997) App No 30240/96 [69]  (referring to Soering v. United Kingdom, (Judgment) (7 July 1989) 
App. No. 14038/88, and Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, (Judgment) (30 October 1991) App. No. 13163/87. 
The UN Human Rights Committee commented on Finland’s report (CCPR/C/95/Add.6) regarding the 
obligation under Article 2(b) of the ICCPR that ‘while noting that a recent reform of the Penal Code makes 
punishable the violation of several rights and freedoms, including those protected by articles 21 and 22 of 
the Covenant, the Committee is concerned that criminal law may not alone be appropriate to determine 
appropriate remedies for violations of certain rights and freedoms (Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee, Finland: 08/04/98 CCPR/C/79/Add.91). 
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deemed to constitute adequate and effective remedies […], in the event of particular 
serious violations of human rights’.888 
 
This is reflected in the Principles and Guidelines: 
 
12. A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effective 
judicial remedy as provided for under international law. Other remedies 
available to the victim include access to administrative and other bodies, as well 
as mechanisms, modalities and proceedings conducted in accordance with 
domestic law. 
 
Accordingly, in cases of gross/serious violations, non-judicial remedies, such as 
administrative or other remedies, are not considered sufficient to fulfil states’ obligations 
under international law. Even if a victim can apply for compensation through an 
administrative procedure, he/she should also have the right in law and practice to bring a 
claim against the individual and state in a judicial court.889 In the same way, a person who 
has been detained has a right to challenge his/her detention before a judicial body and, if 
applicable, to bring a civil claim for his/her arbitrary detention. Nevertheless, the relevant 
procedures may take into account compensation already awarded to the victim in order to 
determine whether the claimant has received full and adequate reparation.890  
                                               
888 Nydia Bautista v Colombia (No. 563/1993); José Vicente and Amado Villafane Chaparro, Luis 
Napoleon Torres Crespo, Angel María Torres Arroyo and Antonio Hugues Chaparro Torres v Colombia 
(No. 612/1995). Furthermore, the individual right of access to court for the determination of civil rights and 
obligations regarding serious human rights violations is a fundamental part of international human right law 
(See, for example, Article 27.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights; and Article 7 of the African Charter of the African Charter on Human 
Rights and People’s Rights). 
889  See Albert Wilson v. Philippines, Communication No. 868/1999 (2003) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/79/D/868/1999.  
890  For example, the benefit to those persons who were detained in Argentina before 10 December 1983 by 
virtue of the state of siege and who were in the custody of the Executive (under Decree No. 10/90 and Law 
24.043) was extended to cover persons who had initiated legal action and won their cases, but who had 
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While the Principles and Guidelines have a legal and judicial approach to reparation, it is 
clear that in practice non-judicial schemes and programmes offering redress and 
reparations also contribute to reparative justice for the benefit of a large number of 
victims. Such schemes and programmes should operate in coordination with other justice 
measures,891 but ultimately it should be possible to challenge these measures through 
effective judicial remedies (i.e. before an independent court).892  
 
In sum, victims of serious HR and IHL violations have the right to access to justice, 
which includes being able to trigger effective judicial remedies of a sufficiently high 
standard of fairness and impartiality. States can also provide other remedies to 
complement reparation procedures, such as access to administrative bodies and 
mechanisms, modalities, and proceedings conducted in accordance with a state’s 
domestic law. To this end, the Principles and Guidelines exhort states to publicise 
information about available remedies893 to protect victims, and their representatives, 
                                                                                                                                            
received compensation lower than that awarded by the reparations laws. Decree Num. 131/94 of 1 August 
1994. For a general overview of the reparation process in Argentina, see: P Guembre, ‘Economic 
Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations: the Argentine Experience’ in de Greiff, The Handbook of 
Reparations (n 13).  
891 See in particular P de Greiff, ‘Reparations Efforts in International Perspective: What Compensation 
Contributes to the Achievement of Imperfect Justice’ in Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader (eds), 
To Repair the Irreparable: Reparations and Reconstruction on South Africa (David Phillip 2004). 
892 See, for example, the case of Garcia Lucero v Chile, challenging the reparations measures in Chile. 
There were no effective remedies to challenge the lack of reparation for torture victims (due to lack of 
jurisdiction ratione temporis) or bring a claim before any other existing compensation scheme. Similarly, 
civil claim were also blocked in practice by the amnesty law in place. Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Case of García Lucero et al v Child (Judgment) [28 August 2013] (Preliminary objection, merits 
and reparations). See also Albert Wilson v. Philippines where the HRC considered that despite existing 
administrative compensation schemes there were no effective remedies since ‘[…] a civil action may not be 
advanced against the State without its consent, and […] there are, under domestic law, extensive limitations 
on the ability to achieve an award against individual officers of the State’ (n. 889) para 6.2. 
893 UN Principles and Guidelines, (n 2)VIII. 12(a). 
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witnesses, and families from intimidation and retaliation;894 to provide proper assistance 
to victims seeking access to justice;895 to provide appropriate legal, diplomatic; and 
consular means to ensure that all victims can exercise their rights to a remedy;896 and so 
on. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Germany disagreed with the overall proposition that victims of 
serious HR or IHL violations have an international right to an effective remedy outside of 
special HR procedures like the ECtHR. Thus, the inclusion of the qualifying wording ‘as 
provided for under international law’ in Principle 12 was suggested and adopted in the 
final version. Notwithstanding, Germany still gave an explanation of vote during the 
adoption of the instrument before the CHR. It stated its position that victims do not have 
a right to a remedy and reparation under CIL but only as part of state sponsored 
mechanisms.897 
 
Finally, the Principles and Guidelines specify that: ‘13. In addition to individual access to 
justice, States should endeavour to develop procedures to allow groups of victims to 
present claims for reparation and to receive reparation, as appropriate’. Several 
amendments were considered with regard to Principle 13 during the last consultation. The 
suggestion to reinstate references to ‘collective’ claims for reparation and to receive 
reparation ‘collectively’ was made. Collective and group claims are particularly 
important when victims are targeted as a community or a group, since the appropriate 
                                               
894 UN Principles and Guidelines (n  2)VIII.12 (b). 
895 UN Principles and Guidelines (n 2)VIII.12 (c). 
896 UN Principles and Guidelines (n 2) VIII.12 (d). 
897 See: (n 716) and accompanying text. 
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form of reparation needs to reflect the collective suffering. International crimes like 
genocide and apartheid are directed against groups/communities and in these cases 
authorities need to guarantee adequate reparation and effective access to justice for all the 
victims. However, several delegations opposed the suggestion to include claim 
procedures for groups of victims, and highlighted the lack of collective procedures in 
their domestic systems. The issue of collective forms of reparation was addressed in 
detail when analysing the definition of victims in Principle 8.898 Importantly though, it 
was noted again during the discussions surrounding Principle 13 that it might be difficult 
to find consensus on the issue of collective rights and that the language thus reflected a 
compromise. 
 
D.  Forms of reparation for harm suffered 
 
The Principles and Guidelines emphasise that victims are entitled to ‘adequate, effective 
and prompt reparation’,899 which should be ‘proportional to the gravity of the violations 
and the harm suffered’.900 One of the key aspects of the instrument is that it re-iterates the 
five forms of full and effective reparation: restitution; compensation; rehabilitation; 
satisfaction; and guarantees of non-repetition. At the same time, it makes clear that 
account must always be taken of the individual circumstances of each case. Not every 
gross/serious violation will necessarily and automatically give rise to all of these aspects 
                                               
898 See: (n 718-721) and accompanying text. 
899 Principles and Guidelines, (n 2) IX.15.  
900 ibid. 
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of reparation, but they should always be considered and, if appropriate, applied in 
proportion to the gravity of the violation suffered.901   
 
The ILC’s Articles on state responsibility and the case law of HR monitoring bodies were 
important sources of guidance in the formulation of the Principles and Guidelines. Van 
Boven’s original study identifying these forms of reparation was formulated with the then 
‘draft’ ILC Responsibility Articles in mind (subject to the differences already described 
in the above section on state responsibility).902 HR monitoring bodies have developed 
extensive case law on legal consequences of conventional HR obligations. The richest 
case law in this respect is probably that of the Inter-American system.903 The forms of 
reparation originally enlisted by van Boven were retained throughout the drafting and 
adoption process of the Principles and Guidelines, but were further elaborated, taking into 
account developing jurisprudence of HR mechanisms. This section will give a brief 
overview of the forms of reparation described in the Principles and Guidelines.  
 
According to Section IX, the forms that reparation may take in include:  
Restitution (Principle 19): This form of reparation consists of re-establishing the 
status quo ante, i.e. the situation that existed prior to the occurrence of the wrongful 
act. Although it is generally not possible to ‘undo’ the pain and suffering caused by 
human rights violations, certain aspects of restitution might nonetheless be possible – 
                                               
901 Principles and Guidelines, (n 2) IX.18. 
902 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 38. 
903 See, for example, L Laplante, ‘Bringing Effective Remedies Home: The Inter-American Human Rights 
System, Reparations, and the Duty of Prevention’ (2004) 22(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
347. 
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such as restoring an individual’s liberty, legal rights, social status, family life, and 
citizenship; returning to one’s place of residence; restoration of employment; and 
returning of property.904 
 
Compensation (Principle 20): The role of compensation is to fill in any gaps so as to 
ensure full reparation for the damage suffered (as long as the damage is financially 
assessable).905 The IACtHR held in the Velásquez Rodríguez case that ‘it is 
appropriate to fix the payment of ‘fair compensation’ in sufficiently broad terms 
[…]’.906 Awards of compensation encompass material losses (loss of earnings, 
pension, medical expenses, etc.) and non-material or moral damage (pain and 
suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of 
companionship or consortium), the latter usually quantified on the basis of an 
equitable assessment. 
 
Rehabilitation (Principle 21): Rehabilitation is an important component of 
reparation and it is a right specifically recognised in international human rights 
instruments.907 The UN Victims’ Declaration stipulates that: ‘victims should receive 
the necessary material, medical, psychological and social assistance and support’.908 
Reparation should include medical and psychological care and other services such as 
                                               
904Principles and Guidelines (n2). See also, Principles 8-10 of the Victims’ Declaration (n 643) . 
905  Commentary, ICL Report on Responsibility Articles (n 23) [IV.E]. 
906 Velásquez Rodríguez (n 164) [27]. 
907 See, for example, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol; the UN 
Convention against Torture; the Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances (n 9). 
908 Principle 14, Victims’ Declaration (n 643) 
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legal and social services.909 Rehabilitation may be provided ‘in kind’ or the costs may 
form part of a monetary award. It is important to distinguish between indemnity paid 
by way of compensation (for material and/or moral damage) and money provided for 
rehabilitation purposes. 
 
Satisfaction and Guarantees of Non-repetition (Principle 22): Satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition refer to the range of measures that may contribute to the 
broader and longer-term restorative aims of reparation. A central component is the 
role of public acknowledgment of the violation, and the victims’ right to know the 
truth and to have the perpetrators held accountable.910 The Principles and Guidelines 
list measures such as cessation of continuing violations; judicial sanctions against 
persons responsible for the violations; an apology, including public acknowledgement 
of the facts and acceptance of responsibility; commemorations and tributes to the 
victims; and implementing preventative measures, such as ensuring effective civilian 
control of military and security forces, protecting human rights defenders, and 
persons in the legal, media and other related professions. 
 
As mentioned already, the forms and modalities are not mutually exclusive, nor worded 
exhaustively. The Principles and Guidelines are designed with a fair degree of flexibility 
in this regard and do not establish a hierarchy of forms of reparation. They leave room for 
forms of reparation that are not mentioned but that might be appropriate in a concrete 
                                               
909  Principle 24,Bassiouni 2000 Report (n 668). 
910  Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political); (2 October 
1997) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 [17].  
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case. For example, the list in Principle 21 is not intended to be exhaustive of all of the 
various situations that can occur where restitution is appropriate, and what are given are 
examples of where it should be feasible to ‘return’ the victim to where he/she was prior to 
the occurrence of the wrongful act.  However, it is often not possible to restore victims to 
their original situation before the violations occurred  for example, pain, and suffering 
cannot be ‘undone’  though certain specific aspects of restitution are possible, as listed. 
Restitution is especially important where the obligation breached is of a continuing 
character: thus in a case of unlawful detention or disappearance, for example, the 
authorities must end the situation by producing the victim. However, other forms of 
reparation might be needed to redress the harm and suffering of the victim and his/her 
family. 
 
The payment of compensation can be conceived of as covering all the damage that the 
victim has suffered, which can be financially assessed so as to ensure full reparation.  
There is a distinction between payment of money by way of compensation and payment 
of monies for other purposes (like a sum of money to pay for physical or physiological 
treatment which would be for rehabilitative purposes or a sum of money to repay the cost 
and expenses of the case). As its title indicates, payment under this head is purely 
compensatory, and corresponds to what can be calculated in monetary terms for the 
damage suffered by the injured party. It is not concerned with the punishment of the 
responsible state, nor does it include the concept of punitive or exemplary damages. 
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The IACtHR held in the Velásquez Rodríguez that ‘it is appropriate to fix the payment of 
“fair compensation” in sufficiently broad terms in order to compensate, to the extent 
possible, for the loss suffered’.911 Monetary compensation is intended to remedy the 
damage suffered by the injured party as a result of the breach, to the extent that money 
can do this. The appropriate heads of compensatory payments can vary according to the 
type of breach, the behaviour of the parties, and other factors.  As explored in Chapter 2, 
compensation awards for individuals include material losses (loss of earnings, pension, 
medical and legal expenses) and non-material or moral suffering (pain and suffering, 
mental anguish, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of companionship or 
consortium), the latter calculated on the basis of what is fair in all the circumstances. 
Importantly, the right to compensation for the damage suffered by the victims up until the 
time of their death should be transmitted by succession to their heirs, and the awards of 
compensation need to consider also the course that the victim’s life would normally have 
taken and whether the violation caused a serious harm to his/her life plan.912  
 
In addition to compensation, rehabilitation is an important component of reparation. 
Victims are entitled to and should receive the necessary material, medical, psychological, 
and social assistance and support. State parties to the UNCAT, for example, have been 
specifically encouraged to support rehabilitation centres that may exist in their territory to 
ensure that torture victims get the means for as full rehabilitation as is possible.913 
Rehabilitation services should be provided in kind or the costs to have them provided 
                                               
911 Velásquez Rodríguez (n 164) [27] 
912 G Donoso, ‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ reparation judgments: Strengths and challenges for 
a comprehensive approach’ (2009) 49 Revista IIDH. 
913 Report on Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, submitted by Sir 
Nigel Rodley, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with General 
Assembly resolution 53/139, Report A/54/426, 1 October 1999, Para 50.  
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may form part of a monetary award 914: in this latter situation it is important to distinguish 
between money paid by way of compensation and money provided for rehabilitation 
purposes. As van Boven explains, a sum of money might also be a way to produce 
rehabilitation when it aims to pay a) “reasonable medical and other expenses of 
rehabilitation;” b) “harm to reputation or dignity;” and c) “reasonable costs and fees of 
legal or expert assistance to obtain a remedy”.915 
 
 
There are a number of definitions of rehabilitation and of what is understood by services 
which aims at rehabilitation.916 General Comment 3 to article 14 of CAT, for example, 
establishes that rehabilitation “should be holistic and include medical and psychological 
care as well as legal and social services”. Furthermore rehabilitation “refers to the 
restoration of function or the acquisition of new skills required as a result of the changed 
circumstances of a victim in the aftermath of torture or ill-treatment. It seeks to enable the 
maximum possible self-sufficiency and function for the individual concerned, and may 
involve adjustments to the person's physical and social environment. Rehabilitation for 
victims should aim to restore, as far as possible, their independence, physical, mental, 
social and vocational ability; and full inclusion and participation in society.”917 The 
Committee has also point out that ‘the payment of compensation alone is not enough; it is 
equally necessary to ensure victims the means necessary for their rehabilitation’.918 
 
Satisfaction covers a wide and varied range of non-monetary measures that may 
contribute to the broader and longer-term restorative aims of reparation. Some will apply 
                                               
914 Christina Cerna discusses the challenges faced in the Inter-American region when affording 
rehabilitation services in kind as opposed to as part of a monetary award (e.g. through the states’ public 
health systems). See Christina M. Cerna, Regional Human Rights Systems, Vol. V of the Library of Essays 
on International Human Rights (Ashgate 2014).  
915 van Boven, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution’ (n 17), principles 3-4, and 9-10, p. 56-57. 
916 REDRESS, ‘Rehabilitation as a form of reparation under international law’ December 2009, p. 10 
available at: http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/The%20right%20to%20rehabilitation.pdf 
(accessed on 13 April 16) 
917 UN Committee Against Torture, General comment no. 3, 2012: Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: implementation of article 14 by States parties, 13 
December 2012, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5437cc274.html [accessed 1 May 2016] 
918UN Committee Against Torture, Country Reports, Azerbaijan, May 2010, CAT/C/SR.909. [35] 
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to all violations (e.g. verification of the facts) and in that sense are more general than 
specific measures for specific violations (e.g. searches in respect to disappearances). A 
central component of satisfaction is the role of public acknowledgment of the violation. 
Bringing events officially into the open – provided that this does not cause further harm 
to or danger for the victim and their families – can help to restore the individual’s sense 
of identity and dignity, and can act as a deterrent. Equally significant is the victims’ right 
to know the truth, and for the perpetrators to be made accountable.  The obligation to 
verify the facts and make full and public disclosure of the facts is part of the primary 
obligation to respect HR and IHL.919 This obligation as a form of reparation has been 
especially prominent in the case law of the IACtHR,920 first set out in the well-known 
Velásquez Rodríguez case.921  
 
Satisfaction may consist of an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a 
formal apology, a declaratory judgment, or another appropriate modality. Again, the 
appropriate form of satisfaction will depend on the circumstances and cannot be 
prescribed in advance. One of the commonest forms of satisfaction is a declaration of the 
wrongfulness of the act by a competent state body, be it a court, a tribunal, or some other 
official organ. Thus, any court or tribunal that has jurisdiction over a dispute has the 
authority to make a declaration of its findings, as a necessary part of the judicial process. 
A declaration may sometimes act as a precondition to other forms of reparation, or it may 
                                               
919 See, for example, Article 32 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (12 August 1949). 
920 Sandoval, Clara and Duttwiler, Michael 'Redressing Non-Pecuniary Damages of Torture Survivors: The 
Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.' In: Gilbert, Geoff and Hampson, Françoise J and 
Sandoval, Clara, (eds.) The Delivery of Human Rights: Essays in honour of Professor Sir Nigel Rodley, 
(Routledge 2010) pp. 114-136.  
921 Velásquez Rodríguez (n 164) [134] et seq. 
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be the only remedy sought.  In some instances, therefore, a finding of a violation could in 
itself be sufficient ‘satisfaction’. This is consistent with general international law practice 
as well as with human rights jurisprudence in particular. 922 
 
International courts and other remedial mechanisms have taken different approaches 
when affording redress. Sometimes their judgements and views focus narrowly on the 
needs of the particular individual who suffered a violation of a right in the past, without 
attempting to specify the more general implications of their conclusions for the laws, 
institutions, and practices of the responsible state. Others have expressly taken on the task 
of overseeing broader reform as a continuation of the adjudication of the case. Orders for 
broader reform are generally undertaken as "guarantees of non-repetition," ensuring that 
the past violation will not be repeated.  
 
As mentioned earlier, although assurances or guarantees of non-repetition may amount to 
a form of redress, they also serve a preventive function.923 In this context, they may be 
described as a positive reinforcement of future performances, with cessation of violations 
being conceived of as the negative aspect of future performance, concerned with securing 
an end to the continuing wrongful conduct.  
 
                                               
922 Chapter 2 explores satisfaction as a form of reparation in diplomatic protection cases. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 1, following the practice of international tribunals in general, human rights courts have 
recognised that declaratory judgements are a form of satisfaction. See nn. 122-125 and accompanying text. 
923 ‘The core function of guarantees of non-recurrence is preventive in nature […]’. UN Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of 
non-recurrence, 7 September 2015, A/HRC/30/42, para 24. 
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International human rights instruments generally include positive obligations to prevent 
violations.924 At the same time, considerable emphasis is placed on institutional reforms 
and/or strengthening human rights norms within states, and especially amongst those who 
are often at the sharp end of committing violations: law enforcement, military, prison, 
and security services.925 Pablo de Greiff, Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence, explains that:  
25. […] guarantees of non-recurrence relates to a combination of deliberate, diverse 
interventions that contribute to a reduction in the likelihood of recurring violations. The 
“object” is not the prevention of isolated violations, but of gross human rights violations 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law. Such violations presuppose 
systemic abuses of (State) power that have a specific pattern and rest on a degree of 
organizational set-up. 
27. […] there is no such thing as a general non-recurrence policy. An effective policy 
designed to prevent systemic violations will need to adjust form to function and choose 
the proper instruments. 
 
While this concept of guarantees of non-repetition is an effective means to achieve 
practice and law reform as well as to implement victim-oriented policies, it can be 
problematic as it expands remedies beyond the specific victims of a case. Gerald Neuman 
recognises that ‘the goal of international human rights institutions is to induce action at 
the national level for the remediation of past injuries and the prevention of future 
injuries.’926 However, he argues that the understating of guarantees of non-repetition as a 
measure of redress with the potential to prevent future violations may cloud the 
distinction between ensuring that the same victim will not face a future repetition of the 
                                               
924 For example, Article 2 of UNCAT. See note 9. 
925These organs and the personnel within them need to be properly and effectively controlled and trained 
(in law and in behaviour), and one important mechanism for this is the promotion and observance of codes 
of conduct and minimum standards that have been developed at the international level. See, among others, 
the Code of Conduct for Law-Enforcement Officials (17 December 1979) UNGA Res 34/169, and the 
Mandela Rules (n 818). 
926 Gerald L. Neuman, ‘Bi-Level Remedies for Human Rights Violations’, Volume 55, Number 2 (Harvard 
International Law Journal 2014) p. 324 
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violation and ensuring that similar conduct will not result in violation of the rights of 
other individuals who are not parties to the case.927 He explains that this type of remedial 
measures might affect third parties and even larger groups of people who are not involved 
in the case. While it is clear that certain violations will require some form of systemic 
reform without which the particular victim will remain exposed to further violations (e.g. 
a law allowing arbitrary detentions), Neuman argues that these are exceptional cases. 
More frequently, narrower focused remedies fully redress and protect the victim. ‘The 
victim's own right to an effective remedy does not entail an additional right to a remedy 
solely for the benefit of unrelated future victims.’928 
 
In this context, it has been argued that is best to formulate systemic policies in 
mechanisms where there is a greater opportunity of victim participation (as opposed to, 
for example, litigation before human rights courts).  Victims’ participation can help 
create more adequate reparation measures and at the same time be part of the restorative 
process for victims.929  The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence makes a distinction between the “epistemic” 
                                               
927 Neuman, ‘Bi-Level Remedies’ (n. 926) fn36 at p. 330  
928 Neuman, ‘Bi-Level Remedies’ (n. 926) p 333. He also notes that it has been argued that overly strong 
remedial doctrines may induce judges to avoid finding violations by narrowing substantive rights or by 
erecting procedural obstacles to their vindication. Ibid. 327 
929A well-organised participatory process has a potential healing effect on victims and communities. 
(REDRESS, ‘Collective Reparations: Concepts & Principles’ available at: 
<http://www.redress.org/downloads/events/CollectiveReparationsMG.pdf> accessed 6 July 2016, 1-3.).  
Being consulted and treated as right holders whose dignity is respected, helps victims to move forward and 
to be better integrated into society. (OHCHR, ‘Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States. Reparations 
Programmes’ (2008) United Nations Publication, available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ReparationsProgrammes.pdf> accessed 6 July 2016, 15-
16).  See Suchkova, Maria. ‘The Importance of a Participatory Reparations Process and its Relationship to 
the Principles of Reparation’, Briefing Paper 5, Reparations Unit, (Essex Transitional Justice Network 
2011) 
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and “legitimacy” arguments in favour of victim participation in transitional justice 
mechanisms. According to de Greiff, epistemic arguments refer to the kind of 
information and insight that can come about through participation, and the positive 
consequences of such a gain in knowledge. Epistemic arguments, therefore, posit that 
asking victims to participate in transitional justice measures can help: capture the sense of 
justice of victims and their judgments of what would constitute effective redress; ensure a 
close fit between the measures and the needs of victims, on the one hand, and important 
contextual factors such as cultural, historical and political realities, on the other; broaden 
the range of adequate alternatives as more ideas for effective redress are put on the table.  
He further explains that according to legitimacy arguments, victim participation is 
important not just because of specific contributions in terms of information or insight that 
victims may make, but rather because participation in itself provides a measure of 
recognition to, and empowerment of, victims. It also contributes to making victims 
visible, helping them achieve a place in the public sphere that may have been denied to 
them before; facilitates the identification of commonalities of experiences, values and 
principles among different types of victims as well as between victims and non-victims; 
the participation of victims puts a human face on discussions about transitional justice.930 
 
Finally, the form of reparation, whether it is a monetary or a non-monetary award, plays 
an important role in its enforceability.931 Monetary awards such as compensation can be 
implemented directly without affecting the structural system of the state, and in this 
                                               
930 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence, 27 December 2016, A/HRC/34/62,  
931 Echeverria, ‘Genealogy’ (n 7) p 174. 
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respect may be easier to implement.932 However, states are not always willing to afford 
monetary compensation, particularly in situations of massive and/or systematic violations 
or where the state has severe financial constraints. In contrast, non-monetary awards 
calling for legal or institutional reforms (e.g. cancelling an amnesty decree to make way 
for the prosecution of alleged criminals, affording victims with new opportunities to 
challenge the legality of detention, removal of the immunity of senior officials) will 
usually require a series of procedural steps within the legislative and/or judicial branches 
of the government, and for this reason it will invariably take more time and be more 
complicated for the state to implement such awards.933  
 
Reparation may also necessitate changes to domestic laws within the liable state, 
including modifications to such laws that are in violation of a rule of HR and/or IHL. 
Sometimes legal reforms will be necessary to afford restitution: for example, for exiles to 
return to their countries and for the restoration of their rights, including property rights, 
legislative amendments within the state’s national system might be required. Legal 
modifications are also required to stop violations (for example, an amnesty decree 
preventing victims from obtaining redress) or to prevent future violations (for example, if 
a law allows for indefinite and/or arbitrary detention). It is also important to recall that 
reparation should not only be secured through litigation and adjudication, but first and 
                                               
932 Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to 
Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 525 (2011). 
933 See generally REDRESS, ‘Enforcement Report’ (n 40). The report analyses the enforcement framework 
for material and non-materials awards, explores the enforcement of preliminary/provisional measures, the 
enforcement of restitution and compensation (monetary awards) and other non-monetary awards such as 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, and considers whether certain forms of 
reparation are easier to enforce than others. 
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foremost through the design and implementation of reparation programmes.934 This is a 
valuable and realistic complement, which remains somewhat under-exposed in the 
Principles and Guidelines.935  
 
5. Concluding remarks on the UN Principles and Guidelines 
 
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
appointed Theo van Boven as Special Rapporteur in 1989. His mandate was to study the 
right to restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, with a view to exploring the possibility of 
developing some basic principles and guidelines in this respect. Two years later, the Sub-
Commission also embarked on studies aimed at combating impunity. This was a time of 
political change on various continents with prospects of a higher degree of human rights 
advancement. It was also a time of the creation of transitional justice mechanisms in 
several countries. In this context, restoring justice implied an increased focus on the 
criminal responsibility of perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and their 
accomplices. It also opened up the exposure of many wrongs inflicted on the victims of 
these abuses, with a view to rendering retributive and reparative justice. This was a time 
marked by the triumph of the human rights discourse in world politics: human rights 
                                               
934 See Article 32 of the Impunity Principles (n. 653). 
935 van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 37. 
 323 
would not only be proclaimed, but also effectively enjoyed – future violations would be 
repressed and victims would be redressed.936  
 
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur established that the study had to take into account 
existing international human rights norms and relevant decisions of international human 
rights’ bodies. According to van Boven, the study and the draft Principles and Guidelines 
as they evolved demonstrated that the gaps in human rights protection were less legal 
than political, and that a new instrument was not supposed to entail new international or 
domestic legal obligations, but rather to identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures, and 
methods for making existing legal obligations operational.937 This is reflected in the 
Preamble of the adopted Principles and Guidelines.  
 
The drafting and adoption process of the Principles and Guidelines stretched over 
fourteen years. While the subject matter of redress and reparation enjoyed broad 
sympathy, as shown by the wide sponsorship that the procedural resolutions of the CHR 
received, the political interest among state members was weak. Even when the drafting 
process regained some impetus after Bassiouni’s appointment as Independent Expert, it 
had new political setbacks once he submitted his report in 2000. The idea of a duty to 
repair historical wrongs connected with practices of slavery and colonialism had been 
formally discussed during the political process leading to the 2001 Durban Conference 
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. This was a 
highly politicised issue that deeply divided states and that was relevant to the substance 
                                               
936 d’Argent, ‘Wrongs of the Past’ (n 644). 
937 van Boven, Victims’ Rights (n 21) 28. 
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of the Basic Principles and Guidelines. In addition, the September 11 attacks in the US 
not only attracted most of the attention among international policymakers, focusing on 
immediate responses to the threat of ‘international terrorism’, but also brought about 
relevant questions on the relationship between HR and IHL and its treatment under 
international law.  Contrary to recent developments, stimulated in particular by the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals, the US lobbied for a complete 
separation of these legal regimes. Such a stringent approach was in obvious conflict with 
the latest version of the Principles and Guidelines, which included both types of 
violations. Understandably, the drafting process stagnated in those years in order to avoid 
disruptive influences. 
 
The changes to the scope of the instrument throughout the process – i.e. including all 
types of HR and IHL violations – also made the drafting, consultation, and adoption of 
the instrument more difficult. The most contentious issue that arose during the 
consultation stage was the scope of the instrument: whether it should cover violations of 
both human rights and international humanitarian law, and whether it should cover all 
breaches or just gross/serious violations.  
 
Van Boven’s first draft covered gross violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. However, after the workshop co-organised by the International Commission of 
Jurists and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights on this topic, he included serious IHL 
violations and excluded fundamental freedoms. The scope of the instrument was further 
widened in Bassiouni’s 2000 draft. The new draft included all violations of HR and IHL 
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– the gross/serious qualification was removed and notions of ICL and IHL were 
developed to a greater extent. This was the draft reviewed during the first consultative 
meeting. Arguably, expanding the scope to all types of violations made it more difficult 
to reflect a coherent set of victims’ demands and their corollary rights. On the other hand, 
the legal consequences of violations of HR and IHL are similar only when dealing with 
the most severe violations (e.g. international crimes), which made the structuring of the 
instrument much more challenging. In the final version, the scope was once more reduced 
to gross/serious violations, but kept both HR and IHL breaches.  
 
The rationale behind including both legal regimes and expanding the scope to all types of 
violations was the victim-oriented nature of the instrument. First, it was argued that from 
a victim’s perspective it doesn’t matter whether one is tortured, unlawfully killed, or 
disappeared during an armed conflict or during peace-time, by a policeman, a soldier, or 
a rebel. Second, that all violations of international law give rise to a right to reparation 
(not only serious or gross). 
 
Despite the lack of recognition of non-states (i.e. victims) as formal actors in the drafting 
process of international instruments or generally under international law, it would seem 
possible in principle to create a victim-oriented document on the right to reparation. 
Clearly, the drafting and adoption process of the Principles and Guidelines was very 
inclusive of victims’ voices. Van Boven made a consistent effort to include the point of 
view of victims’ organisations around the world and the CHR allowed active 
participation of NGOs during the consultative meetings. However, broadening the scope 
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of the instrument to include a less defined groups of victims made this task much more 
difficult. There are still many outstanding legal questions that made the ‘new’ wider 
project very complex. For example, many still challenge whether a right to reparation 
exists under CIL for victims of human rights violations, and especially of IHL breaches, 
to claim reparations directly against states (an argument implicit in the instrument). At 
the same time, it is questionable whether such a right exists for all types of violations or 
only for those violations that are so severe as to constitute crimes under international law, 
breaches of CIL, jus cogens norms, or erga omnes obligations. On the other hand, while 
responsibility of non-state actors for IHL is widely recognised under international law, it 
is not the same under HR law.  
 
In addition, many questions remain open when it comes to reparation for violations 
committed by non-state actors. For instance, in cases on non-state responsibility, are all 
states obliged to afford judicial remedies regardless of where the violations are 
committed and the nationality of the alleged perpetrators or victims? How does 
concurrent liability between state(s) and non-state actor(s) operates in these cases? What 
is the relationship between the principle of access to justice and jurisdictional barriers 
like immunities? 
 
Looking at this legal landscape, it’s easy to conclude that broadening the scope of the 
instrument to include all violations of both HR and IHL was too ambitious. While van 
Boven seemed concerned to create an international instrument that could empower 
victims by reflecting their needs and wishes, Bassiouni went further by proposing a 
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victim-oriented drafting methodology and framework. He explained ‘[t]he Draft 
Guidelines intentionally adopted a victim-oriented perspective, organising principles 
from all legal sources not according to instruments and sources, but according to the 
needs and rights of victims’.938 The Independent Expert used this rationale to expand the 
scope of the Principles and Guidelines to all types of HR and IHL violations and to 
include many new provisions, particularly in regards to IHL. But during the negotiations, 
some delegations contended that many of the provisions in the 2000 draft did not apply to 
all violations of HR and certainly not to some (or none) of the violations of IHL. This 
discussion continued during the next consultation.  The Chairperson and the Experts put 
forward a proposal addressing the contentious issues related to the scope of the 
instrument and suggested two important modifications. The first was to delete all 
references to human rights or international humanitarian law violations and thus change 
the title to ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Law’. The second, following from the first, 
was a suggested definition of ‘gross violations of international law’. According to the 
proposal, its purpose was to achieve consensus to facilitate the adoption of the draft 
Principles and Guidelines. It attempted to limit the scope in terms of gravity and to avoid 
the specific debate of including/excluding IHL by relying on general principles of 
international responsibility under CIL, as opposed to specific norms of the law of armed 
conflict. In reality, however, the proposal created a broader group of victims – or an even 
less clearly defined group – that states were not ready to accept.  
 
                                               
938 Report of First Consultative Meeting (n 670) [20]. 
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As a result, the words ‘gross’ and ‘serious’ were put back in brackets. At the end of the 
third and last consultation, the scope of the instrument was finally reduced once more to 
the most severe violations, although it included a saving clause: ‘26. […] it is understood 
that the present Basic Principles and Guidelines are without prejudice to the right to a 
remedy and reparation for victims of all violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law’. Unfortunately, at this point it was too late to reopen the 
debate on the clear application of some of the ‘contentious’ provisions to gross and 
serious violations. It was the last opportunity to adopt the instrument and participants 
decided to reach a compromise to keep these provisions in the instrument, even if they 
were a weaker/vaguer version (e.g. Principle 18 establishes that ‘in accordance with 
domestic and international law’ victims ‘should’ be provided with full and effective 
reparation when this principle is simply restating existing law and should not depend on 
internal law). On the other hand, it was clear that some delegations still had problems 
with certain provisions of the text, particularly on the inclusion of IHL, but it was also 
clear that the majority of states agreed on the importance of adopting a UN instrument on 
the right to reparation. The draft Principles and Guidelines were finally submitted to the 
Commission on Human Rights at its 61st session. The text was adopted on 19 April 2005 
with no votes against, but with thirteen abstentions. Three months later, on 25 July 2005, 
the Principles and Guidelines were adopted by ECOSOC, by a vote of forty-three in 
favour and five abstentions (none against). The General Assembly adopted the instrument 
on 16 December 2005 without a vote..  
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One wonders whether the outcome of the Principles and Guidelines would have been 
clearer and stronger if the original scope had been maintained. After all, the IHL 
violations covered under the rubric of ‘serious violations of IHL’, as applied in the 
Principles and Guidelines, would seem to be included under the notion of ‘gross human 
rights violations and fundamental freedoms’. It is easy to imagine that states would have 
been less reluctant to apply these principles and guidelines to the most serious HR 
violations and fundamental freedoms than to all violations of HR and IHL. Regardless, 
the instrument successfully structures a broad corpus of law that exists on the right to a 
remedy and reparation. The Principles and Guidelines bring together the standards that 
have been developed in various quarters and structure them. They seek to rationalise 
through a consistent approach the means and methods by which victims’ rights can be 
addressed, so as to maximise positive outcomes and minimise the diversity of approaches 
that may cause uneven implementation. Their adoption marks a long and arduous effort 
seeking recognition of victim-oriented policies as part of international law.  
 
Despite questions still raised on the legal status of the rights reflected in this instrument 
(e.g. whether principles of state responsibility can apply to individuals giving victims of 
the most serious violations of concern to the international community an enforceable 
right to reparation under CIL), after a lengthy process of consideration and review by 
non-governmental and governmental experts, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Principles and Guidelines without a vote. Thus, there is some basis to consider the text as 
declaratory of legal standards in the area of victims’ rights, particularly in regards to the 
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provisions relating to the right to a remedy and reparation.939 Clearly, the instrument has 
been used as reference in international law by other international courts and tribunals as 
well as by governments implementing reparation policies. The Principles and Guidelines 
are without a doubt an invaluable reference, being the only international instrument that 
classifies the norms, rules, and standards on the right to a remedy and reparation for 
victims of grave abuses, and contains a detailed description of the mechanisms, 
procedures and forms of adequate redress. 
 
  
                                               
939 See: van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights’ (n 21) 32, citing M Groenhuijsen and R Letschert, Reflections on the 
Development and Legal Status of Victims' Rights Instruments,” in Compilation of International Victims' 
Rights Instruments (Tilburg/Nijmegen 2006) 1–18 
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Conclusion 
 
In the area of state liability, there is a clear merging of HR law with IHL, ICL, and the 
law on diplomatic protection. It is well established that HR law applies during armed 
conflict; that serious violations of HR and IHL are international crimes that carry the 
same legal consequences; and that, nowadays, diplomatic protection is a mechanism used 
by foreign states to espouse HR claims on behalf of their nationals. While state 
responsibility principles have traditionally applied to these legal regimes, it has been at 
the inter-state level. However, HR law has transformed the law on state responsibility. 
Today, it is generally recognised that not only states, but also individuals can be holders 
of international rights. States have a customary obligation to afford domestic remedies 
and reparation for serious acts or omissions contrary to international HR law. If states fail 
to comply with this primary obligation under international law, they commit an IWA and, 
as such, are liable to afford reparation at the international level. HR violations that are 
systematic and/or massive are also IWAs and states become liable to afford reparation in 
the same way. The present study concludes that individual victims   (as opposed to the 
state of nationality only or the international community as a whole) can also be the 
beneficiaries of this secondary obligation to afford reparation. In other words, since 
individuals enjoy customary rights, when these are breached, individuals have an 
actionable secondary right to reparation under general international law.  
 
As shown in the present study, this conclusion becomes more forceful when examining 
the developments on the entitlement of individual primary and secondary rights and how 
they interconnect in HR law (Chapter 1), the law on diplomatic protection (Chapter 2), 
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and IHL and ICL (Chapter 3). The legal status of the Principles and Guidelines is 
premised precisely on the application of state responsibility principles to the relationship 
between individuals and states when gross violations of HR and serious violations IHL 
occur (Chapter 4). As demonstrated, the instrument accurately reflects current legal 
standards in this regard, and it is further evidence that the majority of states accept state 
responsibility for reparation in favour of individuals as part of contemporary international 
law. 
 
Chapter 1. The Legal Position of the Individual in International Law  
 
Chapter 1 analyses the different doctrinal positions on the individual right to reparation. 
The chapter shows that the individual can be a holder of international rights, including 
under CIL. It explains how certain fundamental obligations of states give rise to 
individual rights under general international law (e.g. the prohibition against torture; 
genocide; apartheid).  It concludes that when individuals have customary rights, they 
have an enforceable right to reparation under CIL. If a state fails to respect a customary 
individual right (by failing to redress it domestically or because the breach is massive 
and/or systematic), it becomes liable to afford reparation under principles of state 
responsibility. Responsibility to afford reparation for these types of violations can be 
invoked by the individual victim in available international mechanisms or in domestic 
fora. 
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The doctrinal discussion on the notion of international legal subjectivity is not helpful 
when looking at the existence of an individual right to reparation. Whether one considers 
the individual a ‘subject’ or simply a ‘participant’ of international law, it is still necessary 
to determine which conditions have to be fulfilled to qualify a rule under international 
law as a norm containing an individual right. In addition, it is necessary to examine 
whether any general regime of reparations has developed to cover individuals. The 
Commentary on Article 33(2) of the ILC Responsibility Articles on state responsibility 
makes this clear: ‘It will be a matter for the particular primary rule to determine whether 
and to what extent persons or entities other than States are entitled to invoke 
responsibility on their own account’.940   
 
Recent ICJ jurisprudence confirms that there are international individual rights, including 
under CIL.941 At the same time, the legal basis for a right to reparation for individual 
victims has become firmly enshrined in the elaborate corpus of international HR 
instruments. It has also been further refined by the extensive HR jurisprudence.  The duty 
to remedy official misconduct is so widely acknowledged that it may be regarded as 
forming part of CIL. 
 
While HR protection has been confined under specific treaty regimes, it does not mean 
that state responsibility is inapplicable to HR breaches. The powers of international HR 
                                               
940 Commentary on Article 33, Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n 23) 234 et seq. 
941 See, for example, LaGrand (n 92), Avena (n 123), Diallo (n 97) the Wall Opinion (n94), and Armed 
Activities Case (n 97). 
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bodies and tribunals to afford reparation, and the actual reparations afforded, reflect 
principles of state responsibility for injury to aliens.  
 
The PICJ applied in the Chorzów case the general principle of international law that 
every violation entails the duty to afford reparation in adequate form. The Court indicated 
that this was not only an international principle, but a general conception of law 
applicable to any breach.942 While the Chorzów principle was first applied in an inter-
state case, the ICJ already recognised that it equally applies to reparation for injury to 
individuals.943 Importantly, it recently confirmed that the Chorzów judgment, as well as 
the principles of state responsibility clarified in it, applies in the relationship between 
individuals and states.944  
 
Based on the legal maxim that the capacity to bring claims is inherent in the substance of 
a right (ubi jus ibi remedium), the PCIJ affirmed in Danzig that national courts could 
enforce international rights of individuals.945  Similarly, the ICJ reiterated in LaGrand 
that international individual rights should be enforced domestically.946 The ILC refers to 
these two cases when exploring the individuals’ capacity to invoke state responsibility in 
its commentary to the ILC Responsibility Articles.947 In this sense, since individuals have 
fundamental rights under general international law, when such rights are breached, 
                                               
942 Chorzów (n 22) [102].  
943 Application for Review (n 131) 197-198. 
944 Wall Opinion (n94) [52 et seq]. 
945 Danzig (n 91) 
946 LaGrand  (n 92) [77]. 
947 Commentary, Report of the ILC Responsibility Articles (n. 23) 234 et seq.  
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individuals have a customary right to reparation. In principle, this right can be enforced 
through domestic courts. 
 
While procedural bars, like immunities, might apply in foreign or third state courts, these 
may be waived and may not be permanent. The ICJ clarified that:  
[…] the fact that immunity may bar the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular case 
does not alter the applicability of the substantive rules of international law […] 
whether a State is entitled to immunity before the courts of another State is a 
question entirely separate from whether the international responsibility of that 
State is engaged and whether it has an obligation to make reparation.948 
 
Chapter 2: State Responsibility, Diplomatic Protection, and the obligation to afford 
reparation to individuals 
 
Diplomatic protection, as the mechanism to enforce the law on state responsibility for 
injury to aliens, is the predecessor of the right to a remedy and reparation under HR law. 
It is also a contemporary mechanism that can be used to enforce HR of aliens. Both legal 
regimes coexist and are closely related. Evidence shows that there has been ample cross-
fertilization between them (e.g. in addition to exhaustion of domestic remedies, HR rights 
law also allows inter-state claims). It is also clear that HR has greatly influenced the law 
of diplomatic protection. First, it has altered its traditional scope to include HR as part of 
denial of justice claims. Secondly, it is now recognised that the reparation due at the 
international level in diplomatic protection cases is to redress the actual injury of the 
individual victim. The concept that the injury claimed at the international level is an 
                                               
948 Germany v Italy (n 25), especially [100].  
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injury of the state, as opposed to an injury of an individual (the so called Vattel’s legal 
fiction949), has departed from its traditional understanding. Article 1 of the ILC Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection was modified when defining diplomatic protection. It 
left out the part stipulating that a state was ‘adopting in its own right’ the claim of its 
national. The reference to this provision by the ICJ in the Diallo case seems to confirm 
that it is the up-to-date understating of diplomatic protection. The Court emphasised the 
point when it stated ‘that the sum awarded to Guinea in the exercise of diplomatic 
protection of Mr. Diallo is intended to provide reparation for the latter’s injury’.950 
 
The notion that an international (HR) standard of justice applies to individuals at home 
and foreigners abroad led some to argue that diplomatic protection would be superseded 
by HR law. After the adoption of the Universal Declaration on HR, the ILC rapporteur on 
State Responsibility, Garcia Amador, argued that the new rules of HR and fundamental 
freedoms would resolve the debate on whether states had an obligation to apply a national 
or an international standard of treatment to aliens. According to him, HR would help 
clarify the content of the international standard of justice that would be applicable to 
anyone regardless of his or her nationality.951 However, due to the lack of individual 
procedural rights at the international level, there has been a ‘renaissance’ of diplomatic 
protection procedures. Victims have resorted to this institution as means to enforce HR. 
But the exercise of this remedy by states continues to be completely discretionary. The 
severity of the violations plays no role in the decision of states to exercise it. As such, 
                                               
949 (n 59)  
950 Diallo (Compensation) (n 113) [57]. 
951 FV Garcia Amador, ‘First Report on State Responsibility’ (1956) 2 YBILC 202, [156]. 
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diplomatic protection cannot be considered a HR remedy, but only a subsidiary 
machinery to enforce (some) HR.  
 
The history and coexistence of diplomatic protection and HR, confirms the understanding 
that state responsibility principles apply to HR. Clearly, the recent recognition that the 
injury is to the individual and not to the state is consistent with the development of HR 
law and the acknowledgment of the role that individuals have in international law. 
Paradoxically, however, the rationale behind Vattel’s legal fiction is ultimately coherent. 
If the injury is to the state (because the other state failed to afford the minimum treatment 
required by international law to its national) and not to the individual, then the state 
should be the one to have a remedy for such a breach. But if the law of state 
responsibility for injury to aliens now recognises that the legal or natural person is the 
injured individual, should not the individual have access to remedy directly under 
international law (regardless of the capacity of states to ‘represent’ them in diplomatic 
procedures)?  
 
Importantly, Chapter 2 concludes that the ‘minimum standard of treatment to aliens’ is 
inseparable from the right to access to justice. The rule requiring prior exhaustion of local 
remedies as a precondition for diplomatic protection proves this symbiotic relation.  The 
chapter explains that states have an obligation to afford foreigners access to a system of 
justice that guarantees due process in accordance with the international minimum 
standard. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, therefore, is not a procedural 
precondition that can be waived in diplomatic protection claims. It is an inherent part of 
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the international wrong of denial of justice. In a similar way and obviously influenced by 
the law on protection of aliens, international HR law also requires the exhaustion of 
effective domestic remedies prior to bringing individual claims before international HR 
bodies. The local remedies rule presupposes access to justice for everyone under the 
jurisdiction of any state. So in the same way that denial of justice is understood as a 
system failure, where exhaustion of domestic remedies is an inherent material element of 
the IWA of denial of justice, international HR violations also materialise as IWAs after 
states fail to redress the breaches in accordance with international standards (i.e. effective 
remedies and adequate reparation). States, therefore, have nowadays an obligation to 
protect aliens and nationals alike from acts or omissions that breach general international 
law (like torture, slavery, arbitrary detentions, undue process, unfair trials, enforced 
disappearances, and so on). If states are unable to protect individuals and then fail to 
redress these violations in accordance with international standards, they commit and 
international wrong (a denial of justice/international HR violation) and are responsible 
under international law to afford reparation.  
 
This understanding of exhaustion of domestic remedies as an inherent part the IWA 
would seem to limit the application of secondary obligations to afford reparation only to 
states. As it will be discussed further below, there have been recent attempts to transport 
the regime of state responsibility to non-state entities committing atrocities in armed 
conflicts or other situations of violence where IHL/HR apply.  Clearly, if state 
responsibility for HR violations exhaust itself in the concept of lack of access to 
justice/effective remedies, it is hard to apply this standard to non-state actors. But can 
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states commit an IWA (and thus be liable to afford reparation) independent of domestic 
remedies? In terms of state responsibility for international crimes, there is a difference 
between ‘state crimes’ and an isolated international crime committed by a state official or 
another person connected to the state. The first case entails state responsibility when a 
pattern of ‘system criminality’952 is proven. The second requires exhaustion of effective 
domestic remedies if available (the state commits an IWA engaging its international 
responsibility when it fails to redress the criminal act or omission). One can take the view 
that in the case of so-called state crimes the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is 
not applicable because the direct intent of the state can be proven (the violations are 
massive and/or systematic). The state is breaching the international legal order directly. 
The IWA materialises irrespective of domestic remedies. It is also possible to argue that 
the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is not applicable because it is assumed that 
there are no effective remedies available (the state is unable or unwilling to 
prevent/redress the violations). This nuanced difference can have an impact on the debate 
over non-state responsibility. 
 
Finally, as clearly shown by the history of diplomatic protection, the strengthening of the 
exhaustion of the local remedies rule as a way to protect state sovereignty was born in 
response to the practice of abusive inter-state commercial activities. It was in this context 
that the principle of equality and state sovereignty was vigorously upheld and reinforced 
(e.g. the Calvo Doctrine). Paradoxically, it is more common nowadays to apply a 
restrictive reading of the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and the protection of 
                                               
952 [Röling, ’The Significance of the Laws of War’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Current Problems of International 
Law (1975), at 137–139]  
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sovereign equality in HR cases than in cases involving transnational commercial 
activities. Modern commercial arbitration allows direct claims by legal persons (without 
exhaustion of local remedies) and binds third states to enforce their judgements. 
Commercial activity is an exception to the principle of sovereign and diplomatic 
immunity when governments or state officials are sued in foreign courts.  None of this is 
possible under HR law, not even when violations involve jus cogens norms.  
 
Chapter 3. Is there an individual right to reparation for violations of IHL against 
states? 
 
The obligation to afford reparation for IWAs of States applies equally to violations 
committed in armed conflict (e.g. for a serious breach of a right protected by a jus 
congens norm). Nothing in IHL instruments or CIL prevents individual reparation for 
violations of the laws of war. Therefore, if individuals are the primary right-holders, they 
have a secondary right to reparation under principles of state responsibility.  
 
As this chapter shows, war crimes and crimes against humanity give rise to international 
liability under general principles of state responsibility. Additionally, HR law continues 
to apply during armed conflict, including the obligation to afford a remedy and reparation 
for an infringement of a non-derogable right. If states fail to comply with this primary 
obligation, they become liable under international law. The ICC recently recognised that 
victims of international crimes have a right to reparation.953  Indeed, when serious HR 
                                               
953 Lubanga (n 599). 
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and IHL violations are committed, not only the perpetrator is liable under international 
law to afford reparation, but also the state on whose behalf or acquiescence he or she 
committed the crimes.  
 
While traditionally reparation for IHL breaches has been awarded at the inter-state level, 
Chapter 3 proves that no legal norm exists that excludes redressing victims directly. 
There is no consistent case law or state practice showing that compensation for IHL 
violations belongs only to states as opposed to the individual victim. On the contrary, HR 
law has influenced the understating of IHL precisely in the context of individual 
entitlements. As shown by the ICRC study on CIL, the clear tendency to recognise the 
exercise of rights by individuals that started in 1945954 has continued to consolidate in 
contemporary IHL.955 The chapter shows that the notion of individual remedies was 
already present during the drafting discussions of Article 3 of Hague IV (establishing 
liability to pay compensation for IHL violations). Likewise, that the intention and 
sometimes the practice of post-WWII settlements was to compensate individual war 
victims (and therefore the state-to-state practice of these compensation funds is evidence 
of a policy concern rather than the aim and intention of a legal norm). There are also 
many compensation programs specifically for victims of IHL violations committed 
during WWII. The chapter shows that while states have claimed that these funds are a 
result of moral as opposed to legal obligations, and therefore do not show opionio juris 
on an obligation to redress victims of IHL breaches directly, they were created to settle or 
avoid pending litigation. Their claimed ex-gratia nature is therefore questionable and is 
                                               
954 ICRC Commentary on the APs by Sandoz (n 441)1067.  
955 ICRC Commentary on IHCL by Henckaerts and Doswald-Bexk (n 441) 549. 
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important to reconsider the legal source of this practice and its impact on the formation of 
CIL. Finally, the chapter also describes how the European and Inter-American HR 
systems have applied individual remedies to violations arising in armed conflict 
settings. In sum, while there is lack of evidence to establish that an obligation to afford 
reparation to victims exist under the rules of IHL (i.e. that the compensation provision in 
Article 3 of Hague IV or Article 91 of AP I apply to individuals), there is certainly no 
legal norm preventing direct reparation to victims. If a state commits an IWA by 
breaching an individual right under IHL, it becomes liable to afford effective remedies 
and adequate reparations directly to the victim. 
 
Not only is there lack of evidence to prove the existence of a ‘state-to-state only 
reparation norm,’ but such a rule would also be contrary to the right to reparation for 
victims recognised in HR law and ICL (both applicable during armed conflicts) and 
would be unsuitable in non-international armed conflicts – where states and non-states 
actors are equally bound by IHL rules. The claimed rule would leave victims of IHL 
violations by their state of nationality completely unprotected and other victims would 
depend on the political will and capability of states to bring claims on their behalf.  
 
Chapter 3 shows that the dominant view in contemporary literature is that an individual 
right to reparation exists for victims of IHL violations and that the traditional inter-state 
practice responds to policy considerations rather than legal norms. There are still many 
questions as to how to implement this right in practice, particularly in cases of mass 
atrocities. However, there are also important policy considerations against government-
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to-government negotiations. Political processes such as compensation treaties are 
generally imposed by the victorious states. In the past, these settlements have disregarded 
injuries suffered as a consequence of IHL violations in the vanquished countries. 
Individual claims, on the other hand, can help bring accountability and enforcement of 
international standards.  
Ignoring the evolution of international law since the end of WWII, particularly in the area 
of HR and IHL, seems a rather short-sighted approach. Victims of IHL violations will 
continue to look for remedies in international law. There is already practice of IHL 
reparation claims before HR mechanisms, before the ICC, and even before domestic 
courts to force representation by the state of nationality in diplomatic protection claims. 
A better strategy is to recognise the changes and the reasons why the transformation of 
international law occurred in the first place. Efforts should be focused on creating 
effective mechanisms to enforce individual rights that respond to the specific nature of 
IHL.  
 
Chapter 4: The Principles on Reparation 
 
In the same way as ILC Responsibility Articles, the Principles and Guidelines organise 
secondary rules of state responsibility aimed at the generalisation of international 
standards, albeit in regards to victims’ rights. 
 
The origins of the Principles and Guidelines date back to the end of the Cold War.  
Following the major geopolitical changes of the time, demands for criminal and 
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reparative justice became visible and vocal. It was against this background that Theo van 
Boven was appointed Special Rapporteur to study the right to restitution, compensation, 
and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of HR and fundamental freedoms, with a 
view to exploring the possibility of developing some basic principles and guidelines in 
this respect.956   
 
The study and the draft principles and guidelines as they evolved indicated that a new 
instrument was supposed to identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures, and methods 
for making existing legal obligations operational.957 Still, the drafting and adoption 
process stretched over fourteen years. In addition to a lack of strong political support on 
behalf of states, there was a shift of focus on the relevance of victim-related issues after 
the new Rapporteur, Cherif Bassiouni, submitted his report in 2000. The idea of a duty to 
repair historical wrongs tabled at the 2001 Durban Conference was a highly politicised 
issue that deeply divided states and that was relevant to the substance of the instrument. 
In addition, after September 11, the US lobbied for a complete separation of HR and IHL. 
Such a stringent approach was in obvious conflict with the latest version of the Principles 
and Guidelines, which included both types of violations. The idea of convergence 
between IHL and HRL, which was once popular, had become deeply problematic. The 
drafting process lingered in those years in order to avoid disruptive influences.  
 
                                               
956 The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1989/13 
(31 August 1989). 
957 See: the Preamble of the Principles and Guidelines (n 2). 
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Two elements were considered essential during the drafting of the instrument. First, the 
necessity to maintain the victims’ perspective on the structure and substance; and second, 
the capacity to reflect emerging concepts, as well as allow for progressive development. 
Based on these premises, it was deemed necessary to expand the scope of the draft to 
include all violations of HR and IHL. However, the modifications to the scope made the 
drafting, consultation, and adoption of the instrument more challenging.  
 
While the process was very inclusive of victims’ voices, broadening the scope of the 
instrument to include a less defined group of victims made the task more difficult. Van 
Boven seemed intent on creating an international instrument that could empower victims 
by reflecting their needs and wishes. Bassiouni went further. He proposed a victim-
oriented drafting methodology and framework: ‘[t]he Draft Guidelines intentionally 
adopted a victim-oriented perspective, organising principles from all legal sources not 
according to instruments and sources, but according to the needs and rights of victims’.958 
He used this rationale to expand the scope to all types of violations (not only 
gross/serious) and to include many new provisions, particularly in regards to IHL.  
 
During the negotiations, however, some delegations contended that many of the 
provisions in the Bassiouni draft (e.g. universal jurisdiction, the obligation to afford 
judicial remedies, and so on) did not apply to all violations of HR and certainly not to 
some (or none) of the violations of IHL. As a result, open-ended formulations were 
employed to keep these provisions in the text. For example, the drafting formula ‘where 
                                               
958 Report of First Consultative Meeting (n 670) [20].  
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so provided in an applicable treaty or contained in other international legal obligations’ 
was used for the principle on universal jurisdiction and the principle on statutes of 
limitations.  
 
During the last consultation, the scope was reduced once more to the most severe 
violations in order to keep IHL in the text. After all, this was an instrument dealing with 
the consequences of breach, and serious violations of IHL and HR both constitute 
international crimes and share the same legal consequences in regards to remedies and 
reparation. Unfortunately, at this point it was too late to reopen the debate on the clear 
application of some of the ‘contentious’ provisions to gross and serious violations. It was 
the last opportunity to adopt the instrument and participants decided to reach a 
compromise to keep these provisions in the instrument, even if they were a 
weaker/vaguer version (e.g. Principle 18 establishes that ‘in accordance with domestic 
and international law’ victims ‘should’ be provided with full and effective reparation 
when this principle is simply restating existing law and should not depend on internal 
law).   
 
One wonders whether the outcome of the Principles and Guidelines would have been 
clearer and stronger if the original scope had been maintained. As explained in the 
chapter, the IHL violations covered under the notion ‘serious violations of IHL’ as 
applied in the instrument would seem to be included in the notion of ‘gross human rights 
violations and fundamental freedoms’ that was the scope of the original project. It is easy 
to imagine that states would have been less reluctant to apply these principles and 
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guidelines to the most serious HR violations and fundamental freedoms than to all 
violations of HR and IHL. Regardless, its adoption marked a long and arduous effort 
seeking recognition of victim-oriented policies as part of international law. 
 
Notably, the UN General Assembly adopted the Principles and Guidelines without a vote.  
Thus, there is some basis to consider the text as declaratory of legal standards in the area 
of victims’ rights, particularly in regards to the provisions relating to the right to a 
remedy and reparation. Despite the questions raised on its legal status (e.g. Germany’s 
contention that the principles of state responsibility only apply to inter-state relations), 
the instrument reflects recent developments in this area of international law. Its 
underlying premise of applying principles of state responsibility to the relationship 
between individuals and states is consistent with current international law as confirmed 
by jurisprudence from the ICJ, the history and evolution of diplomatic protection, the ILC 
Responsibility Articles, IHL and HR conventions, and soft law instruments, as well as 
HR and ICL jurisprudence. All of these elements support the argument that state 
responsibility for reparation in favour of individuals has crystallised in international law. 
 
In addition the Principles and Guidelines have already been used as reference by 
international courts and tribunals, as well as by governments implementing reparation 
policies. The text is without a doubt an invaluable reference, being the only international 
instrument that classifies the norms, rules, and standards on the right to a remedy and 
reparation for victims of grave abuses and contains a detailed description of mechanisms, 
procedures and forms of adequate redress. 
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Unfortunately, despite the adoption of the Principles and Guidelines, there is still a long 
road ahead in terms of achieving victims’ full access to justice and other forms of 
reparation. Unsettled questions on the legal basis of an international right to a procedural 
remedy and its scope, continues to affect the implementation of the right to reparation in 
practice. The notion that state responsibility principles only apply to inter-state relations, 
or the notion that individuals might have a secondary right to reparation under 
international law but cannot exercise it without the intervention/mediation of states, are 
still influential. These arguments are sometimes reflected in domestic and international 
judicial decisions on reparations. They also inform political and judicial forums on 
related topics like enforcement of awards; the application of sovereign immunities; and 
liability of non-state actors.  
 
Even within the well-established system of HR tribunals and bodies, the lack of certainty 
surrounding the legal basis of the right to a remedy and reparation affects the 
implementation and enforcement of remedial judgments.959 Outside HR mechanisms (or 
other established international bodies awarding reparations like the ICC), victims of 
serious violations of HR and IHL have very limited opportunities to obtain access to 
justice and other forms of reparation. Although not explored in the present work, the lack 
of clarity regulating this right and its procedural scope undermines victims’ efforts at 
obtaining remedies in foreign or third state courts. Prospects of successful civil universal 
jurisdiction claims have been overshadowed by the application of immunities. The recent 
ICJ decision in Germany v Italy established that states are obliged under current CIL to 
                                               
959 See generally: Enforcement Report (n 40). 
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afford sovereign immunity to other states in their domestic courts (regardless of the 
gravity of the acts or the lack of alternative remedial avenues). The Court argued that it 
did not have to rule on the question of victims right to reparation960: ‘whether a State is 
entitled to immunity before the courts of another State is a question entirely separate from 
whether the international responsibility of that State is engaged and whether it has an 
obligation to make reparation.’961 It restated that immunities are merely a procedural bar 
that may be waived and may not be permanent.962 But in practice, the possibility of states 
waiving their immunity is pretty unlikely given the inherently political nature of serious 
HR and IHL violations. A change in state practice (denying immunities when heinous 
crimes are committed) is also improbable given how Italy’s “practice” was characterised 
as unlawful by the ICJ.963 For the time being, it seems that sovereign and diplomatic 
immunity will generally bar HR claims before third state courts, as well as before the 
courts of the state where the violations occurred (forum state) when the perpetrators are 
officials of another state or the state itself is being sued.964  
 
The ICJ ruling separating the question of victims’ right to access to justice from the 
states’ right (or obligation) to afford sovereign immunity seems artificial. There is a clear 
                                               
960 ‘[b]ecause immunity is upheld, no need to examine questions whether individuals are directly entitled to 
compensation for violation of IHL and whether states may validly waive the claims of their nationals in 
such cases’. Germany v Italy (n 25), [108].  
961 Germany v Italy (n 25), [100].  
962 Germany v Italy (n 25) [100]. 
963  ‘The Court can find no basis in the State practice from which customary international law is derived 
that international law makes the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent upon the existence of 
effective alternative means of securing redress’. Germany v Italy (n 25), [101]. 
964 See, for example, Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, Merits, App No 35763/97, ECHR 2001-XI; Jones and 
Others v The United Kingdom App nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06 (ECtHR, 14 January 2014). The ICJ 
established that even in criminal cases, diplomatic immunity would bar the jurisdiction against acting heads 
of governments and other officials such as the minister for foreign affairs. See: Arrest Warrant case (n 345)  
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interconnection between the two. As long as there is ambiguity on the legal basis and 
status of the accountability of states to redress individuals and the procedural dimensions 
of such obligation, it will be hard to clarify the relationship between remedies and 
immunities. It is crucial therefore to continue exploring this relationship. There are many 
questions unanswered and is important to address them.  
 
Another key challenge in this area of law, not specifically addressed in this thesis, is the 
relationship between the right to reparation and the accountability of non-state actors. 
While non-state actors have been involved in violence throughout history, the influence 
of armed groups has been rising exponentially in recent times.965 ‘By definition, at least 
half the belligerents in the most widespread and most victimizing of armed conflicts 
around the world, i.e. non-international armed conflicts, are non-state armed groups’.966 
As a result, there seems to be a growing consensus that non-state entities should be 
responsible to afford reparation to victims. But while is evident that more and more 
victims suffer from non-state violence, it is unclear how victims could claim reparation 
from non-state groups without the intervention of states. It may be tempting to apply the 
regime of secondary rules codified in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility to non-
state entities, but it is difficult to conceive an autonomous non-state actors’ obligation to 
afford remedies and reparations (a separate question all together is whether non-state 
responsibility for HR violations enhances the protection of HR in general).967 
                                               
965 R. Dudai ‘Closing the gap: symbolic reparations and armed groups’ (2011) 93 International Review of 
the Red Cross 783, 1 
966 M. Sassòli ‘Taking armed groups seriously: ways to improve their compliance with international 
humanitarian law’ (n. 487) p.6 
967 For a brief discussion of this topic, see: (n 711 and accompanying text 
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It is true that individual responsibility of perpetrators of international crimes to afford 
reparation has been established and recognised in the context of the ICC. However, this 
obligation directed to individuals (as opposed to states) under ICL is confined within the 
existing state-controlled legal framework. The ICC is a complementary mechanism that 
supplements states’ primary obligation to investigate and prosecute international crimes 
and to make perpetrators accountable for reparations to victims. Perpetrators have an 
obligation to afford reparations to victims under ICL. States have a duty to require that 
perpetrators afford these reparations. Secondary rules of state responsibility are not 
applicable in this scenario.968  
 
A separate question is that of non-state entities and the proposition to hold them 
accountable to afford reparations for HR and IHL violations. The UN has called upon 
armed organisations to respect HR law, and where violations or crimes occur, it has 
recognised that such groups have an obligation to provide reparations.969 However, it is 
questionable whether armed groups have the resources or capacity to fulfil HR 
obligations (and what are the type of HR obligations non-state entities can have). In 
practice, only states can hold these groups accountable to afford reparations. This duty 
therefore seems similar to the obligation of individuals charged with international crimes 
to afford reparations.  
                                               
968 Nonetheless, states might be responsible under the rules of attribution. See Chapter 3, section 3.D. 
969 See Darfur Report (n. 100) [600] [603]; UN Secretary - General, Report of the Secretary – General’s 
Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011 paras.188 and 419; and Human Rights 
Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 
A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012 p21 and 47. Cf Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict, 25 September 2009, A/HRC/12/48, p401-403.   
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However, while it is clear that under ICL states need to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes and if applicable punish perpetrators and make them liable to afford 
reparations to the victims, it is unclear if a duty to make collective entities award 
reparations exists in international law (or how can this duty be implemented in practice). 
On the other hand, there are sometimes claims for legitimacy/self-determination from 
these groups and the idea of confining the notion of reparations to a criminal/civil context 
is perceived as inadequate. This explains the desire to move the obligation to afford 
reparation to the “international” (state) level. Nevertheless, it is hard to conceive a right 
to access to justice against non-state entities. While (some) armed groups might share 
some of the same characteristics as states (e.g. collective entities, perhaps organised to a 
certain extent, and possibly exercising control over a territory), they are not legal entities 
and do not have the permanency of a state. Unless the non-state entity becomes the new 
government of a state, it seems rather difficult to apply secondary rules of reparation 
directly to these groups.  
 
The Principles and Guidelines recognise that non-state actors can be responsible to afford 
reparation to victims. Principle 15 establishes that where ‘a person, a legal person, or 
other entity is found liable for reparation for a victim, such party should provide 
reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided 
reparation to the victim.’970 This does not imply that the instrument acknowledges state 
responsibility as the legal basis for non-state liability to afford reparations. As van Boven 
                                               
970 Priciples and Guidelines (n. 2) 
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explained during the consultations: ‘It may be that HR law [has] not yet developed far 
enough on non-State responsibility, but, as the draft [is] not a treaty, it could reflect those 
emerging concepts as well.’971 Chapter 4 already explains that the Principles and 
Guidelines leave open the question of implementation of such duty. Are states obliged to 
afford a procedural remedy to implement such obligation? If such duty exists, is it based 
on rules of attribution or is there a universal (primary) obligation to afford procedural 
remedies (i.e. access to courts) to victims regardless of where the violations are 
committed and the nationality of the alleged perpetrator or victims?  
 
The conceptual and practical difficulties of this debate are vast. While this topic did not 
form part of the research conducted for the present study there are a series of questions 
asked throughout this thesis that have to do with the close relationship between non-state 
liability and state responsibility towards victims. After all, impugned actions by non-state 
actors rarely fall short of state involvement. What is the exact relationship between non-
state liability and states’ secondary obligations to afford remedies and reparation? There 
is no doubt that the question of non-state liability to afford reparations needs to be study 
further. However, there are legitimate concerns that undoing the HR notion based on state 
protection might have negative consequences for victims:  
“The alternative idea, claiming to be victim-oriented, that human rights 
should be understood in terms of the harm done, regardless of the character 
of the perpetrator, means that human rights as an idea will be 
indistinguishable from most kinds of serious crime or terrorism.”972 
 
There are many reasons why international law treats ‘private’ crimes differently from HR 
                                               
971 See n. 802 and accompanying text. 
972 Rodley, ‘Non- state actors and human rights’ (n 712) p 523 
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violations. While there is no space here to expand on this topic, there is one example 
mentioned earlier that shows how applying states ‘standards’ to non-state actors could 
result in less protection to victims. As advanced in Chapter 2, in cases of individual 
claims, domestic remedies need to be exhausted before the states’ international 
responsibility can be called into question. There is a primary obligation to afford 
remedies and reparation to individuals under HR law and there is a secondary obligation 
under international law when states fail to redress the violations in accordance with 
international standards. This notion is inherited from the law on state responsibility for 
injury to aliens, which is state centric. Can this be the case also for reparation claims 
against non-state entities? What are the non-states entities primary obligations (if any) 
and when are these primary obligations breached? In this scenario, only quasi-states 
groups/organised entities with a capacity to afford a system of ‘justice’ affording 
‘domestic’ remedies could be responsible under international law. Of course this scenario 
opens a whole set of new questions (e.g. would the same standard of effectiveness and 
adequate remedies under HR law apply?). 
 
One might argue however that states and therefore non-state actors can breach the 
international legal order directly (regardless of their capacity to afford domestic 
remedies). For example, in cases of massive and/or systematic violations is common to 
reason that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is not applicable because it is 
assumed that there are no effective remedies available (the state is unable or unwilling to 
prevent/redress the violations). It is therefore not necessary to exhaust them. But one can 
take the view that a state infringes international law directly when its intention is to 
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commit the violations (so-called ‘state crimes’). So when violations are massive and/or 
systematic the IWA materialises irrespective of domestic remedies. But even if arguing 
that states and therefore non-state actors can breach the international legal order directly, 
this scenario has several shortcomings. First, unless non-state groups have a system of 
‘domestic remedies’ in place, non-state entities would only be liable for reparations when 
committing massive and/or systematic violations. What would happen for example in 
isolated cases of torture committed by members of armed opposition groups? Second, 
without concurrent liability of a state(s), how can victims access procedural remedies to 
hold these non-state entities accountable? Finally, separating the procedural dimension of 
the right to reparation (effective remedies) from its substantive component (adequate 
reparations) does not seem to enhance HR protection.  
 
At first sight, it seems that moving beyond the regime of attribution is problematic. It is 
clearly necessary to explore this topic further. Perhaps states primary obligations to hold 
non-state actors responsible needs to be reinforced, or perhaps some form of a shared 
model of international responsibility between states and not state-actors can be 
implemented. What seems clear is that transporting the regime of secondary obligations 
under state responsibility principles to non-state actors accountability is inadequate.  
 
There are innumerable questions on non-state liability that need further study, but it is 
important to remember that:  
 
Despite the claim that non-state actors play today a major role in present-day armed 
conflicts, in the harsh reality of many conflicts states continue to play a major direct 
or indirect role, particularly if they are not allowed to hide behind the smokescreen 
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labels of “globalization”, “failed States” or “uncontrolled elements”. They are 
responsible, under the general rules on attribution of unlawful acts, much more often 
than they would wish.973 
 
Similarly, notwithstanding the recent progress of ICL, where individual criminal liability 
has been recognised for serious violations of HR and IHL as well as an obligation to 
afford reparation to the victims, the applicability of state responsibility principles to the 
relationship between states and individuals for states breaches of HR and IHL remains 
crucial for ensuring reparation for victims. As long as the international community 
continues to consist of sovereign states, it is of paramount importance to clarify the scope 
of the wrongful states’ secondary obligation towards individual victims.  
 
The present work confined its research to answer the question whether the Principles and 
Guidelines were correct in assuming that state responsibility is the basis of a CIL right to 
a remedy and reparation for individuals victims in cases of gross violations of HR and 
serious violations of IHL committed by states. It answered this query affirmatively. 
Despite some of the questions that have been raised on the legal status of the Principles 
and Guidelines, its underlying premise of applying principles of state responsibility to the 
relationship between individuals and states is consistent with current developments in 
international law. Injured individuals can invoke state responsibility directly under 
general international law for serious violations of HR and IHL that constitute IWAs. In 
principle, this can be done before established international mechanisms or before 
domestic courts. 
 
                                               
973 Sassòli, 'State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law' (n. 495), p. 433. 
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